State v. Monaco: Felony-Murder Mens Rea “Established as a Matter of Law” Does Not Create a Sandstrom Presumption; Confession Voluntariness Remains a Totality-of-the-Circumstances Inquiry

1. Introduction

In State v. Monaco, 375 Or 1 (2026), the Oregon Supreme Court (en banc) affirmed (1) the denial of a motion to suppress custodial statements made after Miranda warnings and (2) the denial of a demurrer asserting that Oregon’s felony-murder statute, ORS 163.115(1)(b), violates federal due process. The case arose after defendant allegedly set fire to his estranged girlfriend TM’s apartment, killing two sleeping roommates. After arrest and medical clearance, defendant was interrogated in jail for roughly four hours; he ultimately admitted pouring gasoline on the couch but disputed intentional ignition. The state obtained, among other convictions, two felony-murder convictions predicated on first-degree arson.

Two questions drove the appeal: (a) whether interrogation tactics—including “Reid technique”-style maximization/minimization and statements suggesting different charging outcomes—overbore defendant’s will; and (b) whether, given Oregon’s definition of “criminal homicide” in ORS 163.005(1) and this court’s construction of felony murder in State v. Blair, 348 Or 72, 228 P3d 564 (2010), ORS 163.115(1)(b) unconstitutionally relieves the state of proving a culpable mental state as to causing death.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Suppression/voluntariness: The court held defendant’s statements were voluntary under ORS 136.425, Article I, section 12, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Applying State v. Jackson, 364 Or 1, 430 P3d 1067 (2018), it concluded that—considering the totality—defendant’s free will was not overborne by threats or promises of leniency.
  • Felony murder/due process: The court held ORS 163.115(1)(b), as construed in State v. Blair, does not violate due process as an unconstitutional conclusive presumption under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510 (1979), and is not unconstitutional even if characterized as imposing strict liability in part.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Voluntariness of confessions: Oregon statutory and constitutional lines

  • State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 854 P2d 421 (1993): Sets appellate review structure for suppression rulings—deference to supported historical findings and implied findings consistent with the ruling; legal-error review for ultimate admissibility determinations.
  • State v. Powell, 352 Or 210, 282 P3d 845 (2012): (i) assigns the burden to the state to prove voluntariness by a preponderance; (ii) emphasizes the policy of excluding potentially false confessions; and (iii) recognizes ORS 136.425 extends beyond state-actor coercion (though not dispositive here).
  • State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 136 P3d 22 (2006): Frames Article I, section 12 as protecting against compelled self-incrimination (distinct purpose from ORS 136.425’s reliability focus).
  • State v. Linn, 179 Or 499, 173 P2d 305 (1946): Supplies the durable doctrinal distinction between permissible “mere adjuration” (truth-telling appeals) and “adjuration accompanied by inducement” (threat/promise).
  • State v. Jackson, 364 Or 1, 430 P3d 1067 (2018): The controlling modern framework—totality-of-circumstances inquiry into whether free will was overborne; “Reid technique” not per se coercive; detailed treatment of implied threats/promises, interrogation-process pressure, and defendant vulnerabilities.

B. Federal voluntariness

  • Lego v. Twomey, 404 US 477 (1972): Confession voluntariness must be proved by a preponderance under federal law.
  • Haynes v. Washington, 373 US 503 (1963): Federal voluntariness is assessed under totality; confession must be “freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.”

C. Felony murder, mens rea, and due process

  • State v. Blair, 348 Or 72, 228 P3d 564 (2010): Oregon’s key felony-murder construction. The court reaffirmed the “implied malice” tradition: felony murder has no “distinct or independent mens rea requirement in relation to the cause of death,” and “requisite culpable mens rea is established, as a matter of law, by the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony.”
  • Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510 (1979): Due process is violated when jury instructions/statutes can be understood as shifting the burden or conclusively presuming an element (here, intent).
  • Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197 (1977): Reemphasizes state latitude in defining crimes and allocating burdens, subject only to limits grounded in fundamental principles of justice.
  • Out-of-state felony-murder due process decisions relied on to reject the Sandstrom analogy: State v. Patterson, 311 Kan 59, 455 P3d 792 (2020); State v. Burkhart, 325 Mont 27, 103 P3d 1037 (2004); State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash 2d 301, 588 P2d 1320 (1978), superseded by statute, 1975 Wash Sess Laws 863, as recognized in In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash 2d 602, 56 P3d 981 (2002); plus a string of similar holdings including Mares v. State, 939 P2d 724 (Wyo 1997) and others.
  • Strict-liability discussion and interpretive “scienter” presumptions: Rehaif v. United States, 588 US 225 (2019); United States v United States Gypsum Co., 438 US 422 (1978); Morrissette v. United States, 342 US 246 (1952).
  • Oregon de-emphasis of labels in constitutional effects analysis: State v. Rainey, 298 Or 459, 693 P2d 635 (1985) (the effect matters, not the label—there, for presumptions).
  • Oregon’s understanding of federal tolerance for strict liability: State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 651 P2d 1055 (1982), citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514 (1968).
  • “Beyond constitutional challenge” dictum narrowed: Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US 586 (1978) (plurality section; not treated as a categorical bar to challenging felony-murder statutes).
  • Comparative constitutional avoidance reference: State v. Ortega, 112 NM 554, 817 P2d 1196 (1991), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 148 NM 381, 237 P3d 683 (2010).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Suppression: how Jackson is applied—and distinguished

