Summons Misnomer Does Not Rewrite Party Identity: Counties Remain Non-Immune When Only the County Is Sued in Michigan Tax-Foreclosure Takings Litigation

Introduction

Judy Flumerfelt; Frances Ridenour; Anthony Hamilton; Holly Hamilton (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought a multi-defendant suit arising out of Michigan’s delinquent-tax foreclosure regime. As relevant to this interlocutory appeal, they alleged that their properties were foreclosed through the statutory process and then transferred in a manner that deprived them of surplus value—framed as constitutional violations and an inverse-condemnation claim.

The appeal, taken by Eric Sabree and captioned as involving the Wayne County, Michigan Treasurer, presented a narrow Eleventh Amendment question: whether sovereign immunity barred the claims. The Sixth Circuit, however, treated a different issue as dispositive and logically antecedent: who was actually sued—Wayne County, or the Wayne County Treasurer?

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity, but for a clarifying reason: the operative complaint sued Wayne County, not the Wayne County Treasurer. Because counties generally do not receive Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, immunity for the Treasurer (as a potential “arm of the State” in certain contexts) was irrelevant.

The court emphasized that a mistaken summons label and an erroneous docket entry cannot override the complaint’s caption and allegations, and it rejected what it characterized as procedural “gamesmanship” attempting to substitute the Treasurer as defendant to obtain immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Bowles v. Sabree, No. 22-1912, 2024 WL 1550833 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2024)
    Role in the decision: Bowles supplied the substantive Eleventh Amendment framework for Michigan tax-foreclosure claims: a county treasurer may be an “arm of the State” when “complying with state mandates” in conducting foreclosures, but the county itself is not immune where its participation is voluntary (i.e., the county elects to act as the foreclosing governmental unit). Here, once the panel determined that only Wayne County was sued, Bowles effectively compelled the conclusion that sovereign immunity does not apply.
  • Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015)
    Role in the decision: Cited for the general rule that counties are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment, while recognizing the “multiple hats” possibility—local officials sometimes act on behalf of the State.
  • Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
    Role in the decision: Reinforced the core distinction between states (immune) and local governmental entities (generally not immune), which undergirds the panel’s conclusion once Wayne County is identified as the defendant.
  • Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999)
    Role in the decision: Provided the “arm of the State” concept and the no-discretion/mandated-action rationale used in Bowles; relevant here to show why the Treasurer’s immunity arguments matter only if the Treasurer is actually the defendant.
  • Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005), and McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960)
    Role in the decision: Established the “master of the complaint” principle: plaintiffs choose whom to sue. This anchored the court’s refusal to let a summons/docket error rewrite party identity.
  • Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1991)
    Role in the decision: Used to explain waiver/preservation: Wayne County did not object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Wayne County was the defendant, which reinforced that later efforts to relitigate party identity were procedurally infirm.
  • Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)
    Role in the decision: Cited to distinguish individual-capacity and official-capacity suits and to illustrate why “Wayne County” and “Treasurer in official capacity” are not always interchangeable, particularly when jurisdictional and notice consequences follow.
  • Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30 (2021)
    Role in the decision: A modern statement of Eleventh Amendment basics (states are generally immune), serving as the doctrinal gateway.
  • Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth. of Ga., 723 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2013), and Tennessee v. Dep't of Educ., 104 F.4th 577 (6th Cir. 2024)
    Role in the decision: Defined the interlocutory posture and limited appellate jurisdiction to the collateral sovereign-immunity question; also supported de novo review and affirmance on any record-supported ground.
  • Fox v. Saginaw County, No. 21-1108, 2022 WL 523023 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022)
    Role in the decision: Reinforced that county defendants in Michigan General Property Tax Act foreclosure litigation generally are not “arms of the State.”
  • R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
    Role in the decision: Part of the procedural background explaining why the state inverse-condemnation claim moved in and out of abstention; the Sixth Circuit declined to reach that issue on this interlocutory appeal.
  • Lowe v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs., 610 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2010), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)
    Role in the decision: Limited the court’s ability to decide additional questions (no pendent appellate jurisdiction) beyond sovereign immunity.
  • Hall v. Meisner, 51 F.4th 185 (6th Cir. 2022)
    Role in the decision: Mentioned in briefing as supporting that “the County alone is responsible” in this Michigan tax-foreclosure taking context; the panel’s analysis aligned with the county-centered approach by clarifying that Wayne County is the defendant here.
  • Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010), and Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1990)
    Role in the decision: Used in a cautionary footnote about party-identification and amendment/substitution consequences; supported the broader theme that rules should facilitate merits resolution where notice exists, while acknowledging plaintiffs can lose when they truly sue the wrong entity.

