Date: Jun 2, 2026

Temporal Proximity Cannot Prove Retaliation Where Termination Was Already Contemplated; Pretext Evidence Cannot Substitute for Comparator Proof

1. Introduction

In Savannah Moton v. Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor Company (6th Cir. May 29, 2026) (unpublished), Savannah Moton, a Black recruiter working for Amer Sports’ subsidiary Arc'teryx, challenged her June 2022 termination as (i) race discrimination and (ii) retaliation for an internal discrimination complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to Amer on all claims, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The appeal turned on two recurring employment-law issues: (1) what evidence can satisfy the fourth element of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case for race discrimination when direct evidence is absent; and (2) whether “temporal proximity” alone can establish retaliation causation when performance-based termination had already been contemplated before the protected complaint.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Amer because Moton failed to establish a prima facie case for either:

Race discrimination: Moton offered no comparator (and no other evidence supplying the missing inference of differential treatment). Alleged inconsistencies about who participated in the termination decision did not create a triable inference of race discrimination.
Retaliation: Although Moton was terminated about five weeks after her internal complaint, Amer had already contemplated termination due to documented performance issues before the complaint. Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, temporal proximity alone was insufficient to show “but-for” causation on these facts.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Summary judgment standard

Home Depot, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 125 F.4th 769 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review and viewing evidence in the nonmovant’s favor. The court used this framework to assess whether Moton had produced evidence creating a genuine dispute on required prima facie elements.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): The governing standard—no genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law—anchored the court’s conclusion that Moton’s evidence could not carry her claims to trial.

Race discrimination: the McDonnell Douglas framework and comparator requirement

Smith v. City of Toledo, 13 F.4th 508 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)): Provided the four-part prima facie test used because Moton had no direct evidence. The panel applied the framework strictly and disposed of the claim at element (4): similarly situated non-protected employee treated more favorably.
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992): Used to confirm that Ohio discrimination claims under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A) follow the same framework as Title VII claims; thus, the federal analysis resolved the state claim as well.
Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited for the proposition that without evidence of a similarly situated comparator treated more favorably, a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case.
Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Emp. Servs., LLC, 732 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2013): Cited for the comparator standard (same job; subject to evaluation by same decisionmakers). The court used it to reject Moton’s attempt to excuse the absence of comparator evidence by claiming she could not identify decisionmakers.
Blount v. Stanley Eng'g Fastening, 55 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022): Cited to emphasize that comparator/replacement evidence is a standard way to supply the missing inference and that Moton could have pursued such evidence during discovery.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015): Quoted for the broader principle that a prima facie case can be shown by evidence permitting an inference that the challenged action was “more likely than not” based on a protected characteristic. The panel nonetheless held Moton’s proffered inference (confusion about decisionmaker) did not make race discrimination “more likely than not,” especially against the backdrop of documented performance problems.

Pretext, alleged dishonesty, and sequencing under McDonnell Douglas

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000): Used to explain that evidence an employer lied about its reason can support an inference of discrimination—but typically in combination with a prima facie case. The court read Reeves as reinforcing the sequence: prima facie case first; pretext analysis thereafter.
Coburn v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 238 F. App'x 112 (6th Cir. 2007): Cited alongside Reeves for the idea that lies can indicate pretext, but the panel treated this as irrelevant absent a prima facie showing.
Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App'x 478 (6th Cir. 2014): Invoked by Moton to argue that employer dishonesty can “buttress” a prima facie case. The panel limited Philbrick: such “buttressing” helps only if it supports the missing inference of differential treatment/replacement. Because uncertainty about who decided to fire Moton did not speak to race-based differential treatment, it did not help her meet element (4).

Retaliation: but-for causation and temporal proximity

Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2020): Supplied the prima facie retaliation test, including the crucial requirement that protected activity be the but-for cause of the adverse action. Amer conceded the first three elements; causation controlled.
Moody v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 183 N.E.3d 21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021): Cited to apply the same retaliation test to Ohio law claims, allowing the federal causation failure to defeat the state claim as well.
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam): The central causation precedent. The panel applied Breeden to hold that temporal proximity alone does not establish causation when the employer had “previously contemplated” the adverse action and merely proceeded along the same lines after the complaint.
Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2014): Used to refine the analysis of “previously contemplated” adverse action. The panel distinguished Montell because there the employer deviated from a performance-improvement timeline by firing immediately after the complaint; here, Amer investigated and terminated later for performance issues documented both before and after the complaint.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Race discrimination: the missing comparator and the limits of “decisionmaker confusion”

The court assumed (without deciding) Moton might satisfy the first three prima facie elements (protected class, adverse action, qualification), and focused on element (4): evidence that Amer treated a similarly situated non-protected employee more favorably.

