Statistical Counts of Child-Abuse/Neglect Reports from Named Facilities Are Disclosable Under CORA Despite § 19-1-307(1)(a) Confidentiality

I. Introduction

In Brubaker v. Colo. Sun & Tegna, 2026 CO 18, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a recurring tension in public-records disputes: the public’s interest in government transparency under the Colorado Open Records Act (“CORA”), §§ 24-72-200.1 to -205.5, versus statutory confidentiality protections for child-abuse and neglect information under the Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act (“Children’s Records Act”).

The respondents, Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News (collectively, the “Media Organizations”), sought facility-specific totals over a three-year period for (1) the number of child-abuse/neglect reports made from each of three state-funded residential child care facilities (“RCCFs”), and (2) how many such reports at each facility were “screened in” for investigation. The petitioner, Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the records custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services (“CDHS”), denied the request, invoking § 19-1-307(1)(a).

The key issues were: (1) whether § 19-1-307(1)(a) is ambiguous; and (2) whether the six requested “cardinal numbers” are protected as confidential “reports,” “name[s],” “address[es],” or “any other identifying information” contained in such reports.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous: it makes confidential (i) reports of child abuse or neglect themselves, and (ii) the name, address, and any other identifying information of any child, family, or informant contained in such reports. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ use of “reverse ejusdem generis” to read the statute as protecting only “identifying” names/addresses in some narrower sense.

Nonetheless, the Court concluded CDHS failed to carry its burden to prove that the Media Organizations’ requests—limited to six numerical totals—would disclose any protected “report” or protected “name,” “address,” or “any other identifying information” within the meaning of § 19-1-307(1)(a). It therefore ordered disclosure of the six numbers, reversed the court of appeals’ remand for fact-finding, and sent the case back for proceedings including potential attorney fees under § 24-72-204(5)(b).

A concurrence in the judgment only (JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE HOOD) agreed the statute is unambiguous but argued the majority’s approach effectively compels CDHS to confirm confidential reports and risks undermining the statute’s protective purpose.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. CORA’s presumption of disclosure and narrow construction of exceptions

  • Shook v. Pitkin Cnty. Comm'rs, 2015 COA 84: The Court relied on the principle that CORA exceptions are narrowly construed and that the records custodian bears the burden to establish an exception. This framing mattered because CDHS—invoking § 24-72-204(1)(a) (“contrary to any state statute”)—had to show that § 19-1-307(1)(a) actually covered the requested information.
  • Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33] v. W. Servs., Inc., 751 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1988): Quoted for the narrow construction of CORA exceptions and the policy favoring openness—used to resist expanding § 19-1-307(1)(a) beyond its textual scope.
  • Archuleta v. Roane, 2024 CO 74: Invoked for the proposition that Colorado favors transparency and for the avoidance of illogical or absurd results in statutory interpretation.

2. Plain-meaning statutory interpretation and limits on judicial tools

  • Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33; Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011); Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88; Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3: These cases supplied the Court’s methodological steps: interpret de novo, read statutory language in context, apply ordinary meaning and grammar, and do not use extra tools when the text is clear.
  • In re People in Ini. of A.T.C., 2023 CO 19: Cited for avoiding constructions that render words superfluous or yield illogical or absurd results—important later when the Court rejected CDHS’s “confirmation” theory as over-expansive.
  • Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83; Crandall v. City &Cnty. of Denver, 238 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2010): Used to reinforce that once plain meaning resolves intent, interpretive inquiry ends (“look no further”).

3. Ejusdem generis, “reverse ejusdem generis,” and why the Court rejected it here

  • United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996): The court of appeals used this decision to justify “reverse ejusdem generis,” under which specific terms (e.g., “name and address”) are treated as subsets controlled by a following general term (“any other identifying information”). The Supreme Court described this as a niche canon and deemed the resulting reading unreasonable in light of ordinary meaning.
  • Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022); People v. Sims, 2020 COA 78: These authorities were referenced to explain traditional ejusdem generis (general terms constrained by preceding specifics) and to situate the court of appeals’ “reverse” move as atypical.
  • Jay Wexler, Fun With Reverse Ejusdem Generis, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2020): Cited to emphasize how recent and uncommon “reverse ejusdem generis” is, supporting the majority’s reluctance to treat it as a basis for finding ambiguity.

