Temporary Injunctions Cannot Compel Prejudgment Monetary Payments; CR 65.05 Bond Is Mandatory and Nonwaivable

Case: Ashley Caudill; Brittany Evans; Chase Fossitt; Cherry Wilson; Darwin Simpson; Djuana Ellis; Jill Herpy; and Timothy Poe v. Sanitation District No. 1 of Northern Kentucky ("SD1"); and Bray Construction Services, Inc.
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky (Not to Be Published)
Date: February 19, 2026
Posture: Review under RAP 20(F) of a Court of Appeals order granting interlocutory relief under RAP 20(B) dissolving a circuit court temporary injunction.

I. Introduction

This dispute arises from sewer-project excavation and trenching work at the Woodland Hills Condominium Complex in Campbell County. Eight condominium owners (the “Movants”) alleged that SD1 and its contractor, Bray Construction Services, Inc. (“Bray”), removed lateral and subjacent support, triggering slope movement and structural damage that rendered their units unsafe and effectively forced evacuations. The Movants sued for breach of contract; strict liability for failure to provide lateral and subjacent support; inverse condemnation; negligence/gross negligence/professional negligence; and trespass.

Seeking immediate relief, the Movants moved under CR 65.04 for a temporary injunction compelling the defendants to (among other things) provide comparable alternative housing and to pay ongoing expenses (mortgage, HOA fees, storage, and related costs). The Campbell Circuit Court granted a temporary injunction ordering SD1 and Bray to each pay $1,000 per month to each Movant (including “backpay”), but it did not set an injunction bond under CR 65.05.

On interlocutory review under RAP 20(B), the Court of Appeals dissolved the injunction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding monetary relief via a temporary injunction, that the order raised due process concerns, and that the failure to require a bond was independently fatal. The Movants then sought Supreme Court relief under RAP 20(F), which is available only upon a showing of “extraordinary cause.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the Movants’ RAP 20(F)(1) motion, vacated the circuit court’s June 5, 2025 temporary injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held:

  • No irreparable harm as defined by Kentucky injunction law where the alleged injuries are measurable by a “certain pecuniary standard” and recoverable as money damages if the plaintiffs prevail.
  • A temporary injunction may not be used to compel prejudgment monetary payments that function as compensatory damages before liability is adjudicated.
  • CR 65.05 requires a bond; the parties’ asserted agreement to delay/waive a bond did not excuse the rule’s mandatory requirement.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. The governing temporary-injunction framework

The Court grounded the injunction analysis in Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Ky. App. 1978), which describes three considerations: (1) compliance with CR 65.04 by showing irreparable injury (a “mandatory prerequisite”); (2) balancing of equities (public interest, harm to defendant, status quo); (3) whether a substantial question on the merits is presented. That structure echoed the circuit court’s reliance on Price v. Paintsville Tourism Comm'n, 261 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2014), for the familiar formulation that injunctive relief requires (among other things) irreparable harm and equitable propriety.

Because irreparable injury is a threshold requirement under Maupin v. Stansbury, the Court rejected the Movants’ complaint that the Court of Appeals addressed only irreparability: once irreparable harm fails, the remaining prongs need not be reached.

2. “Irreparable” harm is harm not measurable by a certain pecuniary standard

The core doctrinal move is the Court’s strict application of the pecuniary-measurement test from Cyprus Mountain Coal Corp. v. Brewer, 828 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Ky. 1992), which quotes United Carbon Co. v. Ramsey, 350 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1961), and states that harm is irreparable only if there is “no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of the damages.” The Court reinforced that injunctions generally do not lie where the legal remedy (money) is sufficient, citing Cyprus Mountain Coal Corp. v. Brewer, and added that even substantial economic burdens do not suffice, citing Norsworthy v. Kentucky Bd. of Med. Licensure, 330 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)).

Applying these authorities, the Court characterized the Movants’ injunction request as a request for compensatory, measurable expenses (relocation costs, mortgages/fees, storage). Because the alleged losses are quantifiable and recoverable if they prevail, the Court held that a “pecuniary standard exists,” defeating irreparable harm.

3. Historic property-destruction language did not authorize paying money by injunction

The circuit court and Movants relied on Henry v. Koch, 80 Ky. 391 (1882), to support irreparable harm. The Supreme Court distinguished it: Henry v. Koch involved an injunction stopping continuing dismantling of a home (a prohibitory/in-kind restraint), not an order compelling the defendant to pay living expenses or reimburse damages before adjudication. Thus, Henry v. Koch supported preventing ongoing physical harm, not converting a preliminary injunction into an interim damages award.

4. Out-of-state / federal district court authorities were not persuasive on these facts

The Court rejected analogies to eviction-prevention cases Dinter v. Miremami, 627 F. Supp. 3d 726 (E.D. Ky. 2022) and Ali v. Louisville Metro Housing Auth., 3:22-CV-463-CHB, 2023 WL 4564779 (W.D. Ky. July 17, 2023), noting they sought to prevent eviction (i.e., to restrain specific conduct), not compel interim payments of money damages.

The Court also distinguished Smith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 737 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Mich. 2010), as (i) Michigan-law based, and (ii) status-quo preserving because the insurer had already been voluntarily making alternative living expense payments under an insurance contract. The Court emphasized that Michigan’s preliminary-injunction framework (as described via Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007)) treats factors as balanced rather than a prerequisite-based system like Kentucky’s irreparable-harm threshold under Maupin v. Stansbury.