Moton conceded she lacked comparator evidence, arguing she could not identify the final termination decisionmaker due to Amer’s discovery responses. The panel rejected this on practical and procedural grounds: Moton had tools during discovery (depositions, targeted questions, motions to compel, sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)-(4)) to pursue comparator and decisionmaker evidence but did not do so.

Moton’s alternative theory—asking the court to infer discrimination from inconsistent statements about who “played any role” in the termination decision—failed for two reasons:

Pretext sequencing: Even if inconsistency suggested pretext, the court treated pretext as a later-stage inquiry reached only after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Without element (4), pretext did not become material.
No race-linked inference: Confusion about decisionmaking roles did not show differential treatment by race. It did not identify a similarly situated non-Black recruiter who was treated better, nor show replacement by a non-Black employee. Thus, it did not make race discrimination “more likely than not” under Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc..

The court also emphasized Amer’s consistent record-supported explanation: performance deficiencies (communication, procedure-following, candidate quality). This undercut any attempt to treat the discovery inconsistency as evidence that the employer was lying about its substantive reason for termination.

(B) Retaliation: temporal proximity is not enough when termination was already in motion

On retaliation, the dispute narrowed to causation. Moton relied on timing: termination roughly five weeks after her internal complaint. The court applied Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden to hold timing alone cannot establish causation where the employer had already contemplated termination before the protected activity and then followed the same path afterward.

The panel pointed to evidence that before Moton complained: (i) performance concerns were raised months earlier (February); (ii) Brideau documented deficiencies to HR on May 9; and (iii) HR considered the “gaps in performance” serious enough that termination was a possibility (“straight to a termination” after discussion with the manager). Because those facts showed termination had been contemplated pre-complaint, the five-week proximity could not, by itself, satisfy “but-for” causation under Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc..

Moton’s attempt to analogize to Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc. failed because Amer did not abruptly deviate from a set improvement deadline immediately after the complaint; instead, it investigated the complaint and relied on continuing performance problems documented after the complaint as well.

3.3. Impact

Comparator evidence remains pivotal at the prima facie stage in the Sixth Circuit: This decision reinforces that, absent direct evidence, a plaintiff typically must produce evidence of differential treatment (or replacement) tied to similarly situated employees. Attempts to use generalized “suspicious circumstances” unconnected to race—such as internal uncertainty about decision roles—may be deemed insufficient to supply element (4).
Pretext allegations cannot “bootstrap” a missing prima facie element: The opinion draws a firm line between (i) evidence that supports the differential-treatment inference required for a prima facie case and (ii) evidence that merely attacks the employer’s credibility in the abstract.
Retaliation claims face heightened causation scrutiny where discipline predates the complaint: By applying Breeden, the panel underscores that temporal proximity is weak evidence when performance management and possible termination are already underway. Employers who document performance issues before a complaint—and proceed consistently afterward— are better positioned to defeat “but-for” causation at summary judgment.
Discovery diligence matters: The court’s discussion signals that plaintiffs who believe disclosures are evasive should use procedural mechanisms (e.g., motions to compel) rather than rely on gaps later as a basis for an inference of discrimination.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute over material facts requiring a jury trial, so one party wins as a matter of law.
Prima facie case (in discrimination/retaliation): The minimum set of elements a plaintiff must show to create an initial inference of unlawful conduct. If the plaintiff cannot meet these elements, the case can end without reaching later questions like pretext.
McDonnell Douglas framework: A burden-shifting method used when there is no direct evidence of discrimination. The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case; only then do questions about the employer’s stated reason and alleged pretext become central.
Comparator evidence / “similarly situated”: Evidence that another employee outside the protected class, with the same relevant job circumstances (including similar supervision/decisionmakers), was treated more favorably. This can support an inference that the plaintiff was treated worse because of a protected trait.
Pretext: The idea that an employer’s stated reason (e.g., poor performance) is not the true reason, but a cover for discrimination or retaliation.
Temporal proximity: The closeness in time between protected activity (like complaining about discrimination) and an adverse action (like firing). This may suggest causation, but the court emphasized it is not enough when the employer had already been considering the action.
But-for causation (retaliation): The plaintiff must show the adverse action would not have occurred but for the protected activity—not merely that the complaint was one factor among others.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms summary judgment by applying two practical limits on employment claims: (1) in race discrimination cases lacking direct evidence, uncertainty about internal decisionmaking roles does not replace the need for comparator/replacement evidence that supports an inference of race-based differential treatment; and (2) in retaliation cases, temporal proximity alone cannot establish but-for causation when the employer had already contemplated termination for documented performance reasons and proceeds consistently along that path after the complaint.

Although unpublished, the opinion functions as a cautionary guide for litigants: build the prima facie record with concrete, race- or retaliation-linked facts (often through comparator evidence and discovery enforcement), because generalized skepticism about employer process will not, by itself, carry a case past summary judgment.