State v. Korsakas: No Structural “Complete Denial of Counsel” When Plea-Withdrawal Motion Is Raised at Sentencing but Counsel Remains Appointed; CrR 4.2(f) Motions May Be Oral Before Judgment

1. Introduction

In State v. Korsakas (Wash. May 21, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant is automatically entitled to reversal (structural error) when, at sentencing, defense counsel declines to argue an oral motion to withdraw a guilty plea and the defendant personally presents the request to the court.

Parties. The State of Washington was the respondent; Kristopher Korsakas was the petitioner.

Backdrop. Korsakas pleaded guilty mid-trial to multiple domestic-violence-related offenses and an aggravator. At sentencing, he sought to withdraw the plea under CrR 4.2(f), claiming the plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance. Defense counsel characterized the attempt as a “collateral attack” and did not argue the motion. The sentencing judge allowed Korsakas to speak, denied the motion as failing to show “manifest injustice,” and imposed an exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted limited review on whether Korsakas was entitled to have counsel argue the plea-withdrawal motion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that (1) a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage when considered during sentencing, but (2) Korsakas was not “completely denied counsel” because counsel remained appointed and available, was not conflicted in a Sixth Amendment sense, and the matter did not proceed to an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the claimed error was not structural and did not require automatic reversal under State v. Heng and United States v. Cronic.

The court additionally provided procedural guidance: a presentence CrR 4.2(f) motion is not a collateral attack (citing State v. Buckman), and CrR 4.2(f) requires only that a motion be made (orally or in writing) before judgment—civil-rule motion formalities do not apply.

The court affirmed the Court of Appeals.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Structural error and “complete denial of counsel”

  • State v. Heng — Reinforced that complete denial of counsel at a critical stage is structural error requiring automatic reversal. Korsakas invoked this framework; the court distinguished the facts to conclude there was no “complete denial.”
  • United States v. Cronic — The centerpiece for presumptive prejudice. The court relied on Cronic’s narrow class of situations: counsel “totally absent,” “prevented from assisting,” or an “entire[] fail[ure] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Because counsel was present/appointed and not disabled by circumstances, Cronic did not apply.
  • State v. McCabe — Used to emphasize that complaints about underperformance, dedication, or similar quality-of-representation allegations are not Cronic claims; they are typically analyzed under Strickland v. Washington.
  • State v. Heddrick — Cited for the baseline rule: the right to counsel attaches at all critical stages, and outright denial is presumptively prejudicial.
  • State v. Harell — Important comparator. In Harell, the defendant effectively proceeded pro se at a plea-withdrawal evidentiary hearing while counsel testified for the State—an archetypal setting for a complete denial. Korsakas differed because there was no evidentiary hearing and counsel was neither adverse nor turned into a witness.

B. Guilty pleas: voluntariness, finality, and withdrawal standards

  • Boykin v. Alabama — Anchored the requirement that a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent with an affirmative record.
  • Kercheval v. United States and Woods v. Rhay — Supported the proposition that an accepted guilty plea is itself a conviction and has the effect of a guilty verdict unless withdrawn.
  • State v. Olmsted — Reiterated there is no constitutional right to withdraw a guilty plea after acceptance; withdrawal is governed by rule and discretion (subject to manifest injustice).
  • State v. Taylor and State v. Saas — Defined “manifest injustice” and enumerated (nonexclusive) examples such as involuntariness, ineffective assistance in connection with the plea, and breach of the plea agreement.
  • State v. Branch — Explained why the manifest-injustice standard is demanding: robust plea safeguards precede acceptance.
  • State v. Perez, State v. Osborne, and State v. Frederick — Supported the strong presumption of voluntariness created by a written plea statement and a proper colloquy (“well nigh irrefutable,” albeit not conclusive).
  • State v. Davis and State v. McLaughlin — Used to support the trial court’s discretion and the principle that courts need not spend time on frivolous CrR 4.2(f) motions; Davis also supplied the procedural point that a CrR 4.2(f) motion may be oral or written and is timely if made before judgment is filed.

