Date: Mar 20, 2026

Stidhum v. 161-10 Hillside Auto Ave, LLC — Discrimination Claims Fail Without Evidence of Disparate Treatment; Pre-Suit Loss of Records Defeats Spoliation Relief

Note on status: The Second Circuit issued this decision as a Summary Order, which the court states “do[es] not have precedential effect.” The analysis below explains what the court did and the practical guidance the order provides.

1. Introduction

Parties: Plaintiff-Appellant Leticia Francine Stidhum, a former car salesperson, sued her former dealership employer 161-10 Hillside Auto Ave, LLC (and related entities/individuals, including managers).
Claims: Sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, and parallel claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and New York City law.
Procedural posture: The Eastern District of New York (Merchant, J.) granted summary judgment to defendants on the federal and certain NYSHRL claims, concluding Stidhum failed to show an “adverse employment action.” The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state/local claims. Stidhum appealed.
Core issues on appeal: Whether Stidhum produced enough evidence to survive summary judgment on three theories: (i) lost commissions due to alleged managerial interference, (ii) a promised-but-unrealized promotion, and (iii) constructive discharge; and whether alleged loss of sales records warranted spoliation relief sufficient to affect summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. Even assuming (without deciding) that the alleged commission loss could qualify as an adverse employment action, the court held that no reasonable jury could infer discriminatory intent on this record. The court also held Stidhum failed to establish a prima facie case for failure to promote (no rejection and no showing of qualifications), and her constructive discharge theory merely repackaged the same non-discriminatory circumstances. Finally, the court rejected spoliation-based arguments: defendants had no duty to preserve the weekly sales logs at the time they were lost.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc., 62 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023) — Cited for the de novo standard of review on summary judgment and drawing reasonable inferences for the nonmovant. This frames the appellate lens: even with favorable inferences, plaintiff still must present evidence permitting a reasonable inference of discrimination.
Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., 124 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024) — Cited to explain that the NYSHRL historically tracked Title VII but was amended in 2019 to align with the NYCHRL’s more liberal standard. The panel noted the claims arose pre-amendment and the plaintiff did not argue retroactivity, reinforcing that timing can dictate the governing state-law standard.
Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2024) — Supplies the familiar prima facie elements: protected class, qualification, adverse employment action, and inference of discrimination. The panel used this as the roadmap, then resolved the case on the “inference” element.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) — Referenced via the district court’s view that the alleged harms were “no more than trifling” (quoting Thomas, J., concurring). The Second Circuit declined to opine on Muldrow’s scope because it affirmed on lack of discriminatory inference—an important narrowing move: the panel avoided deciding whether the challenged conduct met the “adverse action” threshold.
Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir. 1990) — Provides the rule that the appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if not relied upon below. This enabled affirmance based on the insufficiency of evidence of discriminatory intent.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020) — Cited for the basic anti-discrimination principle: discrimination entails treating an individual worse than similarly situated others. The court deployed Bostock to emphasize that a plaintiff must connect alleged workplace friction to differential treatment because of protected status.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) — Used to reinforce that actionable injury must stem from “distinctions or differences in treatment” of protected individuals. Here, the panel found the plaintiff’s evidence did not show she was treated worse than others.
Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2010) — Cited on the need for evidence that the plaintiff was treated “less favorably” than comparators. The court highlighted the record’s silence on whether she waited longer than other salespeople.
Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1985) — Cited for the proposition that conclusory allegations, absent “concrete particulars,” cannot defeat summary judgment in Title VII cases. This directly undercut the plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that others were treated better.
Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2005) — Emphasizes separating reasonable inference from “speculation and conjecture.” The plaintiff’s attempt to infer disparate treatment from others’ higher sales numbers was deemed speculative.
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002) — Sets out spoliation requirements: duty to preserve, culpable state of mind, and prejudice. Applied here to reject sanctions because the sales logs were lost before any preservation duty attached.
Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994) — Recognizes the prima facie burden at summary judgment can be “de minimis,” yet still requires evidence. The panel used Chambers to stress that even a low threshold is not met by speculation alone.
Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009) — Provides the prima facie elements for discriminatory failure to promote, including application/qualification and rejection. The plaintiff failed on rejection (no refusal) and qualification (no evidence beyond an alleged offer).
Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2001) — Sets the constructive discharge standard: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. The panel found her conditions largely mirrored coworkers’ conditions and thus were not objectively intolerable.

