Summary Judgment in Title-Contested Trespass Requires Deraignment of Title; Unchallenged Summary-Judgment Findings Are Not Binding on Appeal

I. Introduction

In ATC Makena N Golf LLC v. Kaiama (Haw. June 25, 2026), the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed a trespass-and-nuisance action brought by a group of related entities (collectively, “ATC Makena”) against self-represented defendant Azizi Kaiama concerning a large Makena-area parcel acquired by ATC Makena at a foreclosure auction.

Two issues reached the court on certiorari from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA):

  1. Whether the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to ATC Makena on trespass/nuisance claims when Kaiama disputed ATC Makena’s ownership of two small “Piena Parcels” located within the larger tract.
  2. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing HRCP Rule 37 attorney-fee sanctions after granting ATC Makena’s motion to compel discovery.

The court affirmed the discovery sanction but held summary judgment was improperly granted as to the Piena Parcels because ATC Makena’s evidence revealed a substantial, unexplained break in the chain of title from the original awardee/grantee (Piena) to a later purported successor (Kapeka).

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Summary judgment: Vacated in relevant part. The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether and how Kapeka acquired any ownership interest from Piena before conveying in 1901; therefore, ATC Makena did not eliminate factual dispute on the required showing of title for relief akin to ejectment when title is contested in a trespass action.
  • Discovery sanctions: Affirmed. The HRCP Rule 37 fee award of $5,067.67 was within the circuit court’s discretion where ATC Makena documented meet-and-confer efforts, Kaiama offered no substantial justification for deficient responses, and she did not meaningfully challenge the reasonableness of the amount.
  • Appellate review point: The court corrected the ICA’s approach to “unchallenged findings” in the summary judgment context, emphasizing that findings tied to summary judgment are not binding on appeal under Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards governing summary judgment

  • Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State — Provided the governing standard of review (de novo) and, critically, the rule that “findings of fact made by a trial court in relation to a summary judgment ruling are not binding on appeal.” The court used this to reject the ICA’s reliance on the “unchallenged findings are binding” principle in the summary-judgment setting and to explain why the ICA’s approach (based on Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply) was misplaced here.
  • Gima v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu — Supplied the definition of “material” fact: one that could establish or refute an essential element. The “missing link” between Piena and Kapeka was material because it went to ATC Makena’s ability to prove ownership and right to possession.
  • Nuuanu Valley Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu — Reinforced the requirement to view evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; doing so magnified the significance of the near 50-year gap in the asserted chain of title.

2. Trespass where title is disputed; ejectment-like burden and “strength of title”

  • Gomes v. Perry — Cited for the core nature of trespass as interference with possession; it set up the court’s transition to the heightened proof required once title is contested.
  • Mew Kung Tung v. Wong Ka Mau — The key doctrinal bridge: when title is in issue in a trespass action, the action becomes similar to ejectment and the plaintiff bears the burden to prove title. This principle drove the court’s insistence that ATC Makena’s summary judgment showing had to establish (without genuine dispute) a legally cognizable chain of ownership to the Piena Parcels.
  • Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi — Reiterated ejectment requirements: plaintiff must prove ownership and right to possession, and that possession is unlawfully withheld. This case anchored the court’s conclusion that “ownership” (and thus deraignment of title) was a necessary element once Kaiama challenged title.
  • State v. Magoon, State v. Midkiff, and Carter v. Kaikainahaole — Used to restate that the plaintiff must prove ownership, title and right of possession, and unlawful withholding. Midkiff also supplied the maxim that the plaintiff must prevail on the strength of its own title.
  • Fong Hing v. Yamaoka — Quoted via Midkiff to emphasize the “strength of own title” rule, which foreclosed any attempt to win simply because Kaiama’s position might be weak; the gap in ATC Makena’s proof was dispositive at the summary judgment stage.

3. What constitutes legally cognizable private title in Hawaiʻi

  • Omerod v. Heirs of Kaheananui — Provided the court’s formulation that private title traces to a recognized government act (e.g., Land Commission Award, Royal Patent, Grant, Royal Patent Grant). The court used it to frame what ATC Makena needed to show: not merely that Piena received an LCA/RPG, but how ATC Makena derived title from that original source.
  • State by Kobayashi v. Zimring, Thurston v. Bishop, In re Title of Pa Pelekane, and Rose v. Yoshimura — Cited within Omerod to emphasize Hawaiʻi’s historic land-title architecture and the proposition that events like the Māhele or an application for award did not themselves convey title. These authorities supported the court’s insistence on a demonstrable legal transfer path from the original awardee/grantee to later claimants.

4. Appellate treatment of “unchallenged findings” in summary judgment

  • Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply — The ICA relied on its general rule that unchallenged findings are binding. The Supreme Court clarified that, under Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State, that principle does not control in the summary judgment context because appellate review is de novo and trial-level “findings” do not alter that standard.

5. Discovery sanctions under HRCP Rule 37

  • Fujimoto v. Au and Wong v. City and County of Honolulu — Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for HRCP Rule 37 sanctions. The court applied that deferential lens and upheld the fee award.
  • Erum v. Llego — Cited for liberal construction of self-represented filings to promote access to justice. The court applied this approach to understand Kaiama’s arguments, but it did not immunize her from procedural obligations (including discovery compliance) or from fee-shifting sanctions when Rule 37’s conditions were met.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the “gap” in the Piena Parcels chain of title defeated summary judgment

ATC Makena’s summary judgment showing depended heavily on a declarant’s title research stating that Piena received the relevant Royal Patent Grant and Land Commission Award in the 1850s, and that a 1901 deed reflected conveyance by “Kapeka” (described as Piena’s “kaikamahine ponoi”). But the same declaration also stated: “No conveyances appear of record by PIENA dealing with the subject lands, likewise, there is no probate proceeding of this estate.”

