Successive CBAs and Post-Expiration Arbitration: “No Gap” Does Not Revive Expired Rights Absent a Litton Exception

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a dispute at Kellanova’s Grand Rapids, Michigan bakery, where hourly employees are represented by Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union AFL-CIO-CLC, Local No. 70 (the “Union”). The Union sought to compel arbitration of two grievances filed in August 2021, contending that Kellanova failed to “transition” certain “transitional employees” to regular full-time status pursuant to a “core number” mechanism contained in the parties’ 2017 collective bargaining agreement (the “2017 CBA”).

The critical complication was temporal and contractual: the 2017 CBA expired at 11:59 p.m. on April 30, 2021. The parties later agreed to a new, retroactively effective agreement (the “2021 CBA”), which superseded the 2017 CBA’s terms and—importantly—did not include the core-number/transitional-employee framework at all. Despite the absence of any gap in the parties’ arbitration clauses across CBAs, Kellanova refused to arbitrate these particular grievances.

The district court compelled arbitration, reasoning that the dispute “arose under” the expired 2017 CBA and thus triggered a presumption of arbitrability. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the grievances did not “arise under” the expired agreement under the controlling post-expiration arbitration framework.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit reversed the order compelling arbitration. Applying Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, the court held that the Union’s grievances did not “arise under” the expired 2017 CBA because none of the three Litton pathways for post-expiration arbitrability applied:

• The “facts and occurrences” giving rise to the grievances arose after expiration (the alleged violations occurred on August 1–2, 2021).
• No accrued or vested right to transition to full-time employment was shown to survive expiration.
• Ordinary contract interpretation (including the general durational clause) showed no survival of the core-number/transitional-employee mechanism.

Because the grievances did not arise under the expired agreement, the presumption of arbitrability for post-expiration disputes did not apply, and the court did not reach whether the parties negated any presumption of post-expiration arbitration.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is a disciplined application of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit doctrine separating (i) broad pro-arbitration presumptions during a CBA’s life from (ii) narrower post-expiration arbitrability rules.

• United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (6th Cir. 2007): Cited for the standards of review—summary judgment and an order compelling arbitration are reviewed de novo. This frames the appellate posture: the Sixth Circuit independently assesses arbitrability.
• Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (2010): Reinforces the foundational proposition that arbitration “is a matter of contract” and cannot be imposed beyond what the parties agreed to submit. The court uses this to emphasize that continuity of arbitration clauses does not itself expand the subject matter of what is arbitrable.
• AT & T Tech., Inc. v. Comm. Workers of Am. (1986): Supplies the familiar presumption of arbitrability for broad arbitration clauses— doubts are resolved in favor of coverage and arbitration should be denied only with “positive assurance” the clause does not cover the dispute. The opinion contrasts this with the more constrained post-expiration regime.
• Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB (1991): The centerpiece. The court applies Litton’s holding that the presumption does not apply “wholesale” after expiration, and that post-expiration arbitration is presumed only when a dispute has its “real source” in the expired contract via one of three exceptions: (1) pre-expiration facts/occurrences; (2) post-expiration action infringing an accrued/vested right; (3) survival of the disputed right under ordinary contract interpretation.
• S. Cent. Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 2359 (6th Cir. 1999): Used in two key ways. First, it operationalizes Litton’s first exception into a “majority of the material facts and occurrences” test. Second, it describes the subsequent inquiry (if a Litton exception is met) into whether the parties negated the presumption that the arbitration clause extends beyond expiration—an inquiry the Sixth Circuit did not reach here because no exception applied.
• Nolde Bros. v. Loc. No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO (1977): Cited through S. Cent. Power for the proposition that even after expiration, arbitration can be compelled where the dispute arises under the contract unless the parties clearly negate that post-expiration extension. Here, Nolde Bros. is effectively cabined by the threshold Litton inquiry.
• Stevens-Bratton v. TruGreen, Inc. (6th Cir. 2017): Provides a comparative template. Like the telemarketing calls that occurred after expiration in Stevens-Bratton, the “occurrences at the heart of the dispute” here (the August 2021 alleged violations and the grievances) occurred after the 2017 CBA expired. This case supports a rigorous, event-centered application of the first Litton exception.
• Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, Loc. 14519, Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. (6th Cir. 1994): Anchors the analysis of “accrued” and “vested” rights using standard contract interpretation and requiring contract language or extrinsic evidence. The Sixth Circuit borrows Cincinnati Typographical Union’s caution that certain benefits (like vacation or severance) accrue step-by-step, but not every workplace expectation is “vested.”
• Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local Union 1199 v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. (6th Cir. 1992): Cited for survival principles—rights may survive if the agreement explicitly so provides—and for the idea that an employer’s continued processing of grievances may reflect NLRA caution rather than contractual survival. This case is also used to rebut the Union’s inference from Kellanova’s “core number calculation” responses.
• CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese (2018) and M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett (2015): Together support a modern contract-law approach to CBAs and the rule that a general durational clause governs unless a specific provision indicates otherwise. The Sixth Circuit uses these to reject survival-by-implication for the core-number mechanism.
• Gallo v. Moen Inc. (6th Cir. 2016): Reinforces that absent a specific end date for a provision, the general durational clause supplies it—i.e., every term ends “until this agreement ends.” This directly undercuts the claim that the core-number right persisted beyond April 30, 2021.
• Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1200 v. Detroit Free Press, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 2014): Cited (via Pepsi-Cola) to support the idea that continuing to adhere to certain obligations after expiration may reflect NLRA requirements rather than an agreement that the CBA itself remains in force.
• Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, LLC (6th Cir. 2016): Cited for the rule that extrinsic evidence is considered only when contractual language is ambiguous. This helps the court prioritize the unambiguous durational clause over any arguable inference from post-expiration conduct.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is best understood as a two-level sorting process: (1) identify the governing framework (post-expiration arbitration under Litton); (2) test the grievances against each Litton exception.

