Stays Denied Where a State Attorney General’s Out-of-State Enforcement Suit Appears Retaliatory and Bad-Faith: Younger’s Bad-Faith Exception and “Express Aiming” Jurisdiction

1. Introduction

American Academy of Pediatrics v. James Uthmeier (7th Cir. June 22, 2026) arises from an unusual procedural and federalism posture: a Florida Attorney General filed a Florida state enforcement action against an Illinois-based medical nonprofit and others, publicly framing the suit as a means to “hurt” the organizations financially and to end gender-affirming care “for once and for all.” Before service was even made, the Illinois organization—American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)—filed a federal action in Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex parte Young, alleging the Florida lawsuit was filed in bad faith to retaliate against and chill AAP’s First Amendment-protected scientific advocacy on gender-affirming care.

The Northern District of Illinois issued a preliminary injunction barring Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier from pursuing the Florida action against AAP. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed a narrow issue: whether to stay that injunction pending expedited merits review under Fed. R. App. P. 8. The majority (per curiam) denied the stay; Judge Scudder dissented, warning of serious federalism costs and an overexpansive use of the Younger bad-faith exception.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit denied Attorney General Uthmeier’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal because he did not make the “strong showing” required by Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, and (2) he will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay.

• Personal jurisdiction: The court held Uthmeier did not strongly show the Illinois federal court lacked personal jurisdiction. Applying Calder v. Jones “express aiming,” it found substantial support that the Florida enforcement action targeted harm in Illinois (including requested relief such as dissolution/charter forfeiture).
• Venue: Uthmeier did not strongly show venue was improper; the locus of chilling effects and relevant AAP activities in Illinois supported venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
• Younger abstention: Although enjoining a pending state enforcement action raises serious comity concerns, the court emphasized the longstanding bad-faith exception to Younger and held Uthmeier did not strongly show the district court clearly erred in finding bad faith.
• Equities/irreparable harm: Uthmeier’s asserted sovereign harm from being enjoined did not outweigh the concrete First Amendment harms and the limited, expedited duration of the injunction; his own delay in service undercut urgency.

The court repeatedly stressed its ruling was preliminary and did not decide the merits of the preliminary injunction appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Stays pending appeal and appellate posture

• Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009): Supplies the central stay framework: the movant must make a “strong showing” of likely success and irreparable injury; only then do courts weigh balance of harms and public interest. The Seventh Circuit used Nken to keep the inquiry tightly focused on whether Uthmeier had met a demanding interim-relief burden, not whether he might ultimately prevail.
• Illinois v. Trump, 155 F.4th 929 (7th Cir. 2025) and Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 14 F.4th 624 (7th Cir. 2021): Explain the Seventh Circuit’s stay methodology: a “fresh look” at legal issues while reviewing factual findings for clear error and respecting the district court’s equitable discretion.

B. Personal jurisdiction: minimum contacts and “express aiming”

• International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945): Baseline due process standard: minimum contacts consistent with “fair play and substantial justice.”
• Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984): Anchors the “effects” principle: intentional conduct in one state can support jurisdiction where it is “calculated to cause injury” in the forum.
• Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hou. Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2010): Provides Seventh Circuit gloss: “express aiming” requires evidence beyond plaintiff’s residence; knowledge and targeting of forum harm matter.
• Defense Distributed v. Grewal, 971 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2020): Key analog: an out-of-state attorney general’s threats and litigation aimed at stopping speech “generally,” combined with public statements indicating an intent to “crush” operations, supported personal jurisdiction in the speaker’s home forum. The Seventh Circuit treated this as strong, persuasive support for jurisdiction over an out-of-state AG when the practical target is nationwide suppression and operational shutdown.
• Media MaĴers for America v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir. 2025): Reinforces that “censorship-based effects” of a retaliatory investigation can connect an out-of-state attorney general to the forum; also supports venue based on the location where chilling effects are felt.

C. Venue

• 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2): Venue is proper where a “substantial part” of events or omissions occurred; the court emphasized this does not require the “best” or exclusive venue.
• Myers v. BenneĴ Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2001): Cited for the proposition that in tort-like claims, the locus of injury is relevant to venue.
• Media MaĴers for America v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir. 2025): Used again to support forum venue where retaliatory effects are experienced.

