Striking an Adjudication of Guilt Under a Deferred Sentence Is Not “Reversal or Vacatur” for Automatic Reinstatement from Interim Suspension (A.O. 9, Rule 21(F))

Case: In re Eva Vekos, Esq. (Office of Disciplinary Counsel*), 2026 VT 35 (Vt. July 23, 2026) (entry order)
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
Posture: Motion for automatic reinstatement from an interim suspension imposed under Administrative Order 9, Rule 21

1. Introduction

This decision addresses a narrow but consequential procedural question in Vermont attorney discipline: when a lawyer’s interim suspension is based “solely” on a criminal conviction, does completion of a deferred sentence—resulting in the trial court “strik[ing] the adjudication of guilt” under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e)—qualify as the conviction being “reversed or vacated” for purposes of automatic reinstatement under A.O. 9, Rule 21(F)?

The respondent, Eva Vekos, had previously been placed on interim suspension after pleading nolo contendere to DUI under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2). After successfully completing the conditions of a deferred sentence, she sought “automatic reinstatement” arguing that the “adjudication of guilt” was vacated because it was “stricken.” Disciplinary Counsel opposed, contending that “striking” an adjudication under the deferred-sentence statute is not “vacating” a conviction.

The Vermont Supreme Court denied automatic reinstatement, clarifying that Rule 21(F) is triggered only by a true reversal or vacatur of the underlying conviction—not by statutory striking/expungement mechanisms that do not nullify the conviction’s legal validity.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that respondent did not meet the express requirement of A.O. 9, Rule 21(F)—namely, demonstrating that the “underlying conviction has been reversed or vacated.” A trial court order under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e) “str[iking] the adjudication of guilt” upon completion of a deferred sentence is not the same as vacating the conviction. Because Rule 21(F) does not provide automatic reinstatement based on the striking of an adjudication of guilt (or pending expungement), the interim suspension remained in place. The Court emphasized that automatic reinstatement is appropriate when the conviction is undermined by a legal or factual deficiency—something not shown here.

Justice Nolan concurred in the result (denial under the text of Rule 21(F)) but reiterated disagreement with the earlier interim suspension decision, questioning whether the DUI constituted a “serious crime” and whether interim removal was justified given timing, lack of reoffense, and delayed prosecutorial/discplinary actions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Vekos, 2026 VT 11

This earlier decision is the immediate doctrinal backdrop. There, the Court imposed the interim suspension after concluding that respondent had been convicted of a “crime that reflects adversely on [her] . . . fitness as a lawyer” under A.O. 9, Rule 21(C), (D). In the present order, the Court used In re Vekos to reinforce two points:

  • Purpose of interim suspension: to “protect the profession and the administration of justice” from the “specter” of a lawyer guilty of a serious crime continuing as an officer of the court.
  • Continuing significance: completion of a deferred sentence does not “undermine” the Court’s prior assessment of the seriousness of the conviction for interim-suspension purposes.

Justice Nolan’s concurrence explicitly references her dissent in In re Vekos, 2026 VT 11, ¶ 21 (Nolan, J., dissenting), underscoring an internal judicial debate: not about what Rule 21(F) says, but about the threshold choice to impose interim suspension in the first place.

ABA Model Rules for Layer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 19, Commentary

The Court cited this commentary (as it had in In re Vekos) to justify interim suspension as a public-confidence measure: continued practice after a serious-crime finding “undermines the public confidence in the profession and the administration of justice.” While not binding authority, it frames Rule 21 as serving reputational and institutional integrity goals in addition to case-specific risk management.

State v. Love, 2017 VT 66

The Court relied on State v. Love to interpret 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e), particularly the meaning of “strike” in the deferred-sentence context. Love was used for the proposition that the statutory directive entails expungement-like removal of adjudications from the record—supporting the Court’s conclusion that “strike” is aligned with “expunge,” not “vacate.”

