Sudden Tire Failures and No‑Evidence Summary Judgment in Texas Negligence Law: Commentary on Lozada v. Posada

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam decision in Osvanis Lozada and TELS, Inc. v. Cesar R. Posada, No. 23‑1015 (Tex. June 20, 2025). The Court reversed a divided court of appeals and reinstated no‑evidence summary judgments for a truck driver and his employer after a serious tractor‑trailer collision on Interstate 10.

At its core, the decision clarifies a set of interlocking principles in Texas negligence and procedural law:

  • That the mere occurrence of an accident—here, a jackknifed tractor‑trailer after a sudden tire failure— is not, by itself, evidence of negligence.
  • That a plaintiff facing a properly filed no‑evidence motion for summary judgment must produce at least a scintilla of evidence of breach (and, if challenged, causation), even where the defendant asserts theories such as “unavoidable accident” or “excuse.”
  • That uncontroverted deposition testimony from an interested witness can support summary judgment, even when that witness is the defendant.
  • That negligence per se in Texas continues to require proof of an unexcused statutory violation, and that the burden to negate “unavoidable accident” and “excuse” falls on the plaintiff—not the defendant.

The opinion is particularly significant for transportation and personal‑injury litigation involving alleged mechanical failures (such as tire blowouts) and for the practical use of no‑evidence summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i).

II. Case Background

A. The Parties and the Collision

The case arises from a pre‑dawn collision between two commercial tractor‑trailers on Interstate 10. Petitioner Osvanis Lozada was driving a tractor‑trailer for his employer, petitioner TELS, Inc., traveling west from Houston in foggy, cold conditions. Respondent Cesar Posada was also operating a tractor‑trailer on the same stretch of highway.

According to Lozada’s deposition (which is the only substantive evidence in the summary‑judgment record), he was driving in the left lane of I‑10 at approximately 72 mph—under the posted speed limit—when his right front tire suddenly and rapidly lost air:

The tire “separated from the rim” and “started losing air very fast,” which pulled the truck sharply to the right and caused the rig to jackknife across both lanes.

Lozada testified that the tire appeared to be in good condition before the trip and was “new.” In the process of losing control, he did not strike any other vehicles. His rig, however, came to rest across both lanes of the interstate. Before he could move it, Posada’s truck collided with Lozada’s vehicle.

B. Claims and Defenses

Posada sued in El Paso County, alleging:

  • Common‑law negligence against Lozada.
  • Negligence per se based on alleged violations of the Texas Transportation Code.
  • Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) against TELS, Inc., based on Lozada’s conduct in the course and scope of his employment.

In their answers, Lozada and TELS:

  • Generally denied the allegations, and
  • Asserted that the accident was an “unavoidable accident” and that any statutory violation was “excused.”

C. Discovery and Summary Judgment Motions

Discovery included the depositions of both drivers. After discovery, Lozada filed a no‑evidence motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), asserting there was no evidence of:

  • Any breach of an applicable standard of care; or
  • Proximate causation linking Lozada’s conduct to Posada’s injuries.

TELS, whose liability was entirely derivative of Lozada’s alleged negligence, filed its own no‑evidence motion.

Posada’s response was extremely limited. He offered:

  • Excerpts of Lozada’s deposition testimony; and
  • Two photographs of the accident scene (showing tractor‑trailers after the collision).

The trial court excluded other evidence that Posada attempted to submit, and Posada did not challenge those exclusions on appeal. Thus, the appellate record was confined to Lozada’s deposition and two photographs. Posada expressly disclaimed reliance on res ipsa loquitur, stating that the case did not present a situation in which negligence is presumed from the mere occurrence of injury.

The trial court granted the no‑evidence motions in favor of both Lozada and TELS and denied Posada’s motions for new trial.

D. Court of Appeals Decision

A divided El Paso Court of Appeals reversed. The majority held:

  • A reasonable jury could find that Lozada breached his duty of ordinary care in operating his truck, because his vehicle ended up fully blocking both lanes of I‑10.
  • A reasonable jury could also find proximate cause, since but for Lozada’s truck blocking both lanes, the collision would not have occurred.
  • TELS’s summary judgment, based on the absence of vicarious liability, must therefore also be reversed.

The dissenting justice would have affirmed the trial court, reasoning that:

  • The mere position of Lozada’s jackknifed truck did not constitute more than a scintilla of evidence of negligent conduct.
  • Posada had failed to offer evidence that Lozada could have avoided the collision by fulfilling his duties as a driver.
  • Posada simply failed to present controverting evidence; based on the actual record, there was no evidence that a reasonably prudent driver in Lozada’s position would have produced a different result.

