Strict Issue Exhaustion and Deference to Adverse Credibility Determinations in Asylum Cases: Commentary on Kalombo v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a December 22, 2025 summary order in Kalombo v. Bondi, No. 23‑7851, denied a petition for review filed by Emanuel Kashama Kalombo, a native and citizen of Angola. The panel (Judges Chin, Lohier, and Nathan) upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Although the decision is designated as a “summary order” without precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, it is nonetheless citable and important for how it:

  • Applies the post‑Santos‑Zacaria framework on statutory issue exhaustion in immigration cases;
  • Reaffirms the breadth of the REAL ID Act credibility standard and the deference accorded to IJ findings;
  • Clarifies the role of corroboration (or lack of it) in assessing credibility;
  • Illustrates the court’s approach to speculative reasoning about foreign practices and to harmless‑error review.

The central dispute was whether the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and, if not, whether any errors required remand. The court concluded that the adverse credibility determination was amply supported and dispositive, thereby foreclosing all three forms of protection sought by the petitioner.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Parties and Claims

The petitioner, Emanuel Kashama Kalombo, is a native and citizen of Angola. He sought:

  • Asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158;
  • Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and
  • Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

His claims rested on alleged political persecution in Angola, including a week‑long detention involving torture (described at various points as “waterboarding” and repeated assaults), a broken arm, and continuing interest by the authorities. He also alleged related harms to family members, including the disappearance of his father in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the arrest and killing (or disappearance) of a cousin by police searching for him.

The respondent is the Attorney General of the United States, here captioned as Pamela Bondi, represented by the Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation.

B. Agency Decisions

The IJ (Hochul, IJ) denied all relief on July 18, 2019, principally on the basis of an adverse credibility finding. The IJ pointed to:

  • Inconsistencies between written and oral accounts of his mistreatment and injuries;
  • Perceived implausibilities in aspects of his narrative (including his ability to obtain a party identification card shortly after escape from custody and to obtain a family photograph while under guard in a hospital);
  • Discrepancies regarding his father’s nationality;
  • Reliance on an asylum interview summary;
  • Absence or weakness of corroborating evidence regarding his father’s disappearance and his cousin’s fate; and
  • A finding that it was implausible he could depart Angola on an international flight with an outstanding arrest warrant.

The BIA, in an October 25, 2023 decision, affirmed the IJ. It agreed that the adverse credibility determination was supported by multiple grounds and that, because the petitioner’s asylum, withholding, and CAT claims shared the same factual predicate, the credibility ruling was dispositive of all forms of relief.

C. Petition for Review to the Second Circuit

Before the Second Circuit, the petitioner challenged the adverse credibility finding and, by extension, the denial of all relief. The government invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), arguing that several challenges were unexhausted because they had not been raised before the BIA. The Second Circuit:

  • Enforced the exhaustion requirement as a mandatory claim‑processing rule when properly invoked by the government; and
  • Reviewed the remaining grounds that were either properly exhausted or expressly addressed by the BIA, even if not raised by the petitioner, consistent with its precedent in Ud Din v. Garland.

Ultimately, the court denied the petition, vacated any stays, and denied all pending motions.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Standards of Review

The court reaffirmed standard immigration review principles:

  • Review of IJ and BIA decisions. The court reviews the IJ’s decision “as supplemented by the BIA,” citing Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
  • Legal questions. Questions of law and the application of law to fact are reviewed de novo, citing Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
  • Factual findings and credibility. The agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, are reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard, and are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary” (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Adverse credibility findings receive strong deference unless “it is plain that no reasonable fact‑finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling,” citing Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).

B. Exhaustion of Issues

The court held that the petitioner failed to exhaust challenges to several independent bases supporting the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, including:

  • The IJ’s reliance on the asylum interview summary;
  • An inconsistency regarding his father’s nationality;
  • The plausibility of obtaining a party‑affiliation identification card days after escaping police custody; and
  • The plausibility of obtaining a photograph with his wife and child while hospitalized under police supervision.

