Statute of Limitations Accrues on Nonpayment of Retirement Benefits Under a Nonmerged PSA; Court May Order a “Second” QDRO to Effectuate (Not Reform) the Agreement

1. Introduction

In Michele B. Codere-Wilson v. Craig S. Wilson (R.I. July 8, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed a post-judgment Family Court order enforcing a divorce Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) that had been incorporated, but not merged, into the final judgment.

The central dispute involved the division of the husband’s union “retirement plan,” which at the time of divorce consisted of both a defined benefit pension and a defined contribution annuity. A QDRO was entered in 2010 for the annuity, but no QDRO was entered for the pension. After the husband retired and began receiving pension payments in 2015 (without paying the wife any share), the wife moved in 2023 to reopen the case to enter a QDRO for the pension and to enforce the PSA.

The case presented four recurring issues in domestic relations enforcement litigation: (1) when the statute of limitations begins to run for a breach of a nonmerged PSA; (2) whether ordering compliance constitutes impermissible modification/reformation; (3) whether PSA language contemplating “a” QDRO bars entry of a second QDRO for another component; and (4) the scope of specific performance as a remedy for breach of a nonmerged PSA.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court order. The Court held:

  • The PSA’s reference to the husband’s “fully vested retirement plan through his employer/union” unambiguously required a 50/50 division of the entire plan, including both annuity and pension components.
  • The wife’s claim was timely under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13 because the cause of action accrued when the husband began receiving pension benefits (June 1, 2015) and failed to pay the wife her share—not when the final judgment entered in 2010.
  • Ordering entry of a QDRO for the pension and reimbursement of past-due shares enforced (rather than reformed) the PSA; it did not improperly modify a nonmerged agreement.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Capaldi v. Capaldi

The husband relied heavily on Capaldi v. Capaldi, arguing that the pension should be treated as a “newly discovered asset” and that the claim was time-barred. The Court rejected that analogy.

The Court distinguished Capaldi on two key grounds emphasized in the opinion itself:

  • In Capaldi, the pension was not mentioned in the agreement and was pursued decades later as an omitted asset.
  • Here, the pension was not “newly discovered” in the legally relevant sense because the parties had already contractually agreed to divide the husband’s “retirement plan” in equal shares, and the pension was a component of that plan.

Doctrinally, Capaldi served as a limiting comparison: it reinforced that statute-of-limitations outcomes can differ sharply depending on whether a post-judgment request is (a) an attempt to add an omitted asset, or (b) an attempt to enforce an already-bargained-for division.

Robayo v. Robayo and Giarrusso v. Giarrusso (and Bober v. Bober)

The Court relied on Robayo v. Robayo (quoting Giarrusso v. Giarrusso) for the core proposition that a PSA “incorporated but not merged” retains the characteristics of a contract. This framing mattered in two ways:

  • It supported contract-interpretation methodology (focus on unambiguous text and party intent).
  • It supported the remedy: enforcement through contract principles, including specific performance.

Giarrusso v. Giarrusso (quoting Bober v. Bober) also anchored the Court’s deferential standard of review regarding factual findings by the Family Court (misconceived evidence/clearly wrong).

Morgan v. Bicknell and Gorman v. Gorman

In resolving whether the PSA was ambiguous, the Court cited Morgan v. Bicknell for the principle that, absent ambiguity, interpretation is a question of law. It also cited Gorman v. Gorman for related interpretive and remedial constraints on nonmerged PSAs.

On the reformation/modification argument, Gorman v. Gorman played the central role. The Court reaffirmed Gorman’s rule: absent consent or a recognized basis for reformation, the Family Court lacks authority to reform or modify a contractual PSA that is incorporated but not merged. The Court then held that the Family Court’s order did not reform the PSA at all—it simply effectuated it.

The Court also referenced Gorman’s footnote recognizing that mutual mistake is not the only basis for reformation (noting, by quotation, that “fraud or inequitable conduct” may also justify reformation). Even so, the Court did not need to find any reformation basis because it characterized the order as enforcement, not alteration.

Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc. and American States Insurance Company v. LaFlam

To determine accrual under § 9-1-13, the Court cited Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc. (quoting American States Insurance Company v. LaFlam) for the general accrual rule: a cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party suffers injury.

Applied to this PSA, “injury” was not the 2010 entry of judgment, but rather the husband’s later failure to transmit the wife’s share once pension payments began in 2015.

