Date: May 9, 2025

Suspending Parenting Time Requires Substantial Evidence and Non-Delegable, Court-Set Visitation Parameters—With Needed Evaluations and (Typically) a Lincoln Hearing When a Child’s Aversion Lacks a Clear Record Basis

I. Introduction

Matter of Melissa H. v Jordan G. (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 8, 2025) addresses when a Family Court may suspend a noncustodial parent’s parenting time based on a child’s anxiety and refusal to visit. The parties are unwed parents of a child born in 2013. Under a January 2020 order, the mother had legal custody and primary placement, and the father had regular parenting time that was conditioned on his participation in the child’s diabetes-related medical care, with potential expansion upon compliance.

After a contentious October 2021 exchange in which the child resisted going with the father and ran back to the mother’s home, regular visitation ceased. The mother sought modification, and a temporary public-place schedule was ordered but did not occur. The father filed an enforcement petition alleging the mother failed to share medical appointment information required by the prior order.

Following fact-finding, Family Court granted the mother sole physical placement and suspended the father’s parenting time, while stating parenting time would occur “solely in a therapeutic/counseling setting” without a schedule. The court dismissed the father’s enforcement petition. The father appealed, challenging—among other things—the suspension of parenting time.

Key issues included: (1) whether the record contained “compelling reasons and substantial evidence” that visitation was detrimental; (2) whether Family Court’s factual misstatements undermined its best-interests ruling; and (3) whether the court should have developed the record through a psychological/forensic evaluation and a Lincoln hearing given the unclear cause of the child’s asserted PTSD and anxiety.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held that Family Court erred in suspending the father’s parenting time. Although the mother established a change in circumstances sufficient to trigger a best-interests inquiry, the appellate court found the suspension lacked a “sound and substantial basis in the record.” The court emphasized multiple problems:

Family Court’s order repeatedly misstated testimony and relied on those misstatements.
The record did not adequately explain the cause of the child’s PTSD/anxiety related to the father, and a contemplated forensic evaluation never occurred.
Given the evidentiary gap, the failure to conduct a Lincoln hearing—after it was discussed and initially scheduled—was error absent an on-record determination that it “may do more harm than good.”

The Third Department modified the order by reversing the suspension of parenting time (and the restriction on the father’s ability to seek modification), and remitted for updated fact-finding and a best-interests determination specifying whether parenting time would be detrimental and, if not, what structured parenting-time arrangement (therapeutic, supervised, or unsupervised) should be ordered, including amount, duration, location, and relationship-supporting provisions.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Threshold to modify: change in circumstances

The father conceded that the mother met the change-in-circumstances threshold, allowing the court to proceed directly to best interests. The Third Department cited:

Matter of Matthew TT. v Erin TT. (change in circumstances warrants best-interests inquiry).
Matter of Harvey P. v Contrena Q. (same framework).

2. Best-interests factors and deference to Family Court—when supported

The opinion restated the multi-factor best-interests analysis for modifying visitation:

Matter of Nathan PP. v Angela PP. (home environments, stability, willingness to foster other-parent relationship, past performance, fitness, ability to meet emotional/intellectual needs).
Matter of Devin W. v Jessica X. (same best-interests considerations).

It also reiterated the usual appellate deference to credibility and factfinding—but only when the outcome has a sound and substantial basis:

Matter of Kyle I. v Kandice K. (deference principle and “sound and substantial basis” standard).

Here, the appellate court found the deference principle did not save the order because the factual predicates were misstated and the record was underdeveloped on the claimed detriment.

3. Visitation is presumptively beneficial; suspension requires detriment and the court must not abdicate its role

The Third Department framed a central rule: healthy and meaningful relationships with both parents are generally in a child’s best interests, and courts must structure access unless visitation is inimical to welfare:

Matter of Cecelia BB. v Frank CC. (general best-interest principle favoring meaningful relationships; warning against delegation that can function as indefinite denial).
Matter of Henry CC. v Antoinette DD. (same general proposition).
Matter of Ellen TT. v Parvaz UU. (unless visitation is inimical, court must structure frequent and regular access; court cannot delegate visitation decisions to parent or child).
Matter of Jessica HH. v Sean HH. (reinforces non-delegation and the need for a court-structured schedule).
Matter of Paul JJ. v Heather JJ. (delegation can become a de facto indefinite denial without requisite detriment showing).