D. Younger abstention and the bad-faith exception

• Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): The foundational abstention doctrine grounded in federalism and comity, generally barring federal injunctions interfering with pending state proceedings; critically, Younger also recognizes an exception for proceedings brought in “bad faith and harassment.”
• Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965): The paradigm for the bad-faith/harassment exception; Younger relied on Dombrowski to describe when equitable intervention is justified to prevent irreparable First Amendment injury caused by bad-faith prosecutions.
• Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013): Defines the categories of proceedings to which Younger applies (criminal, quasi-criminal civil enforcement, and certain civil proceedings implicating state judicial functions).
• Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975): Confirms Younger’s civil counterpart and reiterates intervention is allowed when a proceeding is motivated by harassment or bad faith.
• Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976): Reaffirms the “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction, framing abstention as exceptional.
• Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) and Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975): Provide the bad-faith exception’s “no hope” / “no reasonable expectation” formulations. The Seventh Circuit used Kugler to justify looking at objective weakness on the merits as part of the bad-faith inquiry.
• Collins v. Kendall County, 807 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1986): Seventh Circuit authority emphasizing the immediacy of harm from bad-faith prosecution and explaining that comity rationales weaken when the state lacks a legitimate interest in retaliatory enforcement.
• Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979): Quoted via Collins for the proposition that retaliation/harassment prosecutions negate the “legitimate pursuit” rationale for Younger deference.
• Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th 1080 (5th Cir. 2023): Supports the proposition that a defendant’s federal right not to be subjected to a bad-faith prosecution cannot be adequately vindicated by enduring the prosecution and raising constitutional defenses later; also supports considering prosecutorial delay as a bad-faith indicator.
• Additional persuasive authorities cited for application of the exception in comparable contexts: Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1992); Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1988); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982); and the multiple-prosecution discussion relying on Fiĵgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981).
• The court also cited Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) and Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969) (via Collins) for characterizations of bad faith as prosecutions used to suppress speech or brought with no expectation of conviction.

E. Substantive First Amendment backdrop

• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908): Provides the doctrinal vehicle allowing injunctive relief against a state officer for ongoing violations of federal law.
• Chiles v. Salazar, 607 U.S. —, 146 S. Ct. 1010 (2026): Cited to underscore that speech and advocacy relating to gender-affirming care are protected and that the state may not impose viewpoint-based censorship under the guise of regulation.
• Endocrine Soc'y v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 26-512, 2026 WL 1257289 (D.D.C. May 7, 2026): Used to support the “ideas rather than products” characterization of clinical guidance, education, and policy advocacy when assessing attempts to treat such speech as commercial conduct.
• Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990): Invoked by Uthmeier to argue “standards-setting” speech can implicate antitrust; the Seventh Circuit distinguished Wilk as involving boycott-like effects not apparent in AAP’s policy statement and advocacy.

F. Irreparable harm and delay

• Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers): Recognizes states suffer irreparable injury when enjoined from effectuating statutes; the majority accepted the general principle but found it insufficient given the particular record and expedited review posture.
• Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001): Cited for the proposition that delay in seeking or pursuing relief undermines claimed irreparable harm.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The court’s core move: treating “bad faith” as a jurisdiction-preserving safety valve, not an exceptional afterthought

The opinion frames Younger’s bad-faith exception as a “critical safety valve” necessary to preserve federal rights when state power is allegedly used to suppress protected expression. The majority’s analysis emphasizes that comity is premised on the state’s legitimate interest in enforcing its laws; that premise weakens when the enforcement action is plausibly retaliatory and brought without a reasonable expectation of success. In that setting, the federal judiciary’s “virtually unflagging obligation” to decide cases reasserts itself.

B. Objective and subjective bad faith: merits weakness + retaliatory indicators

The Seventh Circuit treated the district court’s bad-faith finding as supported by both:

• Objective weakness on the merits: The district court found that all three Florida claims (FDUTPA, Florida RICO, and Florida antitrust) required showing AAP’s conduct was “commercial,” while AAP is a nonprofit scientific organization that does not sell or provide gender-affirming care. The Seventh Circuit held that considering the merits is consistent with Kugler v. Helfant’s “no reasonable expectation” standard and is commonly done in bad-faith cases (citing Netflix, Inc. v. Babin and Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas).
• Conduct indicative of retaliatory purpose: The court credited the district court’s reliance on Uthmeier’s inflammatory public statements (including intent to cause financial harm and to end gender-affirming care), litigation delay (three months without service), and alleged mischaracterizations of AAP’s policy statement. These factors supported an inference that the enforcement action functioned as an instrument to chill speech.

Importantly, the majority rejected the idea that bad faith requires multiple or repeated prosecutions, noting Younger’s disjunctive phrasing and cases like Fiĵgerald v. Peek and Wilson v. Thompson.

C. Personal jurisdiction and the “anti-censorship” application of Calder

The jurisdiction analysis extends beyond mere forum injury. The court identified “express aiming” through the Florida complaint’s requested remedies—especially dissolution/reorganization, charter forfeiture, and nationwide activity restrictions—paired with public statements indicating an intent to “crush” operations. In the majority’s view, these facts line up closely with Defense Distributed v. Grewal and Media MaĴers for America v. Paxton, which recognize that a state attorney general can create constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the target’s home forum when the enforcement action is aimed at suppressing speech broadly rather than regulating within the AG’s state.

D. Venue anchored in where chilling effects and organizational activity occur

For venue, the opinion relies on the practical reality of First Amendment retaliation: a key “event” is not just where the enforcement action is filed, but where the threatened consequences and deterrence are experienced. Service in Illinois, chilling effects in Illinois, and the Illinois-based creation and publication of the statements targeted in Florida together supported venue.

