State v. Shangreaux, Jr.: Waiver of Batson Step-One Challenge After Race-Neutral Explanation; “We Know” Closing Arguments Not Improper Vouching When Tethered to Evidence

1. Introduction

In State v. Shangreaux, Jr., 2026 S.D. 32, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed David J. Shangreaux, Jr.’s jury conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence arising from the fatal stabbing of E.M. The appeal presented two recurring trial issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred under Batson v. Kentucky by allowing the State’s peremptory strike of a Native American prospective juror (P.D.), and (2) whether the prosecutor’s “we know” remarks in closing argument amounted to improper vouching and denied due process.

The Court’s opinion is significant for its treatment of Batson procedure—particularly how preservation and waiver operate when the State supplies a race-neutral reason without first contesting the prima facie showing—and for its contextual approach to closing-argument language that risks blurring into vouching.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Batson: The defense’s on-the-spot assertion that the struck juror was Native American, without more, was deemed insufficient to establish a step-one prima facie case (citing United States v. Young). However, the State waived any step-one argument by failing to raise it in the circuit court and instead immediately offering race-neutral explanations; the Supreme Court therefore reviewed the circuit court’s step-three finding for clear error and affirmed.
  • Closing argument/vouching: Because there was no contemporaneous objection, the Court applied plain-error review. The prosecutor’s “we know” statements were held not to be improper vouching where they marshaled admitted evidence and reasonable inferences rather than implying special governmental knowledge (discussing United States v. Younger and relying on South Dakota vouching standards). No due-process violation was found.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Batson framework, standards of review, and preservation

  • Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): Establishes that equal protection is violated when jurors are excluded on account of race and provides the foundational three-step test. The Court here applied Batson’s structure through South Dakota formulations.
  • State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, 843 N.W.2d 364 and State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, 829 N.W.2d 458: These cases supply the South Dakota articulation of Batson’s three steps and emphasize that, at step three, the question is whether the offered reason is pretext masking racial discrimination.
  • State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21, 729 N.W.2d 356 (citing State v. Martin, 2004 S.D. 82, 683 N.W.2d 399): These cases establish that Batson determinations are reviewed for clear error because intent discrimination findings are factual determinations.
  • United States v. Young, 129 F.4th 459 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1990)): The Court used Young to hold that merely pointing to the removal of a Native American juror—without identifying supporting facts and circumstances—does not satisfy Batson step one. The defense’s language here (“strike is [P.D.], who I believe is a Native American”) was deemed “remarkably similar” to the insufficient language in Young.
  • State v. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32, 896 N.W.2d 669: Used to enforce preservation principles: arguments not presented to the circuit court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This is the vehicle for the Court’s conclusion that the State waived its step-one argument.
  • Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion): Discussed in a footnote via Young to acknowledge the federal concept that step one may become “moot” once a race-neutral explanation is offered and the court rules. The South Dakota Court did not rest on Hernandez directly; it instead resolved the issue on waiver because the State did not raise step one below.

2) What counts as “race-neutral” and how step three is assessed

  • Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) and State v. Martin, 2004 S.D. 82, 683 N.W.2d 399: Reinforce that at Batson step two the State’s reason need not be persuasive or plausible; it must be facially race-neutral (i.e., discriminatory intent not inherent). This sets the stage for why the real contest is step three (pretext).
  • United States v. Allen, 644 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2011), United States v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2005): Cited to validate as race-neutral a strike based on a prospective juror’s “past dissatisfaction with law enforcement” that could indicate bias against the prosecution. These cases supported the circuit court’s acceptance of the State’s reliance on P.D.’s negative police experience and criminal-history disclosure in the questionnaire.
  • State v. Roach, 2012 S.D. 91, 825 N.W.2d 258: Provides the “great deference” principle: appellate courts defer to the trial judge’s step-three credibility and pretext determinations.
  • State v. Ryan, 2008 S.D. 94, 757 N.W.2d 155 (quoted in State v. Guthmiller): Used to confirm there are no “magic words” required; trial courts may implicitly satisfy Batson step three by accepting or rejecting the offered explanation.

3) Closing argument, vouching, and plain error

  • State v. Hankins, 2022 S.D. 67, 982 N.W.2d 21: Supplies the general definition and framework for prosecutorial misconduct and the standard that misconduct is prejudicial when it infects the trial with unfairness as a denial of due process. Also emphasizes that reversal is not automatic and depends on the entire proceeding’s context.
  • State v. Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72, 855 N.W.2d 668 and State v. Beck, 2010 S.D. 52, 785 N.W.2d 288: Establish preservation requirements (objection at trial) and that unpreserved claims are reviewed for plain error.
  • SDCL 23A-44-15 (Rule 52(b)) and State v. Buchhold, 2007 S.D. 15, 727 N.W.2d 816: Provide the four-part plain-error test applied by the Court.
  • State v. Carter, 2023 S.D. 67, 1 N.W.3d 674 (quoting Owens v. Russell, 2007 S.D. 3, 726 N.W.2d 610): States the prejudice standard under plain error: a reasonable probability of a different result but for the error.
  • State v. Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, 599 N.W.2d 344: Provides the due-process framing for prejudice: whether the misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to deny due process.
  • State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, 970 N.W.2d 814 (quoting State v. Westerfield, 1997 S.D. 100, 567 N.W.2d 863): Defines improper vouching as placing the prestige of government behind a witness or implying the prosecutor knows the truth.
  • State v. Manning, 2023 S.D. 7, 985 N.W.2d 743 (quoting State v. Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, 951 N.W.2d 792): Reinforces the jury’s exclusive role in credibility determinations, while allowing “fair comments” on credibility in closing.
  • Jenner v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 422 (S.D. 1994): Cited through Manning for the principle that the State may fairly comment on credibility.
  • United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2005): Used to address “we know” phrasing: it can blur lines and is disfavored, but is not necessarily vouching if it summarizes admitted evidence and reasonable inferences.
  • Lodermeier v. Class, 1996 S.D. 134, 555 N.W.2d 618: Supplies the South Dakota test for improper assurance: whether the State implied “superior knowledge or criterion” unavailable to the jury.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Batson: Step one insufficiency, but State’s waiver; affirmance on step three

