State v. Olson (2026 ND 8): N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 Is a Strict-Liability Crime and Title 12.1 Default Culpability Does Not Apply

Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota
Date: January 29, 2026
Author: Bahr, Justice
Disposition: Criminal judgment affirmed

1. Introduction

State v. Olson arose from court filings submitted in a criminal case on behalf of an incarcerated defendant, Eric Grewe. Mandy Deann Olson—who was not licensed to practice law in North Dakota—filed multiple documents in Wells County District Court that explicitly described Grewe as appearing “by and through his representative,” with Olson signing as “Representing Incarcerated Individual.” The State charged Olson with the misdemeanor offense of practicing law without a license under N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01.

The appeal presented several procedural and substantive questions, but the decision’s principal doctrinal holding is substantive: N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 contains no culpability requirement and is therefore a strict-liability criminal statute; the “default” mens rea rule in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2) does not apply because that section is limited to Title 12.1 offenses.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed Olson’s conviction. It held:

  • Several issues were not reviewable because Olson failed to comply with appellate briefing rules requiring record citations and preservation statements.
  • Olson’s Fourth Amendment/Wiretap Act motion to dismiss was properly denied as untimely under the district court’s scheduling order and N.D.R.Crim.P. 12 and 47.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to amend the information to expand the “on or about” date range; no new or different offense was charged and no substantial right was prejudiced under N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(e).
  • Critically, the district court correctly removed “knowingly” from the jury instructions because N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 is a strict-liability statute; N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02’s default culpability provisions apply only to Title 12.1.
Core rule announced/confirmed:
N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 contains no mens rea element and is a strict-liability offense; the default culpability rule of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2) is confined “for the purposes of” Title 12.1 and will not be imported into offenses outside Title 12.1 absent express legislative direction.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Preservation, briefing adequacy, and record-citation discipline

The court framed the appellate posture with a strict enforcement of briefing and preservation requirements—an approach increasingly used to narrow appeals to properly preserved, properly presented issues.

  • Anderson v. Krueger, 2025 ND 161 (quoting Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2001 ND 62): These cases supply the general preservation rule—issues not presented to the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Olson uses them to justify refusing review of issues not raised below.
  • Edwards v. State, 2025 ND 43: Applied to briefing defects, not merely preservation defects. The court invoked Edwards to emphasize that a brief must identify where an issue was preserved as required by N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B)(ii); failure to do so can be outcome-determinative.
  • State v. Gates, 2020 ND 237: Quoted for the “We are not ferrets” admonition. Olson uses Gates to reinforce that the court will not search the record to support a party’s position.
  • Field v. Field, 2024 ND 84: Cited to support declining to address arguments lacking citations to legal authority and record evidence, dovetailing with N.D.R.App.P. 28 and 30 requirements.

Together, these authorities function as a gatekeeping framework: even meritorious claims may be unreachable if the appellant does not connect them to the record and to trial-court preservation.

B. Amendment of charging documents and abuse-of-discretion review

  • Alerus Financial, N.A. v. Erwin, 2018 ND 119 (quoting Yesel v. Brandon, 2015 ND 195): These cases provide the general abuse-of-discretion standard for amending pleadings. Although civil, they are used for the discretion framework.
  • State v. Miller, 2025 ND 188: Supplies the articulation of “abuse of discretion” (arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, irrational process, or misapplication of law), which the court applies when reviewing the decision to amend the information under N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(e).

The decision reinforces that expanding a date range—particularly when the charge already alleges “on or about”—ordinarily does not “charge an additional or different offense” and will be upheld absent a concrete showing of prejudice to a substantial right.

C. Jury instructions, statutory interpretation, and culpability

  • State v. Roller, 2024 ND 180 (quoting State v. Martinez, 2015 ND 173; also quoting State v. Gaddie, 2022 ND 44): These cases supply the governing standard: instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury of the law; reviewed as a whole. Olson uses them to assess whether removal of mens rea misled or confused the jury.
  • State v. McCreary, 2021 ND 212 (quoting State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30): These cases provide the interpretive method for criminal statutes: plain meaning first; avoid surplusage; ambiguity can open extrinsic aids; and ambiguous criminal statutes are construed against the government. The court applied this framework to determine whether § 27-11-01 has any culpability component.
  • State v. Montplaisir, 2015 ND 237; State v. Knowels, 2002 ND 62; State v. Glass, 2000 ND 212: These are the critical line of precedent rejecting importation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02’s default culpability provisions into non-Title 12.1 offenses. Olson relies on these cases to hold § 27-11-01 is strict liability.
  • N.B. v. Terwilliger, 2021 ND 74: Used on waiver/preservation: even where an objection is not repeated in a particular form, a party does not necessarily waive an issue if it was argued and the court ruled on it.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Narrowing the appeal through briefing and preservation rules

The court first narrowed the case to issues it could properly review, invoking N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B)(ii) (preservation citations or explanation), N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(6) and (f) (record references), and N.D.R.App.P. 30(a) (citation format to record locations). By applying Anderson v. Krueger, Edwards v. State, and State v. Gates, the court treated noncompliance not as a technicality, but as a substantive barrier to review.

