Substantial-Evidence Review Governs “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship” Determinations in Cancellation of Removal

1. Introduction

In Fortunato Martinez-Garcia v. Todd Blanche (6th Cir. May 18, 2026), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of non-LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

The petitioner, a Mexican national who entered without inspection in 1999, sought cancellation based on alleged hardship to his U.S.-citizen children (born in Ohio in 2008 and 2010). Although the IJ found him credible, of good moral character, and otherwise statutorily eligible on continuous presence and lack of disqualifying convictions, the application failed on the fourth element: whether removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualifying relatives. The key issue on review was twofold: (i) the proper standard of judicial review for a hardship determination, and (ii) whether the IJ and BIA legally erred by failing to conduct a cumulative (aggregate) hardship analysis.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that, under recent Supreme Court and circuit authority, the court reviews the agency’s hardship determination under the “substantial evidence” standard of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Applying that deferential framework, the court concluded that the IJ identified and applied the correct legal rule—including the requirement to consider hardship factors in the aggregate—and that the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The petition for review was therefore denied.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Jurisdiction and what is reviewable

  • Galvez-Bravo v. Garland, 119 F.4th 1038 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the general proposition that courts may review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
  • Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2014): Supplies the standard administrative-law framing: when the BIA issues its own decision, that decision is reviewed as the final agency determination, while the IJ’s reasoning is reviewed to the extent the BIA adopted it.
  • Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762 (6th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that, in cancellation denials, courts may review “certain legal questions.”
  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Critical to reviewability. The Supreme Court characterized application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a given set of facts as a “quintessential mixed question of law and fact,” reviewable as a “question of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
  • Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021): Reinforces that mixed questions around hardship are reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D).

2) The standard of review after recent Supreme Court guidance

  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Invoked by the petitioner to argue for de novo review “without deference.” The panel treated this argument as misdirected because the dispositive question was not deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation, but the standard Congress and the Supreme Court require for reviewing the agency’s application of the hardship standard to facts.
  • Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399 (6th Cir. 2025): Noted as the circuit’s prior phrasing—reviewing the hardship mixed question under a “more deferential” approach—without fully specifying the “metric.”
  • Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845 (2026): The Supreme Court decision the panel treated as controlling on the “metric.” It indicates hardship determinations are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard.
  • Baltazar Us v. Blanche, No. 25-3504, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 1162684 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026): The Sixth Circuit’s immediate circuit implementation of Urias-Orellana. It holds that a hardship finding is reviewed under § 1252(b)(4)(B) and is “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Martinez-Garcia applies this rule.

