Stop Signs Do Not Reset the 100-Foot Turn-Signal Requirement Under N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2)

I. Introduction

In Porteus v. NDDOT, 2026 ND 103, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed an administrative driver’s license suspension arising from a DUI arrest that followed a traffic stop. The central dispute was whether law enforcement had a lawful basis to stop Katie Lynn Porteus’s vehicle after she activated her turn signal only once she was already stopped at a stop sign and then turned. Porteus contended the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion because, in her view, N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2)’s “last one hundred feet traveled” requirement does not apply once a vehicle is fully stopped. The North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT) maintained the statute required continuous signaling beginning at least 100 feet before the turn, even if the driver stops at a stop sign within that 100-foot interval.

The Court affirmed the suspension, adopting a plain-language reading of § 39-10-38(2) that treats the “last one hundred feet traveled” as the travel immediately preceding the turn, unaffected by a mandatory stop at a stop sign.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2) requires a driver to signal continuously for at least the last 100 feet of travel immediately before turning. A required stop at a stop sign within that interval does not eliminate or “reset” the duty to have been signaling for that minimum distance. Because Porteus did not activate her signal until she was stopped at the stop sign, she violated § 39-10-38(2). The traffic stop based on that observed violation was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. Accordingly, the NDDOT’s order suspending her driving privileges for 91 days was in accordance with law and adequately explained.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Hoistad v. Henke, 2025 ND 45, ¶ 6, 17 N.W.3d 811

The Court relied on Hoistad v. Henke to frame the standard of review under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32. The decision reiterates that reviewing courts defer to the agency’s findings of fact while reviewing legal conclusions de novo. That division mattered here: the basic facts (including what the dashcam showed) were largely undisputed, while the key dispute—what § 39-10-38(2) requires—was a legal question reviewed independently by the Court.

2. State v. Oliver, 2006 ND 241, ¶ 6, 724 N.W.2d 114 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996))

State v. Oliver and Whren v. United States supplied the constitutional baseline: a traffic stop is a “seizure,” but it is generally reasonable when police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred. While this case was litigated using “reasonable and articulable suspicion” language common to investigatory stops, the cited authority underscores the Court’s broader point: when an officer observes a traffic infraction (here, a signaling violation), the constitutional reasonableness of the stop is strongly supported.

3. Hussiene v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2021 ND 126, ¶ 8, 962 N.W.2d 400

The Court used Hussiene to restate North Dakota’s reasonable-suspicion framework: it is assessed under the totality of the circumstances, is objective, and does not require certainty or the actual commission of a crime. Critically, the Court emphasized (consistent with Hussiene) that observed traffic violations provide the requisite basis for an investigatory stop—reinforcing that the legality of the stop hinged on the correct interpretation of § 39-10-38(2), not on any ulterior DUI-related motive.

4. City of Lincoln v. Schuler, 2021 ND 123, ¶¶ 7, 10, 962 N.W.2d 413

Schuler served two roles. First, it supplied the principle that statutory interpretation is fully reviewable on appeal and begins with the statute’s plain language. Second, it supported the notion that even if an officer is mistaken, a traffic stop can still be objectively reasonable. Although the Court ultimately concluded the officer’s interpretation was correct, the citation to Schuler signals that the constitutional analysis is anchored in objective reasonableness rather than subjective perfection.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The case turns on “the last one hundred feet traveled … before turning”

The Court’s reasoning is a straightforward textual construction of N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2). It focused on the statute’s command that a signal “must be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” The Court treated “must be given” as the operative requirement, with “during not less than the last one hundred feet” defining the minimum signaling interval.

2. The Court rejects the “stopped means not traveling” theory

Porteus’s argument relied on a narrow reading of “traveled,” asserting a vehicle that is stopped is not “traveling,” and therefore a signal activated while stopped is sufficient so long as it occurs “before turning.” The Court rejected this as an error of equivalence—conflating “travel” with “continuous movement.” A driver can be in the course of travel even when required to stop momentarily for traffic control.

The Court reinforced this point by referencing the independent statutory duty to stop at stop signs, N.D.C.C. § 39-10-24(2). In other words, because the law requires a stop at certain intersections, it would be incongruent to interpret the signaling law to become inapplicable precisely in those common, legally mandated scenarios.

3. A stop sign does not “negate the duty” to signal 100 feet before turning

The Court’s core rule is practical and bright-line: if the driver travels at least 100 feet prior to turning, the signal must be continuously activated for at least that last 100 feet, even if the driver comes to a complete stop within that distance. The “last one hundred feet traveled … before turning” are the immediately preceding feet of travel leading up to the turn; they are not erased by an intervening stop.

4. Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8 application

Once the Court determined Porteus’s conduct violated § 39-10-38(2), the constitutional question largely answered itself under the cited traffic-stop precedents: an observed traffic violation provided an objectively reasonable basis for the stop. The Court therefore concluded the stop was reasonable and the administrative suspension was “in accordance with the law.”

C. Impact

  • Clarifies signaling compliance at controlled intersections: Drivers who wait to signal until after stopping at a stop sign (or similar control) risk violating § 39-10-38(2) if they traveled at least 100 feet before the turn without signaling continuously.
  • Creates a workable enforcement rule: The decision avoids a stop-start interpretation that would complicate enforcement and invite fact disputes about when “travel” pauses and resumes. The duty is measured by distance before the turn, not by whether the vehicle briefly stopped.
  • Strengthens administrative suspension cases built on traffic-stop predicates: Many DUI-related administrative proceedings turn on whether the initiating stop was lawful. This opinion provides NDDOT and law enforcement a clear statutory basis for stops where signaling begins only at the stop line.
  • Signals textualism in traffic-code interpretation: The Court’s grammatical parsing of § 39-10-38(2) indicates that future disputes over traffic statutes may be resolved through close attention to syntax and modifiers (e.g., what phrases modify “feet” versus what phrases create independent conditions).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable and articulable suspicion: A common standard allowing police to briefly stop a vehicle when specific, objective facts suggest a law is being broken. It is less demanding than “probable cause” and depends on the overall circumstances.
  • Objective reasonableness: Courts assess whether a reasonable officer, given the observable facts, could believe a violation occurred—rather than focusing on an officer’s subjective intent.
  • “Continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled”: This means the turn signal must be on for at least the final 100 feet leading up to the turn. If you drive that distance and only signal at the stop sign, you have not satisfied the “at least 100 feet” requirement.
  • Administrative license suspension review (N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46): Courts generally uphold an agency decision unless it violates the law, lacks evidentiary support, or fails to explain itself adequately (among other listed grounds). Here, because the legal interpretation was affirmed and the facts were supported by the record, the agency decision stood.

V. Conclusion

Porteus v. NDDOT establishes a clear interpretive rule for N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38(2): stopping at a stop sign does not eliminate the requirement to have signaled continuously for at least the last 100 feet before turning. By grounding its holding in plain language and aligning it with established Fourth Amendment traffic-stop doctrine, the Court both validates the stop in this case and provides a durable, administrable standard likely to govern future disputes over signaling at controlled intersections in North Dakota.