C. Defendant autonomy and counsel’s role

  • Jones v. Barnes and State v. Grier — Framed the line between decisions reserved to the defendant (fundamental objectives like pleading guilty) and tactical decisions generally entrusted to counsel.
  • McCoy v. Louisiana — Korsakas analogized counsel’s non-advocacy to an autonomy violation. The court distinguished McCoy because counsel did not concede guilt at trial over the client’s objection or override the fundamental objective of maintaining innocence.
  • State v. Humphries — Used as a contrasting autonomy case (counsel cannot concede an element over a defendant’s objection), underscoring how different the plea-withdrawal setting is.
  • State v. Elwell — Quoted by Korsakas on client-vs-counsel decisions; the court agreed that the decision to plead guilty is personal, but emphasized there is not an unfettered right to pursue a plea-withdrawal motion without a cognizable basis.
  • State v. Barker, State v. Hightower, and United States v. Halbert — Cited for the concept of discretionary “hybrid representation,” i.e., allowing a represented defendant to personally raise arguments, without creating a right to do so.

D. Ineffective assistance and conflict-of-interest doctrine

  • Strickland v. Washington and Bell v. Cone — The court stressed that if Korsakas wishes to litigate counsel’s misunderstanding of CrR 4.2(f) (“collateral attack”), the proper doctrinal vehicle is Strickland, not Cronic; the court declined to decide Strickland because it was not briefed.
  • State v. Estes — Used to note that competent representation includes researching and understanding the law, signaling possible Strickland relevance without reaching it.
  • Christeson v. Roper — Invoked by Korsakas to argue counsel faced a conflict in advocating a motion alleging counsel’s own ineffectiveness.
  • State v. Roberts, State v. Hampton, and Morris v. Slappy — Reiterated that the right to counsel does not guarantee counsel of choice, substitution on demand, or a “meaningful relationship.”
  • Cuyler v. Sullivan and State v. Regan — Provided the standard for Sixth Amendment conflict-of-interest claims: an actual conflict that adversely affects performance.
  • State v. Nation — Noted that withdrawal is required when counsel is likely to be a witness on substantive contested matters; that did not occur here.
  • State v. Cross, State v. Stark, and State v. Rosborough — Supported the long-standing Washington rule that alleging ineffective assistance does not automatically require substitution of counsel, and disagreement about strategy or merits is not itself an actual conflict.
  • State v. Kitt, State v. McDonald, and State v. Reeder — Reinforced the loyalty/conflict framework and the two-part requirement (conflict + adverse effect), with presumed prejudice only if that showing is made.

E. Appellate procedure and alternate grounds

  • Bavand v. OneWest Bank, FSB — Used for the proposition that an appellate court can affirm on any basis supported by the record.
  • Douglas v. Freeman — Recognized discretion to decline issues raised for the first time in supplemental briefing after review is accepted; the court nevertheless addressed the State’s procedural argument to provide guidance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Critical stage acknowledged, but structural error rejected. The court accepted that sentencing is a critical stage and that the plea-withdrawal request, made during sentencing, fell within that critical stage (citing State v. Harell). The dispositive question became whether the defendant was completely denied counsel. The majority treated “complete denial” as a Cronic-category event and found the facts short of that threshold: counsel remained appointed and present; no conflict of interest rendered counsel effectively unavailable; and the motion did not proceed to an evidentiary hearing.
  2. Distinguishing “counsel did not argue” from “counsel was absent or prevented.” The court drew a sharp line between (a) counsel’s failure or refusal to advocate a particular motion and (b) the constitutional condition of counsel being absent, barred, or rendered incapable of assistance. The opinion signals that even if counsel’s “collateral attack” comment reflects misunderstanding, that is more naturally treated as a Strickland v. Washington issue (deficient performance + prejudice), not a structural error requiring automatic reversal.
  3. Autonomy doctrine limited to fundamental objectives. The court declined to extend McCoy v. Louisiana beyond its core: counsel cannot concede guilt at trial over a defendant’s express insistence on innocence. Here, counsel did not override the trial objective—Korsakas had already entered a guilty plea and counsel’s conduct did not amount to a new concession of guilt against the client’s will.
  4. No automatic substitution of counsel from an IAC allegation. The court applied Washington conflict doctrine (State v. Regan; Cuyler v. Sullivan) and emphasized that merely alleging one’s lawyer was ineffective does not, without more, create an “actual conflict” requiring new counsel (citing State v. Stark and State v. Rosborough). Because counsel was not a necessary witness and no divergent loyalty interest was shown, no Sixth Amendment conflict requiring substitution was established.
  5. Procedural clarification: presentence CrR 4.2(f) motions are flexible and not “collateral attacks.” Reaffirming State v. Buckman, the court corrected counsel’s premise: a pre-judgment plea-withdrawal motion is not a collateral attack. It further rejected the State’s attempt to import civil-rule motion formalities, relying on State v. Davis to clarify that CrR 4.2(f) requires only a motion (oral or written) made before judgment is filed.