B. Legal Reasoning

Affirmance on discriminatory-inference grounds (without resolving “adverse action”): The panel assumed arguendo that lost commissions from delayed credit checks could be an adverse action, but held the claim still failed because the record did not support an inference of sex/pregnancy discrimination. Central to this was the absence of comparator evidence: Stidhum conceded she could not say anyone was treated more favorably, and she offered no concrete examples showing her wait times were longer than others’.
Non-discriminatory explanation corroborated by plaintiff’s own account: The court emphasized that Stidhum’s unique access to Dealertrack ended when the general manager’s password changed during his vacation, putting her in the same position as all other salespeople (who lacked access). With only one manager able to run checks, longer waits plausibly affected everyone. The panel also noted a practical motive inconsistent with intentional sabotage: the manager allegedly delaying checks would personally earn commissions on sales.
Failure-to-promote claim failed at the prima facie stage: Under Aulicino, Stidhum did not show she was rejected—she testified the manager asked to wait and she never followed up. The court also found no evidentiary basis that she was qualified for a sales manager role beyond the claimed offer.
Constructive discharge theory collapsed into the same evidentiary gaps: The alleged intolerable conditions were essentially: loss of software access, reliance on a manager for credit checks, lower income, and a delayed promotion discussion. Because those conditions did not reflect discriminatory differential treatment and were not objectively unbearable under Fitzgerald, constructive discharge failed.
Spoliation could not supply the missing proof: Applying Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., the court found no duty to preserve when the weekly logs were lost (early 2019), since litigation notice (at the earliest) arose later (service of a separate suit in December 2019) and the present complaint was filed in December 2021. The court also noted the plaintiff did not establish culpability beyond the fact of loss, and prejudice was limited because defendants produced monthly logs and pay stubs.
Supplemental jurisdiction issue waived/not pursued: The panel noted Stidhum did not argue error in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims, leaving that disposition intact.

C. Impact

Practical evidentiary lesson in discrimination cases: Even with the “de minimis” prima facie burden (per Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp.), plaintiffs must produce non-conclusory facts allowing a reasonable jury to find disparate treatment or another concrete basis for discriminatory inference. Performance outcomes (e.g., others sold more cars) are not enough without evidence tying the disparity to discriminatory conduct rather than neutral operational changes.
Post-Muldrow litigation strategy: The order shows that “adverse action” debates may be bypassed if the plaintiff cannot prove discriminatory inference. Defendants may emphasize comparator and causation gaps; plaintiffs should anticipate that courts can dispose of cases without reaching the outer boundary of adverse-action doctrine.
Spoliation timing matters: The decision underscores that pre-notice loss of documents often will not support sanctions because the duty to preserve has not attached. Plaintiffs seeking spoliation relief must build a record on (i) when notice arose, (ii) what preservation steps were required, (iii) culpability, and (iv) specific prejudice.
NYSHRL standard depends on accrual date: By citing Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., the panel reinforces that pre-2019 NYSHRL claims may be analyzed under the pre-amendment framework (often aligned with Title VII), absent a developed retroactivity argument.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A case-ending ruling entered when the evidence—viewed in the nonmovant’s favor—could not lead a reasonable jury to find for that party.
Prima facie case (Title VII): An initial showing requiring evidence of protected status, qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances suggesting discrimination.
Adverse employment action: A materially negative change in employment conditions (e.g., pay, responsibilities, status). Here, the court assumed lost commissions could qualify, but still required proof of discriminatory inference.
Inference of discrimination / disparate treatment: Evidence suggesting the plaintiff was treated worse because of protected status—often shown through comparators (similarly situated coworkers treated better) or other concrete indicia of bias.
Constructive discharge: Not a resignation “by choice,” but a resignation compelled by objectively intolerable working conditions.
Spoliation and adverse inference: Sanctions for lost evidence. The moving party typically must show a duty to preserve at the time of loss, culpability, and prejudice.
Supplemental jurisdiction: A federal court’s discretion to keep or dismiss state-law claims after federal claims are resolved; here the court declined to keep the remaining claims.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment because Stidhum’s evidence did not permit a reasonable inference that she was treated worse than similarly situated coworkers due to sex or pregnancy. Conclusory assertions about delayed assistance and speculative inferences from sales outcomes were insufficient under Meiri v. Dacon and Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc.. Her failure-to-promote claim failed for lack of rejection and qualification evidence under Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., and her constructive discharge claim did not meet the objective threshold of Fitzgerald v. Henderson. Finally, the court rejected spoliation-based efforts to fill evidentiary gaps because the lost records predated any preservation duty under Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp..