Telecommuting as a Reasonable Accommodation Under NYSHRL: Essential-Function Limits, Undue Hardship, and Employee-Caused Breakdown of the Interactive Process

1. Introduction

In Briffa v New York State Dept. of Health (2026 NY Slip Op 02180 [248 AD3d 1462] [3d Dept Apr. 9, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed summary judgment for the New York State Department of Health (DOH), rejecting a disability-discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) based on the denial of a requested accommodation: at least three telecommuting days per week.

The plaintiff, Gerald E. Briffa, a senior attorney hired through the Governor’s disability-hiring program (Civil Service Law §§ 55-b, 55-c), had chronic fatigue syndrome and other ailments. Soon after starting, he requested multiple accommodations, including telecommuting “as much as possible,” but not less than three days per week. DOH granted two telecommuting days per week but denied a third, citing operational disruption and undue hardship because Briffa’s primary assignment involved reviewing paper-based, confidential applications that could not leave the office.

The case presented three recurring issues in modern accommodation disputes: (i) when telecommuting is “reasonable” under the NYSHRL; (ii) how “essential functions” and “undue hardship” are evaluated on summary judgment; and (iii) what constitutes a good-faith interactive process—and when an employee’s actions can be deemed the cause of its breakdown.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held that DOH was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The court concluded that:

• Briffa failed to show he could perform the essential functions of the job with the requested accommodation (a third telecommuting day), particularly given his own testimony that he “ideally” needed five telecommuting days to rest, nap, and meditate to remain “sharp,” and given that his principal assignment required on-site review of confidential paper applications.
• DOH demonstrated that granting a third telecommuting day would impose an undue hardship in light of the job’s operational requirements, Briffa’s training/supervision needs, and performance concerns.
• The record supported that DOH engaged in a good-faith interactive process: it sought medical documentation, provided multiple accommodations, supplied telecommuting policies and forms, and granted two telecommuting days. The “breakdown” occurred when Briffa resigned rather than reapply under a revised telecommuting policy.
• Briffa’s constructive discharge theory failed because the alleged conditions were not “so intolerable” that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign—especially where he resigned before the new policy took effect and after being told he could reapply.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Core NYSHRL accommodation framework

The court’s articulation of the governing NYSHRL accommodation rules draws heavily from Third Department and sister-department precedent:

• Matter of Vinikoff v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 83 AD3d 1159 (3d Dept 2011): cited for two key propositions—(i) the NYSHRL requires reasonable accommodation for a known disability, and (ii) the parties’ reciprocal good-faith obligations in the interactive process, including the rule that an employee who causes the breakdown may not recover.
  Influence here: The Third Department used Vinikoff to frame the interactive-process analysis and to assign responsibility for the process ending to Briffa, who resigned and did not reapply.
• Pimentel v Citibank, N.A., 29 AD3d 141 (1st Dept 2006), lv denied 7 NY3d 707 (2006): cited for the general accommodation duty and for the proposition that the employer’s record of investigating feasibility and giving “due consideration” supports summary judgment.
  Influence here: The court relied on Pimentel to validate DOH’s documented steps—seeking documentation, providing forms/policy, granting partial telecommuting, and offering a route (reapplication) under a changed policy.
• Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 154 AD3d 1214 (3d Dept 2017): cited repeatedly for (i) the definition of “reasonable accommodation,” (ii) the prima facie elements of denial-of-accommodation claims, and (iii) the summary-judgment principle that an employer generally cannot win without showing the absence of factual disputes about good-faith interactive consideration.
  Influence here: Graham functions as the opinion’s principal template: the court applies its prima facie test, its undue-hardship framing, and its interactive-process summary-judgment guidance.
• Matter of New Venture Gear Inc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 41 AD3d 1265 (4th Dept 2007): cited for the definition of a reasonable accommodation as one enabling performance without undue hardship.
  Influence here: Supports the conclusion that the accommodation must be workable for the job’s core duties—telecommuting cannot be “reasonable” if it prevents completion of the primary work or imposes undue hardship.
• Nordenstam v State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. of Envtl. Science & Forestry, 184 AD3d 1157 (4th Dept 2020): cited for the prima facie elements of a denial-of-accommodation claim.
  Influence here: Reinforces that the plaintiff must show ability to perform essential functions with the accommodation.