These issues were neither raised in the brief to the BIA nor addressed by the BIA. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) and the Second Circuit’s strict approach to issue exhaustion (as crystallized in Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024)), the court treated challenges to these grounds as unexhausted. Because the government invoked § 1252(d)(1), the court enforced exhaustion and left these unchallenged credibility grounds intact as valid support for the IJ’s determination.

C. Credibility Analysis on the Merits

Turning to the exhausted or otherwise reviewable grounds, the court concluded that “substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.” Two core sets of problems were emphasized:

  1. Inconsistent descriptions of detention and injuries. The petitioner’s written statement and hearing testimony diverged on:
    • How often he was “waterboarded” versus otherwise assaulted during his week in prison; and
    • Whether his arm was broken, contrasted with a medical report that documented detailed injuries but did not mention a broken arm.
    The court considered these discrepancies “significant because they relate directly to the alleged persecution,” relying on Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). The court rejected his explanation for the missing broken‑arm notation under Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005), which requires that an applicant show a fact‑finder would be compelled to accept the explanation.
  2. Failure to corroborate key family‑related events. The IJ noted a lack of corroboration for:
    • The alleged disappearance of his father in the DRC; and
    • The alleged arrest and killing (or disappearance) of his cousin by police searching for him.
    The petitioner submitted statements from family and friends, but none mentioned these specific events. A letter purportedly from his father’s attorneys in the DRC was submitted at the last minute, and the IJ gave it diminished weight. The Second Circuit upheld this approach, citing:
    • Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2023) (failure to corroborate can undermine credibility, particularly when testimony is already in doubt);
    • Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (the applicant bears the burden to produce corroborative evidence without prompting from the IJ); and
    • Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (courts defer to the agency’s weighing of documentary evidence).

The court explicitly declined to rely on one of the IJ’s claimed inconsistencies — the suggestion that supporting letters were inconsistent because they referenced fear of return to the DRC rather than Angola — noting that those letters in fact stated that the petitioner feared both places. That ground was treated as erroneous but ultimately immaterial.

D. Speculation About Departure from Angola and Harmless Error

The IJ had also found it implausible that the petitioner could leave Angola on an international flight while a warrant for his arrest was supposedly outstanding. The petitioner explained that a friend who worked at the airport assisted him, and there was no record evidence of Angolan airport security practices or warrant‑enforcement systems.

The Second Circuit held that the IJ “may have erred” here because, absent record evidence of foreign practices, an IJ “must not speculate” about how such systems operate, citing Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 428 F.3d 391, 405 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the court deemed this error harmless. Other credibility defects—especially the inconsistencies in the account of torture and injuries and the corroboration failures—provided “substantial evidence” supporting the adverse credibility finding such that “we can state with confidence that [the] IJ would adhere to h[er] decision were the petition remanded,” citing Liangping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2016).

The court also referenced Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020), reiterating that “even a single inconsistency” can suffice to support an adverse credibility determination; multiple inconsistencies, as in this case, do so even more forcefully.

E. Consequences for Asylum, Withholding, and CAT

Because all three forms of relief—asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection—rested on the same disbelieved factual narrative, the adverse credibility finding was dispositive of all. Citing Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76, the court reaffirmed that where “the same factual predicate underlies” all three claims, an adverse credibility determination “forecloses all three forms of relief.”

The petition for review was therefore denied in full, and all stays and pending motions were vacated or denied.

IV. Analysis of Precedents and Their Role in the Decision

A. Standards of Review and Credibility: Hong Fei Gao, Xiu Xia Lin, and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 & 1252

The court anchored its analysis in well‑established Second Circuit and statutory standards:

  • Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018). This case is now a central reference for:
    • Articulating the de novo standard for legal issues; and
    • Restating that adverse credibility can be dispositive across asylum, withholding, and CAT when all depend on the same factual account.
    In Kalombo, Hong Fei Gao is cited both for the standard of review and for this dispositive effect of credibility.
  • Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008). This decision implemented the REAL ID Act’s credibility provisions. It holds that:
    • Courts must “defer” to an IJ’s credibility determination unless it is plainly unreasonable on the “totality of the circumstances”;
    • Even inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of a claim can support an adverse credibility finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
    The Kalombo order explicitly relies on this deference and totality‑of‑circumstances framework.
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). This REAL ID Act provision specifies that credibility determinations may rest on:
    • Plausibility;
    • Consistency between written and oral statements;
    • Consistency with other evidence;
    • Inaccuracies or falsehoods, “without regard to whether” they go to the heart of the claim.
    The Second Circuit quotes this language and applies it to the petitioner’s shifting story of torture and injury.
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). This provision codifies the substantial evidence standard for reviewing agency fact‑finding: the court must treat findings as “conclusive” unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. Kalombo invokes this to frame the high bar the petitioner must clear to overturn the IJ’s credibility determination.