The majority begins with the settled voluntariness test: under ORS 136.425 and Article I, section 12, the “ultimate question” is whether, under the totality, defendant’s free will was overborne by improper threats or inducements. Citing State v. Jackson and State v. Powell, the court focuses on whether police conduct conveyed a concrete “threat or promise,” as opposed to permissible truth-telling appeals (“mere adjuration”) recognized since State v. Linn.

Defendant argued the detectives employed a “Reid technique” pattern—“maximization” (emphasizing evidence and severe consequences like “agg murder”) followed by “minimization” (suggesting a less culpable narrative if he admitted starting the fire without intent to kill). The court accepted that the interrogation “appear[ed]” to use those tactics but reiterated Jackson’s core teaching: method labels do not decide admissibility; the totality does.

The court then distinguishes the interrogation from the “close case” in Jackson on several legally salient axes:

  • Defendant vulnerabilities: Unlike Jackson (schizophrenia, delusions, substantial impairments), Monaco had no comparable history; hospital found nothing physically wrong; no intoxication; he had slept overnight.
  • Interrogation pressure and duration: Four hours midday; no threats to interrogate “all day” and into a second day (as in Jackson).
  • Nature of inducements/threats: Although urgency (“last opportunity”) and refusal to permit a phone call until “done here” were noted, the court emphasized: no explicit promise of leniency; repeated messaging that jail and charges would occur regardless; and defendant continued to deny memory/intent rather than simply adopt the detectives’ preferred version.
  • Demeanor and accommodations: Trial court findings—Detective Michaels was calm, patient, empathetic; breaks and water were granted; defendant requested to speak to Michaels alone, supporting a finding of comfort rather than coercion.

On this record, the court held the state met its preponderance burden and affirmed admissibility under ORS 136.425, Article I, section 12, and—by parallel analysis—under Haynes v. Washington and Lego v. Twomey.

B. Due process and felony murder: rejecting the Sandstrom analogy

Defendant’s due process challenge leveraged the interaction between ORS 163.005(1) (defining “criminal homicide” as “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence caus[ing]” death) and State v. Blair’s conclusion that felony murder requires no separate mens rea as to causing death. Defendant argued that if homicide requires a culpable mental state, then felony murder must be operating via an unconstitutional conclusive presumption (or, alternatively, strict liability).

The majority’s key move is conceptual: it characterizes Blair not as presuming a distinct “causing death” mental state, but as defining felony murder so that the only required culpable mental state is the predicate felony’s mens rea—“established as a matter of law” once the predicate felony is proved. Because (in the majority’s view) there is no separate mental-state element regarding death on a felony-murder charge, there is no element for a jury to be directed to find by presumption, and thus no Sandstrom problem.

The court buttresses that conclusion with an extensive survey of other jurisdictions rejecting the same due process claim—particularly State v. Patterson, State v. Burkhart, and State v. Wanrow. Those courts reasoned that felony murder does not “presume” intent to kill; rather, intent to kill is not an element, and the felony’s mens rea substitutes for otherwise-required murder mens rea.

C. Strict liability framing: labels vs constitutional limits

On defendant’s alternative theory—if not a presumption, then strict liability—the court largely treats the issue as one of constitutional limits rather than taxonomy. It accepts that Oregon felony murder “dispenses with proof of a culpable mental state as to causing death,” but emphasizes that felony murder still requires proof of the predicate felony’s culpable mental state. In any event, relying on State v. Rainey, it insists the constitutional analysis is about effect, not labels.

The court then rejects the notion that Supreme Court decisions like Rehaif v. United States, United States v United States Gypsum Co., and Morrissette v. United States constitutionalize a broad anti–strict liability principle for serious crimes. Instead, it reads those decisions primarily as statutory interpretation (scienter presumptions), not as due process prohibitions. It returns to federal deference to state crime-definition choices under Patterson v. New York, and notes Oregon precedent recognizing that the Supreme Court has “generally refused to interfere” with state strict-liability choices, citing State v. Buttrey and Powell v. Texas.

