“Suppress” Means Illegally Obtained Evidence: Improper Prosecution Appeals Do Not Toll Colorado’s Statutory Speedy-Trial Clock

I. Introduction

In Phillips v. People, 2026 CO 21, 586 P.3d 1102 (Colo. 2026), the Colorado Supreme Court enforced the “bedrock” presumption of innocence through the statutory speedy-trial mechanism, holding that the People could not toll the speedy-trial deadline by filing a pretrial appeal that was not legally authorized as an interlocutory appeal.

The petitioner, Khristina Phillips, was prosecuted in county court on charges of child abuse (permitting children to be placed in a threatening situation) and operating a childcare facility without a license. The core evidentiary dispute involved a recorded police-station interview in which Phillips described her son’s sexualized behavior. After a first, proper suppression dispute and appeal, the prosecution attempted a second “interlocutory” appeal when the county court excluded the interview video under the Colorado Rules of Evidence (CRE 401 and CRE 403) as cumulative, irrelevant in part, and unfairly prejudicial.

The key issue before the Supreme Court was narrow but consequential: under § 18-1-405(6)(b), C.R.S. (2025), does the People’s second pretrial appeal qualify as an “interlocutory appeal” that tolls the statutory speedy-trial deadline? The answer turned on whether the prosecution’s assertion that the appeal was authorized had “arguable merit” under People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the People’s second pretrial appeal was not an interlocutory appeal for purposes of the speedy-trial tolling provision because the People’s claim of authorization under Crim. P. 37.1(a) lacked arguable merit. The county court’s ruling was an evidentiary exclusion under CRE 401–403, not a “suppression” order in the criminal-law sense. Because tolling did not apply, Phillips’s § 18-1-405(1) six-month deadline expired, requiring dismissal.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded with instructions that the county court vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Speedy-trial purpose and constitutional backdrop

  • Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)): cited to frame the speedy-trial right’s systemic functions—preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, reducing anxiety, and protecting the defense from impairment. Although the case concerns the statutory right, the Court used Betterman/Marion to underscore why tolling rules must not be expanded by creative labeling.

2. Colorado’s statutory speedy-trial framework and compliance burden

  • People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68 (quoting People v. Rosas, 2020 CO 22): Lucy supplied interpretive guideposts—de novo review, the statute as a mechanism to effectuate the constitutional right, and the trial court/prosecution burden to make a record demonstrating compliance.
  • Marquez v. Dist. Ct., 613 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1980): reinforced that the trial court must create “a record sufficient” to permit appellate determination of statutory compliance.

3. The decisive test: what counts as an “interlocutory appeal” for tolling

  • People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997): provided the controlling definition and “good faith” test for interlocutory-appeal tolling under § 18-1-405(6)(b). Under Gallegos, an appeal is taken in good faith only if (1) the assertion that the appeal is authorized has arguable merit, (2) it is not taken for delay, and (3) the issues have a substantial effect on the prosecution’s case. The Phillips Court resolved the case on prong (1).

4. Meaning of “suppress” and limits on prosecution interlocutory appeals

  • People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986): central to the Court’s reasoning that interlocutory suppression appeals do not encompass ordinary evidentiary admissibility questions “not constitutional in character.” Bowers also served as a bridge between the rules governing prosecution appeals (C.A.R. 4.1(a)) and county-court interlocutory appeals (Crim. P. 37.1(a)).
  • People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380 (Colo. 1997); Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197 (Colo. 2001); People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831 (Colo. 2009): cited for the proposition that suppression is generally reserved for constitutional violations; statutory errors do not “ordinarily require suppression.” These cases anchored the Court’s insistence that “suppress” is a term of art in criminal practice.
  • People v. Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1983) (quoting People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1978)): warned prosecutors may not “piggyback” evidentiary issues onto authorized interlocutory appeals to obtain pretrial review of ordinary evidentiary decisions. Phillips effectively applies that anti-piggyback principle in the county-court interlocutory-appeal setting.
  • People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001): summarized the proper domain of interlocutory suppression appeals (unlawful search and seizure, involuntary confession or admission, or improperly ordered/unsupported nontestimonial identification), supporting the Court’s conclusion that CRE 401–403 exclusions are outside that domain.
  • People v Sapp, 934 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1997); Tate v. People, 2012 CO 75; People v. Zhuk, 239 P.3d 437 (Colo. 2010): exemplified how Crim. P. 37.1(a) has been used in practice—interlocutory appeals tied to Miranda/unlawful seizure/constitutional suppression issues—not mere evidentiary disputes.

5. Interpretive constraints: avoiding absurd results and reading rules like statutes

  • McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44: supplied the Court’s “absurd results” guardrail; accepting the People’s reading would functionally allow interlocutory appeals from any adverse evidentiary ruling, effectively giving prosecutors a “blank check” to toll speedy trial.
  • People v. Angel, 2012 CO 34: supported the methodology of construing criminal procedural rules using principles of statutory interpretation.
  • Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M: rejected as inapposite; the Court refused to import a casual civil-case usage of “suppress” to redefine the term in criminal motions practice.
  • Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20 (Colo. 2006): cited for the standard of review (de novo) when assessing application of precedent.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The statutory mechanism: dismissal is mandatory when the clock runs

The Court began with the architecture of § 18-1-405. Under § 18-1-405(1), trial must begin within six months of the not-guilty plea. If not, the statute requires dismissal and bars reprosecution for the same offense(s) arising from the episode. While certain provisions allow extensions, § 18-1-405(6)(b) excludes (“tolls”) time only for delay caused by an interlocutory appeal.

