Mandatory-Minimum DUI Fines Require Ability-to-Pay Findings Under § 46-18-231(3) (and Written Judgments Must Conform to Oral Pronouncements)

1. Introduction

State v. Horn arises from a felony DUI-per-se conviction (fourth or subsequent offense) after Christopher Horn entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. The parties jointly recommended, among other terms, a mandatory-minimum $5,000 fine under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019). Horn also asked the District Court to waive various fees listed in the PSI.

Two sentencing issues reached the Montana Supreme Court:

• Whether imposing the $5,000 mandatory-minimum fine was unlawful because the statute is facially unconstitutional, or because the court failed to comply with the ability-to-pay requirements in § 46-18-231, MCA (2019).
• Whether the District Court erred when its written judgment imposed fees that the court had orally waived at sentencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Applying State v. Cole, the Court held the District Court erred by imposing the $5,000 fine without making findings regarding Horn’s ability to pay as required by § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019). The Court directed the District Court on remand to conduct an ability-to-pay analysis and enter appropriate findings, with further proceedings as necessary.

On the second issue, the Court reiterated that the oral pronouncement controls; because the District Court orally waived the PSI paragraph 13 fees but the written judgment imposed several fees and surcharges, the Supreme Court ordered the written judgment amended to conform to the oral sentence.

A concurrence/dissent agreed remand for ability-to-pay findings was required, but rejected the notion (attributable to Cole) that a court can “impose” a fine on someone unable to pay and cure the problem by suspending it; the dissent read § 46-18-231(3) to forbid the fine’s imposition in the first instance if the offender lacks ability to pay.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1) Sentencing review framework

• State v. Kalina, 2025 MT 70, ¶ 53 (citing State v. English, 2006 MT 177, ¶ 55): The Court reiterated that sentence legality review asks whether the sentence fits within statutory parameters. This frames the inquiry as a statutory-authorization problem, not a discretionary leniency review.
• State v. Dowd, 2023 MT 170, ¶ 6: Ability-to-pay compliance is reviewed de novo as adherence to sentencing statutes.
• State v. Garrymore, 2006 MT 245, ¶ 9: Constitutional claims about sentencing are reviewed de novo.

2) Statutory authority limits on sentencing

• State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 342, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979): Sentencing power exists only by statute and cannot be exercised beyond statutory authorization. This principle undergirds both the majority’s insistence on compliance with § 46-18-231 and the dissent’s position that a court cannot “work around” a statutory prohibition via suspension.

3) The controlling precedent: reconciling mandatory-minimum DUI fines with ability-to-pay limits

• State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, ¶¶ 11-15, 22: This is the pivotal authority. Cole held sentencing courts must consider ability to pay when imposing the mandatory-minimum DUI fine, harmonizing § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019), with § 46-18-231 and § 46-18-201, MCA (2019), and permitting suspension of the portion a defendant lacks ability to pay. In Horn, the Court applied Cole to require remand because the District Court made no ability-to-pay findings.
• State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63 (overruled in part by State v. Cole): The parties briefed Gibbons, but the Court explained Cole superseded it. Horn clarifies that, post-Cole, the mandatory-minimum fine statutes are construed to avoid facial unconstitutionality by incorporating § 46-18-231’s ability-to-pay constraints.
• State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148, ¶ 56 (quoted in Cole): The presumption of constitutionality and the canon that courts construe statutes to avoid unconstitutional constructions. This interpretive principle supports the majority’s approach: rather than strike the DUI fine statute, harmonize it with ability-to-pay statutes.

4) Plea agreement and “acquiescence” in sentencing illegality

• City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 2019 MT 126, ¶ 45 (overturning State v. Micklon, 2003 MT 45): Horn argued his agreement to the fine cannot validate an illegal sentence. Although the Court did not need to resolve “waiver” doctrine expansively, its remand despite Horn’s plea-agreed fine reflects the core Salsgiver concept: parties cannot stipulate around statutory sentencing limits.

5) Oral pronouncement versus written judgment

• State v. Hamilton, 2018 MT 253, ¶ 50: The oral pronouncement is the legally effective sentence. This precedent directly controlled Issue 2 and compelled remand to conform the written judgment to the oral waiver of fees.