Finally, the court treats State v. Ortega (New Mexico) as avoidance rather than invalidation: construing felony murder to require an intent-to-kill element “removes the statute from [a] threat of unconstitutionality,” but does not establish that the alternative construction would violate due process.

3.3 Impact

A. Oregon suppression practice after Monaco

  • Reinforced centrality of “totality” over interrogation “branding”: The court again signals that “Reid technique” labels do not control; courts must evaluate concrete threats/promises and defendant-specific vulnerabilities.
  • “Urgency” and “process” pressure remain relevant but not automatically disqualifying: Statements like “last opportunity,” paperwork deadlines, and delayed phone calls are factors, but Monaco shows they may be outweighed by rest, absence of impairment, short-ish duration, and lack of explicit quid pro quo.
  • Trial-court demeanor findings matter: The affirmance leaned on supported findings that the lead detective was calm/empathetic and that accommodations were provided—reinforcing the importance of video review and explicit findings under State v. Ehly.

B. Felony murder litigation in Oregon

  • Due process challenges grounded in Sandstrom v. Montana are substantially constrained: The court holds ORS 163.115(1)(b) does not create an unconstitutional conclusive presumption because, in its view, felony murder has no separate “causing death” mens rea element.
  • State v. Blair is reaffirmed and operationalized as constitutional: The court treats predicate-felony mens rea substitution as compatible with ORS 163.005(1) and the Due Process Clause.
  • Open door (narrowly stated) for as-applied challenges in extreme contexts: The court expressly limits its holding to defendant’s convictions and “do[es] not suggest that every application of the rule will comply with due process,” an invitation (or at least a reservation) for future litigants to develop context-specific due process claims.

C. The concurrence’s significance (and potential future fault line)

Justice DeHoog’s concurrence agrees on voluntariness but argues the majority misreads State v. Blair. The concurrence contends Blair and the Court of Appeals decision it affirmed effectively treat a culpable mental state regarding causation of death as required by ORS 163.005(1), while deeming it “established as a matter of law” by proof of the predicate felony—functionally resembling a conclusive presumption under Sandstrom v. Montana. The concurrence thus criticizes the majority for relying on out-of-state cases that do not involve an ORS 163.005(1)-like “criminal homicide” definition.

Even so, the concurrence would affirm on harmless-error grounds, invoking State v. Cook, 340 Or 530, 135 P3d 260 (2006), ORS 131.035, and State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 77 P3d 1111 (2003), reasoning that the trial evidence would have supported, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least criminal negligence (and likely recklessness) as to causing death. That concurrence highlights an important practical reality: even if the constitutional theory were accepted, many arson-and-death felony-murder prosecutions may still result in murder-grade liability on traditional culpability theories.

The split frames a doctrinal tension for future cases: whether “established as a matter of law” is meaningfully distinguishable, for due process purposes, from an element being conclusively presumed—particularly in a statutory scheme where a general homicide definition expressly includes culpable mental states.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Voluntariness (confessions): A confession is inadmissible if police threats or promises overcame the suspect’s free choice. Courts examine everything that happened (duration, tactics, condition of suspect, warnings, access to breaks, etc.).
  • “Mere adjuration” vs inducement: Police may urge truth-telling (“you’ll feel better,” “families need closure”). They may not imply “confess and you’ll get a break” or “stay silent and we’ll punish you” in a way that overbears the will.
  • Reid technique; maximization/minimization: “Maximization” stresses evidence and seriousness; “minimization” offers a face-saving narrative. Oregon treats these as relevant circumstances, not automatic coercion.
  • Felony murder: A murder classification for deaths occurring during specified felonies (here, first-degree arson), even without proof the defendant intended to kill.
  • Conclusive presumption (Sandstrom): A rule that forces the jury to treat an element (like intent) as automatically satisfied once another fact is found, potentially relieving the state of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Strict liability: Criminal liability without proving a particular mental state for some aspect of the offense. The court emphasized that felony murder still requires mens rea for the predicate felony.
  • Demurrer: A pretrial challenge asserting the indictment (even if facts are assumed true) does not state a legally valid crime or is unconstitutional as charged.
  • Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Even if a constitutional error occurred, an appellate court can affirm if it is convinced the error did not affect the outcome.

5. Conclusion

State v. Monaco cements two practical rules for Oregon criminal litigation. First, it confirms that voluntariness remains a fact-intensive totality inquiry under ORS 136.425, Article I, section 12, and federal law, and it illustrates how State v. Jackson can be distinguished where defendant lacks substantial vulnerabilities and where interrogation pressure does not rise to implied threats or concrete promises of leniency. Second, it reaffirms State v. Blair and holds that Oregon felony murder, predicated on proof of the underlying felony’s mens rea, does not violate federal due process either as a Sandstrom v. Montana-type conclusive presumption or as an impermissible strict-liability regime—while leaving open that different applications of the felony-murder rule might present different due process questions.