Striking a Defendant’s Entire Closing Argument Is a Prejudicial Abuse of Discretion (Even If Parts Were Improper)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Cristian Arevalo Arias (consolidated appeals including codefendants Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez and Carlos Jose Turcios Villatoro), the Fourth Circuit reviewed convictions arising from a joint trial of three alleged MS-13 members charged with RICO and drug conspiracies and multiple murder-related counts. A central appellate issue was the district court’s post-summation remedy for perceived misconduct in one defendant’s closing argument: the court instructed the jury to “completely disregard the entire closing argument” of Turcios’ counsel.

The appeal presented two distinct questions: (1) whether that instruction sufficiently cured any spillover prejudice to Turcios’ codefendants (Arevalo and Menjivar), and (2) whether striking Turcios’ entire closing—rather than only improper portions—impermissibly deprived Turcios of the constitutional right to present a closing argument.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit issued a split disposition:

  • Arevalo and Menjivar: convictions affirmed. Even assuming Turcios’ closing was improper, the targeted curative instruction directing the jury to disregard that closing cured any prejudice to the codefendants, and the court presumed the jury followed it.
  • Turcios: convictions vacated and remanded. The same instruction, when applied to Turcios, was a prejudicial abuse of discretion because it effectively nullified his closing argument in its entirety, including unobjectionable portions, violating the constitutional protection recognized in Herring v. New York and United States v. King.

The court also rejected additional challenges by Arevalo and Menjivar concerning limits on cross-examination of a cooperating witness (Guevara), alleged due process violations (including deportation of Vasquez, destruction of jail-call recordings, and late disclosure), and an asserted inconsistency between a RICO special finding and a VICAR acquittal.

III. Analysis

A. The New Rule/Principle Clarified

The opinion’s most significant doctrinal contribution is its boundary-setting on trial-court control of summations: a district court may police improper argument, but it abuses discretion by striking an entire defense closing—thereby eliminating proper argument along with improper remarks—because the jury is presumed to follow the instruction and thus the defendant is effectively denied closing argument.

B. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1. The right to a closing argument and limits on judicial control

  • Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975): The cornerstone. While recognizing “great latitude” to control scope and duration of summations, it condemns a regime that allows a judge to deny “absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation at all.” The Fourth Circuit treated striking Turcios’ entire closing as functionally equivalent to total denial, because jurors are presumed to comply and therefore consider none of it.
  • United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1981): Reinforced that courts may regulate closings but must respect constitutional rights. King’s logic—no “real opportunity” to argue if the decisionmaker will not consider it—supported the conclusion that an instruction nullifying an entire closing eliminates meaningful advocacy.
  • United States v. Wiley, 93 F.4th 619 (4th Cir. 2024): Cited for the general abuse-of-discretion framework for limitations on closing arguments, which the court then applied with heightened sensitivity to the constitutional floor set by Herring.
  • Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) and United States v. Nixon, 130 F.4th 420 (4th Cir. 2025): Used to explain that even under abuse-of-discretion review, legal errors are reviewed de novo and constitute an abuse of discretion—supporting careful appellate scrutiny where constitutional guarantees are implicated.

2. Presumption that juries follow instructions; limiting Bruton

  • Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023): Provided the modern articulation of the strong presumption jurors follow limiting instructions. This presumption was decisive in two directions: it defeated codefendants’ claims (instruction cured prejudice) and supported Turcios’ claim (instruction erased his entire summation).
  • United States v. Ritter, 167 F.4th 677 (4th Cir. 2026) and Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887): Defined the narrow “exceptional case” where prejudice cannot realistically be cured by an instruction.
  • Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), and Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967): The codefendants analogized to Bruton, but the court refused to extend it—emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reluctance to broaden Bruton and distinguishing arguments (not evidence) from confessions admitted into evidence.
  • Long v. Hooks, 972 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Supported the critical distinction that counsel’s statements in closing are not evidence, undermining the Bruton analogy.
  • Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) and United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2020): Reinforced that overcoming the presumption requires a record-specific showing of an “overwhelming probability” the jury could not follow instructions and “devastating” prejudice.

3. The importance of contemporaneous objection practice

  • Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977): Cited to explain why contemporaneous objections exist (error correction, anti-sandbagging). This supported the court’s critique that the district judge’s “Don’t object” directive contributed to the later overbroad remedy.
  • United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985): Cited for the functional value of timely objections and rulings during summations.

4. Confrontation Clause limits on cross-examination

  • Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974): Recognized cross-examination as the principal means of testing credibility and bias.
  • Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) and Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985): Supplied the controlling limitation principle—Confrontation guarantees an opportunity for effective cross, but trial judges have “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limits to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion, or marginal relevance. These cases drove the court’s approval of excluding inquiry into uncharged sexual-assault allegations as likely to cause a “trial within a trial.”
  • Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1978): Hoover supported the general point that perceived benefits can show bias, but Rabinowitz supported rejecting speculative “curry favor” theories where no pending/anticipated charges exist.
  • Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 2000): Confirmed Confrontation does not override reasonable application of evidentiary rules.
  • United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292 (4th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Seward, 135 F.4th 161 (4th Cir. 2025): Noted as reflecting some intra-circuit articulation differences in standard of review (abuse of discretion vs de novo), but the panel held the result was the same under either.