Riffenburg v. Riffenburg

Finally, Riffenburg v. Riffenburg provided the remedial bridge: because a nonmerged PSA is contractual, the appropriate remedy for nonperformance includes a breach-of-contract action seeking specific performance. The Court used Riffenburg to justify compelling the husband to do what the PSA required—transfer the wife’s share—rather than treating the matter as an impermissible revision of the divorce judgment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Unambiguous contract: “retirement plan” means the whole plan

The Court’s interpretive move was straightforward but important: it treated “fully vested retirement plan through his employer/union” as a unitary object. Even though the PSA did not separately say “pension” and “annuity,” the Court held that the plan’s components remained within the PSA’s scope. The fact that a QDRO had been entered only for the annuity did not narrow the meaning of “retirement plan”; it showed, at most, incomplete implementation.

Accrual under § 9-1-13: breach occurs when performance is due and not rendered

The key doctrinal holding is an accrual rule for nonmerged PSAs dividing retirement benefits: the limitations clock starts when the obligated spouse begins receiving benefits (or otherwise becomes obligated to pay/transfer) and fails to provide the other spouse the contractually promised share.

Here, the husband could not have breached the duty to share pension payments before any payments existed. The Court therefore located the first actionable injury at the moment pension payments began and the wife received nothing.

“Second QDRO” as enforcement mechanism, not reformation

The husband argued that ordering another QDRO effectively reformed the PSA without mutual mistake and without consent. The Court rejected that characterization because:

  • The PSA already required transferring one-half of the retirement plan by QDRO; the second QDRO simply supplied the missing instrument for the pension component.
  • Directing steps necessary to effectuate performance (preparing/entering the appropriate order) is consistent with enforcing an existing bargain, not changing it.

Specific performance and make-whole relief

Consistent with contract principles and Riffenburg, the Court approved remedies designed to place the wife in the position she would have been in absent breach: (1) entry of a QDRO for the pension; (2) ongoing payment of the wife’s portion until the QDRO is effectuated; and (3) reimbursement for the wife’s share of past pension payments received since June 1, 2015.

3.3 Impact

1) Clarifies limitations accrual for retirement-benefit divisions in nonmerged PSAs

The opinion establishes a practical accrual benchmark: for contract-based claims to enforce a nonmerged PSA’s division of pension payments, accrual is tied to the commencement of benefit receipt and nonpayment, not the divorce judgment date. This materially affects enforcement viability in cases where retirement begins years after divorce.

2) Reinforces broad reading of “retirement plan” when components exist

Drafting disputes often turn on whether general terms capture subcomponents. This case signals that, where a plan is described as a single “retirement plan” and the parties intended equal division of marital assets, courts may treat all plan components as included—even if implementation documents were incomplete or partially executed.

3) Confirms judicial authority to order implementation instruments without “modifying” the PSA

The opinion strengthens the enforcement toolkit: courts may order entry of additional QDROs (or comparable instruments) when necessary to carry out the PSA’s agreed division, without triggering the prohibition on unilateral modification of nonmerged agreements under Gorman v. Gorman.

4) Narrows “newly discovered asset” arguments in the enforcement context

By distinguishing Capaldi v. Capaldi, the Court cautions litigants against recasting an enforcement action as a belated asset-discovery case when the agreement already encompasses the asset category at issue.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Incorporated but not merged” PSA: The agreement is referenced in the divorce judgment, but it remains a standalone contract. That typically means contract remedies (like specific performance) apply, and courts cannot freely rewrite the deal.
  • QDRO (Qualified Domestic Relations Order): A court order used to direct a retirement plan administrator to pay a portion of benefits to a former spouse (an “alternate payee”) in compliance with federal retirement rules.
  • Defined benefit vs. defined contribution: A defined benefit plan (pension) pays a formula-based monthly benefit; a defined contribution plan (annuity/401(k)-type) is an account balance. One “retirement plan” can have both components.
  • Specific performance: A remedy compelling a party to do what the contract requires (here, to effectuate the agreed 50/50 division), rather than merely paying damages.
  • Reformation/modification: Changing contract terms is generally forbidden for nonmerged PSAs absent consent or a recognized basis (e.g., mutual mistake). Enforcing the existing terms—even by ordering necessary paperwork—is not the same as changing the deal.
  • Accrual of a cause of action: The statute of limitations begins when the claimant suffers an injury from breach. For retirement-sharing provisions, that injury may not occur until benefits begin and the promised share is withheld.

5. Conclusion

Michele B. Codere-Wilson v. Craig S. Wilson solidifies two practical rules in Rhode Island domestic relations law governing nonmerged PSAs: (1) a claim to enforce a promised share of retirement payments accrues when payments begin and are wrongfully withheld; and (2) directing entry of an additional QDRO to implement an agreed division enforces—rather than impermissibly reforms—the contract. The decision strengthens post-divorce enforcement of retirement divisions where implementation was incomplete at the time of judgment but the underlying agreement was clear.