State v. Pierce, 163 Vt. 192

State v. Pierce further informed the Court’s understanding of deferred sentences under § 7041. The Court quoted Pierce to characterize § 7041 as providing an opportunity to have an adjudication “expunged,” and described it as “more akin to a conditional pardon . . . than to a judicially imposed sentence based on an adjudication of guilt.” This framing reinforces that § 7041 relief is not a merits-based repudiation of guilt; it is a statutory benefit contingent on compliance.

United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004)

Though from the Ninth Circuit and outside Vermont’s jurisdiction, United States v. Crowell supplied a clear conceptual distinction:

  • Vacatur: sets aside or nullifies the conviction and its legal disabilities; it does not necessarily erase the historical fact.
  • Expungement: attempts to destroy/seal records but, “without more,” does not alter the legality of the prior conviction or signify innocence.

The Vermont Supreme Court used Crowell to support its textual reading of Rule 21(F): “reversed or vacated” concerns the validity of the conviction, not merely record status.

G. Blum, Annotation, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult under Statute, 69 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2011)

The Court invoked this secondary authority to reinforce that motions to expunge are substantially different from motions to vacate or set aside—again aligning Rule 21(F) with validity-based relief rather than record-clearing relief.

In re Ettinger, 538 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. 1989)

In re Ettinger was cited for the foundational distinction between criminal and disciplinary systems: criminal proceedings punish wrongdoing; disciplinary proceedings assess whether an individual is fit to practice law. This citation supports the Court’s refusal to treat post-conviction criminal-case mechanisms (like striking/expungement after deferred sentencing) as automatically controlling in the separate regulatory regime governing attorney licensure.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The controlling text: Rule 21(F) requires “reversed or vacated”

The Court treated Rule 21(F) as a straightforward trigger provision. It applies only when a lawyer is suspended “solely” under Rule 21(D) and the lawyer “demonstrates that the underlying conviction has been reversed or vacated.” The respondent’s submission—an entry order “str[iking] the adjudication of guilt” under § 7041(e)—did not satisfy those words.

(b) Statutory comparison: the Legislature distinguishes “vacate” and “strike”

The opinion’s central interpretive move is comparative statutory reading. The Court contrasted:

  • 13 V.S.A. § 2658(d)(2) (human-trafficking-victim relief), which expressly authorizes a court to “vacate the conviction, strike the adjudication of guilt, and expunge the record.”
  • 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e) (deferred sentence), which directs only that the court “shall strike the adjudication of guilt” and expunge the record absent good cause—without mentioning vacatur.

From this, the Court inferred deliberate legislative choice: “vacate” and “strike” are not synonymous, and § 7041(e) does not provide vacatur. This reinforces the Rule 21(F) reading: striking an adjudication after deferred sentence completion does not equal vacatur.

(c) Ordinary legal meaning: Black’s Law Dictionary definitions

The Court grounded its conclusion in conventional legal definitions:

  • “Vacate” = “nullify or cancel; make void; invalidate.”
  • “Strike” = “expunge, as from a record.”

The Court then aligned these definitions with Vermont precedent interpreting § 7041(e) as expungement-like relief (State v. Love; State v. Pierce).

(d) Purpose of Rule 21(F): automatic reinstatement is for invalid convictions

The Court articulated an implicit policy premise: Rule 21(F) is designed for situations where the conviction no longer stands because of “a legal or factual deficiency in the underlying conviction.” Completion of a deferred sentence does not signal deficiency in the conviction; it is a compliance-based statutory benefit. Accordingly, it does not warrant automatic reinstatement that would bypass ordinary disciplinary adjudication.

(e) Expungement is not the same issue—and was not yet granted

Respondent’s argument emphasized expungement, but the Court drew two boundaries:

  • Procedural: the trial court had not yet ruled on expungement (“pending before the trial court”).
  • Doctrinal: expungement is not a listed basis for automatic reinstatement under Rule 21(F).

