Independent Legal Research Is Not Judicial Notice; No Fact-Finding Required for a Purely Legal Motion to Dismiss

I. Introduction

In State v. Romanyshyn, 2026 ND 73, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed an amended criminal judgment entered on a conditional guilty plea. The underlying charge was a class A misdemeanor for violating a disorderly conduct restraining order (“DCRO”) under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01, based on alleged text-message contact with protected parties in late 2023.

The appeal focused not on whether Romanyshyn violated the order, but on whether the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was procedurally and legally adequate. Romanyshyn argued (1) the order lacked sufficient factual findings to permit appellate review and (2) the district court improperly took judicial notice—without complying with N.D.R.Ev. 201—by referencing its “own research.”

A related civil proceeding loomed in the background: in Davis v. Romanyshyn, 2025 ND 18, the Supreme Court reversed a separate Hettinger County DCRO and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. Romanyshyn attempted to use Davis to argue the Stark County DCRO (the basis for the criminal case) was invalid.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • No factual findings were required because Romanyshyn’s motion to dismiss presented a pure question of law (it did not rely on disputed facts and no evidentiary hearing was requested or held).
  • The district court’s reference to “the court’s own research” did not constitute judicial notice of adjudicative facts under N.D.R.Ev. 201; it was permissible independent legal research.
  • The Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of whether dismissal was warranted (including the State’s collateral-attack argument) because Romanyshyn did not brief the merits in his opening brief and filed no reply brief.
  • The Court affirmed the amended judgment after a prior remand in State v. Romanyshyn, 2026 ND 62, to ensure the judgment accurately reflected the plea as conditional.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Review standards for motions to dismiss/suppress

The Court framed its review using suppression-case methodology:

  • State v. Kukert, 2021 ND 192, ¶ 11, 965 N.W.2d 849: the standard of review for a motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding is the same as for a motion to suppress.
  • State v. Canfield, 2013 ND 236, ¶ 6, 840 N.W.2d 620: denial of suppression is affirmed if supported by competent evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence; questions of law are fully reviewable.
  • State v. Juntunen, 2014 ND 86, ¶ 3, 845 N.W.2d 325: appellate review is impaired when the district court fails to make adequate findings explaining its conclusion.
  • State v. Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d 381 (quoted in Canfield): whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.

These cases supply the general requirement for adequate findings, but they also create the space for the Court’s key move: distinguishing when findings are necessary (fact-dependent rulings) from when they are not (purely legal issues).

2. Separating law from fact; “purely legal” questions

  • Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729, 738 (2023), quoting Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 328 (2015): appellate courts can separate factual from legal matters; purely legal questions are independent of disputed facts.

The Court used these authorities to justify its holding that, because Romanyshyn presented a legal-only argument (the purported invalidity of the Stark County DCRO based on Davis), the absence of factual findings did not prevent meaningful review.

3. Judicial notice vs. legal research

  • Radu v. Shon, 62 F.4th 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2023): independent judicial research on a legal question does not trigger the judicial-notice/ex parte concerns associated with independent factual research.

This citation anchored the Court’s conclusion that the district court’s statement about its “own research” was not an invocation of N.D.R.Ev. 201 (which is limited to adjudicative facts), but ordinary legal analysis.

4. Collateral attacks on protection/restraining orders (raised by State; not reached)

  • State v. Kenny, 2019 ND 218, ¶¶ 15-18, 932 N.W.2d 516: a party may not collaterally attack the issuance of temporary restraining orders in a later criminal prosecution for violating those orders.
  • State v. Zahn, 2007 ND 2, ¶ 5, 725 N.W.2d 894: a party cannot collaterally challenge the validity of a domestic violence protection order without first raising the issue with the trial court.

Although the State relied on these cases to defend the denial of dismissal, the Court explicitly declined to decide the issue because Romanyshyn did not brief the merits (discussed below). Nonetheless, the presence of Kenny and Zahn signals a strong doctrinal headwind against defendants attempting to invalidate underlying protection-type orders as a defense in later violation prosecutions—unless properly and timely challenged through direct processes.

5. Issue waiver for inadequate briefing

  • Lyons v. State, 2024 ND 19, ¶ 17, 2 N.W.3d 679: issues not briefed or argued will not be addressed.

This procedural principle was dispositive as to the “merits” of the dismissal question: even if the record could support substantive review, the Court refused to supply arguments Romanyshyn did not make.

6. Related Romanyshyn decisions shaping posture

  • Davis v. Romanyshyn, 2025 ND 18, ¶¶ 10, 12, 16 N.W.3d 464: reversed a separate (Hettinger County) DCRO and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing—used by Romanyshyn as the legal basis for his dismissal request in the Stark County criminal case.
  • State v. Romanyshyn, 2026 ND 62, ¶¶ 6-7: remanded for correction of the judgment to reflect that the guilty plea was conditional and preserved appeal rights.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Adequacy of findings: why none were required here

The Court acknowledged the general rule that inadequate findings can obstruct appellate review (Juntunen), and it also noted the district court “could have more clearly articulated its reasoning.” But it held that deficiency was not reversible because the motion presented a pure question of law.