B. Issue Exhaustion: Santos‑Zacaria, Ud Din, Vera Punin, and Shunfu Li

A significant dimension of Kalombo is the enforcement of issue exhaustion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), as reshaped by the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023).

  • Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). The Supreme Court held that § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is a claim‑processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar. That means:
    • Courts are not deprived of subject‑matter jurisdiction by a failure to exhaust; but
    • If the government properly invokes § 1252(d)(1), courts must ordinarily enforce it.
    Kalombo cites Santos‑Zacaria for this claim‑processing characterization and for the principle that the rule is “subject to waiver and forfeiture.”
  • Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411 (2d Cir. 2023). Post‑Santos‑Zacaria, the Second Circuit in Ud Din clarified:
    • Exhaustion is “mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it;”
    • However, if the BIA chooses to address an issue that a noncitizen failed to raise, the court may review the BIA’s ruling on that issue.
    Kalombo applies both aspects:
    • It enforces exhaustion as to unraised and unaddressed IJ findings that the government invoked;
    • It notes that, where the BIA has nonetheless addressed an issue, the court may review that BIA analysis.
  • Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024). Vera Punin sharply restricts loose or general exhaustion. It holds that an argument is not exhausted unless it “can be closely matched up with a specific argument made to the BIA.” In Kalombo, the court invokes this standard to deem unexhausted the petitioner’s attacks on:
    • Reliance on the asylum interview summary;
    • His father’s nationality inconsistency; and
    • The purported implausibilities regarding obtaining the party ID card and the hospital photograph.
    Because these points were not “closely matched” to an argument actually raised to the BIA, they could not be revived on petition for review.
  • Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008). Shunfu Li emphasizes that waiver is “significant” where unchallenged findings “could, by themselves, support an adverse credibility determination.” In Kalombo, this principle is pivotal: the unexhausted credibility grounds are left in place, and the court underscores that these alone are potentially sufficient to sustain the IJ’s adverse credibility finding—even before it reaches the additional, exhausted grounds.

C. Material Inconsistencies and Explanations: Xian Tuan Ye and Majidi

  • Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2006). Ye remains a leading case for the weight courts give to inconsistencies that directly involve the alleged persecution. There, as here, discrepancies in the petitioner’s account of the persecutory episodes themselves justified an adverse credibility finding. In Kalombo, the court relies on Ye to treat inconsistencies in the description and frequency of torture, and the conflict with medical records, as especially grave.
  • Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005). Majidi held that a petitioner must do more than offer a “plausible” explanation for inconsistencies; the explanation must be so compelling that a reasonable fact‑finder would be required to accept it. In Kalombo, this principle is applied to reject the petitioner’s claim that the absence of a broken‑arm notation in the medical report was an artifact of him leaving the hospital before treatment was complete. The record (a report showing that doctors completed a full physical examination before treatment) contradicted his explanation, and the court held that the IJ was not compelled to credit it.

D. Corroboration: Malets, Wei Sun, and Y.C.

  • Malets v. Garland, 66 F.4th 49 (2d Cir. 2023). Malets affirms that where credibility is already in doubt, a failure to produce corroboration—particularly for significant aspects of the claim—can bolster an adverse credibility finding. Kalombo invokes this principle as to the uncorroborated allegations of his father’s disappearance and cousin’s fate.
  • Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018). Wei Sun clarifies that the burden to produce corroboration lies with the applicant; the IJ need not prompt or direct the applicant to supply such evidence. Kalombo uses this to reject any suggestion that the IJ erred by not asking for more corroboration.
  • Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013). This case instructs that reviewing courts “generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.” In Kalombo, the court relies on Y.C. in accepting the IJ’s decision to give diminished weight to a late‑submitted letter from his father’s purported attorneys in the DRC.

