Stevens v. Jurnigan: Appellate Deference to Circuit Court Factfinding on Evidentiary Pleas in Bar

I. Introduction

Case: Stevens v. Jurnigan (Supreme Court of Virginia, Apr. 9, 2026).
Parties: Plaintiff Steve Thomas Jurnigan, II (sexual-abuse survivor) versus defendants Michael H. Stevens, James M. Bowes, and the Southampton Bowmen Club (“SBC”) (collectively, “appellants”).
Posture: The Circuit Court of Sussex County sustained the defendants’ pleas in bar and dismissed as time-barred. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished decision, Jurnigan v. Byrum, treating the matter like summary judgment and reviewing de novo. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment.

Core issues: (1) What standard of appellate review applies when a circuit court decides a plea in bar after receiving evidence (here, deposition testimony and documents)? (2) Relatedly, may an appellate court treat such a plea in bar like a summary judgment motion and deny deference because the trial court heard no ore tenus testimony? (3) On the merits, did the circuit court permissibly find that the plaintiff knew of injury and causal connection before majority such that accrual occurred in 2002 under Code § 8.01-249(6) (2002), making the action time-barred under Code § 8.01-243(A) (2002)?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. When the parties present evidence on a plea in bar and the circuit court resolves disputed facts, an appellate court must defer to the circuit court’s factfinding and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. That deference applies even when the evidence consists of depositions and documents rather than ore tenus testimony.

