Sterling v. City of Jackson: No Substantive Due Process Right to Contaminant-Free Municipal Water or Truthful Official Assurances About Water Safety

Introduction

In Sterling v. City of Jackson (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026) (en banc), residential subscribers to Jackson, Mississippi’s municipal water system (Priscilla Sterling, Raine Becker, Shawn Miller, and John Bennett, on behalf of a putative class) sued the City of Jackson and multiple city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that city actions and failures caused lead to leach into the drinking water and that officials then falsely assured residents the water was safe, inducing consumption of contaminated water and resulting in serious health harms.

The central issues were whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes (i) a substantive due process right not to be exposed to contaminated municipal water caused by government mismanagement, and/or (ii) a substantive due process right to truthful information from public officials about the presence of contaminants in municipally supplied drinking water—either directly, through the “bodily integrity” line of cases, or by analogy to informed-consent principles.

The district court dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12 and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. A prior panel decision was vacated when the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.

Summary of the Opinion

The en banc majority (Judge Engelhardt) affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The court held that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, though grave, are not constitutionally cognizable under substantive due process because neither asserted right is “deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and tradition.” The court declined to expand:

  • a right to be free from exposure to contaminated water attributable to officials’ acts or omissions, and
  • a right to accurate information from public officials during a public-health crisis.

The majority additionally explained that even if Plaintiffs could plead a constitutional violation, the individual officials would be entitled to qualified immunity because no such right was clearly established.

Judge Haynes concurred in part and dissented in part (joined by Judges Stewart, Higginson, Douglas, and Ramirez), arguing Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of the established right to bodily integrity and criticizing the majority for omitting discussion of Plaintiffs’ separately pleaded “state-created danger” theory. The dissent agreed, however, that the individual officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claims as pleaded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The modern framework: history-and-tradition constraints on substantive due process

  • Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022): The majority uses Dobbs as a directive to avoid “freewheeling judicial policymaking” and to demand a historical analogue before recognizing new substantive due process rights. The opinion repeatedly emphasizes Dobbs’s insistence that courts “exercise the utmost care” and keep contested policy issues in the democratic arena absent deeply rooted tradition.
  • Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997): Supplies the “careful description” requirement and the test asking whether a right is deeply rooted and implicit in ordered liberty. The majority treats Glucksberg as the methodological backbone for rejecting both proposed rights as novel.
  • Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993): Reinforces the need to define the asserted right precisely; the majority also invokes its “mere novelty” caution as a reason to doubt that substantive due process supports a claim for official misrepresentations about water safety.
  • County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): Cited for the demand for an “exact analysis” of circumstances and context. Plaintiffs relied heavily on Lewis; the majority responds that Lewis addresses culpability standards and provides no recognition of a right applicable to municipal water contamination.
  • Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992): Central to the majority’s refusal to constitutionalize service-delivery failures; it is cited for the Court’s “reluctant to expand” language and the idea that the Due Process Clause is not a font of generalized governmental competence requirements.
  • DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989): Used to draw the line between constitutional wrongs and tort harms, stressing that the Constitution does not impose affirmative duties to provide safety or services and should not be expanded into a broad liability regime.
  • Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010): Cited to reiterate that only certain unenumerated rights qualify and to echo skepticism about substantive due process methodology.

2) No constitutional entitlement to competent municipal services

  • Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982): Invoked for the proposition that a State generally has no constitutional duty to provide substantive services absent a special relationship.
  • DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) and Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992): The majority extrapolates that even when services like water treatment are provided, the Constitution does not require they be delivered “in a reasonably competent fashion.”

3) Bodily integrity doctrine—recognized, but not extended to water contamination

  • Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990): Recognizes bodily integrity interests in refusing treatment; the majority distinguishes this line from claims about misinformation and contaminated water.
  • Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Tyson v. County of Sabine, 42 F.4th 508 (5th Cir. 2022): The majority frames bodily integrity as protection against direct physical intrusions (forced procedures, involuntary medication, assault), concluding the municipal water allegations are “wholly different” and too attenuated to fit within that category.
  • Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989): Supplies language for extreme reluctance to “breathe further substantive content” into the Due Process Clause.
  • Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2019): Expressly rejected as unpersuasive. The majority reasons that applying bodily integrity to contaminated water would dilute the doctrine beyond what would have been understood at the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption.

