“Power-and-Control” Motive as a Non-Propensity Basis for Same-Victim Domestic-Abuse Other-Acts Evidence Under M. R. Evid. 404(b), Subject to Rule 403 Line-Drawing

Case: State v. S. Mann, 2026 MT 92 (DA 23-0380) (Mont. Apr. 28, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Montana
Issue: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by permitting other acts testimony.

1. Introduction

State v. Mann arises from a domestic-violence prosecution charging Serenity Alana Mann with Strangulation of a Partner or Family Member, based on a November 16, 2021 altercation with S.R., Mann’s partner. The State’s theory emphasized a long-term “power and control” relationship dynamic to explain both why the assault occurred and why S.R. behaved as she did (e.g., delayed reporting, fear, and difficulty providing linear, date-specific recollection).

The central evidentiary dispute concerned the admissibility of prior relationship conduct (financial control, isolation, threats, physical abuse, and limited prior strangulation references) under M. R. Evid. 404(b), and whether any such evidence—though relevant—should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial under M. R. Evid. 403. A secondary dispute involved Mann’s recorded statement to detectives describing a choking incident with shifting timelines, which the State treated as an admission to the charged event.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. Applying abuse-of-discretion review for other-acts rulings (with de novo review for rule interpretation), it held:

  • Other-acts evidence showing a “power and control” motive and explaining the victim’s behavior was admissible under M. R. Evid. 404(b), consistent with Montana domestic-violence precedent.
  • The District Court performed appropriate Rule 403 line-drawing by excluding allegations of coercive/forcible/nonconsensual sexual activity while admitting other relationship-dynamic evidence.
  • Limited testimony concerning prior strangulation did not constitute impermissible propensity use on this record, particularly where it arose in response to impeachment and was not argued as “Mann strangled before, therefore Mann strangled now.”
  • Mann’s recorded incriminating statement was not barred by Rule 404(b) because the State offered it as describing the charged incident (not “other crimes”), and it was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.

A dissent (Justice McKinnon, joined by Justices Gustafson and Bidegaray) warned the majority’s approach collapses “motive,” “context,” and “propensity,” risks routine admission of same-kind prior strangulations in strangulation prosecutions, and viewed the errors as non-harmless in a credibility case.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) The governing standard and framework: State v. Palmer and State v. Madplume

The Court anchored its review in State v. Palmer, 2024 MT 25, ¶ 10, for (1) abuse-of-discretion review of other-acts rulings and (2) the principle that reversal requires an affected “substantial right.” It also relied on State v. Madplume, 2017 MT 40, ¶ 23, for the core 404(b) requirement: the proponent must “clearly articulate a chain of logical inferences where no link relies on a prohibited inference.”

Palmer also supplied the domestic-violence-specific evidentiary rationale: jurors may find victim behavior “perplexing,” and relationship-context evidence can help evaluate credibility and behavior (Palmer, ¶ 14, citing State v. Haithcox, 2019 MT 201, ¶ 19). In Mann, that line of authority was extended/confirmed as applicable to strangulation, where the State sought to explain delayed reporting, fear, and testimony shaped by repeated trauma.

(b) Motive limits: State v. Blaz and State v. Dist. Ct. of Eighteenth Jud. Dist. of Montana

The Court treated State v. Blaz, 2017 MT 164, as the cautionary boundary: “Motive can be a broad, nebulous concept” (¶ 14), and generalized hostility is too amorphous to justify other-acts admission (¶ 15). The majority then invoked State v. Dist. Ct. of Eighteenth Jud. Dist. of Montana, 2010 MT 263, ¶ 59, quoted in Blaz, ¶ 14, to explain the accepted “motive” structure: the uncharged act can evidence a motive, which in turn supports the inference of the defendant’s commission of the charged act—so long as the inferential chain avoids propensity.

In Mann, the Court characterized “power and control” not as “general hostility,” but as a specific hostility/dynamic directed toward the same victim, offered to explain the charged assault and the victim’s post-assault behavior.

(c) Domestic-violence other-acts precedent: State v. Crider, State v. Haithcox, and State v. Palmer

The majority explicitly located its holding within State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139, ¶ 28, and reiterated that Crider previously rejected arguments that “motive to control or harass” necessarily becomes propensity. It then treated Palmer and Haithcox as affirming the admissibility of certain relationship-dynamic evidence to contextualize victim behavior and maintain credibility.