5. Due process concerns with prejudgment compelled payment

The Court endorsed the Court of Appeals’ due process concern and drew support from PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard, 407 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Ky. 2013), where this Court held a trial court lacked authority “to require a party to pay a demanded judgment into court in advance of an adjudication that he owes it.” While PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard arose in a writ posture, the Supreme Court treated its equitable/due-process warning as relevant: compelling money transfers that resemble damages before liability is adjudicated risks serious unfairness.

6. Extraordinary-cause review and abuse of discretion

Because the motion came under RAP 20(F)(1), the Movants had to show “extraordinary cause.” The Court invoked the high-burden line of cases: Chesley v. Abbott, 503 S.W.3d 148, 152 (Ky. 2016); Courier-Journal, Inc. v. Lawson, 307 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Ky. 2010); Kindred Hosps. Ltd. P'ship v. Lutrell, 190 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Ky. 2006). The Court acknowledged that an abuse of discretion can constitute extraordinary cause, citing Chesley v. Abbott and Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Ky. 2001), and defined abuse of discretion using Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). It then concluded the circuit court abused its discretion by (i) finding irreparable harm in essentially compensable monetary injuries, and (ii) failing to require a bond.

7. Bond requirement is mandatory; no party-waiver recognized

The Court treated CR 65.05(1) as mandatory: “No... temporary injunction shall be granted except upon the giving of a bond... in such sum as the court... deems proper....” It rejected the Movants’ contention that the parties agreed to delay a bond, stating the rule contains no waiver-by-agreement mechanism and the Movants offered no Kentucky authority allowing such waiver. This provided an additional, independent reason the circuit court’s injunction could not stand.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in a tightly sequenced way:

  1. Procedural gatekeeping: Under RAP 20(F)(1), the Court reviews only for “extraordinary cause,” and the movant bears an “enormous burden” (Chesley v. Abbott).
  2. Merits filter through “irreparable harm”: Under Maupin v. Stansbury, irreparable harm is mandatory. The Court applied Cyprus Mountain Coal Corp. v. Brewer to define irreparable harm as not measurable by a certain pecuniary standard.
  3. Characterization of the relief sought: Although framed as emergency relief, the order required monthly payments—functionally interim compensatory damages. Because the underlying alleged harms (relocation and expense burdens resulting from property damage) are quantifiable and remediable via final money judgment, irreparable harm was not established.
  4. Equity and due process: Even apart from irreparability, forcing payments before adjudication creates “serious due process concerns,” reinforced by PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard.
  5. Mandatory bond noncompliance: The circuit court’s failure to set a bond violated CR 65.05. The Court held parties cannot override that requirement by agreement.

C. Impact

Although designated “Not to Be Published,” the reasoning signals several practical constraints likely to shape injunction practice in Kentucky trial courts:

  • No “housing stipend” injunctions in tort/property-damage cases absent non-pecuniary irreparability: Plaintiffs facing displacement after alleged negligence may have strong equities, but if the relief is essentially reimbursement of measurable expenses, courts risk reversal for lack of irreparable harm.
  • Sharper line between “prevent further harm” and “pay for past/present harm”: The Court’s treatment of Henry v. Koch underscores that injunctions traditionally restrain harmful conduct or preserve property interests, not substitute for interim damages.
  • Heightened attention to due process when injunctions compel money transfers: The reliance on PremierTox 2.0 v. Miniard puts trial courts on notice that compelled prejudgment payments can be characterized as coerced satisfaction of an unadjudicated claim.
  • Bond practice is not optional: Litigants and judges must treat CR 65.05 as mandatory; attempting to “agree around” the bond requirement is unsafe.

The dissent, however, previews an ongoing doctrinal tension: whether “home loss,” threatened homelessness, and health risks should qualify as irreparable harm even when monetary losses are theoretically measurable. Future published cases could confront that policy conflict more directly.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Temporary injunction (CR 65.04): A short-term court order issued early in a case to prevent imminent harm while the lawsuit proceeds. In Kentucky, the movant must show “irreparable injury” as a threshold.
  • Irreparable injury: Harm that cannot be adequately fixed later with money damages. Kentucky often frames this as the absence of a “certain pecuniary standard” to measure damages (Cyprus Mountain Coal Corp. v. Brewer).
  • Interlocutory relief (RAP 20(B)): An appellate mechanism allowing a party to seek immediate review of certain non-final orders—here, an order granting a temporary injunction.
  • Extraordinary cause (RAP 20(F)): A heightened threshold for Supreme Court intervention in the interlocutory process; the movant’s burden is “enormous” (Chesley v. Abbott).
  • Injunction bond (CR 65.05): Security posted by the party who obtains the injunction to cover damages/costs if it turns out the injunction was wrongful. This opinion treats the bond as mandatory and not waivable by party agreement.
  • Lateral and subjacent support: Property-law doctrines requiring that land support adjacent land (lateral) and that the surface be supported by underlying strata (subjacent). Removing support can create strict-liability exposure.
  • Inverse condemnation: A claim that governmental action has taken or damaged private property for public use without just compensation (even if the government did not formally “condemn” the property).

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky left in place the Court of Appeals’ dissolution of a temporary injunction that required SD1 and Bray to make monthly payments to displaced condominium owners. The Court held that Kentucky injunction law requires irreparable harm—harm not measurable by a certain pecuniary standard—and that measurable relocation and carrying costs are ordinarily compensable via a final judgment, making interim compelled payments improper. The opinion further emphasizes due process concerns with prejudgment monetary compulsion and treats the CR 65.05 bond requirement as mandatory and not subject to waiver by party agreement. The dissent highlights a competing equitable intuition—protecting homeowners from homelessness and health risks—but the controlling holding draws a firm boundary: temporary injunctions are not a vehicle for interim compensatory payments in advance of adjudicated liability.