Legal Reasoning
1. The key doctrinal move: video is not a special category for sufficiency review
The court confronted a modern appellate temptation: because judges can watch the same video as jurors, the court could “redo” factfinding.
Wells rejects that move. It holds that video recordings are akin to photographs or audio recordings—admissible evidence whose meaning and weight are still for the jury.
The court’s reasoning is structural: the jury saw the video with live testimony explaining what is and is not depicted.
Even a “clear” video is limited by angle, timing, and off-camera context; and the jury’s job includes integrating video with credibility judgments about witnesses.
Borrowing from State v. Alvarez-Soto, the court stressed that trial-level factfinders are better positioned to resolve disputes about
perspective and events beyond the frame, and to assess demeanor and credibility.
The court also foreclosed an analogy to “document-only” civil cases. Under Rye Beach Country Club v. Town of Rye,
reduced deference applies only when all evidence is documentary. Here, the jury heard live testimony and then evaluated the video in that context.
2. Application to simple assault (RSA 631:2-a, I(a))
Simple assault required proof that Wells purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury or unprivileged physical contact.
The court held a rational jury could find unprivileged contact based on the officer’s testimony that Wells “shoved his finger into [the officer’s] chest.”
The surrounding circumstances—yelling, verbal hostility, “squared up,” “balled his right fist,” aggressive stepping toward and pointing—supported the inference of purposeful/knowing conduct.
Wells’s counterarguments (uncorroborated testimony; the officer initially omitted the chest-contact detail; inadvertent gesticulation; implied consent during argument)
were treated as classic jury issues of credibility and competing inferences. Under State v. Gubitosi, the jury may accept or reject testimony in whole or in part.
Under State v. Seibel, an alternative hypothesis does not defeat sufficiency unless it is so reasonable that guilt could not be found beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Application to resisting arrest (RSA 642:2)
Resisting arrest required proof that Wells knowingly or purposely physically interfered with a law enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest or detention.
The court held there was ample evidence: pulling away as the officer grabbed his wrist and announced the arrest; tightening muscles; turning toward the officer; struggling on the ground;
thrashing/wiggling; tensing and clenching hands; and taking an unusually long time to secure handcuffs—supported by both officers’ testimony and the video.
Wells argued he may not have understood he was under arrest before being taken down, and that his movements were not “actual interference.”
The court again deferred to the jury’s resolution of these factual disputes and found the alternative explanations not sufficiently reasonable to undermine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. “De minimis” argument rejected on procedural and plain-error grounds
Wells’s claim that his conduct was de minimis was unpreserved (State v. Blackmer).
The court further held there was no plain error under State v. Ortiz because the contrary rule was not “clearly settled,” citing
State v. Scott Chandler, No. 2021-0515.