4) No constitutional right to truthful public statements in a crisis

  • Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007) and Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008): The majority relies on these cases—arising from post-9/11 air-quality communications—to support refusal to recognize substantive due process liability for public statements. Both Second Circuit decisions are used to underscore the lack of precedent and the judiciary’s hesitancy to constitutionalize official communications during evolving crises.
  • Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor, 137 F.4th 420 (6th Cir. 2025): Deemed unpersuasive, largely because it relied on Guertin.

5) Qualified immunity and “clearly established” law

  • Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011), Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), and Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004): Anchor the majority’s alternative holding: even if a right existed, it was not clearly established in a sufficiently particularized way.
  • Dilworth v. Tucker, No. 25-60414, 2026 WL 1892138 (5th Cir. July 1, 2026) and Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2021): Cited for the “rare ‘obvious case’” exception; the court holds this is not such a case.
  • Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994): Used to reject reliance on later-decided cases (like Guertin) to clearly establish earlier conduct.

6) § 1983 pleading and municipal liability support points

  • James v. Tex. Collin County, 535 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2008) and Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 2013): Provide the threshold structure: absent a constitutional violation, § 1983 fails.
  • Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1997): Reinforces that municipal liability cannot exist without an underlying constitutional violation.
  • Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Address pleading posture and dismissal of claims against an official as to whom no factual allegations were made.
  • Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2009): Supports affirmance of the supplemental-jurisdiction dismissal of state claims without prejudice once federal claims are dismissed.

Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s “careful description” of the asserted rights

Rather than accept broad framings (e.g., “clean water is a fundamental human right”), the majority narrows the asserted rights to: (1) a right not to be exposed to contaminated water caused by officials’ acts or omissions, and (2) a right to truthful information from public officials about contaminants in municipally supplied drinking water. This definitional step is decisive because the more specifically a right is described, the harder it becomes to claim it is historically “deeply rooted.”

2) Refusal to constitutionalize municipal water mismanagement

The majority treats the provision and quality of municipal water as a paradigmatic “services” problem governed by ordinary political accountability and tort law, not the Due Process Clause. Building on DeShaney and Collins, the court reasons that the Fourteenth Amendment restrains government from depriving life, liberty, or property without due process, but generally does not impose affirmative obligations to provide safe conditions or competent services.

3) Bodily integrity: recognized category, but limited to direct intrusions

Plaintiffs attempted to recast contaminated-water exposure and alleged inducement-by-misinformation as a bodily integrity violation. The majority rejects the fit, distinguishing classic bodily integrity cases—forced procedures, compelled medication, sexual assault, stomach-pumping—from indirect harms caused by system failures and alleged misleading communications. The court’s underlying worry is doctrinal: expanding bodily integrity to cover municipal infrastructure failures risks transforming substantive due process into a general constitutional tort.

4) No substantive due process right to accurate information from officials in this context

On misinformation, the majority emphasizes the absence of any Supreme Court or binding precedent recognizing § 1983 liability for public statements made during an evolving public crisis, drawing support from Lombardi v. Whitman and Benzman v. Whitman. It rejects analogies to informed-consent cases, reasoning that the informed-consent line concerns invasive medical or evidence-extraction intrusions rather than public risk communication.

5) Alternative holding: qualified immunity

Even if a constitutional right could be teased from the Due Process Clause, the majority holds it was not “clearly established” at the relevant time. The absence of controlling authority or a “robust consensus” recognizing such rights—coupled with the court’s rejection of Sixth Circuit decisions as persuasive—means the individual officials would be immune from money damages in any event.

