State v. Roberts (Ecker, J., concurrence): Re-centering Boykin—A Mandatory, Defendant-Facing Checklist Approach to Guilty Plea Canvasses

1. Introduction

In State v. Roberts (Concurrence) (Conn. Apr. 28, 2026), Justice Ecker (joined by Justice McDonald) concurs in the judgment “with reluctance,” agreeing that prevailing federal and Connecticut precedent “likely compels” the conclusion that the trial court’s guilty-plea canvass for defendant David D. Roberts satisfied Boykin v. Alabama—but only “just barely,” and at “the outer limits of compliance.”

The concurrence is less about the defendant’s particular conviction and more a doctrinal warning: Connecticut’s application of Boykin and its own procedural rule, Practice Book § 39-19 (5), has drifted toward a form-without-substance regime. According to the concurrence, courts too often uphold guilty pleas despite plea colloquies that fail to identify (or verify the defendant’s understanding of) the core constitutional rights a guilty plea waives. The key issue is how strictly trial courts must personally enumerate and confirm a defendant’s waiver of the “Boykin rights,” versus how much appellate courts may infer from the “totality of the circumstances,” including defense counsel’s role.

2. Summary of the Opinion (Concurrence)

Justice Ecker agrees with the result because existing case law has “diluted” Boykin v. Alabama and because the defendant did not raise a distinct claim under Practice Book § 39-19 (5). But he writes separately to:

  • criticize modern “totality of the circumstances” review for enabling appellate courts to uphold guilty pleas even when plea canvasses omit core rights;
  • reject the idea that vague references to “trial” or to attorney-client discussions can substitute for a judge personally advising and confirming understanding of the rights being waived;
  • urge trial courts to treat Practice Book § 39-19 (5) as a “mandatory checklist” that directly enumerates the rights to jury trial, confrontation/cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination;
  • flag that Connecticut’s “substantial compliance” doctrine has effectively rewritten § 39-19 (5) into something less than its mandatory text.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The foundation: Boykin and the “utmost solicitude” principle

The concurrence centers on Boykin v. Alabama, which requires a record showing a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because it waives fundamental constitutional rights. Justice Ecker emphasizes Boykin’s language that courts must exercise “the utmost solicitude” in ensuring an accused understands what the plea “connotes” and its “consequence.”

2) Connecticut’s permissive applications: missing advisements upheld

Justice Ecker identifies Connecticut cases that, in his view, exemplify how the doctrine became permissive:

  • State v. Godek (182 Conn. 353 (1980)): despite acknowledging the need to “scrupulously protect” rights, the court found no error even though the defendant was not advised of the right to a court trial; also used to support the idea that failure to satisfy each requirement does not “automatically” require vacatur.
  • State v. Shockley (188 Conn. 697 (1982)): despite the presumption against waiver of fundamental rights, no error found although the trial court failed to advise of the right to jury trial.

These cases are used rhetorically to highlight an internal inconsistency: courts recite strict waiver principles but sustain pleas where the colloquy omits key advisements.

3) “No talismanic words”: flexible standards and their consequences

Justice Ecker quotes (and criticizes the practical effect of) the proposition that “Boykin does not require any specific canvass, or talismanic words,” citing State v. Roberts, 227 Conn. App. 159 (2024). He then notes analogous out-of-state authority invoked for flexibility:

  • Dumont v. Borders, which itself quotes Wilkins v. Erickson (“not the sine qua non”) and United States v. McWilliams (“no particular ritual”).
  • People v. Tyrell, rejecting a mandatory catechism in favor of flexible standards.

The concurrence’s point is not that flexibility is inherently wrong, but that flexibility has become an excuse for omissions—transforming Boykin into a post hoc appellate exercise of “reading between the lines.”

4) Connecticut cases recognizing an affirmative duty to advise of the three rights

Justice Ecker relies on Connecticut cases stating the rule in stronger terms:

  • State v. Badgett (200 Conn. 412 (1986)): “Under Boykin . . . a trial court is required to advise a defendant” that the plea waives “three fundamental constitutional rights—jury trial, confrontation and self-incrimination.”
  • State v. Carter (243 Conn. 392 (1997)): cited as collecting/endorsing this line of authority.

These cases function as an internal corrective: Connecticut doctrine has, at least in articulation, recognized a duty to advise of each right, even if later decisions (and “substantial compliance”) have permitted outcomes inconsistent with that articulation.

5) The role of counsel and institutional actors

Justice Ecker’s skepticism about leaning on defense counsel is supported by:

  • Maia v. Commissioner of Correction (347 Conn. 449 (2023)): used to highlight the tension between properly advising a client and coercion concerns in plea dynamics—suggesting defense counsel is not a clean proxy for the judge’s constitutional duty during canvass.
  • Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction (336 Conn. 168 (2020)): invoked for the prosecutor’s “minister of justice” obligation, supporting the concurrence’s view that prosecutors should flag canvass deficiencies to ensure lawful waivers.

6) Checklist as a judicial best practice

The concurrence turns to:

  • Oppel v. Lopes (200 Conn. 553 (1986)): endorsing the idea of a “checklist” as “a prompter” to ensure all necessary lines are delivered.
  • State v. Suggs (194 Conn. 223 (1984)): cited as an example where minor wording variance (“face” vs. “confront”) was acceptable—used to define “substantial compliance” as tolerating minor deviations but not complete omissions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The concurrence’s core claim: Boykin has been doctrinally “vitiated”

Justice Ecker argues that the constitutional values animating Boykin are “plainly substantive,” yet courts often treat them as “mere formalities.” The practical consequence is that appellate courts can deem a plea valid even when the record does not show the defendant was advised of—let alone understood—the three core rights.

2) The canvass in this case as an “outer limits” example

The concurrence highlights specific defects:

  • Confrontation right: “never mentioned . . . directly or by implication.”
  • Jury trial right: defendant was not told he had a “right” to a “jury”; merely confirming he did not want to “take this to trial” is not equivalent.
  • Privilege against self-incrimination: omitted; the majority’s inference that “choice” to plead guilty implies knowledge of the waiver is called a “non sequitur.”

The concurrence thus treats the case as a cautionary tale: a thin record forces appellate courts into strained inference-making.

3) Nondelegability: the judge must personally confirm understanding

A major doctrinal insistence is that Boykin should be read to impose an “independent obligation” on the trial judge to ensure the defendant understands the specific rights being surrendered, via “personal and particularized colloquy,” not by “hearsay or proxy” (e.g., off-the-record counsel discussions, counsel’s failure to object, or counsel’s assurance there is “no reason” not to accept the plea).

4) Practice Book § 39-19 (5) as the straightforward solution

The concurrence argues that Connecticut already has a clear, mandatory framework. Under Practice Book § 39-19 (5), the court “shall not accept the plea” without personally addressing the defendant and determining he fully understands:

  • the right to plead not guilty / persist in a not guilty plea;
  • the right to trial by jury or judge;
  • at trial: assistance of counsel, confrontation/cross-examination, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself.

For Justice Ecker, this functions as an ideal checklist that is minimally burdensome and prevents the inefficiency of appellate reconstruction.

5) Critique of “substantial compliance” as judicial rewriting

Justice Ecker accepts that “substantial compliance” could excuse minor deviations, but argues it has been used to “empty [§ 39-19 (5)] of substance.” In his view, total omission of enumerated rights cannot be “substantial compliance.” He notes that in this case, there was “no reference whatsoever” to confrontation/cross-examination or self-incrimination, and states he would find a “clear violation” of § 39-19 (5) had it been properly raised.

C. Impact

1) Immediate doctrinal effect (limited, but influential)

As a concurrence, the writing does not itself change controlling law. It expressly concedes that “existing case law” compels the judgment. Nonetheless, its practical influence may be significant because it:

  • provides a detailed roadmap for future litigants to frame claims under Practice Book § 39-19 (5) (not just federal Boykin);
  • signals openness (at least by these two justices) to revisiting Connecticut’s “substantial compliance” approach in a future case;
  • encourages trial courts to adopt a checklist practice immediately, reducing reversal risk and strengthening plea validity.

2) Systemic effect on plea bargaining practice

The concurrence underscores that plea bargaining is the dominant mode of resolution (it cites a 2024 statistic that “97 percent” of Connecticut criminal cases were resolved via plea bargains). In such a system, the plea canvass is the critical constitutional checkpoint. A more rigorous, right-by-right colloquy would:

  • create cleaner records and fewer postconviction challenges;
  • reduce reliance on inferential “totality” reasoning;
  • clarify institutional responsibilities for defense counsel and prosecutors, including prosecutors’ duty (as “minister of justice”) to flag deficiencies.

3) Potential future litigation and doctrinal correction

The concurrence invites a future case to correct Connecticut’s interpretation of its own rule (as distinct from federal Boykin doctrine). That is consequential: whereas federal Boykin standards may constrain state courts, Connecticut remains free to enforce stricter plea protections through its own rules and state-law doctrines.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plea canvass (plea colloquy): the in-court Q&A where the judge ensures the defendant understands the plea, its consequences, and the rights being waived.
  • Boykin rights: the core constitutional trial rights a guilty plea waives—(1) the right to a jury trial, (2) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and (3) the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
  • Totality of the circumstances: an appellate method that looks at the whole record (not just the judge’s words) to decide if the plea was knowing and voluntary. The concurrence argues this can become an invitation to infer understanding without a clear record.
  • “No talismanic words”: the idea that the judge need not use exact phrases. The concurrence argues this sensible flexibility has been stretched into permission to omit the rights altogether.
  • Substantial compliance: partial adherence that is “close enough.” Justice Ecker’s view: it should excuse minor wording differences, not the complete absence of required advisements.
  • Nondelegable judicial duty: a responsibility the judge cannot shift to counsel. Here, the concurrence insists the judge must personally verify the defendant’s understanding of each waived right.

5. Conclusion

Justice Ecker’s concurrence in State v. Roberts is a pointed warning that modern practice has reduced Boykin v. Alabama to a near-empty safeguard when appellate courts uphold guilty pleas despite plea colloquies that fail to identify and confirm understanding of the fundamental rights being waived. The concurrence’s central prescription is straightforward and administrable: trial courts should treat Practice Book § 39-19 (5) as a mandatory, right-by-right checklist, ensuring a personal, particularized colloquy that creates a clear record of a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Although it does not change the judgment, the concurrence seeks to reorient Connecticut plea practice toward substance over inference—strengthening constitutional legitimacy in a system where pleas resolve the overwhelming majority of criminal cases.