“Structuring” Terminology Does Not Constructively Amend a § 5324(a)(1) Indictment When the Jury Is Properly Charged and Aggregation Evidence Shows a Triggered CTR Duty

Precedents Cited

Bank Secrecy Act framework and the (a)(1)/(a)(3) distinction

• United States v. Phipps, 81 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 1996): The court relied on Phipps for the core statutory taxonomy of § 5324(a) and, critically, for the rule that § 5324(a)(1) is violated only when the defendant causes (or attempts to cause) a bank not to file a CTR it had a legal duty to file. This anchored the panel’s rejection of Zayas’s claim that “structuring-style” proof necessarily implies an (a)(3) prosecution.
• United States v. Leon, 841 F.3d 1187 (11th Cir. 2016): Leon supplied two key moves. First, it recognized that “structuring” is often used loosely to describe conduct across § 5324, including (a)(1), and that such characterization is not automatically reversible error. Second, Leon provided the cautionary lens: “structuring” terminology could be prejudicial if the jury were told about a separate offense (i.e., § 5324(a)(3)) that criminalizes evasion even when the CTR duty is not triggered. The Zayas court used Leon to conclude that, here, the jury was not instructed on (a)(3), and the charge correctly required a triggered CTR duty—so the “structuring” language did not expand the basis for conviction.

Constructive amendment doctrine

• United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2007): These cases supplied the standard of review (de novo) and the per se reversal rule for constructive amendments.
• United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628 (11th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004): The opinion used Keller/Narog for the controlling definition: a constructive amendment occurs when the indictment’s essential elements are altered, broadening the possible bases for conviction beyond the indictment. Narog also provided the contrast with a “variance,” which the court noted Zayas did not pursue.
• United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1988): These cases supported the “in context” approach—evaluating the prosecutor’s statements and the jury charge together to determine whether the indictment was effectively expanded.
• United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503 (11th Cir. 1994): Cited for the proposition that constructive amendment may arise from the government’s evidence/argument or the court’s instructions.
• United States v. Gutierrez, 745 F.3d 463 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2012): These cases supported the court’s treatment of the “structure” definition as an isolated instructional imperfection that did not change the charged elements where the overall charge correctly set out the proper offense elements.
• United States v. James, 642 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001): These informed the separate holding (in a footnote) that the inclusion of a “structure” definition, while unnecessary, did not misstate the law or mislead the jury to Zayas’s prejudice given the correct statement of § 5324(a)(1)’s elements.

Sufficiency of the evidence and circumstantial proof of intent

• United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2000): Provided the standard for sufficiency review—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
• United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550 (11th Cir. 2011), United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2007): These cases supplied the general sufficiency framework: a reasonable trier of fact standard, and the rule that evidence need not exclude every hypothesis of innocence.
• United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344 (11th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Aunspaugh, 792 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2015): Bird and Aunspaugh were pivotal to the mens rea analysis: intent to evade reporting requirements is typically proved circumstantially through irregular patterns, because direct admissions are rare. The court treated Zayas’s rapid, near-threshold, multi-branch withdrawals after an unusual wire as classic circumstantial proof.
• United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013): These cases were cited for affirming convictions where the evidence supports a reasonable construction consistent with guilt.

Supplemental jury instructions / jury questions

• United States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2018): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard and the requirement that supplemental instructions not misstate the law or confuse the jury.
• United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Martin, 274 F.3d 1208 (8th Cir. 2001)): Supported the principle that answers must stay within the limits of the question presented.
• United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1998)): The court used Lopez/Johnson for evaluating a response in the context of the whole trial record to determine whether the jury was misled.
• United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Bailey, 830 F.2d 156 (11th Cir. 1987): These supported the court’s conclusion that directing the jury back to accurate original instructions can be an adequate and proper response.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why “structuring” proof can still fit § 5324(a)(1)

The opinion draws a functional distinction between § 5324(a)(1) and § 5324(a)(3) while acknowledging they can share a common fact pattern. The key pivot is whether the defendant’s transactions, as processed and known by the bank, triggered a CTR duty.

• Under (a)(3), the government can prevail even if the bank never had a duty to file a CTR (e.g., spreading withdrawals across multiple days so aggregation does not cross the threshold in a single business day).
• Under (a)(1), the government must show the bank did have a duty to file—often satisfied through aggregation when multiple same-day cash transactions exceed $10,000 and the bank has the requisite knowledge.

Applying that framework, the Eleventh Circuit held the government’s evidence supported (a)(1) because two withdrawals on December 20 collectively exceeded $10,000, and Wells Fargo’s systems and identification procedures supported the inference that the bank had knowledge sufficient to aggregate and therefore a duty to file.

2) Constructive amendment: improper “labeling” vs altered elements

The court treated the government’s repeated use of “structuring” as potentially “loose” but not element-changing. The decisive point was that the trial, taken as a whole, did not broaden the grounds of conviction beyond the indictment because:

• The evidence presented could establish the charged offense (a)(1), including a triggered reporting duty via aggregation.
• The district court ultimately instructed on the correct elements of (a)(1), explicitly requiring that the bank “was required to file” a CTR.
• Although the court added a definition of “structure” that better aligns with (a)(3), the jury was not told about (a)(3), and the core (a)(1) elements were not replaced.

In other words, the court treated “structuring” rhetoric and a superfluous definition as imprecision rather than a shift in the legally required findings.

3) Sufficiency: aggregation and intent

On aggregation, the court rejected the claim that the bank lacked knowledge “by or on behalf of the same person,” pointing to: account ownership, teller withdrawals, use of identification/debit card, internal system logging, and testimony about system flagging of same-day totals.

On intent, the court followed United States v. Bird and United States v. Aunspaugh to hold that the jury could infer mens rea from the pattern: an anomalous $25,000 wire followed quickly by near-threshold withdrawals at multiple branches.

4) Jury question response

The jury’s question (“if I say not guilty based on the evidence presented[,] can I say guilty based on reasoning and common sense?”) was treated as confusion about how common sense fits into factfinding and the reasonable doubt standard. The court approved the judge’s choice to refer jurors back to instructions that correctly stated: (i) reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense after considering all evidence; and (ii) jurors may use reasoning and common sense to draw conclusions from admitted evidence.

Impact

Although framed as a straightforward application of existing doctrine, the decision has meaningful practical consequences for Bank Secrecy Act prosecutions and trial practice:

• Confirms a broad evidentiary overlap: A “structuring-like” withdrawal pattern (multiple sub-$10,000 transactions) can support a § 5324(a)(1) theory so long as the prosecution also proves aggregation-triggered CTR duty.
• Limits constructive amendment arguments based on terminology: Repeated “structuring” language—by itself—will not establish constructive amendment when the jury is properly instructed on the charged subsection’s elements and the evidence fits that subsection.
• Signals caution on jury instructions: The panel agreed the “structure” definition should not have been given for an (a)(1) charge, but it treated the error as non-prejudicial in context. Future litigants should still expect close scrutiny if the jury is exposed to (a)(3)’s distinct theory (no triggered duty required), because that would heighten the risk of conviction on an uncharged basis.
• Reinforces circumstantial mens rea proof: The opinion strengthens the government’s hand in proving intent through transaction irregularities, especially abrupt near-threshold withdrawals following a sudden deposit.