6) The dissent’s competing approach (and what the majority effectively rejects)

The dissent would treat the pleaded facts as plausibly alleging that officials effectively caused residents to ingest a toxic substance without meaningful ability to avoid it—an invasion of bodily integrity—and would have the case proceed to discovery against the City (while still granting qualified immunity to individuals). It also urges the Fifth Circuit to adopt the “state-created danger” doctrine and criticizes the majority for not addressing it.

The majority’s silence on “state-created danger” leaves the Fifth Circuit’s long-running reluctance to adopt that doctrine intact, while its core holding narrows the availability of substantive due process as a vehicle for litigating municipal public-health infrastructure breakdowns.

Impact

1) Substantive due process claims tied to municipal infrastructure harms face a higher bar

The decision signals that, in the Fifth Circuit, plaintiffs harmed by municipal water contamination should expect substantive due process claims to fail unless they can identify a historically grounded right and fit their allegations within a tightly cabined doctrine (and not merely describe severe injury or bad governance).

2) Bodily integrity doctrine constrained

By rejecting Guertin v. Michigan and distancing contaminated-water exposure from classic “intrusion” cases, the Fifth Circuit limits bodily integrity to more direct, state-imposed interferences, reducing the likelihood that environmental and public-health exposures will be constitutionalized under that rubric.

3) Public-official misstatements: no general constitutional remedy

Plaintiffs alleging they were misled by government assurances during crises will find little traction under substantive due process absent extraordinary, historically anchored circumstances. The court’s reliance on Lombardi and Benzman suggests skepticism toward constitutional liability for crisis communications and risk messaging.

4) Litigation channeling: tort, statutory enforcement, political remedies

The opinion deliberately channels relief to state tort law, elections, and regulatory enforcement (including Safe Drinking Water Act and EPA oversight described in the record). Practically, this reinforces the division between constitutional litigation and public-health governance: the latter is expected to be addressed through legislation, regulation, and ordinary civil liability, not federal constitutional adjudication.

5) Qualified immunity backstop

The qualified-immunity discussion further reduces incentives to litigate novel substantive due process theories for damages against individual officials, even where plaintiffs can plead egregious facts, because “clearly established” law will rarely exist for unprecedented crisis scenarios.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Substantive due process: A doctrine that protects certain fundamental rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution. Courts will recognize such rights only if they are deeply rooted in U.S. history and tradition and essential to ordered liberty.
  • “Careful description” of the right: Courts define the claimed right narrowly (what, exactly, is the government alleged to have done, and what specific entitlement is asserted?) to prevent broad, abstract formulations from driving outcomes.
  • Bodily integrity: A protected interest against direct physical intrusions by the state—e.g., forced medical procedures, compelled medication, or assault. The majority held that contaminated municipal water exposure caused by mismanagement is not the same kind of direct intrusion.
  • Qualified immunity: Even if a right exists, officials are protected from damages unless the right was “clearly established” so that every reasonable official would have understood the conduct was unlawful under then-existing precedent.
  • § 1983: A federal statute allowing suits for violations of federal constitutional rights by those acting under color of state law; it is not a general remedy for all harms caused by government actors.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear related state-law claims when federal claims are present, but may dismiss state claims without prejudice after federal claims are dismissed.

Conclusion

Sterling v. City of Jackson establishes (and emphatically reiterates) that, in the Fifth Circuit, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not create new substantive rights to (1) be free from exposure to contaminated municipal drinking water attributable to officials’ acts or omissions, or (2) receive truthful information from public officials about water contaminants during a public-health crisis—absent a deeply rooted historical analogue.

The decision draws a firm boundary between constitutional law and public-health/infrastructure governance, directing plaintiffs toward tort remedies, statutory and regulatory enforcement, and political accountability. While the dissent would have allowed the case to proceed (at least against the City) on bodily integrity and would address state-created danger more directly, the controlling en banc opinion tightens the circumstances in which municipal public-health failures can be reframed as substantive due process violations.