2. Gallegos controls: “interlocutory” for tolling depends on good-faith authorization with arguable merit

Because the statute does not define “interlocutory appeal,” the Court applied People v. Gallegos. The Court treated “arguable merit” as the gatekeeping question: if the appeal is not plausibly authorized, it is not “interlocutory” for tolling even if filed pretrial and even if it disrupts the proceedings.

3. Why the People’s claimed authorization lacked arguable merit

The People relied on Crim. P. 37.1(a), which authorizes county-to-district interlocutory appeals from rulings granting motions “to suppress evidence” (and related categories) with certification requirements. The Court rejected the attempt to recharacterize the county court’s ruling as “suppression”:

  • “Suppress” is a term of art in criminal practice: it means excluding evidence because it was illegally obtained, typically in violation of constitutional protections. The Court cited Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of a “motion to suppress” and relied on People v. Bowers and related cases to confirm suppression’s constitutional character.
  • The record foreclosed any suppression characterization: the county judge stated repeatedly that he was not suppressing the video. He was excluding it under CRE 401, 402, and 403 as cumulative, partly irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial (with concerns about confusion, delay, and wasted time).
  • Structural consequence (absurd results): if “suppress” were treated as synonymous with “exclude,” then virtually any pretrial evidentiary ruling could be appealed, enabling routine tolling and undermining the statute’s function—an outcome the Court refused under McCoy v. People.

4. The Court’s use of C.A.R. 4.1(a): harmonizing interlocutory-appeal limits

The People argued that differences between Crim. P. 37.1(a) and C.A.R. 4.1(a) implied broader county-court appeal authority. The Court rejected that inference, emphasizing the substantive alignment of Crim. P. 37.1(a) with the suppression/return-of-property/confession categories reflected in the rules referenced by C.A.R. 4.1(a). Rather than expanding Crim. P. 37.1(a), C.A.R. 4.1(a) reinforced the conclusion that interlocutory suppression appeals are not vehicles for CRE-based admissibility disputes.

5. Disposition: no tolling, speedy-trial violation, dismissal with prejudice

Because the People failed Gallegos’s “arguable merit” prong, the Court held the second appeal was not “interlocutory” for § 18-1-405(6)(b). Without tolling, the speedy-trial deadline expired (a fact the parties did not dispute). The mandatory remedy under the statute followed: vacatur of conviction and dismissal with prejudice.

C. Impact

  • Bright-line guidance on “suppression” vs. evidentiary exclusion: Prosecutors cannot transform CRE 401–403 (or other admissibility) rulings into “suppression” orders to obtain interlocutory review under Crim. P. 37.1(a).
  • Strengthened protection against speedy-trial erosion: The decision prevents tolling based on unauthorized pretrial appeals, ensuring § 18-1-405 remains an effective enforcement tool rather than a deadline that can be paused by relabeling.
  • Operational consequences for trial practice: The opinion incentivizes earlier resolution of exhibit disputes (especially lengthy recordings), discouraging last-minute attempts to litigate admissibility through appellate interruption.
  • Future litigation focus: Expect disputes to center on the Gallegos “arguable merit” prong—particularly whether a prosecution appeal fits within the narrow categories of authorized interlocutory review—and on careful record-making by trial courts stating whether a ruling is suppression (illegality/constitutional) or evidentiary (CRE).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory speedy trial (§ 18-1-405) vs. constitutional speedy trial
Colorado’s statute sets a concrete deadline (six months from the not-guilty plea) and supplies an automatic remedy (dismissal with prejudice if violated). The constitutional right is broader and more flexible; the statute is designed to help enforce it.
Tolling vs. extension
An extension lengthens the allowed time under specified circumstances; tolling stops the clock for a defined period that is excluded from the calculation. Here, tolling was claimed under § 18-1-405(6)(b) for an “interlocutory appeal.”
Interlocutory appeal
A pretrial appeal taken before final judgment. Because it disrupts ongoing proceedings, Colorado limits when it is allowed. For speedy-trial tolling, it must meet the People v. Gallegos good-faith criteria, including “arguable merit” that the appeal is legally authorized.
“Suppress” (term of art) vs. “exclude” (evidentiary ruling)
Suppress generally means barring evidence because it was obtained illegally (often violating constitutional protections, such as Miranda/Fifth Amendment issues). Exclude can mean keeping evidence out because it fails evidentiary rules (e.g., irrelevant under CRE 401, or unfairly prejudicial under CRE 403). Phillips holds these are not interchangeable for interlocutory-appeal purposes under Crim. P. 37.1(a).
CRE 401 and CRE 403
CRE 401 addresses relevance; CRE 403 allows a judge to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, delay, or waste of time—classic trial-management and fairness considerations, not “suppression.”
Miranda and custody (background to the first appeal)
A Miranda advisement is required for custodial interrogation. The county court initially suppressed part of the interview on a Miranda theory, and the People’s first interlocutory appeal was treated as proper. The second appeal, by contrast, did not involve illegality in obtaining evidence.

V. Conclusion

Phillips v. People establishes a clear rule with practical force: for speedy-trial tolling under § 18-1-405(6)(b), a prosecution pretrial appeal counts as “interlocutory” only if the claimed authorization has arguable merit under People v. Gallegos. An order excluding evidence under CRE 401–403 is not a “suppression” order within Crim. P. 37.1(a), and prosecutors may not use interlocutory appeals to obtain pretrial review of ordinary evidentiary rulings.

The remedy underscores the statute’s teeth: when an unauthorized appeal improperly pauses trial and the deadline expires, the conviction must be vacated and the case dismissed with prejudice. In broader context, the opinion reaffirms that speedy-trial protections are not technicalities—they are core safeguards that operationalize the presumption of innocence.