Lozada and TELS petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Texas, without hearing oral argument, granted the petition for review, reversed the court of appeals, and reinstated the trial court’s take‑nothing judgment in favor of Lozada and TELS. The Court held:

  1. Posada failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence that Lozada breached his duty of care, either under common‑law negligence or negligence per se.
  2. The mere fact that Lozada’s truck jackknifed and came to rest across both lanes of the highway, following a sudden and unexpected tire failure, did not itself constitute evidence of negligence.
  3. Lozada’s uncontroverted deposition testimony—which Posada himself placed into the summary‑judgment record— established only a non‑negligent account of a sudden, unforeseeable tire failure and loss of control. With no contrary evidence, there was no fact issue for a jury.
  4. Posada, as plaintiff, bore the burden at trial to show:
    • That his injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident, and
    • That any statutory violations were unexcused (a necessary element of negligence per se).
    Those are plaintiff’s burdens; defendants were not obligated to establish “unavoidable accident” or “excuse” through a traditional (evidence‑based) motion for summary judgment. A no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i) was appropriate.
  5. Because the Court found no evidence of breach, it did not reach proximate cause. Without underlying tortious conduct by Lozada, TELS could not be vicariously liable as a matter of law.

The Court anchored its reasoning in established no‑evidence summary judgment standards, Texas Transportation Code provisions on driver conduct, prior case law on unavoidable accident and negligence per se, and the Restatements’ treatment of tire blowouts and vehicular accidents.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal and Procedural Framework

1. No‑Evidence Summary Judgment and the “More Than a Scintilla” Standard

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i) allows a party, after adequate time for discovery, to move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the non‑movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.

The Court relies on King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003), and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997), to restate the governing standard:

A no‑evidence motion will be sustained when:
  1. there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact;
  2. the court is barred from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;
  3. the evidence offered is no more than a mere scintilla; or
  4. the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.

Key definitions from King Ranch:

  • Less than a scintilla: Evidence so weak that it creates only a “mere surmise or suspicion” of a vital fact (Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).
  • More than a scintilla: Evidence that “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair‑minded people to differ in their conclusions.”

Because Posada bore the burden of proving negligence and negligence per se at trial, Lozada and TELS were permitted to file no‑evidence motions targeting the elements of breach and proximate cause.

2. Negligence Elements and Transportation Code Duties

Negligence in Texas requires proof of four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Nabors Drilling, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009).

The Court recognizes that Lozada owed a common‑law duty to act as a reasonably prudent person toward others on the road, citing Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. 1998).

Posada also invoked specific statutory duties from the Texas Transportation Code:

  • Speed and special hazards: Section 545.351(a) and (c)(5) provide that a driver:
    • may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, and
    • must reduce speed when special hazards exist (including weather or roadway conditions).
  • Stopping/parking on a roadway: Section 545.303(a) provides that an operator who stops or parks on a two‑way roadway shall do so with the right‑hand wheels within 18 inches of the right‑hand curb or edge of the roadway.

Posada’s theory was that Lozada breached his duty of ordinary care and these statutory duties (supporting negligence per se) by:

  • Driving at 72 mph in foggy conditions;
  • Failing to slow further or adjust to the weather;
  • Allegedly “over‑correcting” when the tire failed; and
  • Allowing his truck to jackknife and block both lanes of traffic.

The Supreme Court’s central task was to determine whether the limited summary‑judgment record contained more than a scintilla of evidence that Lozada’s conduct fell below that required by a reasonably prudent commercial driver or violated the relevant statutes without excuse.

B. The Court’s Treatment of Duty and Breach

1. “Accidents Happen” – Porterfield v. Brinegar

The Court emphasizes a fundamental negligence principle: accidents, standing alone, do not prove negligence. Citing Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1986), the opinion observes:

“Accidents happen when something has gone wrong, but not all accidents are evidence of negligence.”

This sets the tone: the question is not whether the outcome was bad or whether “something went wrong,” but whether there is evidence that Lozada did something that a reasonably prudent person would not have done, or failed to do something that a reasonably prudent person would have done, under the same circumstances.