(b) “Essential functions” and how courts identify them

• Rodal v Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F3d 113 (2d Cir 2004): cited for the definition of essential functions as “fundamental duties” assessed under the “totality of the circumstances.”
  Influence here: The court used Rodal to justify a fact-sensitive inquiry and then anchored that inquiry in undisputed operational facts: paper confidentiality, inability to remove applications, training needs, full-time expectations, and backlog-reduction mission.
• Gill v Maul, 61 AD3d 1159 (3d Dept 2009): cited for a multi-factor test (employer judgment, written descriptions, time spent, consequences, CBA references, and experience of others) for determining whether a function is essential.
  Influence here: The decision uses Gill to elevate DOH’s operational realities (confidential paper workflow and on-site review) into “essential function” status and to support summary judgment where the plaintiff’s own testimony undermined his ability to do the job.

(c) Constructive discharge standards

• Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d 24 (2d Dept 2020): cited for the definition of constructive discharge—deliberately created “so intolerable” conditions that resignation is compelled.
  Influence here: The court used Golston-Green to measure Briffa’s complaints against an objective “reasonable person” standard and found them insufficient as a matter of law.
• White- Barnes v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 214 AD3d 1230 (3d Dept 2023): cited as additional authority on constructive discharge.
  Influence here: Supports the Third Department’s consistent approach that adverse workplace developments, without intolerable conditions, do not establish constructive discharge.
• Whidbee v Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F3d 62 (2d Cir 2000): cited for the requirement that the employer “intentionally” create the intolerable atmosphere; broad policy changes not directed at the employee typically do not satisfy intent.
  Influence here: The court relied on Whidbee to reject the idea that a department-wide telecommuting policy revision—prompted by abuse and not targeted at Briffa—constituted deliberate creation of intolerable conditions.

(d) Preservation and scope of claims

• Matter of Tomarken v State of New York, 100 AD3d 1072 (3d Dept 2012): cited (along with Graham) to hold that new theories raised on appeal are unpreserved where the complaint pleaded only denial of three days’ telecommuting.
  Influence here: The court cabined the case to the pleaded accommodation issue, rejecting attempts to expand it into break-time claims, reassignment claims, and evidentiary objections not framed as pleaded causes of action.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The prima facie structure and the decisive elements

Applying the familiar NYSHRL test (as stated in Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health), the court treated two elements as essentially dispositive: (1) whether Briffa could perform the job’s essential functions with the requested accommodation, and (2) whether DOH’s refusal was justified by undue hardship and supported by a good-faith interactive process.

(b) Essential functions: paper workflow and on-site review as the “fundamental duties”

The court accepted as “undisputed” several operational facts: Briffa’s position was full-time; he lacked health care law experience and needed training; he was hired to help reduce a 12-year backlog; and his primary assignment involved ALP applications that were paper documents containing confidential information that could not be removed from the office. Those facts drove the “essential function” conclusion: the primary work could not be performed remotely to the extent Briffa requested.

Notably, the court did not treat “telecommuting” as inherently unreasonable; rather, it treated this job’s physical-document review requirement and training/supervision needs as making additional telecommuting incompatible with the fundamental duties.

(c) Plaintiff’s own testimony as evidence negating capability with the requested accommodation

A critical feature of the reasoning is that Briffa’s deposition testimony undermined his assertion that three days of telecommuting would enable him to perform a full-time role. He testified he had not held full-time employment since the early 2000s, and described a need to rest and nap during the day, ideally requiring five telecommuting days. The court treated these statements as confirming he could not perform the essential full-time functions even with the requested accommodation.

Practically, the opinion illustrates how a plaintiff’s description of medical limitations—while relevant to disability status—can also become evidence on the separate question of functional capacity to perform essential duties with accommodation.

(d) Undue hardship: beyond preference, tied to operations, supervision, and performance

DOH’s undue-hardship showing was not framed as a generalized objection to remote work. The court emphasized specific operational constraints and performance considerations: while telecommuting, Briffa was shifted to electronically accessible work (certificate of need applications), but his supervisor averred he was slow compared to other attorneys; on-site, he was improperly reviewing the ALP applications; and he needed additional training and supervision. These points supported DOH’s conclusion that increasing telecommuting would disrupt operations and create undue hardship because it would further reduce his ability to do his major assigned task and complicate management of training and quality control.