The Court made two moves that, together, clarify how Batson litigation can be won or lost procedurally:

  1. Step one requires more than race-identification. The defense’s statement—identifying only that P.D. “I believe is a Native American”—did not, standing alone, “identify facts and circumstances” supporting an inference of discrimination. By aligning the defense’s statement with the insufficient proffer in United States v. Young, the Court signaled that South Dakota trial counsel should be prepared to articulate additional circumstances (pattern of strikes, comparative juror analysis, disparate questioning, or other indicia) to satisfy step one.
  2. The State can forfeit a step-one argument by not raising it. Even though the Court agreed the defense’s step-one showing was insufficient, it held the State waived any step-one appellate argument because it did not present it to the circuit court and instead “immediately offered” race-neutral justifications. Under State v. Stanley, that failure to raise the issue below foreclosed the State from using it as an appellate escape hatch.

Having proceeded to steps two and three at trial, the Supreme Court deferred to the circuit court’s step-three determination that the State’s stated reasons were not pretextual. The Court accepted that negative interactions with law enforcement and criminal history (as disclosed on the questionnaire) are common race-neutral bases for strikes, and it applied “great deference” under State v. Roach to the circuit court’s credibility finding.

Notably, the record contained facts that could be argued both ways on pretext (e.g., the State’s “shifting explanations” and the court’s expressed concern that the questionnaire answer “was not explored” in open court). The Supreme Court nevertheless emphasized the clear-error standard and concluded it lacked a “definite and firm conviction” a mistake occurred.

2) Closing argument: “we know” statements evaluated in context; no vouching, no plain error

Because defense counsel did not object to the challenged remarks, the Court reviewed for plain error under SDCL 23A-44-15 (Rule 52(b)) and State v. Hayes. That posture placed the burden on Shangreaux to show not only a plain error but prejudice—a reasonable probability of a different result under State v. Carter.

On the merits, the Court treated the prosecutor’s “we know” phrasing as potentially problematic but not automatically vouching. Consistent with United States v. Younger, the Court focused on whether the remarks: (a) were a summary of admitted evidence and reasonable inferences, or (b) implied special governmental knowledge or personal assurances of truth prohibited by State v. Nelson and Lodermeier v. Class.

The Court found the comments were tethered to record evidence: Shangreaux’s shifting accounts, forensic and DNA evidence, and the knife-print evidence. It therefore concluded the State did not place governmental prestige behind a witness nor imply extra-record knowledge, and the remarks did not constitute improper vouching.

C. Impact

1) Batson practice in South Dakota: a paired caution to both sides

  • Defense counsel: The opinion underscores that a Batson objection should be supported with at least some articulable circumstances beyond the juror’s race—especially if made immediately after an early strike. Comparative juror analysis, patterns, disparate questioning, or suspicious sequencing may matter to get past step one as framed by United States v. Young.
  • Prosecutors: If the defense’s step-one showing is deficient, the State should preserve that argument in the circuit court before (or at least alongside) offering a race-neutral reason. This case illustrates that supplying reasons and litigating step three may waive step-one insufficiency as an appellate argument under State v. Stanley.
  • Trial judges: The opinion implicitly encourages clearer step-three records. Even though “magic words” are not required (State v. Guthmiller), the circuit court’s stated concerns about lack of follow-up questioning show why explicit findings (including any comparative analysis) can strengthen appellate defensibility.

2) Closing arguments: “we know” remains risky but not per se reversible

The Court did not bless “we know” rhetoric; it held only that, in context, these particular statements did not cross the vouching line. Future litigants should expect courts to scrutinize whether “we know” is being used as shorthand for record proof (permissible) or as a personal/governmental guarantee of truth (impermissible). Additionally, failure to object at trial will typically shift review to the demanding plain-error standard.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory strike
A party’s limited right to remove a prospective juror without giving a reason. Batson limits this power by prohibiting race-based strikes.
Batson’s three steps
  1. Prima facie showing: The challenger must point to facts suggesting an inference of race discrimination.
  2. Race-neutral reason: The striking party must provide a facially race-neutral explanation.
  3. Pretext: The judge decides whether the explanation is genuine or a cover for discrimination.
Clear error (appellate review)
A deferential standard. The appellate court will not reverse unless firmly convinced the trial court made a mistake—important because Batson step-three determinations often turn on credibility.
Plain error
A stringent appellate review used when no objection was made at trial. The appellant must show a clear, obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously harmed the fairness or integrity of the proceeding.
Improper vouching
When a prosecutor implies personal belief in a witness’s truthfulness or suggests the State has special knowledge outside the evidence. Prosecutors may argue credibility, but must do so by pointing to evidence and reasonable inferences rather than assurances.

5. Conclusion

State v. Shangreaux, Jr. reinforces two practical rules with statewide importance. First, a Batson challenge requires more than identifying the struck juror’s race, but the State must preserve any step-one insufficiency argument at trial or risk waiving it on appeal after providing race-neutral reasons. Second, “we know” closing-argument phrasing is evaluated in context: when it summarizes admitted evidence and reasonable inferences rather than implying extra-record knowledge, it will not necessarily constitute improper vouching—particularly under plain-error review where no objection was made.