Storm-in-Progress Rule Does Not Bar Liability for Indoor Tracked-In Precipitation

Rowland v Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. (2026 NY Slip Op 02861, 2d Dep’t May 6, 2026)

I. Introduction

Rowland v Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. is a Second Department premises-liability decision that squarely addresses a recurring defense in slip-and-fall cases: New York’s common-law “storm in progress” rule. The plaintiff, Tracy Rowland, alleged she slipped and fell on water immediately upon entering Brooklyn Hospital Center (“BHC”), in an interior vestibule, while it was raining outside. After discovery, BHC sought summary judgment, arguing chiefly that the storm in progress rule barred liability and that it lacked notice of the condition. Supreme Court denied the motion, and on reargument adhered. The Second Department affirmed, using the case “as an opportunity to clarify the boundaries” of the storm in progress rule.

Key issues: (1) whether the storm in progress rule applies to an accident occurring inside a building due to tracked-in precipitation; and (2) whether BHC met its summary-judgment burden on lack of actual/constructive notice and reasonable remedial measures.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department held that the storm in progress rule does not apply to an accident that occurs inside of a building as a result of tracked-in precipitation or similar conditions. Instead, such claims are governed by ordinary premises-liability principles (creation of the condition, or actual/constructive notice plus time to remedy).

Applying those standards, the Court concluded BHC failed to make a prima facie showing that it lacked constructive notice because it offered no evidence of when the vestibule was last inspected or cleaned before the fall. The Court also found BHC did not establish, prima facie, that placing a mat at some point before the accident was a sufficient remedial measure “relative to the danger posed” under the circumstances. Because BHC did not meet its initial burden, the Court did not reach the plaintiff’s opposition (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.).

Procedurally, the appeal from the June 21, 2023 order was dismissed as superseded by the May 1, 2024 reargument order, and the May 1, 2024 order was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Origins, purpose, and modern articulation of the storm in progress rule

The Court traced the doctrine to Court of Appeals railroad-platform cases: Palmer v Pennsylvania Co. and Kelly v Manhattan Ry. Co.. Those cases emphasize the doctrine’s core rationale: during an active storm, “no ordinary diligence could” keep exposed outdoor areas free from continuing accumulation, and efforts like spreading material on steps during the storm may quickly be negated by ongoing precipitation.

The opinion then situated the rule in modern New York jurisprudence, citing Court of Appeals decisions that have “enshrined” the rule: Battaglia v MDC Concourse Ctr., LLC, Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth., and Solazzo v New York City Tr. Auth., as well as older authorities including Moorhead v Hummel, McAuley v United Cigar Stores Co. of Am., Inc., Meginn v Ramsdell, and Valentine v State of New York.

For the “modern formulation,” the Court relied on its own articulation in Polis v City of New York (also citing Powell v MLG Hillside Assoc. and Fitzsimons v North Shore Univ. Hosp.): a property owner generally is not liable for accidents from snow/ice accumulation until an adequate period of time passes after the storm ends to allow remediation.

The Court also drew on storm-timing refinements: pre-existing conditions are not covered (Gervasi v Blagojevic); a lull does not necessarily trigger a duty (Fenner v 1011 Rte. 109 Corp.), but the rule should not be applied when precipitation has “tailed off” so that continued delay is unjustified (Mazzella v City of New York; see also Johnson v Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist.; cf. Alvarado v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc.). And even during a storm, if an owner undertakes removal, it must do so with reasonable care (Polis v City of New York).

Notably, the Court referenced (as context) that other jurisdictions recognize analogous rules (e.g. Pareja v Princeton Intl. Props., Laine v Speedway, LLC, Mattson v St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, Walker v Memorial Hosp.), underscoring the widespread policy basis for suspending duties where remediation would be futile.

2. Interior tracked-in precipitation: the Second Department’s line and the cases at the margins

The Court emphasized that it had not expanded the storm in progress rule to interior, tracked-in hazards, citing: Yarmak v LSS Leasing Corp., Seedat v Capital One Bank, Hickson v Walgreen Co., and Milano v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp.. It acknowledged contrary-sounding authority—Boarman v Siegel, Kelleher & Kahn and Hilsman v Sarwil Assoc., L.P.—but explicitly “decline[d]” BHC’s invitation to extend the doctrine indoors, thereby clarifying the Second Department’s boundary.

The Court then anchored indoor tracked-in cases in general premises principles, citing Court of Appeals authorities (Fortgang v Chase Manhattan Bank; Miller v Gimbel Bros.) and multiple Second Department decisions applying notice/creation analysis: Yarmak v LSS Leasing Corp., Vinokurova v Edith & Carl Marks Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Inc., Yarosh v Oceana Holding Corp., Beceren v Joan Realty, LLC, and Ruic v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr..

3. Summary judgment burdens, notice proof, and remedial measures in slip-and-fall cases

For the summary-judgment framework, the Court relied on Parietti v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (quoted via Vinokurova v Edith & Carl Marks Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Inc.): a defendant must make a prima facie showing that it neither created the condition nor had actual/constructive notice plus time to correct or warn.