The court treated Kaiama’s title challenge as triggering ejectment-like requirements within the trespass action (per Mew Kung Tung v. Wong Ka Mau and Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi), placing on ATC Makena the burden to prove its own title and right of possession. Under de novo review, and with inferences drawn in Kaiama’s favor, the record supported a reasonable inference that Kapeka’s authority or ownership interest was not established by admissible evidence explaining how the property interest passed from Piena to Kapeka across nearly five decades.

The key doctrinal move is that a plaintiff cannot win a title-contested possession dispute by pointing to a later “chain” beginning with a purported successor; it must show the legal link from the original awardee/grantee. The court thus held the unexplained transfer—despite evidence of a later deed—created a genuine issue of material fact as to deraignment of title, making summary judgment improper “as it relates to the Piena Parcels.”

2. Correction of the ICA’s approach to findings in a summary judgment appeal

The ICA characterized the circuit court as finding ATC Makena’s title “to the subject property” continuous and unbroken and treated unchallenged findings as binding, citing Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply. The Supreme Court made two clarifications:

  1. The circuit court’s wording was narrower (continuous and unbroken “from PIENA’s daughter, KAPEKA, to Plaintiffs”), and did not establish continuity from Piena to Kapeka.
  2. Under Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State, trial-court findings accompanying summary judgment do not bind appellate courts because summary judgment review is de novo; therefore, the “unchallenged findings” shortcut is doctrinally inapt in this posture.

3. Why the discovery sanction was upheld

HRCP Rule 37(a)(4)(A) directs that, when a motion to compel is granted, the court “shall” award reasonable expenses including attorney’s fees unless the movant failed to meet-and-confer, the nondisclosure was substantially justified, or other circumstances make the award unjust. The record reflected documented meet-and-confer efforts, deficient responses, and no substantial justification. Kaiama was afforded an opportunity to be heard and did not meaningfully contest the reasonableness of the amount. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard (per Fujimoto v. Au and Wong v. City and County of Honolulu), the sanction was affirmed.

C. Impact

1. Heightened practical burden at summary judgment when title is contested within trespass/ejectment-like claims

The decision underscores that plaintiffs seeking possession-based relief (even if styled as trespass/nuisance) must be prepared to prove a coherent, legally explained chain of title when the defendant places ownership at issue. Title insurance conclusions (e.g., “title is insurable”) or later deeds may be insufficient if the record contains a material gap concerning how an intermediate grantor acquired the interest conveyed.

2. Title disputes involving smaller kuleana-type parcels within larger tracts

The dispute centered on two small parcels embedded within a much larger parcel acquired at foreclosure. The ruling highlights a recurring Hawaiʻi land-tenure reality: a larger TMK parcel may contain historically granted subparcels, and litigation may require parcel-specific proof of deraignment. Future plaintiffs should anticipate that a defendant’s targeted challenge to “inholdings” can defeat broad-brush summary judgment even if ownership of surrounding acreage is undisputed.

3. Appellate practice: no reliance on “unchallenged findings” to uphold summary judgment

By applying Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State to the ICA’s reasoning, the opinion reinforces for litigants and appellate courts that summary judgment stands or falls on the de novo record, not on whether an appellant precisely “challenges” each enumerated finding. This reduces the risk that summary judgment will be insulated by formalistic briefing defaults when the record itself shows a genuine dispute of material fact.

4. Self-represented litigants: liberal construction, not exemption

The court’s invocation of Erum v. Llego signals continued openness to construing pro se arguments generously, but the sanction holding confirms that pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with discovery obligations or shield a party from mandatory fee-shifting provisions in HRCP Rule 37 when prerequisites are satisfied.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment (HRCP Rule 56)
A pretrial ruling where the court decides a claim without a trial only if there is no genuine dispute about facts that matter and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law.
Genuine issue of material fact
A real factual dispute about something important enough to affect the outcome—here, whether Kapeka actually acquired an ownership interest from Piena before conveying in 1901.
Deraignment of title
Showing the legal “chain” of ownership transfers from an original recognized source of title to the present claimant, with an explanation for each link. If there is an unexplained missing link, title is disputed.
Trespass vs. ejectment (when title is disputed)
Trespass usually concerns interference with possession. But if the defendant disputes the plaintiff’s ownership, the plaintiff must prove title and right to possession much like in an ejectment action.
Land Commission Award (LCA), Royal Patent (RP), Royal Patent Grant (RPG)
Historical government acts used in Hawaiʻi to confer private title. Proving an LCA/RP/RPG to an ancestor is not enough by itself; a modern claimant must show how the interest legally passed forward to them.
HRCP Rule 37 discovery sanctions
When a party’s failure to provide proper discovery forces the other side to file a motion to compel, the court generally must order the noncompliant party to pay the reasonable expenses of that motion unless specific exceptions apply.

V. Conclusion

ATC Makena N Golf LLC v. Kaiama delivers two principal takeaways. First, when title is challenged within a trespass action, plaintiffs must be prepared—especially at summary judgment—to prove the strength of their own title with an explained and supported chain from the original government award/grant to the present; an unexplained multi-decade gap raises a genuine issue of material fact that defeats summary judgment. Second, trial courts retain broad discretion to enforce discovery through HRCP Rule 37, and self-represented status does not prevent a fee sanction where noncompliance lacks substantial justification.