(e) The interactive process: documented engagement, and employee-caused breakdown

The court’s interactive-process analysis is twofold:

1. Employer engagement: DOH requested medical documentation, granted a private office and equipment (lamp, ergonomic chair), provided telecommuting policy/forms, and granted two telecommuting days (plus later parking and an anti-fatigue mat). This record supported a finding of good-faith consideration.
2. Breakdown attribution: When Briffa learned of an impending telecommuting policy revision (including limits on probationary employees and reapplication requirements), he was told he would need to reapply. He resigned before the new policy took effect and “never reapplied.” Under Matter of Vinikoff v New York State Div. of Human Rights, the court held that Briffa’s resignation (without pursuing the next step) caused the breakdown, barring recovery on a failure-to-accommodate theory premised on a lack of interactive process.

(f) Constructive discharge: policy changes and disappointment are not “intolerable conditions”

The constructive discharge claim failed because the record did not show objectively intolerable conditions, nor deliberate creation of such conditions. The court highlighted Briffa’s own positive characterization of the job and coworkers, and treated the policy change as department-wide rather than personally targeted. The fact that Briffa resigned before the policy took effect—despite being told to reapply—made it especially difficult to attribute compulsion to the employer.

3.3 Impact

(a) Telecommuting requests under the NYSHRL will turn on job design and information governance

The opinion underscores that telecommuting disputes are often decided not at the level of general workplace flexibility, but at the level of workflow mechanics (paper vs. electronic access), confidentiality controls, and supervision/training demands. Employers with legitimate, documented information-handling constraints (e.g., sensitive paper files that cannot be removed) have a strong basis to argue that additional remote days may be unreasonable or impose undue hardship.

(b) Partial grants matter: incremental accommodations can support reasonableness and good faith

DOH’s provision of two telecommuting days (plus other aids) was central. This suggests that courts may view incremental or partial grants as evidence that an employer is not categorically resisting accommodation, but calibrating it to essential functions and operational needs—especially when the employee’s preferred schedule would reduce capacity to perform the primary task.

(c) Interactive-process breakdown doctrine has practical bite

The court’s reliance on the employee-caused breakdown principle (from Matter of Vinikoff v New York State Div. of Human Rights) is significant for future cases involving changing telecommuting policies. Where an employer provides a procedural path (such as reapplication) and the employee resigns or refuses to participate, courts may treat that refusal as fatal to interactive-process-based arguments.

(d) Constructive discharge remains a high bar—especially for neutral, department-wide policies

The decision reinforces that constructive discharge requires more than fear of future adverse action or disagreement with a neutral policy change. Plaintiffs will need evidence of deliberate, targeted creation of intolerable working conditions—not merely the implementation of stricter telecommuting rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable accommodation (NYSHRL)

A change or adjustment that allows a person with a disability to do the job in a reasonable manner, so long as it does not impose an “undue hardship” on the employer’s business.

Essential functions

The core, fundamental duties of the position—not minor or occasional tasks. Courts look at the overall reality of the job (how the work is actually done, the employer’s expectations, consequences of not doing the task, and similar employees’ work).

Undue hardship

A significant difficulty or disruption to business operations that would result from providing the accommodation. It is a fact-specific evaluation tied to the job and the workplace.

Interactive process

The back-and-forth exchange where employer and employee share information (often including medical documentation) and explore feasible accommodations. Both sides must act in good faith; if the employee ends the process (for example, by resigning rather than continuing), that can defeat the claim.

Constructive discharge

A legal theory treating a resignation as equivalent to a firing, but only when the employer deliberately makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to quit.

5. Conclusion

Briffa v New York State Dept. of Health clarifies and reinforces a practical rule for NYSHRL accommodation litigation: telecommuting is not assessed in the abstract, but against the essential functions of the particular job and the employer’s operational constraints. Where the primary work is on-site by necessity (e.g., confidential paper documents) and the record shows training/supervision needs and performance concerns, an employer may deny additional telecommuting as an undue hardship—especially after granting partial telecommuting and other accommodations.

The decision further emphasizes that the interactive process is reciprocal: an employee who resigns rather than pursuing available accommodation procedures may be deemed to have caused the breakdown, undermining failure-to-accommodate claims. Finally, it reaffirms the demanding nature of constructive discharge, particularly when the alleged pressure to resign stems from neutral, department-wide policy changes rather than targeted mistreatment.