Applying the proper deference, the Court concluded the circuit court was not plainly wrong in finding that Jurnigan knew, before reaching majority, that the abuse caused at least some of his injuries (e.g., anxiety, intrusive thoughts/flashbacks). Accordingly, the cause of action accrued upon majority in 2002 under Code § 8.01-249(6) (2002), and the two-year limitation in Code § 8.01-243(A) (2002) expired in 2004. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated dismissal (“Reversed and final judgment”).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578 (2000)
    Cited for the foundational definition of a plea in bar as a defensive pleading that can reduce litigation to a single dispositive issue. The Court relied on this to frame pleas in bar as a distinct procedural device—not inherently equivalent to summary judgment.
  • Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566 (2010)
    This is the opinion’s procedural spine. It supplies three key rules the Court enforces here: (i) pleas in bar may require resolution of disputed facts; (ii) parties may present evidence and may demand a jury on factual issues; (iii) if no jury is demanded, the court may decide the “whole matter of law and fact.” The Supreme Court used Hawthorne to reject the Court of Appeals’ “summary judgment” approach and to confirm the circuit court’s role as factfinder.
  • Rule 3:20 (summary judgment)
    The Court contrasts the “no genuine dispute of material fact” constraint of summary judgment with the plea-in-bar mechanism, which can entail factfinding. Rule 3:20 is invoked to show why treating the plea in bar like summary judgment was doctrinally mistaken.
  • California Condo. Ass'n v. Peterson, 301 Va. 14 (2022) and Massenburg v. City of Petersburg, 298 Va. 212 (2019)
    These cases provide the counterexample: when a plea in bar is decided without evidence and solely on pleadings, the allegations are assumed true and appellate review is “functionally de novo.” The Supreme Court cites them to clarify that de novo review is appropriate only in the “no-evidence” plea-in-bar posture, which was not this case.
  • Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 289 Va. 34 (2014)
    Used for the bifurcated review principle: factual findings receive deference; application of law to those facts is reviewed de novo. The Court also uses it to reinforce that when evidence has been taken, appellate courts must defer to trial-level factfinding.
  • Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84 (2023) and Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492 (2015)
    Cited for the “highest degree of appellate deference” to factfinding and for the rule that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence. These cases support the Court’s insistence that the Court of Appeals exceeded its role by effectively re-evaluating the record as if it were first-instance factfinder.
  • Ashby v. Dumouchelle, 185 Va. 724 (1946)
    Central to the opinion’s specific holding on depositions: factfinding based on depositions is “presumptively correct” and cannot be disturbed if supported by “substantial, competent, and credible evidence.” This directly refutes the Court of Appeals’ view that lack of ore tenus evidence eliminates deference.
  • Wolford v. Williams, 195 Va. 489 (1953) and Canavos v. Canavos, 200 Va. 861 (1959)
    Both reinforce the strength of deference even when evidence is conflicting: the judgment is entitled to great weight, and the challenger bears the burden to show it is manifestly wrong.
  • Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323 (2018) and Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
    Cited for the institutional competence rationale: trial judges are primary factfinders; experience produces expertise; appellate courts should not substitute their view of the facts.
  • Harris v. Joplin, 304 Va. 338 (2025); Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796 (2022)
    Invoked for the “no reweighing” and “rational factfinder” framing: review asks whether any rational factfinder could have reached the trial court’s conclusion, not what the appellate court thinks happened.
  • Jurnigan v. Byrum, Record No. 1493-23-2, 2025 Va. App. LEXIS 33 (unpublished)
    The Supreme Court uses this as the foil—identifying two “significant” errors: (i) treating the plea in bar as summary judgment, and (ii) giving no deference due to absence of ore tenus evidence.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The procedural classification controls the standard of review.
    The Court begins from the premise that pleas in bar are not summary judgment motions. They can require the circuit court to resolve disputed facts. Therefore, the presence of conflicting evidence does not automatically preclude granting a plea in bar; instead, it triggers factfinding (by jury if demanded; otherwise by the judge).
  2. “Evidence was presented,” so deference attaches.
    Here, the parties stipulated the evidentiary record for the plea in bar: Jurnigan’s deposition and accompanying documentary exhibits (including statements to police). That record is “substantive evidence,” and it empowered (indeed required) the circuit court to decide the disputed accrual fact.
  3. Ore tenus is not the only gateway to deference.
    While ore tenus findings receive “weight of a jury finding,” the Court emphasizes that deposition/document-based findings also receive substantial deference. The operative standard is not “did the judge hear live testimony,” but “did the judge make factual findings based on evidence.”
  4. Applying the correct standard, the circuit court’s accrual finding stands.
    Under Code § 8.01-249(6) (2002), a childhood sexual-abuse claim accrues at majority unless, at that time, the fact of injury and its causal connection to the abuse is not known—then accrual is when the causal connection is first communicated by a licensed clinician. The circuit court found the “not known” condition was not satisfied because the plaintiff’s own prior statements and testimony showed awareness of at least some injury and causal connection while still in school. The Supreme Court held that finding was reasonably supported and not plainly wrong.
  5. Limitations consequence follows from accrual.
    Once accrual is set at 2002, the two-year period under Code § 8.01-243(A) (2002) ends in 2004, rendering the 2017 complaint time-barred.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies the appellate lens for evidentiary pleas in bar: If evidence is presented and the circuit court resolves factual disputes, appellate courts must defer to that factfinding—even when the evidence is depositions and documents. This narrows the circumstances under which the Court of Appeals may apply “functionally de novo” review in plea-in-bar cases.
  • Reinforces plea in bar as a true factfinding mechanism: The decision discourages litigants and reviewing courts from importing summary judgment concepts (“genuine dispute of material fact”) into pleas in bar where the court is authorized to decide disputed facts absent a jury demand.
  • Practical litigation effects:
    • Parties contesting limitations-based pleas in bar will be incentivized to consider demanding a jury under the framework noted in Hawthorne v. VanMarter, because otherwise the judge’s factfinding will receive strong deference on appeal.
    • Trial strategy will likely focus on developing a record that supports (or undermines) accrual-related knowledge findings, recognizing that appellate courts will not reweigh that record.
  • Substantive implications for delayed-discovery accrual in childhood sexual-abuse cases (procedurally mediated): Without changing the statutory text, the opinion underscores that accrual disputes under Code § 8.01-249(6) (2002) can be resolved against plaintiffs on an evidentiary plea in bar where the record supports earlier knowledge of injury and causal connection. The key shift is not the statute, but the deference accorded to trial-level determinations on that question.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Plea in bar
A defense that, if proven, ends the case (or a claim) without reaching the merits—e.g., “the statute of limitations has run.” Unlike summary judgment, it can involve the court deciding disputed facts.
Summary judgment (Rule 3:20)
A procedure where the court may enter judgment only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The court does not decide whose facts are more believable; it decides whether a trial is unnecessary because the facts are undisputed.
Ore tenus
Live testimony given in person before the judge. Virginia often gives especially strong deference to factfinding based on ore tenus testimony, but this case emphasizes that deposition-based factfinding still gets substantial deference.
Standard of review: “de novo” vs. “deferential” (“plainly wrong”)
  • De novo means the appellate court decides the issue fresh, without deference.
  • Deferential review means the appellate court accepts the trial court’s factual findings unless they are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence; it does not reweigh conflicting evidence.
Accrual
The date the law treats a claim as having “started” for limitations purposes. Under Code § 8.01-249(6) (2002), childhood sexual-abuse claims generally accrue at majority, unless injury and causal connection were not then known, in which case accrual can be delayed until a licensed clinician communicates the connection.
Statute of limitations
The filing deadline measured from accrual. Here, once accrual was found to be 2002, the applicable two-year period in Code § 8.01-243(A) (2002) expired in 2004.

V. Conclusion

Stevens v. Jurnigan establishes a clear procedural rule: when a circuit court decides a plea in bar after considering evidence and resolving disputed facts, appellate courts must defer to the circuit court’s factfinding—even if the evidence is entirely documentary or by deposition and no ore tenus testimony was heard. The Court of Appeals erred by treating the plea in bar as summary judgment and by withholding deference.

The case’s broader significance lies in reaffirming the plea in bar as a factfinding vehicle in Virginia civil practice and in tightening the boundary between de novo review (pleadings-only pleas in bar) and deferential review (evidentiary pleas in bar). Within limitations litigation—especially accrual disputes—the decision signals that trial-level factual resolutions will be difficult to overturn when supported by substantial, competent, and credible evidence.