(f) Concurring perspective: textual agreement, prudential disagreement

Justice Nolan’s concurrence is important for understanding the decision’s scope. She agreed that respondent could not meet the “specific requirements” of Rule 21(F), but questioned whether the original interim suspension served the protective purposes of the disciplinary system, citing:

  • the time lag before Disciplinary Counsel sought interim suspension,
  • lack of recidivism and compliance with probation,
  • and that formal disciplinary charges were filed only after suspension.

This does not change the holding on Rule 21(F), but it signals that future litigation may focus on (1) what qualifies as a “serious crime” under Rule 21(C)/(D) and (2) what evidentiary showing is needed to justify interim suspension as an emergency protective measure.

3.3. Impact

(a) Clear boundary for “automatic reinstatement”

The decision establishes a concrete rule for Vermont attorney discipline: relief under A.O. 9, Rule 21(F) requires an actual reversal or vacatur of the conviction. A deferred-sentence discharge that “strikes the adjudication of guilt” under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e) does not qualify.

(b) Separation of criminal record remedies from licensure consequences

By emphasizing In re Ettinger’s criminal/disciplinary purpose distinction and adopting the Crowell vacatur/expungement framework, the Court reinforces that criminal record-clearing mechanisms do not automatically erase professional-regulatory consequences—especially when the regulatory trigger is the fact of a serious conviction rather than ongoing record visibility.

(c) Practical consequences for deferred sentences

Lawyers (and other licensed professionals) who resolve criminal cases via deferred sentences should not assume that statutory “striking” or even expungement will automatically restore professional status when the governing regulatory rule is keyed to vacatur/reversal. The decision encourages counsel to focus on:

  • whether a conviction has been legally nullified (vacated/reversed), versus
  • whether record consequences have been mitigated (stricken/expunged).

(d) Ongoing disciplinary proceedings continue

Even when Rule 21(F) is satisfied, it states that vacating interim suspension “will not automatically terminate any formal proceeding then pending.” Here, because Rule 21(F) was not satisfied, the interim suspension remains, and the formal disciplinary complaint proceeds in the ordinary course—likely litigating the underlying conduct and fitness issues without reliance solely on the conviction’s procedural posture.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Interim suspension (Rule 21): A temporary suspension imposed before final discipline is decided, typically to protect the public and the integrity of the legal system when a lawyer has been convicted of a qualifying crime.
  • Automatic reinstatement (Rule 21(F)): A limited “undo” mechanism: if the conviction that triggered the interim suspension is later reversed or vacated, the interim suspension is lifted automatically (though discipline can still proceed on other evidence).
  • Vacated conviction: The conviction is legally nullified—treated as invalid. This is the kind of event Rule 21(F) contemplates.
  • Striking an adjudication of guilt (13 V.S.A. § 7041(e)): A statutory consequence of successfully completing a deferred sentence. It is best understood (as the Court does) as an expungement/record-clearing mechanism, not a declaration that the conviction was legally wrong.
  • Expungement: A process that removes/seals records. It does not necessarily mean the conviction was invalid; it often reflects a legislative policy of allowing certain people to move forward after compliance and time.
  • Nolo contendere plea: A plea by which a defendant does not contest the charge. It results in a conviction like a guilty plea, but without an admission typically usable in some later contexts; it does not, by itself, equate to vacatur or innocence.

5. Conclusion

In re Eva Vekos, Esq. (Office of Disciplinary Counsel*), 2026 VT 35 clarifies that A.O. 9, Rule 21(F) is a narrow remedy keyed to the legal invalidation of a conviction. Completion of a deferred sentence under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e)—even though it results in “strik[ing] the adjudication of guilt” and may lead to expungement—does not constitute reversal or vacatur and therefore does not entitle a lawyer to automatic reinstatement from interim suspension.

The decision reinforces a functional separation between criminal record-management statutes and attorney-regulatory protections of the public and the courts. At the same time, Justice Nolan’s concurrence signals continued debate over when interim suspension is necessary and proportionate—an issue likely to recur even as Rule 21(F)’s trigger is now more clearly defined.