E. Speculation and Harmless Error: Cao He Lin and Liangping Li

  • Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 428 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2005). Cao He Lin is often cited to curb “speculation” by IJs about foreign government practices without record evidence. It held that, absent such evidence, IJs must not assume how foreign authorities operate. In Kalombo, this authority underpins the court’s conclusion that the IJ likely erred in deeming implausible the petitioner’s departure from Angola with an outstanding warrant, given a plausible explanation (assistance from an airport‑employee friend) and lack of any record regarding Angolan airport security systems.
  • Liangping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2016). Liangping Li furnishes the standard for harmless error in the credibility context: if the reviewing court can “state with confidence” that the IJ would adhere to the decision even after removing the erroneous ground, remand is unnecessary. In Kalombo, this standard justifies declining to remand despite acknowledging possible error regarding the airport‑departure implausibility and the misreading of letters mentioning fear of harm in the DRC as opposed to Angola.

V. Legal Reasoning and Its Structure

A. The Court’s Step‑by‑Step Approach

  1. Frame the standards. The court begins by restating its deferential standard of review for credibility and the substantial evidence test, and by invoking the REAL ID Act’s broad criteria for assessing credibility (including non‑core inconsistencies).
  2. Identify unexhausted grounds. The court next isolates several components of the IJ’s credibility analysis that the petitioner never challenged before the BIA and that the BIA never addressed. Under § 1252(d)(1) and Vera Punin, these are deemed unexhausted and therefore unavailable on petition for review when the government insists on exhaustion.
  3. Leave unchallenged findings intact. The court stresses, citing Shunfu Li, that these unchallenged findings “stand as valid grounds” for the adverse credibility determination and, by themselves, could support the IJ’s ruling.
  4. Review remaining credibility grounds on the merits. For the issues that were either properly exhausted or addressed by the BIA, the court conducts a substantial evidence review. It focuses on:
    • Internal inconsistency in the account of torture (particularly waterboarding frequency);
    • The discrepancy between testimony about a broken arm and the medical report’s silence on that injury;
    • The lack of corroboration for dramatic family harms; and
    • The limited evidentiary value of a last‑minute DRC attorney letter.
  5. Identify IJ errors but find them harmless. The court acknowledges that some IJ reasoning was flawed (e.g., speculating about Angolan airport practices, mischaracterizing letters about the DRC vs. Angola). Nevertheless, applying Liangping Li, the panel concludes that the remaining, valid grounds are sufficient to sustain the adverse credibility finding, making remand unnecessary.
  6. Apply the adverse credibility finding across all relief. Finally, the court notes that because the same factual account underpinned asylum, withholding, and CAT, the adverse credibility determination necessarily defeats all three forms of relief, following Hong Fei Gao.

B. The Role of “Totality of the Circumstances” in Credibility

Though individual discrepancies and omissions are discussed separately, the court’s reasoning is explicitly rooted in the “totality of the circumstances” concept codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), as interpreted by Xiu Xia Lin and Hong Fei Gao. Several things are notable:

  • Interlocking problems. The court does not treat each inconsistency or corroboration gap in isolation. Instead, it views multiple, overlapping concerns—including unexhausted ones—as reinforcing one another.
  • Centrality versus peripheral issues. Although the REAL ID Act allows non‑core inconsistencies to support an adverse credibility finding, the court emphasizes that here many inconsistencies relate directly to the alleged persecution itself (how often and in what way he was tortured; whether his arm was broken). This makes the credibility concerns even more compelling.
  • Interaction between credibility and corroboration. Following Malets, the court treats the absence of corroboration not as a separate, stand‑alone defect but as an additional reason to mistrust a narrative already undermined by inconsistencies.

C. Balancing Fairness and Deference: Recognizing Errors Without Remand

Kalombo also illustrates how the Second Circuit navigates between correcting legal or factual missteps and respecting the agency’s primacy in fact‑finding:

  • The court is willing to identify IJ errors (e.g., speculation about foreign security practices, misreading of supporting letters), invoking Cao He Lin and correcting mischaracterizations.
  • But it resists remand where such errors are non‑dispositive. Liangping Li allows the court to uphold the result when it is confident the IJ would reach the same outcome on the remaining, sound grounds.