4. Constitutional avoidance and why the Court found it inapposite

  • Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116 (10th Cir. 2022): The court of appeals leaned on Peck to avoid First Amendment concerns by narrowing § 19-1-307(1)(a) to only “identifying disclosures.” The Supreme Court rejected the need for that maneuver because, under plain meaning, names and addresses are inherently identifying information; thus, the Court said Peck’s concern about sweeping in “nonidentifying information” did not apply on the facts and the statutory reading adopted.

5. Party presentation principle (why the Court did not decide broader “identifying information” questions)

  • United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020); Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003); United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1987): The Court invoked these cases to justify limiting its analysis to CDHS’s arguments. Because CDHS argued only that disclosure would reveal/confirm protected “address[es],” the Court declined to theorize whether numbers might qualify as “any other identifying information” in other settings.

6. Concurrence’s additional authorities emphasizing protective purposes

  • Educ. reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. 11, 2024 CO 29; People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75: The concurrence relied on these cases to argue courts must respect legislative language and not rewrite statutes to solve practical problems.
  • Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Watso v. Colo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1992): Used to highlight why confidentiality encourages reporting and protects children and informants—supporting the concurrence’s warning that compelled confirmations could chill reporting.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s textual holding: § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous

The Court parsed § 19-1-307(1)(a) into four protected categories: (1) “reports of child abuse or neglect”; (2) the “name” of any child, family, or informant in such reports; (3) the “address” of any child, family, or informant in such reports; and (4) “any other identifying information” in such reports. It treated “any other identifying information” as a catchall that adds to—rather than narrows—the explicitly listed “name” and “address.”

The Court rejected the court of appeals’ ambiguity finding. In its view, once “identifying information” is given its ordinary meaning (information likely to reveal identity alone or with other information), every “name” and every “address” is inherently identifying. Therefore, the court of appeals’ attempt to distinguish “addresses” from “identifying addresses” (or “names” from “identifying names”) could not be reconciled with ordinary meaning or legislative drafting.

2. The dispositive application holding: CDHS did not prove the six numbers fall within the prohibition

Although the Court accepted CDHS’s core statutory interpretation (confidentiality extends to reports and names/addresses/other identifying information in reports), it held CDHS did not meet its burden to show the requested disclosures are any of those things.

The requests sought only six “cardinal numbers” (per-facility totals and per-facility “screened in” counts). The Court concluded:

  • The numbers are not themselves “reports of child abuse or neglect.”
  • The numbers do not disclose the “name” or “address” of a child, family, or informant contained in any such report.
  • CDHS did not argue (and the Court would not supply the argument) that the numbers constitute “any other identifying information.”

3. The Court’s “already public” address/confirmation rationale

CDHS’s principal theory was that per-facility counts would effectively disclose (or confirm) that a report originated from a particular facility and therefore “confirm” an address tied to a report. The majority rejected that theory as an overextension of § 19-1-307(1)(a), emphasizing that the facilities’ addresses are publicly known. In the majority’s view, § 19-1-307(1)(a) does not bar “confirmation of an already public address” contained in a report.

The Court also highlighted a practical inconsistency: CDHS offered to disclose aggregate counts for all three facilities combined, suggesting CDHS itself believed disclosure of counts is not inherently barred; CDHS could not persuasively explain why facility-level disaggregation transformed permissible aggregate numbers into prohibited disclosures.