Legal Reasoning

  1. The court treated “who is the defendant?” as a threshold issue.
    Sovereign immunity analysis depends on the identity and status of the sued entity. The panel therefore began not with “arm of the State” factors, but with basic pleading and party-identification rules.
  2. The operative complaint controlled.
    The caption and allegations identified “County of Wayne (‘Wayne County’)” as the defendant. The Treasurer was never named as a defendant in the complaint’s party section or claim statements. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), the caption is “instructive,” and the body confirmed the same defendant identity.
  3. A summons misnomer and docket error could not “trump” the complaint.
    The court explained that a summons is a notice/jurisdiction tool (service), not the instrument that defines parties; defects in process/service must be timely raised. The Treasurer/County did not pursue Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4)-(5) defenses and instead litigated merits—undercutting later reliance on the summons label.
  4. Waiver/preservation principles supported finality on party identity.
    The magistrate judge found that “Plaintiffs sue[d] Wayne County,” and Wayne County did not specifically object, implicating Willis v. Sullivan preservation rules.
  5. Once Wayne County was identified as the defendant, Bowles resolved immunity.
    Wayne County is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because its participation in the foreclosure scheme is “voluntary” (the county elects to foreclose). Even if the Treasurer might be immune when sued for state-mandated foreclosure conduct, that was beside the point because he was not sued.
  6. The court refused to expand the interlocutory appeal.
    The panel declined to address supplemental jurisdiction over the state inverse-condemnation claim (and other merits issues) because the collateral-order appeal permitted review only of sovereign immunity.

Impact

  • Procedural clarity in immunity-driven litigation: The decision signals that defendants cannot convert a county suit into an “arm of the State” suit through clerical artifacts (summons/docket) after litigating as though the county is the party.
  • Reinforcement of complaint primacy: Especially in cases where immunity can be dispositive, the panel emphasized precision and respect for plaintiffs’ party choices, limiting courts’ and litigants’ ability to “substitute” defendants without appropriate procedural mechanisms.
  • Practical consequence for Michigan tax-foreclosure cases: Plaintiffs who sue the county (rather than the treasurer) may avoid the sovereign-immunity barrier recognized in Bowles v. Sabree for treasurers performing state-mandated foreclosure steps. The opinion thus heightens the importance of defendant selection and of promptly correcting clerical service documents without altering substantive party choices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: A doctrine that generally prevents states (and certain “arms of the state”) from being sued in federal court without consent. Counties are usually not treated as the state.
  • “Arm of the State” / “multiple hats”: Some local officials sometimes act for the state (immune) and other times for the local government (not immune). In Michigan foreclosures, a treasurer following state-mandated steps may be treated as acting for the state; the county’s choice to participate can still be treated as local action.
  • Master of the complaint: Plaintiffs decide whom to sue; courts and opposing parties generally cannot rewrite that choice based on external paperwork mistakes.
  • Summons vs. complaint: The complaint identifies the parties and claims; the summons is a formal notice used to serve the already-named defendant. A mislabeled summons can be a service defect, but it does not automatically change who the defendant is.
  • Interlocutory appeal (collateral order): A limited early appeal. Here it allowed review of sovereign immunity only, not the merits of remaining state-law issues.
  • Pullman abstention: A federal court sometimes pauses a constitutional case to allow state-law issues to be resolved first, potentially avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s central move was procedural but outcome-determinative: it reaffirmed that Wayne County—not the Wayne County Treasurer—was the named defendant, and it rejected attempts to leverage clerical errors to recast the suit into one that might trigger Eleventh Amendment protection. With party identity settled, the immunity question followed established circuit law: under Bowles v. Sabree and related precedents, counties do not receive sovereign immunity in this setting because their participation in Michigan’s foreclosure regime is voluntary rather than state-compelled. The opinion’s broader significance lies in its insistence on disciplined civil-procedure fundamentals—complaint primacy, waiver of service defenses, and the limited scope of interlocutory review—especially where sovereign immunity defenses invite strategic relabeling of parties.