Applying this, the Court notes:

  • Lozada was driving under the speed limit.
  • Weather conditions were foggy and cold, but not shown to be extreme beyond that.
  • The right front tire—described as new and in good apparent condition—suddenly and rapidly lost air.
  • The sudden loss of air pulled the truck right, and Lozada’s attempt to control the rig led to a jackknife.
  • Despite losing control, Lozada did not strike any other vehicles; the jackknifed rig ended up blocking both lanes before Posada’s collision.

Critically, the Court underscores the absence of any additional circumstances suggesting that Lozada’s responses to the sudden tire failure were negligent.

2. No Evidence of Unreasonable Speed or Improper Response

Posada argued that Lozada’s speed (72 mph in fog) and alleged “over‑correction” provided evidence of breach. The Court rejects this, emphasizing the lack of comparative or expert evidence:

  • No evidence of what speed would have been “reasonable and prudent” under the specific fog and road conditions (as required to show a violation of § 545.351(a), (c)(5)).
  • No evidence that a reasonably prudent commercial driver, confronted with a sudden right‑front tire deflation at highway speed, would or could have reacted differently to avoid jackknifing.
  • No evidence that Lozada had time or ability to move the truck off the roadway or comply with § 545.303(a) (right wheels within 18 inches of the curb) before Posada’s impact.

The Court aligns with the court of appeals dissent: one cannot simply infer breach from the fact that the truck is found jackknifed across two lanes after an unforeseen tire failure. Something more—such as evidence of prior tire defects, failure to inspect, excessive speed contrary to policy or expert opinion, or improper maneuvers—would be needed.

3. Res Ipsa Loquitur and the Restatements’ View of Tire Blowouts

The Court acknowledges that in “certain limited types of cases,” the circumstances themselves can constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It cites:

  • Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Tex. 1974);
  • Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982); and
  • Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ceasar, 670 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex. 2023) (noting that res ipsa applies only rarely).

However, Posada expressly disclaimed reliance on res ipsa. He conceded that the case was not one where negligence could be presumed from the mere occurrence of injury, nor where negligence could be found without evidence of the nature or circumstances of Lozada’s conduct.

Moreover, the Court references the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of Torts to underscore that sudden tire failures and vehicle swerves commonly occur without negligence:

“There are many types of accidents which commonly occur without the fault of anyone. The fact that a tire blows out … is not, in the absence of anything more, enough to permit the conclusion that there was negligence in inspecting the tire… because it is common human experience that such events all too frequently occur without such negligence.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. c (1965).
“If the evidence more specifically shows … that the car swerved because of a sudden deflation of a tire, that evidence largely leaves the motorist off the res ipsa loquitur hook.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 17 cmt. d, reporters’ note (2010).

These authorities support a key practical rule emerging from the case: in sudden tire‑failure scenarios, absent evidence of defective maintenance, inspection, or response, the fact of a blowout and resulting loss of control is not evidence of negligence.

4. Rejection of the Court of Appeals’ Reasoning

The court of appeals majority suggested that a jury could infer negligence because Lozada:

  • Drove at 72 mph in fog;
  • Stayed in the left lane after the tire began losing pressure;
  • Attempted to correct when the truck pulled to the right; and
  • Ended with his rig blocking both lanes.

The Supreme Court holds that these facts, without more, do not constitute evidence of deviation from a reasonably prudent driver’s conduct. Instead, they amount only to a description of what happened, from which negligence could be inferred only by speculation. Under King Ranch, such speculation is a “mere surmise or suspicion,” which is less than a scintilla and legally insufficient.

Thus, the Court treats the case as one in which the plaintiff’s own evidence actually supports a non‑negligent explanation—sudden mechanical failure—and no contrary evidence exists.

C. The Role of Lozada’s Uncontroverted Testimony

1. Interested Witness Testimony and Rule 166a(c)

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) allows summary judgment based on the uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness (such as a party), if that evidence is:

  • Clear, positive, and direct;
  • Otherwise credible and free from contradictions or inconsistencies; and
  • Of a nature that could have been readily controverted.

Posada argued that Lozada’s self‑serving deposition testimony should not be taken at face value and merely created credibility issues for a jury. The Court rejects this:

  • Posada himself placed Lozada’s testimony into the summary‑judgment record as his principal evidence.
  • No other evidence—lay testimony, expert testimony, physical evidence beyond bare photographs, or even Posada’s own account—was offered to contradict Lozada’s description of the tire failure and his reaction.
  • The Court notes that it is not difficult to imagine additional evidence Posada might have offered: accident reconstruction, maintenance records, expert opinions, or testimony about weather and visibility.