E. The stay posture matters: “strong showing” + expedited timeline

Even if the appeal raises significant federalism issues, the majority emphasized that a stay is extraordinary relief requiring strong interim showings. Uthmeier’s delay in serving process and Florida’s criminalization of certain care since 2023 undermined any claim of urgent, irreparable harm from pausing the Florida action briefly while the Seventh Circuit considered the appeal on an expedited basis.

F. Engagement with the dissent

Judge Scudder’s dissent presents the case as a grave federalism breach, emphasizing that the Younger bad-faith exception is rarely applied and warning that weak claims should be resolved in state court without federal intervention. He cited Florida statutory text suggesting FDUTPA reaches nonprofits and invoked authorities emphasizing respect for state courts’ ability to adjudicate federal defenses, including Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). He also drew support from Yelp Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th 944 (9th Cir. 2025) (cited in dissent) for the notion that retaliation defenses do not automatically establish bad faith sufficient to enjoin state proceedings.

The majority did not treat the rarity of Supreme Court applications of the bad-faith exception as disabling; instead, it treated the exception as doctrinally embedded and practically necessary, and it viewed the present record as within the “rare case” category described in Collins v. Kendall County.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical litigation consequences

• Forum selection for targets of state AG enforcement: Organizations sued by an out-of-state attorney general in a manner plausibly aimed at suppressing speech may find stronger footing to sue in their home forum, particularly when the state action seeks nationwide restrictions or organizational dissolution-like relief.
• Evidence record for “bad faith”: The opinion signals that plaintiffs can build a bad-faith record using (i) objective merits weakness (especially threshold elements), (ii) delay or irregular prosecution patterns, (iii) mischaracterizations in pleadings, and (iv) public statements indicating retaliatory motive.
• Stays in federalism-sensitive cases: Even when Younger concerns are serious, state defendants seeking a stay must satisfy Nken’s demanding “strong showing,” and delay or lack of urgency can be decisive.

B. Doctrinal ripple effects

• Younger’s bad-faith exception may be more operational in civil-enforcement speech cases: By relying on Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, Defense Distributed v. Grewal, and Media MaĴers for America v. Paxton, the opinion contributes to an emerging cross-circuit pattern: federal courts are more willing to entertain injunctions where the state action’s practical function is censorship or retaliation rather than ordinary regulation.
• Personal jurisdiction over state officials outside their state: The decision strengthens the argument that “express aiming” is met when an attorney general seeks to shut down or materially burden out-of-state speech operations, not merely regulate in-state conduct.
• Federalism tensions and counter-mobilization: The dissent’s warning highlights a likely future battleground: whether such cases represent necessary protection of speech or a destabilizing expansion that invites routine federal preemption of state litigation whenever bad motive is alleged.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Stay pending appeal

A temporary pause of an order while the appellate court decides the full appeal. Under Nken v. Holder, the movant must make a strong showing of likely success and irreparable harm; it is not enough to show the appeal is non-frivolous.

Preliminary injunction

An early, provisional order designed to prevent irreparable harm before final judgment. Here, it prevented continuation of the Florida case against AAP while the federal action proceeds.

Younger abstention

A doctrine requiring federal courts, in certain circumstances, to avoid interfering with ongoing state proceedings out of respect for state sovereignty and courts. But it contains exceptions—most relevant here, for proceedings brought in bad faith or to harass.

Bad-faith exception

A narrow path allowing federal courts to enjoin state proceedings when they appear motivated by retaliation/harassment and pursued without a reasonable expectation of success (as described in Kugler v. Helfant and Perez v. Ledesma).

First Amendment retaliation

Government action taken to punish or deter protected speech. The harm includes not only penalties but the chilling of future expression.

Ex parte Young

A legal mechanism allowing suits against state officials in their official capacity for prospective relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law, notwithstanding state sovereign immunity principles.

Personal jurisdiction / “express aiming”

A court’s power over a defendant. Under Calder v. Jones, intentional conduct outside the forum can still create jurisdiction if it is expressly aimed to cause harm in the forum, not merely because the plaintiff resides there.

Venue

The proper geographic location for a case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), it is enough that a substantial part of the relevant events occurred in the district.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision does not finally resolve whether the district court correctly enjoined Florida’s Attorney General; it resolves whether he justified an interim stay. Applying Nken v. Holder, the court held he did not make the requisite strong showings on personal jurisdiction, venue, Younger abstention, or irreparable harm. Substantively, the opinion underscores two closely linked principles: (1) Younger’s bad-faith exception remains a live and meaningful safeguard when state enforcement is plausibly used as an instrument to suppress protected speech, and (2) Calder “express aiming” can support jurisdiction and venue where an out-of-state attorney general’s enforcement action is designed to chill and potentially dismantle an in-forum speaker’s operations.

The dissent frames the same move as a dangerous expansion that risks routine federal intrusion into state proceedings. Whether the majority’s approach becomes a durable template will likely depend on how appellate courts calibrate “bad faith” proof—especially the extent to which merits weakness, public rhetoric, and litigation delay together can justify the exceptional remedy of enjoining a state enforcement action.