4. The concurrence’s critique (judgment only)

The concurrence agreed the statute is unambiguous but argued the majority’s application contradicts the statute’s command that protected information “shall be confidential and shall not be public information.” It warned that custodians cannot know what “puzzle pieces” requesters possess and that compelled confirmations may enable identification in future triangulation.

The concurrence further argued that for at least some facilities (it identified Mount Saint Vincent and Cleo Wallace), the majority’s rule risks forcing CDHS to confirm the existence of child-abuse/neglect reports—something the concurrence viewed as “unquestionably prohibited” by § 19-1-307(1)(a).

C. Impact

1. Immediate doctrinal impact

The decision establishes (and operationalizes in CORA litigation) a critical distinction: confidential child-abuse/neglect reports and identifying details within them are protected, but numerical summaries are not automatically swept in. A records custodian must prove that the requested information itself fits within the statutory confidentiality categories, and courts will resist expanding confidentiality based on indirect “confirmation” theories untethered from the statutory text.

2. Practical impact on oversight and reporting about RCCFs

Facility-level counts of hotline calls/reports and screening decisions can be central to accountability reporting—especially where past closures and Ombudsman investigations raised questions about screening practices. After Brubaker, agencies should expect that similarly framed requests for statistical counts tied to particular licensed facilities will often be disclosable, absent a concrete and text-based showing that disclosure reveals protected identifying information.

3. Litigation and compliance impact (where future fights are likely)

  • Small-n / re-identification arguments: The Court did not decide whether a “cardinal number” could ever be “any other identifying information.” Future cases may test whether counts in small facilities, narrow time windows, or highly publicized incidents can effectively identify children or informants.
  • “Confirmation” boundaries: The majority’s “already public” reasoning may invite disputes about what counts as “already public” and whether confirming the existence of reports (not merely a facility address) crosses the statutory line—concerns emphasized by the concurrence.
  • Attorney fees pressure: The remand instructing the trial court to consider fees under § 24-72-204(5)(b) reinforces that erroneous denials can carry financial consequences, shaping agency risk assessments.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

CORA (“Colorado Open Records Act”)
Colorado’s main transparency statute. Public records are presumptively open; exceptions are construed narrowly, and the government bears the burden of showing an exception applies.
§ 24-72-204(1)(a) (“contrary to any state statute”)
A CORA exception allowing withholding when another Colorado statute prohibits disclosure. Here, CDHS relied on this to invoke § 19-1-307(1)(a).
§ 19-1-307(1)(a) (“Identifying information – confidential”)
Makes confidential child-abuse/neglect reports and identifying details within them (names, addresses, and other identifying information) contained in those reports.
“Screened in” vs. “screened out”
Intake decisions on a report: “screened in” means assigned for further investigation; “screened out” means not assigned for investigation.
“Cardinal numbers”
Pure numerical totals (counts). The Court treated the request as seeking numbers, not the underlying narrative reports or identifying details.
Ejusdem generis vs. “reverse ejusdem generis”
Traditional ejusdem generis reads general words after a list as limited to the same type as the listed items. “Reverse ejusdem generis” flips that idea, treating the general term as controlling the specifics. The Court rejected the reverse approach here and relied on ordinary meaning instead.
Party presentation principle
Courts generally decide the arguments the parties actually make, rather than inventing new theories. The Court used this to avoid deciding whether counts might sometimes be “other identifying information.”

V. Conclusion

Brubaker v. Colo. Sun & Tegna delivers a two-part lesson for Colorado public-records law. First, § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous and broadly protects child-abuse/neglect reports and identifying details within them, rejecting the court of appeals’ narrowing via “reverse ejusdem generis.” Second, that breadth does not eliminate CORA access to non-identifying, statistical information: CDHS did not prove that facility-level counts of reports and screening decisions are themselves protected “reports” or “identifying information” under the statute.

The decision strengthens transparency around state-regulated residential child care facilities while leaving open future disputes—highlighted by the concurrence— about when “counts” or “confirmations” may function as de facto identifying disclosures in particular contexts.