The dissent, by contrast, leaned on the concerns raised in State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139, ¶¶ 59-63 (McKinnon, J., dissenting), arguing the Court has “blurred the distinction” between propensity and motive/context.

(d) Federal analogies and Rule 403 method: Old Chief v. United States, United States v. DeCicco, and United States v. Bowman

To illustrate a permissible motive theory not dependent on propensity, the Court cited United States v. DeCicco, 370 F.3d 206, 214 (1st Cir. 2004), where prior tax evasion was admissible to show motive for arson (insurance proceeds), not a propensity for fraud.

For Rule 403’s “unfair prejudice” concept, the Court relied on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S. Ct. 644, 650 (1997), defining unfair prejudice as evidence that may “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” It also used Old Chief (519 U.S. at 182-83, 117 S. Ct. at 651) for the “available substitutes” idea—courts should consider less-prejudicial alternatives with similar probative value. As an example of prejudice overwhelming probative value, the Court cited United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d. 1228, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2002), involving inflammatory “whites-only” evidence.

(e) Montana’s Rule 403 articulation: State v. Lake

The Court used State v. Lake, 2022 MT 28, ¶ 32, to clarify that evidence is not excluded merely because it is damaging; it must be likely to provoke jury hostility “without regard” to probative value. It also cited Lake, ¶ 41 (quoting Old Chief) on substitutes and diminishing marginal returns of cumulative proof.

(f) Admissions/confessions: State v. Goltz

In addressing Mann’s recorded statement, the Court cited State v. Goltz, 197 Mont. 361, 369, 642 P.2d 1079, 1084 (1982), defining an “admission” as an acknowledgement of facts from which guilt may be inferred together with other facts, and emphasized the jury’s role in evaluating truth and weight.

(g) Dissent’s additional citations (harmless error and 404(b) limits)

The dissent framed prejudice/harmlessness through State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶ 47, and State v. Reichmand, 2010 MT 228, ¶ 23, and argued “mere reference to a permissible purpose is insufficient” (Madplume, ¶ 23), invoking State v. Aakre, 2002 MT 101, ¶ 11 (purpose must be “at issue”) and also referencing Rowe, ¶ 25, and Lake, ¶¶ 26-27.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Rule 404(b): the Court’s “power and control” motive holding

The majority’s core move was to treat “power and control” as a sufficiently specific motive in a domestic-violence context—one that: (1) explains the cause of the charged assault (reasserting control after perceived noncompliance), and (2) explains victim behavior that might otherwise undermine credibility (delayed reporting, fear, dependence, difficulty with linear recall, and the prominent role of the victim’s sister in facilitating contact with law enforcement).

The Court rejected Mann’s argument that jealousy was an “obvious” motive that should have confined the State to a narrower presentation. It held the State “is not required to limit itself to a theory of the case which would be the least prejudicial and easiest to defend.”

Critically, the majority presented this as consistent with Palmer and distinguished from Blaz: “power and control” is not generalized hostility toward others; it is a relationship-specific dynamic directly tied to the victim and to contested credibility issues raised by the defense (inconsistent statements and insinuations that M.R. originated the allegation).

(b) Rule 403: line-drawing and limiting use

The District Court’s approach—affirmed by the Supreme Court—was to separate:

  • Highly inflammatory, high-propensity-risk material (allegations of coercive/forcible/nonconsensual sexual activity), which the court excluded due to the risk of conviction on an improper basis.
  • Relationship-dynamic control evidence (financial control, isolation, threats, physical abuse) deemed highly probative to explain behavior and evaluate credibility, with less risk of unfair prejudice.

On prior strangulation, the trial court imposed an explicit limitation: the victim could describe prior strangulation to explain her fear/state of mind, but the State could not argue “Mann strangles for the purpose of obtaining compliance,” because that was “too indistinguishable from a propensity inference.” The Supreme Court treated this limitation as meaningful gatekeeping and found no abuse of discretion on the trial record—especially because the State did not elicit prior strangulation on direct examination and the references emerged in the context of clarifying impeachment about “arm” versus “hands.”

(c) The recorded statement: not “other acts” if argued as the charged act

The majority treated Rule 404(b) as “inapplicable” to Mann’s recorded statement because the State did not offer it as “other crimes” evidence, but rather as an admission describing the charged strangulation, supported by claimed similarities and Mann’s shifting timeline. Rule 403 also did not bar it because (in the majority’s view) it did not invite guilt on an improper basis distinct from proof of the charged offense. The jury instruction on admissions/confessions and the jury’s role in weighing credibility were emphasized.