The opinion’s reasoning turns on the content of the briefing below: Romanyshyn’s motion relied on undisputed procedural events (issuance of the Stark County DCRO, filing of the criminal complaint, and the later reversal of a different DCRO in Davis), not contested evidence. No evidentiary hearing was sought. Thus, the district court was not required to make findings of “adjudicative facts,” because there were no material facts to find.

Importantly, the Court did not say findings are never required for motions to dismiss. Rather, it applied a context-sensitive approach: findings are crucial when the ruling depends on facts; they are unnecessary when the matter is strictly legal and fact-independent.

2. “Own research” and N.D.R.Ev. 201: clarifying the boundary

Romanyshyn characterized the phrase “the court’s own research” as improper judicial notice of “unspecified information.” The Court rejected the premise by explaining:

  • N.D.R.Ev. 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudicative facts—facts of the particular case normally proved through evidence.
  • A court’s legal research is not fact-gathering and does not invoke Rule 201’s procedures.

The Court also pointed out the internal inconsistency in Romanyshyn’s argument: he simultaneously claimed the district court made no factual findings and that it took judicial notice of adjudicative facts. The absence of findings undercut his claim that the court noticed facts.

3. Appellate disposition driven by briefing discipline

After resolving the two procedural criticisms, the Court confronted the reality that Romanyshyn did not brief the substantive basis for dismissal on appeal. The State argued the motion was an improper collateral attack, invoking Kenny and Zahn, but Romanyshyn did not respond. Applying Lyons v. State, the Court declined to decide the merits.

The result is a decision that reinforces appellate practice rules: preservation via a conditional plea is not enough; the appellant must still present developed argument in the opening brief (and, when necessary, address counter-arguments).

C. Impact

1. Trial-court orders: findings are not one-size-fits-all

The decision will likely be cited when litigants claim reversal is required because a district court’s order is terse. Romanyshyn provides a practical limiting principle: when the motion presents a purely legal question and no fact disputes are in play, a lack of factual findings may not impede review and will not automatically require remand.

2. Clarifying that legal research is not “judicial notice”

The opinion draws a clean line between adjudicative facts (Rule 201 territory) and legal authorities/analysis (ordinary judicial work). This matters for future challenges alleging “judicial notice” whenever a court references research beyond the parties’ citations. After Romanyshyn, such challenges must identify an actual noticing of adjudicative facts—not merely the court’s consultation of legal sources.

3. Appellate briefing consequences

The Court’s refusal to reach the collateral-attack merits underscores that conditional pleas preserve issues only if they are actually argued on appeal. This is a recurring and consequential lesson for criminal appeals: failure to brief a claim can be functionally dispositive.

4. Substantive DCRO-collateral-attack doctrine remains poised but not expanded

Because the Court did not reach the State’s reliance on State v. Kenny and State v. Zahn, Romanyshyn does not extend the collateral-attack doctrine. Still, it signals that defendants challenging the validity of restraining/protection orders should generally pursue direct review mechanisms (timely appeal, modification, or vacatur in the issuing case), rather than using a later criminal violation case as the main vehicle.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

DCRO (Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order)
A civil restraining order designed to prevent disorderly conduct and protect identified parties. Violating it can lead to criminal charges.
Conditional guilty plea
A guilty plea that preserves the defendant’s right to appeal a specific pretrial ruling (here, denial of a motion to dismiss). If the defendant wins the preserved issue, the conviction can be undone.
Judicial notice (N.D.R.Ev. 201)
A rule allowing a court to accept certain facts as true without evidence because they are not reasonably disputable. It applies to “adjudicative facts” (case-specific facts), not to legal research or legal authorities.
Adjudicative facts vs. law
Adjudicative facts are “what happened” facts in the particular case (who did what, when, where). “Law” is the governing legal rule and legal reasoning (statutes, case law, legal standards). Courts may research law independently.
Collateral attack
An attempt to invalidate an order or judgment in a different proceeding rather than through direct appeal or proper motion in the original case. In many contexts, courts restrict collateral attacks to protect finality and enforceability of orders.
Issue waiver/forfeiture on appeal
If an appellant does not adequately argue an issue in the briefs, the appellate court may decline to decide it, even if it might have merit.

V. Conclusion

State v. Romanyshyn, 2026 ND 73, establishes a practical procedural rule with two main takeaways. First, when a motion to dismiss raises a purely legal question and no evidentiary hearing is sought, the district court’s failure to make factual findings does not necessarily impair appellate review. Second, a court’s reference to its “own research” ordinarily reflects permissible legal research, not judicial notice of adjudicative facts under N.D.R.Ev. 201. Finally, the decision reinforces that appellate courts will not decide unbriefed merits issues—making disciplined briefing essential, even when a conditional plea preserves the right to appeal.