Subsequent Favorable SSA Awards Do Not Trigger Remand Absent Identified, Material “New Evidence” and Good Cause Under § 405(g) Sentence Six

1. Introduction

In Nancy Artache v. Commissioner of Social Security (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Social Security disability benefits for the closed period June 6, 2016 through July 29, 2020. The central dispute was procedural and evidentiary rather than medical: after an ALJ denied benefits through July 29, 2020, the agency later awarded benefits on a subsequent application with an onset date of July 30, 2020—one day later. Artache argued the ALJ (and reviewing courts) were required to consider the subsequent favorable determination and the records in the later claim file when adjudicating the earlier period.

The case therefore presented a recurring question in SSA litigation: whether (and how) a later favorable decision can justify remand of an earlier unfavorable decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that remand was not warranted. Artache did not challenge any specific factual findings or the substantial-evidence basis of the ALJ’s denial for the 2016–2020 period, so sentence-four remand was unavailable. The only possible avenue was sentence-six remand, which requires “new” and “material” evidence plus “good cause” for failing to present it earlier. The court concluded Artache failed each relevant component: a subsequent favorable decision is not itself “new evidence” warranting remand; Artache did not identify or submit any specific records from the subsequent claim file; she did not show the later-file materials related to the adjudicated period; and she did not establish good cause because SSA regulations allow claimants to obtain their own records, and she did not show she attempted to do so.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)
    Cited for the proposition that when the Appeals Council declines jurisdiction (or otherwise the administrative posture ends), the ALJ’s decision becomes the “final decision of the Commissioner.” This matters because federal court review attaches to the final agency decision and the record that was properly before the agency for that decision.
  • Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021)
    Used to frame the standard of review: the court reviews legal conclusions de novo and reviews whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. This sets the boundary between legal error (reviewed strictly) and factual sufficiency (reviewed deferentially).
  • Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1091–92 (11th Cir. 1996)
    Provides the core remedial framework under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g): remand may occur only under sentence four or sentence six, with sentence four tied to legal error or lack of substantial evidence, and sentence six tied to new, material evidence and good cause. The opinion relies on Jackson to channel Artache’s request into the proper statutory lane.
  • Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986)
    Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part test for sentence-six remand: (1) new, noncumulative evidence; (2) materiality (reasonable possibility of changing the result); and (3) good cause for failing to submit it earlier. The court measures Artache’s argument against this test and finds it wanting.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014)
    Invoked for abandonment principles on appeal: arguments not briefed are treated as abandoned. Here it supports the conclusion that sentence-four remand was off the table because Artache did not argue substantial-evidence error or identify any specific ALJ finding as wrong.
  • Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015)
    The decisive precedent. Hunter holds that a subsequent favorable ALJ decision—without more—is not “new and material evidence” requiring remand of a prior denial, even where the onset date is one day after the earlier denial. The court applies Hunter directly to reject Artache’s “per se remand” theory based on the temporal proximity of the later award.
  • Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999)
    Cited for the temporal relevance principle: evidence is generally irrelevant to review of the ALJ’s decision unless it bears on the period adjudicated. The court uses Wilson to explain why even genuinely “new” evidence must still relate back to June 2016–July 2020 to be material.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in three structured steps, each narrowing the path to remand:

  1. Identify the only remand mechanism available.
    Under Jackson v. Chater and § 405(g), a reviewing court may remand only under sentence four or sentence six. Because Artache did not contest the ALJ’s substantive findings or argue the decision lacked substantial evidence, the court treated sentence-four remand as unavailable (reinforced by Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. abandonment principles).
  2. Reject “subsequent favorable decision” as “new evidence” per se.
    Applying Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., the court holds that the later award, even with an onset date one day after the earlier denial, does not itself constitute new and material evidence that undermines the earlier decision. The legal premise is that two different adjudications can be supported by substantial evidence on their respective records, and a later result does not retroactively invalidate an earlier fact-bound determination.
  3. Enforce the claimant’s burden on sentence-six requirements.
    Even accepting Artache’s reframing—that the file behind the later award contains new information—the court emphasized that sentence-six remand requires the claimant to identify and establish: (a) what the new evidence is, (b) that it is noncumulative, (c) that it is material to the earlier adjudicated period, and (d) good cause for not producing it earlier (per Caulder v. Bowen). Artache did not submit the later-file records, did not proffer what they contained, and did not explain how they related to June 2016–July 2020 rather than the later onset date (a Wilson v. Apfel problem). Finally, she failed good cause because SSA regulations allow a claimant to obtain her records (20 C.F.R. §§ 401.35–401.55), and she did not show any attempt or barrier to doing so.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision reinforces—and operationalizes—binding circuit principles from Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin. in a common fact pattern: a later favorable award with an onset immediately after a prior denial.

  • No “one-day gap” presumption. Claimants cannot rely on the closeness of onset dates to argue that the earlier denial must be wrong. The Eleventh Circuit again treats the later award as logically and legally compatible with the earlier denial.
  • Concrete proffer requirement for sentence-six remand. A claimant must identify the specific later-file evidence, submit it (or at least proffer it with enough specificity to evaluate), and explain how it relates back to the relevant period. General assertions that “there were other doctors’ opinions” will not satisfy Caulder v. Bowen.
  • Good-cause showing is not satisfied by “SSA has it.” The court’s reliance on 20 C.F.R. §§ 401.35–401.55 underscores a practical litigation lesson: because claimants can request their records, they must explain efforts to obtain them and obstacles encountered. Mere “exclusive possession” arguments are unlikely to work without documented attempts and denial/delay.
  • Appellate strategy warning. By invoking Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., the panel signals that failure to challenge specific ALJ findings can foreclose sentence-four remand entirely, forcing the claimant into the more demanding sentence-six posture.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Substantial evidence”
A deferential standard of review: the court asks whether the agency’s decision is supported by “enough” relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with it—not whether the reviewing court would decide the case the same way.
Sentence four vs. sentence six remand (42 U.S.C. § 405(g))
  • Sentence four: remand because the agency applied the wrong law or lacked substantial evidence on the record it had.
  • Sentence six: remand to consider new evidence that wasn’t presented earlier, but only if it is material and there is good cause for the earlier omission.
“Material” new evidence
Evidence that creates a reasonable possibility of changing the outcome for the period adjudicated. Evidence about a later deterioration may support a later onset date but still be immaterial to an earlier period.
Subsequent favorable decision
A later agency determination awarding benefits on a new application. In the Eleventh Circuit (per Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin.), the existence of that later award is not, by itself, “new evidence” warranting remand of the earlier denial.
Good cause
A valid reason the evidence was not submitted earlier (e.g., it did not exist, could not reasonably be obtained, or was withheld despite diligent efforts). This opinion emphasizes that when regulations allow access to SSA records, a claimant should show attempts to obtain them and the reasons those attempts failed.

5. Conclusion

Artache reinforces a clear Eleventh Circuit rule: a subsequent favorable SSA determination—even one beginning the day after a prior denial—does not automatically justify remand. A claimant seeking sentence-six remand must do more than point to the later award; she must identify and provide genuinely new, noncumulative evidence that is material to the earlier adjudicated period and show good cause for not presenting it sooner. Practically, the decision encourages litigants to (1) challenge specific ALJ findings if pursuing sentence-four relief and (2) obtain and proffer the subsequent-file records with a focused explanation of how they relate back in time if pursuing sentence-six relief.