In the absence of such evidence, Lozada’s account stands uncontroverted. The Court refuses Posada’s invitation to treat Lozada’s testimony as evidence that the opposite occurred, citing R. T. Herrin Petroleum Transport Co. v. Proctor, 338 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. 1960), which requires some circumstance supporting a conclusion that reality differed from the witness’s account.

Because Posada produced no such circumstances, there was no genuine fact dispute for a jury. Summary judgment was thus appropriate even though the key testimony came from the defendant.

D. No‑Evidence vs. Traditional Summary Judgment and Burden of Proof

1. Plaintiff’s Argument: Movant Must Use Traditional Summary Judgment to Prove “Unavoidable Accident”

Posada argued that Lozada’s reliance on an “unavoidable accident” or “excuse” theory meant he was effectively asserting an affirmative defense, for which Lozada bore the burden of proof at trial. Under that view, Lozada could not use a no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i) (reserved for parties without the burden of proof) but was required to use a traditional (evidence‑based) summary judgment motion.

The Court notes its own precedent in Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 187 n.6 (Tex. 2022), which confirms that a party with the burden of proof on a claim or defense cannot use a no‑evidence motion to establish that claim or defense.

2. The Court’s Resolution: “Unavoidable Accident” and “Excuse” Are Not Plaintiff‑Free Zones

The Supreme Court rejects Posada’s framing as fundamentally flawed. It holds that the plaintiff bears the burden at trial to prove:

  • That his injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident.
  • That any statutory violation being used as a basis for negligence per se was unexcused.

Two older precedents are pivotal:

  • Hicks v. Brown, 151 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Comm’n Op. 1941) – The plaintiff has the burden of proving that injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident.
  • Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973) – For negligence per se, It is the unexcused violation of a penal standard which constitutes negligence per se. (emphasis in the Court’s opinion).

The Court also refers to:

  • Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995) and
  • Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperative, 157 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2005).

These cases discuss “unavoidable accident” as an inferential rebuttal issue—a jury instruction reminding the jury that some accidents occur without negligence—rather than as a separate, burden‑shifting defense.

The Court clarifies that, despite “unavoidable accident” and “excuse” sometimes being described as defensive in character, they do not reverse the basic allocation of burdens in a negligence case. The plaintiff must still prove breach and causation; the defendant need not “prove” that the accident could not have been avoided.

Accordingly:

  • Lozada and TELS, as parties without the burden of proof on breach and causation, were entitled to use a no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i) to challenge those elements.
  • They had no obligation to conclusively establish unavoidable accident or excuse in a traditional motion.
  • No authority requires a summary‑judgment movant to conclusively prove “unavoidable accident” or “excuse” as a precondition to filing a no‑evidence motion; Posada cited none.

The Court analogizes, by contrast, to Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Tex. 2021), where a defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations must conclusively negate tolling doctrines—because the defendant has invoked limitations as an affirmative defense. By implication, because unavoidable accident and excuse are not true affirmative defenses that relieve the plaintiff of proving breach and lack of excuse, they do not trigger a similar burden on the defendant at summary judgment.

Net effect: the no‑evidence posture here was proper, and the burden remained on Posada to produce at least a scintilla of evidence of breach and of an unexcused violation, which he failed to do.

E. Proximate Cause and Vicarious Liability

1. Proximate Cause (Not Reached)

The court of appeals had also found more than a scintilla of evidence of proximate cause, reasoning that a jury could conclude the collision would not have occurred but for Lozada’s truck blocking both lanes, and that there was a logical connection between Lozada’s negligence and Posada’s injuries.

The Supreme Court declined to reach proximate cause because it found no evidence of breach. Under Texas law, both breach and proximate cause must be established to sustain a negligence claim; failure on breach makes further analysis unnecessary.

Implicit in the opinion, however, is a warning: if a plaintiff relies on an accident’s sequence alone to infer both breach and causation, but the defendant provides a non‑negligent explanation that is not contradicted by evidence, the plaintiff’s case may fail at the summary‑judgment stage.

2. Vicarious Liability

Because TELS’s liability was purely derivative, the Court applied the straightforward rule from G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex. 2011):

An employer cannot be vicariously liable in tort when its agent or employee has not engaged in tortious conduct.

With no actionable negligence by Lozada, TELS could not be held vicariously liable. The summary judgment in TELS’s favor was therefore reinstated as well.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. No‑Evidence Summary Judgment

A no‑evidence summary judgment is a procedural device that lets a defendant (or any party without the burden of proof on a claim) challenge the sufficiency of the opponent’s evidence after adequate discovery. The movant says, in effect:

“You, the plaintiff, have the burden of proof on breach and causation. After discovery, you still have no real evidence on those elements. Unless you can point to at least a small amount (a scintilla) of real evidence for each, your claim should be dismissed without a trial.”