For “tracked-in rain” practicalities, the Court reiterated the familiar limitation from Negron v St. Patrick's Nursing Home and Miller v Gimbel Bros.: defendants need not cover all floors with mats or continuously mop all moisture. But liability may attach where the defendant created the condition or had notice and time to act (citing Hussain v Neurology Continuum, P.C., Yarmak v LSS Leasing Corp., and Mentasi v Eckerd Drugs).

Critically, on constructive notice, the Court applied the specific-inspection proof requirement: to establish lack of constructive notice, a defendant must provide evidence of when the area was last cleaned/inspected relative to the fall (Vinokurova v Edith & Carl Marks Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Inc.; see also Guzman v 787 Holdings, LLC, Phipps v Conifer Realty, LLC, and Yarmak v LSS Leasing Corp.; cf. Solazzo v New York City Tr. Auth.). “General cleaning practices” without proof of a specific inspection is insufficient (same line of cases).

The Court also treated remedial measures (such as mats) as circumstance-dependent, citing Fortgang v Chase Manhattan Bank and additional authorities including Naftaliyeva v Shoprite of Ave. I, Pomahac v TrizecHahn 1065 Ave. of Ams., LLC, and Lawson v OneSource Facility Servs., Inc..

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s doctrinal move is to tie the storm in progress rule to its justifying policy: futility. Outside snow/ice removal during an ongoing storm may be futile because the hazard rapidly re-accumulates. The Court reasoned that interior tracked-in water is different: addressing it during a storm is “simply not subject to the same exigencies,” and “is not a fruitless endeavor.” Therefore, there is no policy basis for suspending the owner’s duty of reasonable care for indoor tracked-in conditions.

Once the storm defense was rejected categorically for this context, the case reverted to standard premises-liability analysis. On summary judgment, BHC’s failure was evidentiary and structural:

  • No constructive-notice negation: BHC offered no proof of when the vestibule was last inspected or cleaned before the fall, which is essential to negate constructive notice under Vinokurova v Edith & Carl Marks Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Inc. and related cases.
  • No prima facie showing of sufficient remediation: merely stating a mat was placed “at some point” did not, on this record, establish adequate remedial action relative to the alleged hazard.
  • Burden allocation consequence: because BHC did not meet its initial burden, the Court did not evaluate the plaintiff’s opposition (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.).

C. Impact

1. A bright-line clarification for the Second Department: The holding supplies a clear rule for litigants and trial courts: defendants cannot invoke the storm in progress rule to defeat liability for indoor slip-and-falls caused by tracked-in precipitation. Those cases must be litigated on creation/notice and reasonable-care measures.

2. Litigation and risk-management consequences: Property owners (including hospitals and other high-traffic facilities) should expect that indoor vestibules and entryways during rain/snow events will be judged by: documented inspection/cleaning intervals, staffing, placement and adequacy of mats/runners, warning signage, and whether conditions were allowed to persist long enough to imply constructive notice. The decision increases the practical importance of keeping time-stamped inspection logs and specific testimony tied to the accident location.

3. Limits on doctrinal expansion: The opinion reinforces that storm in progress is tethered to snow/ice accumulation on exposed areas, and it highlights (in Footnote 2) that New York “has not expanded” the rule to a rain storm not accompanied by snow or ice (citing Hilsman v Sarwil Assoc., L.P. and referencing Sherman v New York State Thruway Auth. and Cammarata v Holy Name of Mary R.C. Church). While the Court’s main holding is about interior accidents, the discussion signals skepticism toward further expansion of the doctrine beyond its traditional snow/ice context.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Storm in progress rule: An outdoor snow/ice doctrine delaying a property owner’s duty to remove accumulations until a reasonable time after the storm ends, because removal during the storm may be futile.
  • Tracked-in precipitation: Water (or slush) carried indoors on shoes, umbrellas, carts, etc., often accumulating near entrances. This decision treats it like any other indoor hazard, not as a storm-in-progress condition.
  • Actual notice vs. constructive notice: Actual notice means the owner actually knew of the wet spot; constructive notice means the wet condition existed long enough that reasonable inspections would have discovered it.
  • Prima facie burden on summary judgment: The moving defendant must first submit evidence eliminating material issues (e.g., inspection times). If it fails, the motion is denied without reaching the plaintiff’s opposing proof.
  • Reasonable remedial measures: The law does not require perfection (e.g., nonstop mopping), but it does require reasonable steps proportionate to the risk—often proven through specific inspection/cleaning evidence and context-appropriate mats/warnings.

V. Conclusion

Rowland v Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr. establishes a clear Second Department rule: the common-law storm in progress rule does not apply to indoor slip-and-fall accidents caused by tracked-in precipitation. Such cases are governed by standard premises-liability principles, and defendants seeking summary judgment must still negate creation and notice with location-specific inspection/cleaning proof.

Beyond rejecting an expansive storm-defense theory, the opinion underscores a practical evidentiary lesson: without concrete proof of when the accident area was last inspected or cleaned—and without a record demonstrating that implemented measures were adequate—summary judgment will fail, even where wet conditions are plausibly related to weather outside.