Although Family Court nominally allowed “therapeutic/counseling” parenting time, it did not set a schedule and tied access to a therapeutic process that—per the therapist—was outside her scope (“reunification is out of [her] scope of practice”). The Third Department’s discussion of non-delegation principles underscores that visitation cannot be effectively suspended indefinitely by leaving the pathway to resumption undefined or contingent on third-party processes without court-ordered parameters.

4. Appellate reversal where the record lacks substantial support

The Third Department relied on prior reversals to justify intervention:

Matter of Nicole TT. v David UU. (reversal where custodial determination lacked sound and substantial basis; cited for remittal approach and standard).
Matter of Rosenkrans v Rosenkrans (similarly supports reversal where the record does not substantiate the Family Court’s conclusion).

5. Lincoln hearings are preferred practice; omission must be justified, especially where the child’s position is pivotal and causation is unclear

The Third Department emphasized that while Lincoln hearings are not mandatory in every case, they are the preferred practice and their absence can be error if not explained on the record:

Matter of Lorimer v Lorimer (Lincoln hearings are the “preferred practice”).
Matter of Mary Ellen H. v Joseph H. (failure to conduct Lincoln hearing problematic; court should assess on-record whether it “may do more harm than good”).
Matter of Merwin v Merwin (quoted for “may do more harm than good”; also used as a comparator showing when omission may be justified).

In this case, the court initially agreed a Lincoln hearing was necessary; the father’s counsel later withdrew the request, but the mother had sought one and the evidentiary gap remained. The Third Department’s point is institutional: where the child’s aversion is central and adult testimony does not provide clarity, the court must either conduct a Lincoln hearing or explain, on the record, why it is not doing so.

6. Suspension requires “compelling reasons and substantial evidence” that visitation is detrimental

The opinion re-centered the high bar for suspending parenting time:

Matter of Laware v Baldwin (visitation curtailment/suspension requires “compelling reasons and substantial evidence” of detriment).

7. Remittal for updated fact-finding and specific visitation terms

Given the passage of time and incomplete record development, the court remitted, citing:

Matter of Shirreece AA. v Matthew BB. (remittal for updated fact-finding when time has passed and record needs development).
Matter of Theressa M. v Gaddiel M. (on remittal, Family Court must promptly determine detriment and, if not detrimental, specify type/amount/duration/location and other relationship-promoting provisions such as phone/video contact).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core deficiency: lack of reliable, record-supported proof of detriment

The Third Department did not dispute that the child experienced anxiety and that visitation had broken down. It focused instead on whether the extreme remedy—suspension—was justified by evidence showing that parenting time would be detrimental. The record problem was twofold:

Causation remained unclear. The therapist’s PTSD diagnosis relied on a trauma assessment listing “several things,” with only one referencing the father (“threatened [the child’s] family”). Yet the therapist had not progressed to the narrative portion of therapy and could not provide specifics; and later fact-finding did not supply corroborating detail.
Proof was unstable or indirect. Some claimed events at the father’s home were introduced largely through the mother’s testimony and were characterized by the appellate court as largely hearsay. The order’s factual foundation therefore did not rise to the “substantial evidence” required for a suspension.

2. Erroneous fact recitations undermined “sound and substantial basis” review

Appellate deference is premised on accurate factfinding. The Third Department found Family Court’s order “repeatedly misstates testimony” and then relies on those misstatements. A highlighted example was the court’s claim that self-harm was a stress reaction caused by the father’s parenting time, when testimony showed self-harming behaviors began about five months after parenting time ceased. The court also attributed to the therapist statements the therapist did not make (including an alleged threat to “beat her ass,” alleged knowledge about a “transition object,” and alleged opposition to third-party presence).

These errors mattered because the court’s chosen remedy—suspension and “therapeutic only” access—depended on the severity and timing of harm. If the factual narrative is wrong, the proportionality of the remedy collapses.

3. The court should have used tools to develop the record: evaluation and Lincoln hearing

The Third Department expressed particular concern that Family Court suspended parenting time without ordering a full psychological evaluation despite repeatedly signaling it required expert input before cutting off the relationship. An off-the-record conference preceded an agreement to obtain a full forensic evaluation, yet none occurred. Against that backdrop, the failure to complete the evaluation left a gap precisely where the court needed reliable evidence.