5. Due process claims: deported witnesses, lost evidence, and delayed disclosure

  • United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982): Controlled the deported-witness claim; defendants must make a “plausible showing” the witness’s testimony would be material and favorable and not merely cumulative. The panel found the substance defendants wanted was largely before the jury through other witnesses/recordings, so no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome.
  • United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004): Cited on whether bad faith is an additional requirement in deportation cases; the panel again declined to decide, but indicated defendants failed any bad-faith showing in any event.
  • California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988): Governed the destroyed jail-call recordings issue: constitutional materiality requires apparent exculpatory value plus inability to obtain comparable evidence; if merely “potentially useful,” bad faith is required. The routine purge policy defeated bad faith, and comparable evidence existed (interview recording, testimony, and the ability to call witnesses).
  • United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 2011): Supported that routine destruction under standard retention policies ordinarily is not bad faith.
  • United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013), United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 (1st Cir. 1986), and United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005): Framed the delayed-disclosure (Brady) analysis and remedies; emphasized that when the problem is delay rather than total suppression, the key is whether the defense was prevented from using the material effectively, and that continuances (not dismissal) are the typical remedy.

6. Inconsistent verdicts and special findings

  • United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984): Supported the general rule that inconsistent verdicts do not entitle a defendant to relief.
  • United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010): Supplied the key doctrinal distinction between VICAR and RICO-conspiracy elements—VICAR requires the “purpose” element tied to maintaining/increasing position, while RICO conspiracy does not—making the special finding and VICAR acquittal reconcilable.
  • United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995): Addressed the concern about “yes/no” special verdict questions; the panel distinguished them because the jury first rendered an ultimate “Guilty” verdict and was instructed to apply the reasonable-doubt standard to the special finding.

C. Legal Reasoning

1. Codefendants (Arevalo and Menjivar): the instruction cured any prejudice

The panel assumed arguendo that Turcios’ closing was improper and focused on remedy. Because the district court’s instruction explicitly removed Turcios’ closing from the jury’s deliberations—and because juries are presumed to follow such instructions under Samia v. United States—the codefendants could not show the “exceptional” kind of ineradicable prejudice required to justify mistrial under United States v. Ritter and the Bruton line. The court also rejected the claim that the instruction might taint the jury’s view of other defendants’ closings, noting the instruction was targeted solely to Turcios.

2. Turcios: striking the entire closing effectively denied closing argument

Turcios’ claim flipped the presumption: if jurors followed the instruction (as courts presume), then they disregarded not just any improper remarks but also the permissible arguments challenging the government’s case. That placed Turcios in the functional position condemned by Herring v. New York—no closing argument “at all.” The panel emphasized that even if portions of a closing are improper, the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded: it must tailor remedies (striking remarks, curative instructions, limiting admonitions) rather than nullify the entire defense summation when substantial portions are unobjectionable.

The court also offered an institutional lesson: the district court’s directive of “Don’t object” during closing undermined the normal error-correction function of contemporaneous objections, making a precise, surgical remedy harder and contributing to the overbroad after-the-fact sanction.

3. Other holdings reinforce trial-management discretion with constitutional backstops

On confrontation, due process, and special findings, the opinion repeatedly applied a consistent method: broad trial-court discretion is respected, but only so long as the defendant retains the constitutionally sufficient “opportunity” to test evidence and present a defense, and only so long as alleged prejudice is material and not merely speculative or cumulative.

D. Impact

  • Trial-court remedies for improper summations must be proportionate. The decision signals that “nuclear” remedies—like striking an entire defense summation—are highly vulnerable on appeal where any meaningful portion of the argument was proper.
  • Curative instructions are affirmed as powerful tools—depending on whom they target. The same instruction can cure codefendant spillover while simultaneously creating reversible error as to the speaker whose advocacy is nullified.
  • Practice implications in multi-defendant trials. The opinion encourages permitting contemporaneous objections in closing (or at least a mechanism for immediate rulings), particularly in complex, high-stakes conspiracy trials where arguments about cooperators and alternative theories are common.
  • Confrontation and due process claims face a “materiality/cumulativeness” filter. The court’s treatment of deported-witness and destroyed-evidence issues underscores that defendants must show non-cumulative, outcome-relevant loss; showing that evidence would be helpful is not enough.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Curative instruction: A direction from the judge telling jurors to disregard certain material. Appellate courts generally presume jurors follow it.
  • Vouching: When a lawyer argues a witness is credible based on the lawyer’s personal belief or special knowledge (“I believe her tears were real”), rather than pointing the jury to evidence.
  • Bruton problem: A special, narrow rule about a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that directly implicates another defendant; jurors may be unable to ignore it even with an instruction.
  • Confrontation Clause “wide latitude”: Defendants have a constitutional right to cross-examine, but judges can limit questioning that is marginally relevant or would cause unfair prejudice or confusion (e.g., a “trial within a trial”).
  • Materiality (due process / Brady / deportation): Missing or withheld information matters constitutionally only if there is a reasonable likelihood it would have affected the verdict; evidence that is cumulative or speculative typically fails this test.
  • VICAR vs. RICO conspiracy element difference: VICAR requires proof the violence was committed to gain/maintain/increase position (or for payment) within the racketeering enterprise; RICO conspiracy does not necessarily require that motive element in the same way for the charged conspiracy.

V. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion draws a sharp line between permissible judicial control of closing argument and an overbroad sanction that effectively erases the defense’s final advocacy. The court reaffirmed the strength of limiting instructions to protect codefendants from improper argument, but held that using the same tool to nullify a defendant’s entire summation crosses the constitutional boundary recognized in Herring v. New York and United States v. King. Practically, the case stands as a caution that when improper remarks occur in closing, the remedy must be targeted—and that ordinary trial safeguards, including contemporaneous objections, are often essential to tailoring a constitutionally sound response.