The non‑movant must then direct the court to specific evidence in the record supporting each challenged element. Merely showing that an accident occurred, or pointing to facts that only might suggest negligence if one speculates further, is not enough.

2. “More Than a Scintilla” of Evidence

Texas uses a two‑level threshold:

  • Less than a scintilla: Evidence so weak that it simply raises suspicion—e.g., “something went wrong, so somebody must have been negligent.” This is legally no evidence.
  • More than a scintilla: Evidence that would allow reasonable people to genuinely disagree about the conclusion. Even a small amount is enough, but it must be substantive.

In Lozada, the Supreme Court held that Posada had less than a scintilla of evidence of breach, because all he showed was:

  • A sudden tire failure not tied to any fault by Lozada; and
  • The resulting jackknifed position of the truck.

Without any expert testimony, maintenance evidence, or fact testimony suggesting that Lozada’s conduct fell below a reasonable standard, this was not enough.

3. Res Ipsa Loquitur (“The Thing Speaks for Itself”)

Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine that sometimes lets a plaintiff prove negligence without showing a specific negligent act. It applies when:

  • The type of accident ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; and
  • The instrumentality causing the harm was under the defendant’s control; and
  • The plaintiff cannot reasonably explain the exact cause because the defendant has superior knowledge.

Classic examples include surgical instruments left inside a patient or elevator free‑falls. But vehicular accidents involving tire blowouts often occur without negligence—tires can fail even after proper inspection and maintenance. For that reason, both the Restatements and Texas cases approach res ipsa very cautiously in such settings.

In Lozada, Posada explicitly disclaimed any reliance on res ipsa. Even if he had invoked it, the sudden tire‑failure context, supported by the Restatements, would have made it difficult to satisfy the requirement that the accident “does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.”

4. Unavoidable Accident

“Unavoidable accident” is not a magic‑words defense that flips the burden to the defendant. It is an inferential rebuttal issue, often appearing as a jury instruction reminding jurors that some accidents occur without anyone being negligent.

The key points:

  • The plaintiff must still prove that the defendant breached a duty and caused the injury.
  • The defendant may point to circumstances suggesting that the accident was not caused by anyone’s negligence (e.g., sudden mechanical failure, unforeseeable natural events).
  • The burden of proof, however, remains on the plaintiff to show otherwise.

In this case, the sudden, unexplained tire failure fits squarely within “unavoidable accident” territory. The Supreme Court confirmed that the plaintiff, not the defendant, bears the burden of proving that such an event was not unavoidable.

5. Negligence Per Se and “Excuse”

Negligence per se allows a plaintiff to prove the breach element by showing that the defendant violated a relevant safety statute intended to protect the class of persons and type of harm at issue.

But Texas law is explicit: it is the unexcused violation of a penal statute that constitutes negligence per se. If the violation is excused—because, for example, compliance was impossible or the violation was caused by a sudden emergency—the doctrine does not apply.

In Lozada, Posada tried to rely on Transportation Code provisions regarding speed and parking on the highway. But:

  • There was no evidence of what a reasonable speed would have been under those foggy conditions.
  • There was no evidence showing Lozada had any practical ability to position his right wheels within 18 inches of the right‑hand edge before the sudden loss of control and collision.
  • The apparent sudden‑emergency nature of the tire failure tended, if anything, to suggest that any noncompliance was excused.

Since Posada bore the burden to prove an unexcused violation and provided no evidence of that, his negligence per se theory failed at the summary‑judgment stage.

6. Summary Judgment Based on an Interested Witness

Finally, the case illustrates how a defendant’s own deposition can support summary judgment when uncontroverted by other evidence. An “interested witness” is not automatically barred from supporting summary judgment. Under Rule 166a(c), such testimony can be enough if:

  • It is clear, direct, and not internally inconsistent; and
  • The opposing party could have, but did not, produce evidence to contradict it.

Lozada’s description of a sudden, unforeseeable tire failure and his efforts to maintain control was:

  • Detailed and consistent;
  • Supported, superficially at least, by the post‑accident photographs (jackknifed truck across lanes); and
  • Undermined by no competing evidence from Posada.

Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court treated Lozada’s testimony as a valid basis for summary judgment in the absence of any contrary evidence.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Practical Impact on Negligence Litigation Involving Mechanical Failures

Lozada v. Posada sends a clear message in cases involving alleged mechanical failures (tire blowouts, brake failures, steering malfunctions, and similar events):

  • For plaintiffs:
    • You cannot rely solely on the severity of the accident or the final position of the vehicles.
    • You must marshal evidence—often expert testimony, maintenance records, inspection logs, black‑box data, or eyewitness accounts—showing that the failure was due to negligent inspection, maintenance, operation, or response.
    • If the only evidence is the defendant’s uncontroverted description of a sudden failure, a no‑evidence summary judgment is a serious risk.
  • For defendants (especially in trucking/transportation):
    • No‑evidence motions after discovery can be powerful tools, especially if plaintiffs cannot point to concrete evidence of breach.
    • Early development of a detailed, credible account by the driver (through deposition) can anchor a defense built on unavoidable accident or sudden‑emergency themes.

Going forward, plaintiffs’ counsel in trucking and vehicular cases will likely feel increased pressure to retain accident reconstructionists and mechanical experts early and to preserve and analyze vehicle components, ECM data, and maintenance documentation to avoid Lozada‑type outcomes.

B. Clarification of Burdens for Unavoidable Accident and Negligence Per Se

The decision also brings clarity to a recurring confusion in Texas practice:

  • Unavoidable accident: Confirmed as an inferential rebuttal theory, not a burden‑shifting affirmative defense. The plaintiff must still prove the accident resulted from the defendant’s negligence, not just from an unfortunate chain of events.
  • Negligence per se: Reaffirmed as requiring an unexcused statutory violation. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the absence of excuse.

In litigation strategy terms, Lozada encourages defendants to plead unavoidable accident and statutory excuse but reassures them they need not carry the trial burden on those issues to defeat a plaintiff’s case at summary judgment. They can properly use no‑evidence motions to force plaintiffs to come forward with affirmative proof.

C. Limits on Inferring Negligence from Circumstances Alone

Although the Court did not decide a res ipsa loquitur question, it implicitly narrows the willingness of courts to allow negligence to be inferred from vehicular accidents alone. By endorsing the Restatements’ view that tire blowouts often occur without negligence, Lozada reinforces:

  • A cautious approach to circumstantial negligence claims based solely on the fact of a mishap; and
  • The principle that “accidents happen” without anyone necessarily being at fault.

This may influence trial courts to be more skeptical of plaintiffs’ arguments that the nature of a crash alone suffices to reach a jury when no evidence identifies specific negligent acts.

D. Appellate and Summary Judgment Practice

The Court decided the case per curiam, without oral argument, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1. That posture indicates the Court saw a clear misapplication of established no‑evidence standards by the court of appeals and felt no need for extensive briefing or argument to correct it.

The decision thus serves as a strong reminder that:

  • Courts of appeals must rigorously enforce the distinction between “more than a scintilla” and “mere suspicion.”
  • They may not allow juries to find negligence based simply on the existence of an accident plus speculation about what the defendant “must have” done wrong.

VII. Conclusion

Osvanis Lozada and TELS, Inc. v. Cesar R. Posada crystallizes several important principles in Texas negligence and summary judgment law:

  • In cases involving sudden mechanical failures such as tire blowouts, the mere fact that a vehicle loses control and causes a crash does not, by itself, amount to evidence of negligence.
  • Plaintiffs carry the burden to produce more than a scintilla of evidence that the defendant’s conduct deviated from that of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances and, for negligence per se, that any statutory violation was unexcused.
  • Defendants may use no‑evidence summary judgment to challenge those elements; they are not required to conclusively prove “unavoidable accident” or “excuse” in a traditional summary judgment motion.
  • Uncontroverted, credible deposition testimony of an interested witness can support summary judgment when the opposing party offers no evidence to contradict it.
  • Without underlying tortious conduct by an employee, claims of vicarious liability against the employer necessarily fail.

The decision will likely shape litigation strategies in trucking and motor‑vehicle cases, particularly where mechanical failures are alleged. It underscores the necessity for plaintiffs to develop concrete, non‑speculative evidence of breach and moves Texas law further away from any implicit presumption that serious accidents imply negligence.

In the broader landscape of Texas tort law, Lozada reinforces a disciplined approach to summary judgment and evidentiary sufficiency: juries decide factual disputes, but courts must first ensure that those disputes are grounded in actual evidence—more than a mere suspicion drawn from the fact of an unfortunate accident.