Similarly, once a Lincoln hearing was raised as “necessary” and scheduled, its disappearance from the process—without argument or on-record justification—was inconsistent with the “preferred practice” of hearing from a child in a developmentally appropriate and protected setting when the child’s wishes and fears are central and causation is disputed.

4. Remedy: remittal with directives to specify a structured parenting-time plan

Rather than impose a final visitation schedule itself, the Third Department remitted given the passage of time and the need for updated fact-finding. Importantly, the appellate court instructed Family Court to make determinations that are often missing from “therapeutic visitation” orders:

Promptly decide whether parenting time would be detrimental.
If not detrimental, specify the type (therapeutic/supervised/unsupervised), amount, duration, and location.
Consider a graduated schedule and non-physical contact (phone/video/written communication) to promote a meaningful relationship.
If therapeutic visitation is chosen, use an appropriate professional specializing in family therapy.

This reflects an underlying principle: courts must craft workable and enforceable visitation terms, not merely express aspirations conditioned on uncertain therapeutic developments.

C. Impact

This decision is likely to influence future parenting-time modification litigation in several practical ways:

Stronger record requirements for suspensions. Parties seeking to suspend parenting time based on a child’s anxiety, PTSD, or refusal should expect close scrutiny of whether the record contains specific, competent evidence linking the noncustodial parent to harm and showing that visitation is detrimental—not merely stressful, conflicted, or resisted.
Pressure to complete evaluations when mental health is central. Where diagnoses like PTSD are invoked but the factual basis is undeveloped, courts may be expected to order and complete psychological/forensic evaluations rather than decide on an incomplete or hearsay-laden record.
Lincoln hearing practice will be policed procedurally. If a child’s aversion is pivotal and the court does not hold a Lincoln hearing, the decision suggests that the court should articulate an on-record reason—especially when previously scheduled or requested—addressing whether the hearing “may do more harm than good.”
“Therapeutic visitation” must be operationalized. Orders that condition parenting time on counseling without specifying logistics may be vulnerable as de facto suspensions or improper delegation. The decision emphasizes that Family Court must determine the schedule and supporting provisions, not outsource the practical decision of whether contact happens.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Change in circumstances: Before changing an existing custody/visitation order, the court must find that something significant has changed since the prior order. Only then does the court re-evaluate what arrangement is in the child’s best interests.
Best interests of the child: A holistic standard assessing stability, each parent’s fitness and past performance, home environments, and willingness to support the child’s relationship with the other parent, among other factors.
Sound and substantial basis in the record: The appellate standard asking whether the Family Court’s decision is supported by credible, reliable evidence in the hearing record. Misstating testimony or relying on speculation can defeat this support.
Visitation “inimical” or “detrimental” to welfare: A high threshold: visitation must be shown to harm the child’s welfare (not merely cause discomfort or conflict) before a court may severely restrict or suspend parenting time.
Lincoln hearing: A private, in-camera interview of the child by the judge (with counsel typically not present), designed to hear the child’s views while reducing pressure and protecting the child from parental conflict. It is “preferred practice” in many contested custody/visitation matters, though not mandatory in every case.
Therapeutic visitation: Parenting time occurring in a therapeutic setting, often to rebuild a strained parent-child relationship. Courts must still set clear parameters (frequency, duration, who supervises, and goals), and the professional involved must have appropriate expertise—particularly where “reunification” work is contemplated.
Forensic/psychological evaluation: An assessment by a qualified mental health professional to help the court understand family dynamics, the child’s mental health, and how contact with each parent may affect the child—especially important when mental health diagnoses are used to justify severe visitation restrictions.

V. Conclusion

Matter of Melissa H. v Jordan G. reinforces that suspending a parent’s parenting time is an extraordinary remedy requiring “compelling reasons and substantial evidence” of detriment. Where a child’s anxiety or PTSD is asserted but the factual basis is unclear, the court should not rely on misstated testimony, conclusions without supporting facts, or an incomplete record. Instead, the court should develop the evidentiary foundation—often through psychological/forensic evaluation and, as the “preferred practice,” a Lincoln hearing (or an on-record explanation for not holding one)—and then craft a specific, enforceable parenting-time structure that promotes a healthy and meaningful parent-child relationship unless contact is truly detrimental.