This approach reflects a pragmatic balance: preserving meaningful judicial review of flawed reasoning while avoiding unnecessary remands in cases where the outcome is overwhelmingly supported by other record‑based reasons.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Precedential Status and Persuasive Value

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, summary orders like Kalombo “do not have precedential effect,” but they may be cited. They often serve as practical guidance on how the court is currently applying established doctrines to recurring fact patterns.

Kalombo does not announce new black‑letter law but:

  • Reinforces a very strict conception of issue exhaustion after Santos‑Zacaria and Vera Punin;
  • Signals strong deference to IJ credibility determinations that rest on multiple, corroborated inconsistencies;
  • Clarifies that an IJ’s missteps will not necessarily trigger remand where other grounds are robust.

B. For Immigration Practitioners and Noncitizens

The decision contains several practical lessons:

  1. Exhaust every significant issue at the BIA.
    Counsel must:
    • Directly challenge each specific credibility ground in the IJ decision in the BIA brief;
    • Avoid relying on generic or broad assertions (“the IJ’s credibility findings are erroneous”);
    • Match arguments on petition for review to arguments made to the BIA, as demanded by Vera Punin.
    Failure to do so may leave damaging IJ findings intact and unreviewable, as occurred with the asylum‑interview summary, nationality inconsistency, and certain plausibility findings in Kalombo.
  2. Prepare for meticulous scrutiny of torture accounts.
    Given the attention to variation in the petitioner’s description of “waterboarding” and daily assaults, practitioners should:
    • Ensure that written statements and testimony are as consistent and precise as possible;
    • Anticipate detailed questioning about the frequency, method, and consequences of torture;
    • Explain any ambiguity proactively, with corroboration if available.
  3. Corroborate key family‑harm allegations.
    Where a claim includes serious harms to family members (disappearances, killings, arrests), Kalombo underscores the importance of:
    • Obtaining and filing timely letters from family members or other witnesses that explicitly reference those events;
    • Securing supporting documents (police reports, legal filings, NGO reports) where possible;
    • Avoiding unexplained late submissions that may justifiably be given reduced weight.
  4. Be wary of last‑minute evidence.
    The court’s acceptance of diminished weight for the late‑filed DRC attorney letter reminds practitioners that:
    • Late submissions are inherently vulnerable to skepticism; and
    • Courts will defer to the BIA’s evidentiary weight assessments absent clear abuse of discretion.
  5. Leverage, but do not overstate, IJ errors.
    Even when IJ reasoning includes speculative or mistaken elements (as here), success on petition for review requires showing that:
    • Those errors significantly tainted the overall decision; and
    • Removing them undermines the IJ’s conclusion on the record as a whole.
    Where multiple, independent credibility grounds exist, as in Kalombo, courts are inclined to treat some errors as harmless.

C. For IJs and the BIA

Kalombo also carries signals directed at adjudicators:

  • Speculation about foreign practices is disfavored. The court restates that, absent record evidence, IJs should not speculate about how foreign governments or security systems operate. This guidance comes from Cao He Lin, and the panel reiterates it in the context of Angolan airport security and arrest warrants.
  • Grounds for adverse credibility should be clearly articulated and supported. Where multiple grounds exist, some may later be disapproved as erroneous or speculative. Yet if others are well supported, the overall determination may survive. This incentivizes careful, thorough reasoning while maintaining efficiency.
  • Weight given to late or weak documents must be explained. The court’s deference under Y.C. presupposes reasoned explanation. Here, the IJ’s concerns about timing and content of the DRC attorney letter were sufficient to justify diminished weight.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection

  • Asylum. Discretionary protection available to noncitizens who demonstrate a “well‑founded fear” of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Requires a lower probability of harm than withholding of removal.
  • Withholding of removal. A mandatory protection if the noncitizen shows that it is more likely than not (i.e., greater than 50% chance) that their life or freedom would be threatened on one of the same protected grounds. Harder to get than asylum but not discretionary.
  • CAT protection. Protection under the Convention Against Torture requires showing it is more likely than not that the person would be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official. CAT relief does not require a protected ground (like political opinion), but does require proof of torture as defined by CAT.