(d) The dissent’s contrary logic: same-kind prior strangulations as propensity in motive clothing

The dissent insisted that, where the other act is the same as the charged act (prior strangulations offered in a strangulation prosecution), the “principal logical force” is often conformity: “because Mann strangled before, she strangled again.” It criticized the majority for making “motive,” “propensity,” and “context” interchangeable and argued the District Court’s own findings (risk “too high”) should have compelled exclusion, particularly given lower-prejudice substitutes (including the State’s “blind expert” testimony on power and control).

3.3 Impact

(a) Expanded practical usability of “power and control” as a 404(b) theory in strangulation cases

Mann strengthens the State’s ability in Montana to frame prior relationship conduct as “motive” and “context” in domestic-violence prosecutions, including strangulation, where credibility and victim behavior are predictably contested. Trial courts may view the decision as authorizing robust narratives of coercive control—financial restrictions, isolation, threats, and non-strangulation violence—so long as prosecutors articulate non-propensity inferential chains and courts engage in explicit Rule 403 filtering.

(b) A sharpened expectation of Rule 403 “line-drawing” (and record-making)

The decision underscores that careful exclusion of especially inflammatory acts (here, allegations of coercive sexual activity) can function as the “safety valve” that allows the remainder of relationship evidence in. Future litigants should expect courts to be pressed—by both sides—to identify where that line sits and to justify it explicitly in writing.

(c) The unresolved fault line: same-kind prior strangulation evidence

The majority upheld limited prior strangulation references, but the dissent flags a recurring appellate risk: when “same-kind” prior acts come in, a reviewing court may be asked whether “motive” has become a label for propensity. Mann likely will be cited both:

  • by the State, to argue limited same-victim strangulation evidence can be admitted for state-of-mind/context and to rehabilitate after impeachment; and
  • by defendants, through the dissent’s analysis, to argue courts must scrutinize whether “power and control” reasoning actually relies on forbidden conformity.

(d) Treatment of memory framing (“script memory”) in DV trials

Though not the formal appellate issue, the District Court’s acceptance of “script memory” as a basis for allowing “what usually happened” testimony, and the Supreme Court’s recitation without disapproval, may influence future Montana trial rulings on how victims of repeated trauma narrate events, particularly when cross-examination emphasizes temporal and detail inconsistencies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Propensity evidence (generally prohibited): “She did it before, so she probably did it again.” Rule 404(a) and 404(b) generally bar using past bad acts to show a character trait and conformity.
  • Rule 404(b) permitted purposes: Past acts may be admissible for non-propensity reasons—like “motive” or “intent”—but the proponent must explain a logical chain that does not require the jury to infer bad character.
  • “Power and control” motive/context: In domestic-violence cases, evidence of isolation, threats, financial restriction, and patterns of intimidation may help jurors understand why a victim might not leave or report promptly, and why testimony may appear inconsistent.
  • Rule 403 unfair prejudice: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it’s likely to drive the jury to decide on an improper emotional basis (e.g., punishing the defendant for past wrongdoing), or if less-prejudicial substitutes exist.
  • “Script memory” vs. “episodic memory”: “Script memory” describes recalling repeated events as “what usually happens” rather than one dated episode (“what/where/when”). The trial court allowed such phrasing to keep testimony intelligible where repeated abuse and cognitive injury affected recall.
  • “Blind expert”: An expert who has not reviewed case-specific facts and instead testifies to general dynamics (here, domestic violence coercive control) to educate the jury.
  • Admission vs. confession: A confession is a statement acknowledging commission of the crime; an admission acknowledges facts that, with other evidence, can support guilt (State v. Goltz).

5. Conclusion

State v. Mann affirms that, in Montana domestic-violence strangulation prosecutions, a “power and control” relationship dynamic can supply a non-propensity “motive/context” theory under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and can justify admission of significant same-victim relationship evidence—provided the trial court engages in careful Rule 403 gatekeeping and limits argument that would collapse into “because the defendant did it before, she did it again.”

The dissent’s warning is the case’s enduring tension: when prior acts are the same as the charged act (prior strangulations in a strangulation case), courts must be vigilant that “motive” does not become propensity by another name. Future litigation will likely turn on the specificity of the State’s inferential chain, the availability of lower-prejudice substitutes, and the precision of trial-court limiting rulings and enforcement.