3) The substantive hardship framework and “cumulative analysis” requirement

  • In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001): The foundational BIA precedent defining the hardship standard as hardship “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected” from removal, and requiring consideration of relevant factors (including ages, health, and family ties) and consideration of hardship factors “in the aggregate.”
  • Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024): Confirms that the BIA’s articulation of the hardship inquiry (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga) is consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s “independent assessment of the statute’s meaning.”
  • Montanez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 780 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2015): Restates the kinds of considerations IJs must address (ages, health, circumstances, and family ties in the U.S. and abroad).
  • In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002): Reinforces that hardship must be assessed “in their totality,” often termed a “cumulative” analysis.
  • Diaz-Roblero v. Garland, No. 23-3873, 2024 WL 3596873 (6th Cir. July 31, 2024): Used as an example of how the Sixth Circuit evaluates whether an IJ performed the required aggregate analysis—especially where the IJ incorporates governing-law addenda stating the aggregate requirement and the decision reflects consideration of all evidence.
  • Pablo-Ventura v. Bondi, No. 25-3071, 2025 WL 3459588 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025): Similar proposition—explicit statement that the IJ considered hardship factors “in the aggregate” supports rejecting a “no cumulative analysis” claim.
  • Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25-3226, 2025 WL 3541837 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025): Supports that reliance on Monreal-Aguinaga and express aggregate evaluation indicates the proper test was applied.
  • Araujo-Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646 (6th Cir. 2021): Emphasizes the narrowness of cancellation—reserved for “truly exceptional and very uncommon situations,” echoing Monreal-Aguinaga.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1 — Identify the review framework: The panel first addressed whether the petitioner’s arguments were reviewable and under what standard. Relying on Wilkinson v. Garland, it treated hardship application as a mixed question reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D). Then, guided by Urias-Orellana v. Bondi and the Sixth Circuit’s own Baltazar Us v. Blanche, it applied the substantial-evidence standard of § 1252(b)(4)(B).
  2. Step 2 — Define the governing hardship legal rule: The court reaffirmed the substantive content of the hardship inquiry—hardship must exceed what ordinarily follows from removal—drawing from In re Monreal-Aguinaga as adopted in Sixth Circuit law (e.g., Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland).
  3. Step 3 — Evaluate the claimed legal error (lack of cumulative analysis): The petitioner framed the dispute as a legal error: the IJ allegedly considered factors in isolation rather than in the aggregate. The court rejected that framing on the record, emphasizing that the IJ cited BIA precedent requiring aggregate review, stated it considered all evidence, and then addressed multiple hardship categories (economic and emotional impact, health/medical issues, and family ties in both countries) before concluding the hardship was not “distinguishable” from ordinary removal hardship.
  4. Step 4 — Apply substantial-evidence deference: With no legal misstep shown, the remaining question was whether the record compelled a finding of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” The panel held it did not. Evidence that the children would remain in the U.S. with their custodial mother, that both parents could work, that there were no serious medical conditions, and that the petitioner had family and a home base in Mexico (and could send remittances) supported the agency’s conclusion.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies the post-2026 Sixth Circuit review “metric” for hardship: Even where hardship application is reviewable as a legal question under § 1252(a)(2)(D), the operative standard is substantial-evidence review under § 1252(b)(4)(B), as implemented in Baltazar Us v. Blanche. This substantially narrows the path to reversal: petitioners must show the record compels the opposite hardship result.
  • Channels “cumulative analysis” challenges into record-based showings: The decision signals that generalized assertions of “no aggregate analysis” will often fail where the IJ cites Monreal-Aguinaga/In re Gonzalez Recinas, incorporates a governing-law addendum, and discusses multiple hardship dimensions before reaching a bottom-line conclusion.
  • Limits the practical significance of deference debates in this posture: The petitioner’s reliance on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo did not change the outcome because the court treated the dispositive inquiry as substantial-evidence review of an application-to-facts determination, not Chevron-style deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of removal (non-LPR) — 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)
A discretionary form of relief for certain nonpermanent residents who can prove (among other things) 10 years’ continuous physical presence, good moral character, no disqualifying convictions, and a very high level of hardship to certain U.S.-citizen or LPR family members.
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
Not ordinary hardship from family separation or reduced income; it must be substantially beyond what typically accompanies removal. The agency considers factors like children’s ages and needs, health conditions, educational consequences, caregiving arrangements, and ties in the United States and abroad—together, not one-by-one in isolation.
Mixed question of law and fact
A question about applying a legal standard to established facts (e.g., do these facts satisfy the hardship standard?). It can be reviewable as a “question of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D), but the reviewing court may still owe deference under a substantial-evidence framework.
Substantial evidence — 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
A highly deferential standard: the agency’s finding stands unless the evidence would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion.
Cumulative (aggregate) hardship analysis
The requirement that the IJ assess the combined effect of all relevant hardship factors on the qualifying relative(s), rather than dismissing each factor in isolation.

5. Conclusion

Fortunato Martinez-Garcia v. Todd Blanche applies the Sixth Circuit’s post-Urias-Orellana v. Bondi framework: hardship determinations in cancellation cases are reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard, even though the hardship application is reviewable as a mixed question. The decision also underscores how difficult it is to overturn an agency’s hardship ruling—particularly where the IJ cites In re Monreal-Aguinaga and conducts an on-the-record aggregate discussion of economic, emotional, health, and family-ties considerations.