6) The separate writing: limits on “impose then suspend”

• State v. Trombley, 2026 MT 77; City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2026 MT 65: Cited by the concurrence/dissent to reinforce skepticism of the “impose then suspend” cure and to frame the disagreement as recurring and consequential.
• State v. Plouffe, 2014 MT 183, ¶ 27 (along with State v. Lenihan): Used by the concurrence/dissent to argue a court cannot do indirectly (via suspension after imposition) what § 46-18-231(3) forbids directly (sentencing an offender to pay a fine they cannot pay).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Ability-to-pay findings are not optional—even with a mandatory minimum and even with a plea agreement

The Court began from two statutory commands that must be read together:

• § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019), uses mandatory language (“shall be punished”) and sets a fine range ($5,000 to $10,000) for fourth-offense DUI.
• § 46-18-231, MCA (2019), requires the court to consider the offender’s financial resources and the burden of payment, and § 46-18-231(3) prohibits sentencing an offender to pay a fine unless the offender “is or will be able to pay.”

Under Cole, these are harmonized: the DUI mandatory-minimum fine exists, but it must be implemented through the ability-to-pay lens, and the court may suspend the portion the defendant cannot pay. In Horn, the District Court imposed the fine without making any ability-to-pay findings—apparently because Horn had agreed to it. That absence of findings was decisive: the Supreme Court would not infer compliance merely from the record, because the sentencing court must actually analyze ability to pay and enter findings.

2) Written judgment must match the oral sentence

The District Court orally waived the PSI paragraph 13 fees, but the written judgment later assessed multiple fees and surcharges. Under State v. Hamilton, the oral pronouncement controls, making the written additions unlawful. The State conceded error, and the Court ordered the written judgment corrected.

3) The fault line in the concurrence/dissent

The concurrence/dissent accepted the remand for ability-to-pay findings but objected to a remedial approach that allows a court to “impose” a fine on an offender unable to pay and then “fix” the problem by suspending it. In the dissenters’ view, § 46-18-231(3)’s “may not sentence” language prohibits imposition at the moment of sentencing if ability to pay is absent; suspension is not a cure because the legal injury occurs upon the imposition itself.

C. Impact

• Sentencing procedure becomes more exacting for mandatory-minimum fines: Trial courts must make explicit ability-to-pay findings for the mandatory-minimum DUI fine under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019), as integrated with § 46-18-231. “The record is clear” arguments will be less effective if the sentencing court did not make findings.
• Plea bargaining cannot substitute for statutory findings: Even where parties jointly recommend the fine, Horn signals courts must still comply with § 46-18-231’s analytic steps.
• More remands for clerical/ministerial sentencing errors: Horn reinforces that adding fees in a written judgment after an oral waiver is reversible error. District courts and clerks must treat oral pronouncements as controlling and ensure judgments match.
• Continuing debate on “impose then suspend”: The concurrence/dissent—citing Trombley and Curran—highlights that Montana law is still developing on whether suspension can lawfully reconcile mandatory-minimum fines with inability to pay, particularly under Article II, Section 22, of the Montana Constitution and § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Facially unconstitutional”: A statute is facially unconstitutional if it is invalid in all (or nearly all) applications. After Cole, the Court avoids a facial invalidation of the DUI fine by reading the DUI fine statute together with the ability-to-pay statutes.
• “Harmonizing statutes”: When two statutes appear to conflict (a mandatory minimum vs. an ability-to-pay restriction), courts try to interpret them so both operate together, rather than striking one down.
• “Ability-to-pay findings”: Not just a general impression that the defendant is employed; it is an on-the-record evaluation of financial resources and burdens, resulting in findings that support the fine actually ordered.
• “Oral pronouncement controls”: The sentence spoken in open court is the real sentence; the written judgment is supposed to memorialize it, not change it.
• “Suspend a fine”: The court imposes the fine but delays/relieves collection of some or all of it under conditions. The dissent’s point is that suspension cannot cure a statute that forbids sentencing an offender to pay a fine they cannot pay.

5. Conclusion

State v. Horn cements the practical consequence of State v. Cole: a mandatory-minimum DUI fine cannot be treated as automatic. Even when the amount is negotiated in a plea, the sentencing court must still conduct—and document—an ability-to-pay analysis under § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019). Separately, the case reaffirms a strict rule of sentencing finality: the oral pronouncement governs, and any written judgment that adds fees after an oral waiver must be corrected on remand.