In Kalombo, all three forms of relief rested on the same facts about alleged torture, detention, and ongoing risk; thus, once that factual story was disbelieved, all three claims failed.

B. Adverse Credibility Determination

An “adverse credibility determination” means the IJ concludes that the applicant’s testimony is not reliable or believable. Under the REAL ID Act (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)):

  • The IJ may consider any inconsistency, inaccuracy, or implausibility;
  • These need not go to the heart of the claim, though inconsistencies about the alleged persecution itself are especially serious;
  • The IJ must consider the “totality of the circumstances.”

Once an adverse credibility finding is made and supported by substantial evidence, the applicant cannot usually prevail unless independent, strong corroborating evidence establishes the claim despite the disbelief of their testimony.

C. Substantial Evidence Standard

The “substantial evidence” standard is highly deferential to the agency:

  • The court does not ask whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the IJ;
  • Instead, it asks whether a reasonable adjudicator could have reached that conclusion based on the record;
  • Agency factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary” (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

In Kalombo, the court found that the record did not compel a finding of credibility; reasonable adjudicators could, and did, conclude otherwise.

D. Issue Exhaustion and Claim‑Processing Rules

  • Issue exhaustion. This means a party must present each specific argument to the BIA before raising it in the court of appeals. General objections are not enough; the exact issue must be flagged and argued, according to Vera Punin.
  • Claim‑processing rule versus jurisdictional rule.
    • A jurisdictional rule limits the court’s power. If violated, the court must dismiss the case even if nobody raises the issue.
    • A claim‑processing rule, like § 1252(d)(1) after Santos‑Zacaria, governs how parties must proceed but does not limit the court’s fundamental power. Such a rule can be waived or forfeited if the opposing party does not invoke it.
    In Kalombo, the government invoked § 1252(d)(1), obliging the court to enforce exhaustion and decline to review unexhausted challenges to the IJ’s credibility findings.

E. Harmless Error

Even if a court finds that the IJ made one or more mistakes (e.g., speculating about how Angolan airports process travelers with arrest warrants), the court will not necessarily remand. Under Liangping Li:

  • If the record shows that the IJ had several other, independent, and adequately supported reasons to reach the same conclusion, and the court is confident the IJ would do so again, the error is “harmless” and does not require a new hearing.

In Kalombo, the inconsistency in torture accounts, the broken‑arm/medical report discrepancy, and the corroboration failures made the IJ’s decision robust enough that speculative reasoning about airport procedures and one misread letter did not warrant remand.

VIII. Conclusion

Kalombo v. Bondi, while a non‑precedential summary order, provides a clear window into the Second Circuit’s contemporary approach to three intertwined areas of immigration law:

  • Strict issue exhaustion. The court strictly enforces § 1252(d)(1) when the government invokes it, rejecting efforts to raise in the court of appeals challenges that were not “closely matched” to arguments presented to the BIA.
  • Robust deference to credibility determinations. Drawing on a suite of precedents (Xiu Xia Lin, Hong Fei Gao, Xian Tuan Ye, Majidi), the court upholds an adverse credibility finding grounded in multiple inconsistencies and corroboration gaps, even while acknowledging that some subsidiary IJ reasoning was flawed.
  • Integrated treatment of asylum, withholding, and CAT. The decision reinforces that when all three forms of relief share the same factual predicate, a single, well‑supported adverse credibility finding is sufficient to defeat them all.

For practitioners, Kalombo underscores the need for precise, exhaustive briefing before the BIA, the importance of internal consistency and timely corroboration in asylum narratives, and the limits of relying on isolated IJ errors to overturn an adverse credibility determination. For adjudicators, it reaffirms both the breadth of their discretion in credibility assessments and the necessity of avoiding speculation about foreign practices without record evidence.

In sum, Kalombo v. Bondi is a detailed illustration of how established doctrines on exhaustion, credibility, corroboration, and harmless error continue to shape the adjudication of protection claims in the Second Circuit, even in non‑precedential summary orders.