3.3. Impact

  • Narrows automatic-reversal arguments in plea-withdrawal settings. After Korsakas, defendants arguing that a plea-withdrawal motion was mishandled at sentencing will face a higher bar to obtain structural error relief: they must show genuine Cronic-type deprivation (absence/prevention of counsel), not merely that counsel declined to argue.
  • Channels complaints into Strickland litigation. The opinion explicitly signals that claims about counsel’s misunderstanding of CrR 4.2(f) or failure to advocate are typically Strickland claims—requiring proof of prejudice—rather than per se reversible events. Practically, this may push litigation into personal restraint petitions or other postconviction vehicles where a record can be developed.
  • Clarifies that trial courts may consider oral CrR 4.2(f) motions before judgment. Courts and practitioners now have direct Supreme Court guidance rejecting the State’s attempt to require civil-rule notice/written motion practice for pre-judgment plea-withdrawal motions, which may increase same-day litigation at sentencing but reduce procedural dismissals.
  • Conflict/substitution doctrine reaffirmed. The court reiterated that an IAC allegation does not automatically require substitution of counsel, helping trial courts resist “substitute counsel by accusation” dynamics while still leaving room for substitution where counsel becomes a witness or an actual conflict is shown.
  • Foreshadows continued debate (dissent). Justice Whitener’s dissent would treat the court’s requiring Korsakas to argue the motion himself—without a waiver colloquy—as a complete denial of counsel requiring automatic reversal. The split suggests future cases may turn on record details: whether the defendant requested self-representation, what the court required, and whether the proceeding resembled an adversarial hearing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Critical stage”
A point in a criminal case where what happens can meaningfully affect the outcome or the defendant’s rights—like entering a plea or being sentenced. Washington cases, including State v. Harell, treat plea-withdrawal litigation as part of this protected zone.
“Structural error” vs. “harmless error”
Structural error is a fundamental breakdown (e.g., complete denial of counsel) requiring automatic reversal, as emphasized in State v. Heng. Harmless-error review asks whether an error mattered. Korsakas holds the event here was not structural.
Cronic vs. Strickland
United States v. Cronic covers rare situations where the process is presumptively unreliable (counsel absent or prevented from helping). Strickland v. Washington covers ordinary ineffective assistance claims and requires showing both deficient performance and prejudice. Korsakas pushes this dispute into Strickland territory unless the deprivation is truly complete.
“Manifest injustice” under CrR 4.2(f)
A high standard for undoing an accepted guilty plea before judgment: an “obvious” injustice (from State v. Taylor, reaffirmed in State v. Saas), such as an involuntary plea or ineffective assistance tied to the plea.
“Collateral attack”
A postjudgment challenge to a conviction (often through separate procedures). A presentence motion to withdraw a plea is not a collateral attack (as clarified by State v. Buckman and reaffirmed here).
“Actual conflict of interest”
Not just discomfort or disagreement: it exists only when the lawyer’s interests diverge from the client’s on a material issue and it adversely affects performance (Cuyler v. Sullivan; State v. Regan). Korsakas holds that alleging “my lawyer was ineffective” does not automatically create such a conflict.

5. Conclusion

State v. Korsakas establishes two practical rules. First, although a plea-withdrawal motion raised at sentencing occurs at a critical stage, a defendant is not automatically entitled to reversal on a “complete denial of counsel” theory when counsel remains appointed and available and no evidentiary hearing occurs; such complaints are generally for Strickland v. Washington, not United States v. Cronic. Second, a presentence CrR 4.2(f) motion may be made orally before judgment and is not subject to imported civil-rule notice and form requirements. Together, these holdings shape how Washington courts will manage late plea-withdrawal requests and how defendants must frame challenges to counsel’s performance in that setting.