A. Why Litton governed despite uninterrupted arbitration clauses

The district court emphasized that arbitration obligations were “uninterrupted” across CBAs. The Sixth Circuit treated that fact as insufficient because the relevant question is not whether the parties always had some arbitration clause, but whether the specific dispute falls within the arbitration duty of the agreement under which it allegedly “arose.” The Union’s grievances, by their substance, targeted a mechanism that existed only in the 2017 CBA. That agreement had expired, and the parties stipulated the 2021 CBA was a “new” agreement that superseded prior terms.

B. First Litton exception (pre-expiration facts/occurrences): not satisfied

Using S. Cent. Power Co. and Stevens-Bratton v. TruGreen, Inc., the court asked whether a “majority of the material facts and occurrences” arose before April 30, 2021. It held they did not: the alleged contractual violations occurred on August 1 and 2, 2021, and the grievances were filed in mid-August 2021. The court rejected the Union’s characterization that employees had been “waiting their turn” before expiration as a material majority fact, because waiting did not create entitlement and did not itself establish a core-number exceedance.

C. Second Litton exception (accrued/vested rights): not satisfied

Under Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, Loc. 14519, Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., vesting requires contract language or extrinsic evidence showing the parties intended the right to persist. The court found none.

Critically, the “transition” mechanism was contingent and event-driven: employees moved to full-time only “if” Kellanova exceeded caps and only to the extent required to restore the contractual balance. That differs from benefits courts readily recognize as accruing “step-by-step” (e.g., vacation or severance). The court also treated the omission of the core-number/transitional-employee structure from the 2021 CBA as evidence the right was “a creature of a particular contract,” not vested for the future.

D. Third Litton exception (survival under contract interpretation): not satisfied

The court applied the general durational clause (expiration at 11:59 p.m. on April 30, 2021) as controlling for all provisions absent a specific survival term, citing CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, and Gallo v. Moen Inc.. Because the 2017 CBA contained no survival clause for core numbers and nothing suggesting post-expiration continuation, the right expired with the agreement.

The Union argued Kellanova’s grievance responses referencing “core number calculation” implied the mechanism remained operative. The court rejected that inference, noting (via Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local Union 1199 v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. and Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1200 v. Detroit Free Press, Inc.) that post-expiration conduct can reflect NLRA status-quo caution rather than contractual survival. Even if the response suggested survival, the court emphasized the 2017 CBA’s unambiguous durational language would control, consistent with Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, LLC (6th Cir. 2016) (extrinsic evidence matters only if ambiguity exists).

3.3 Impact

The decision’s practical impact is to tighten the link between post-expiration arbitration and the continued legal existence of the underlying right. Several consequences follow.

• “No gap” in arbitration coverage is not enough. Parties may have continuous arbitration clauses across successive CBAs, but arbitration still turns on whether the dispute “arose under” the agreement containing the substantive right invoked. This prevents arbitration clauses from functioning as a free-floating mandate untethered to the lifespan of particular terms.
• Unions must plead and prove a Litton pathway for post-expiration disputes. Where a grievance relies on a mechanism removed from a successor CBA, the union must show pre-expiration facts, vesting/accrual, or explicit/implied survival under ordinary interpretation. Event timing and careful identification of “material occurrences” become central.
• Drafting implications: survival clauses and transition mechanics. If the parties want end-of-term transitional mechanisms (like headcount caps or conversion ramps) to carry forward, they should express survival explicitly, or specify how disputes arising during the “tail” of annualized calculations are to be handled after expiration.
• Limits on “status quo” inferences. Employers’ post-expiration processing of grievances or continued reference to old calculations may be treated as NLRA compliance behavior, not an admission that expired terms remain arbitrable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185: A federal statute allowing lawsuits in federal court to enforce collective bargaining agreements, including agreements to arbitrate.
• Arbitrability: Whether a particular dispute must be decided by an arbitrator (not a judge). Courts decide this “gateway” question.
• Presumption of arbitrability: When an arbitration clause is broad, courts generally resolve doubts in favor of arbitration. But after a CBA expires, Litton narrows that presumption.
• Litton exceptions (why some expired-CBA disputes are still arbitrable): Post-expiration arbitration is presumed only if the dispute genuinely traces back to the expired contract because (1) the key events happened before expiration, (2) a post-expiration action violates a right that vested or accrued during the contract, or (3) the contract’s language shows the right survives expiration.
• Accrued vs. vested rights: “Accrued” often means earned progressively (e.g., vacation). “Vested” means guaranteed and not lost by expiration. The court held the “chance to transition” based on future headcount conditions was not shown to be accrued/vested.
• Durational clause: The contract’s general “end date” provision. Courts treat it as applying to all terms unless a specific provision clearly continues beyond that date.
• Retroactive CBA: An agreement reached later but made effective as of an earlier date. Here, despite retroactivity, the 2021 CBA was still a “new” agreement that superseded prior terms.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision reaffirms a core boundary in labor arbitration: continuity of arbitration clauses across CBAs does not, by itself, authorize arbitration of disputes premised on expired—and omitted—substantive provisions. The court rigorously applied Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, holding that post-expiration arbitration requires a concrete fit within a Litton exception. Here, the alleged violations occurred months after the 2017 CBA expired; the Union did not show any vested/accrued right to conversion; and ordinary contract interpretation—particularly the durational clause and the absence of any survival term—foreclosed continuation of the core-number mechanism.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of timing, careful identification of “material occurrences,” and explicit drafting if parties intend headcount-based or conversion-based rights to operate beyond a CBA’s expiration.