Stice v. Bergman: COA Denied Where Petitioner Repeats Ineffective-Assistance Allegations Without Showing Debatable § 2254(d) Error

A. Precedents Cited

• Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)
  The cornerstone COA case. The court quoted Miller-El for two key propositions: (1) a COA requires a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and (2) the COA inquiry is a threshold “overview” and “general assessment,” not a full merits adjudication—indeed, “the statute forbids” full consideration at this stage. This framing allowed the panel to focus narrowly on whether the district court’s resolution was reasonably debatable, not whether Stice could ultimately prevail.
• United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2005)
  The Tenth Circuit cited Silva for its articulation of the COA test (quoting Miller-El): whether reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court’s resolution or conclude the issues deserve encouragement to proceed. This standard directly drove the disposition: Stice’s assertions of “reasonable probability” were not tied to a debatable § 2254(d) error.
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
  The governing IAC standard: deficient performance plus prejudice. The order’s analysis repeatedly turned on prejudice deficiencies identified by the Colorado Court of Appeals and accepted by the federal district court under § 2254(d).
• Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2011)
  Used to stress that federal habeas review of IAC is “doubly deferential”—deference to counsel’s strategic choices layered atop AEDPA deference to the state court’s adjudication. This “double deference” concept functioned as a doctrinal brake: even arguable attorney missteps are not enough unless the state court’s contrary conclusion is unreasonable under § 2254(d).
• State cases: People v. Stice and People v. Stice (“Stice II”)
  While not federal precedent, these decisions supplied the operative reasoning to which AEDPA deference attached. The federal courts assessed whether the CCA’s rejection of the IAC claims (especially its prejudice and record-based determinations) was unreasonable.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The procedural lens: COA review, not full merits review

The court anchored its approach in the COA framework: it must take an “overview” and “general assessment” (Miller-El v. Cockrell) to determine whether the district court’s denial is reasonably debatable. This matters because a COA request can fail even if a claim is colorable in the abstract—if the petitioner cannot show a debatable error in how the district court applied AEDPA’s limits on relitigation.

2. The substantive lens: “doubly deferential” review of IAC under AEDPA

The order reiterated that to win federal habeas relief on IAC, a petitioner must satisfy Strickland v. Washington, but must do so through AEDPA’s narrow portal in § 2254(d). Citing Byrd v. Workman, the panel described this as “doubly deferential,” meaning:

• Deference to counsel’s decisions (the ordinary Strickland presumption of reasonableness), and
• Deference to the state court’s adjudication of the IAC claim (AEDPA).

Against that backdrop, Stice needed to show more than disagreement with the outcome; he needed to show the district court’s conclusion—that the CCA’s determinations were not unreasonable under § 2254(d)—is itself debatable among reasonable jurists. The panel held he did not.

3. Application to the three IAC claims

(a) Claim One: failure to obtain/use medical records to suppress a recorded phone call

The recorded call was initiated by D.M.’s father from the sheriff’s office; Stice admitted hugging D.M. but “admitted no criminal acts.” Trial counsel moved to suppress as involuntary; the trial court found voluntariness and admitted a redacted recording.

In postconviction proceedings, the CCA rejected IAC relief because Stice “fail[ed] to allege Strickland prejudice.” Specifically, he did not explain why symptoms from a car accident would have changed the voluntariness ruling, nor did he show a probability of acquittal if the call were suppressed.

The district court held that this prejudice-based rejection was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), and also was not an unreasonable factual determination under § 2254(d)(2). The Tenth Circuit agreed that reasonable jurists could not debate that assessment—particularly because Stice’s COA application again asserted outcome prejudice in general terms without connecting the medical records to a realistic change in the suppression ruling or verdict.

(b) Claim Two: failure to impeach A.Q. with inconsistent statements

A.Q. testified D.M. disclosed that a “man was touching her in her private areas and he would make her touch him back.” Stice claimed counsel failed to impeach A.Q. because, in pretrial statements, she did not report that D.M. said the man touched her.

The CCA rejected this claim as “directly refuted by the record”: during cross-examination, defense counsel did confront A.Q. about her initial conversation with a police officer, and A.Q. admitted she told the officer only that D.M. said she had touched the man’s private parts, not that the man touched her.

Given that the alleged omission was already explored at trial, the district court concluded the CCA’s ruling was a reasonable application of Strickland and a reasonable reading of the record under § 2254(d)(2). The Tenth Circuit found no reasonable-jurist debate on that point: Stice’s COA request effectively reargued an impeachment failure that the transcript contradicted.

(c) Claim Three: failure to rebut prior-bad-act testimony from C.S. with medical evidence from a 2002 trial

Stice’s adult daughter, C.S., testified that Stice sexually assaulted her when she was nine; her forensic interview was played. Stice argued trial counsel should have introduced medical evidence from a 2002 proceeding, including a doctor’s testimony/report that C.S.’s genital exam was consistent with intercourse but also consistent with other explanations.

The CCA rejected IAC relief because Stice did not show counsel’s decision to omit “minimally relevant and possibly prejudicial” evidence was unreasonable or that it created a reasonable possibility of acquittal on the D.M. charges.

The district court agreed: the report was potentially prejudicial and not truly exculpatory as framed; and the CCA reasonably found no Strickland prejudice. The Tenth Circuit held reasonable jurists could not debate that conclusion, especially given AEDPA’s constraints and the CCA’s plausible view that the medical evidence would not meaningfully undercut the jury’s assessment of the charged conduct involving D.M.

4. The sealing request

The panel denied Stice’s motion to seal the district court’s decision and the record on appeal. Although the order does not elaborate, the denial signals that a generalized preference for confidentiality does not overcome the strong presumption of public access to judicial records absent a concrete showing.

C. Impact

While expressly nonprecedential, the order is a useful illustration of how the Tenth Circuit polices the COA gateway in AEDPA/IAC cases:

• Repetition is not enough: A COA application that largely reiterates earlier arguments—without identifying a debatable flaw in the district court’s § 2254(d) analysis—will fail.
• Prejudice must be concrete: The order underscores how frequently IAC claims fail on prejudice, especially when the petitioner cannot articulate how the omitted evidence would likely change a suppression ruling, impeachment value, or the verdict.
• Record-refutation is decisive: When a state court denies an IAC claim because the trial transcript shows counsel actually did the allegedly omitted act (as with A.Q. impeachment), AEDPA deference and the COA threshold are particularly difficult to overcome.
• “Double deference” remains central: The invocation of Byrd v. Workman highlights that even plausible alternative defense choices rarely justify federal habeas relief unless the state court’s approval of counsel’s performance is outside the bounds of reasonable adjudication.