B. Untimely suppression/dismissal motion

Olson argued warrantless access to jail phone calls/text messages violated the Fourth Amendment and the Wiretap Act. The court did not reach the merits because the motion was denied as untimely under the district court’s scheduling order and N.D.R.Crim.P. 12 and 47. Critically, on appeal Olson did not argue the timeliness ruling was wrong or that the court abused its discretion in enforcing deadlines; that omission left no developed basis for reversal.

C. Amending the information: “on or about” and absence of prejudice

Applying N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(e), the court upheld expanding the date range from “on or about November 6, 2024 to January 7, 2025” to “on or about October 20, 2024 to January 7, 2025.” The reasoning was twofold:

  • No new/different offense: the amendment did not alter the essential elements, only the alleged timeframe.
  • No prejudice to substantial rights: “on or about” already signaled flexible proof of dates, and the information identified the specific court proceeding and filings at issue, giving Olson notice of the conduct alleged to be unlawful.

D. The central holding: § 27-11-01 is strict liability

The dispute over jury instructions turned on whether the State had to prove Olson acted “knowingly.” The court’s analysis proceeded in steps:

  1. Text of § 27-11-01: The statute prohibits practicing law without admission and annual licensing and makes violation a class A misdemeanor. It contains no express culpability term (e.g., “knowingly,” “willfully,” “intentionally”).
  2. Attempted importation from Title 12.1 rejected: Olson argued N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2) supplies a default culpability (“willfully”) when a statute is silent. The court rejected this as a matter of statutory scope: § 12.1-02-02(1) limits the section “for the purposes of this title,” i.e., Title 12.1. Further, § 12.1-02-02(5) states culpability is not required as to the fact conduct is an offense except as expressly provided outside Title 12.1.
  3. Controlling precedent confirms the limitation: Citing State v. Montplaisir, State v. Knowels, and State v. Glass, the court reiterated that Title 12.1 default culpability rules are not read into other titles absent express legislative direction.
  4. Conclusion for instructions: Because § 27-11-01 has no culpability element, the jury instructions correctly omitted mens rea; the statute is strict liability.

3.3. Impact

A. Substantive criminal law: strict liability for unauthorized practice

The most significant doctrinal effect is the explicit characterization of N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 as a strict-liability statute. Going forward, prosecutions under § 27-11-01 need not prove the defendant knew their conduct constituted practicing law, nor that they intended to violate licensing rules. Litigation will likely concentrate on whether the conduct fits the statutory concept of “practice law” or “act as an attorney,” not on mental state.

B. Statutory interpretation: reinforcing the “Title 12.1 boundary”

Olson strengthens a recurring interpretive boundary in North Dakota criminal law: default culpability provisions in Title 12.1 do not spill over into criminal statutes placed elsewhere in the code. That principle matters beyond unauthorized practice; it affects any non-Title 12.1 offense where a party attempts to imply mens rea through § 12.1-02-02(2).

C. Procedure and appellate practice: strict enforcement of briefing rules

The opinion also signals a robust willingness to dispose of issues based on inadequate briefing and lack of record citations. For self-represented litigants in particular, the case underscores that the court will enforce N.D.R.App.P. 28 and 30 requirements and may limit review accordingly.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Strict liability offense: A crime that does not require proof of intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. If the prohibited act occurred, the crime is established, subject to any defenses the law recognizes.
  • Mens rea / culpability requirement: The mental state the State must prove (e.g., “knowingly,” “intentionally,” “willfully”). Some statutes include these words; others do not.
  • Default culpability (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2)): A rule that can supply a mental state when a Title 12.1 criminal statute is silent. Olson holds that this default does not apply outside Title 12.1.
  • “On or about” dates: Charging language allowing the State to prove the offense occurred reasonably near the alleged date(s), rather than on an exact day—so long as the defendant receives fair notice and can prepare a defense.
  • Amending an information (N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(e)): The State can amend before verdict if it does not charge an additional/different offense and does not prejudice a substantial right (such as notice or ability to defend).
  • Preservation and record citations on appeal: Appellate courts generally review only issues raised in the trial court, and briefs must point to where the issue was preserved and where supporting facts appear in the record.

5. Conclusion

State v. Olson is most consequential for its clear statement that practicing law without a license under N.D.C.C. § 27-11-01 is a strict-liability crime, and that the default culpability rule in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2) cannot be imported into non-Title 12.1 offenses without express legislative authorization. The decision also exemplifies North Dakota’s firm approach to appellate briefing requirements and to enforcement of pretrial motion deadlines, emphasizing that procedural compliance can determine what issues are heard and decided on the merits.