State v. Faison: Immunity Orders Must Identify and Apply a Specific OCGA § 16-3-20 Justification Ground

Introduction

In State v. Faison (Supreme Court of Georgia, May 5, 2026), the State appealed an order of the Superior Court of Henry County declaring Anthony Faison immune from prosecution arising from a fatal shooting during an attempted apprehension of a fugitive (Edward Atkins) at an apartment in Stockbridge, Henry County. The indictment included multiple counts (including felony murder predicated on attempted kidnapping, burglary, and home invasion), as well as attempted kidnapping, burglary, home invasion, and simple assault.

Faison claimed immunity under Georgia’s justification/immunity framework, arguing his conduct was justified because he was acting as a bail recovery agent attempting to recover Atkins. A central factual and legal dispute was whether the Henry County Sheriff’s purported revocation of Faison’s authorization affected his ability to act as a bail recovery agent in Henry County, and whether that status alone could supply justification sufficient to trigger immunity.

The Supreme Court did not decide the sheriff-revocation question. Instead, it vacated and remanded because the trial court did not perform the statutorily required justification analysis under OCGA § 16-3-20 when granting immunity.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the immunity order and remanded for further proceedings. Although the trial court focused on whether the Henry County Sheriff had authority to revoke Faison’s ability to operate as a bail recovery agent in the county, the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s immunity ruling was legally incomplete because it did not:

  • identify which specific subsection(s) of OCGA § 16-3-20 supplied the claimed justification; or
  • analyze whether Faison met the elements of any potentially applicable justification ground (such as the “lawful arrest” justification in § 16-3-20(4)).

Even assuming Faison remained “registered,” that status did not end the immunity inquiry. The statute required a determination, under the relevant justification standard, whether Faison’s conduct was justified.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 430, 432 (2019)

Davis v. State supplied the governing standard of appellate review for immunity rulings: appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, defer to supported factual/credibility findings, and review legal conclusions de novo. In Faison, this framework mattered because the Supreme Court’s decision turned on legal error (failure to apply the correct legal analysis), not on reweighing the facts of the entry or the shooting.

State v. Hylton, 321 Ga. 292 (2025)

State v. Hylton was used for an important limiting proposition: “OCGA § 16-3-24.2 does not require a trial court's order granting or denying immunity to include explicit factual findings or conclusions of law.” The Supreme Court distinguished Hylton because, unlike a record where an appellate court can reasonably infer the trial court’s basis, here the trial court made findings and engaged in analysis, but that analysis did not track any of OCGA § 16-3-20’s enumerated justification grounds. Given six distinct statutory bases, the Court refused to presume which one the trial court applied.

Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 258 (2015) and Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (2008)

These cases establish the burden of proof at a Georgia immunity hearing: the defendant must prove entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. In Faison, the Court reiterated that this burden applies to the defendant’s claim that his conduct was “justified” and therefore immune under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. The trial court’s failure was not merely an omission of labeling; it was a failure to assess whether Faison carried that burden under the correct statutory standard(s).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is a structured insistence on statutory fit. OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides immunity when a person uses threats or force in accordance with specified justification provisions, including OCGA § 16-3-20. But OCGA § 16-3-20 itself is not a single, undifferentiated justification rule; it lists six distinct bases.

Faison, on appeal, disclaimed self-defense: he asserted “there never was a self-defense claim” and did not pursue defense-of-others. He instead anchored justification in his asserted authority as a bail recovery agent. That posture made certain OCGA § 16-3-20 subsections facially inapplicable, while leaving only a few plausible candidates:

  • OCGA § 16-3-20(4): conduct “reasonable” and performed “in the course of making a lawful arrest.”
  • OCGA § 16-3-20(5): conduct justified “for any other reason under the laws of this state.”
  • OCGA § 16-3-20(6): conduct standing “upon the same footing of reason and justice” as enumerated grounds.

The trial court did not analyze any of these standards—particularly the “reasonableness” requirement embedded in subsection (4), or the “under the laws of this state” and “same footing of reason and justice” limitations of subsections (5) and (6). Instead, it treated the sheriff’s alleged lack of authority to revoke Faison’s county authorization as effectively dispositive of immunity. The Supreme Court held this was a legal error: even if Faison remained “registered,” that does not automatically establish that his conduct was justified under OCGA § 16-3-20.

Notably, the Court explicitly declined to resolve whether the sheriff could revoke Faison’s authority. The point of the remand is that immunity must be determined by applying the correct justification subsection(s), not by collapsing the inquiry into a single licensing/authorization question.

Impact

1) Enforces analytic discipline in immunity orders. After Faison, a trial court’s immunity ruling is vulnerable if it does not tether its conclusion to a specific OCGA § 16-3-20 ground and apply that ground’s elements. Even though explicit findings are not always required (Hylton), the legal analysis must still be demonstrably grounded in a statutory justification theory.

2) Limits “status-based” immunity theories. The decision signals that occupational status (here, bail recovery agent) or a threshold authorization dispute does not itself confer immunity; the defendant must show the conduct was justified under the governing standard (e.g., “reasonable” conduct in the course of a “lawful arrest,” if subsection (4) is invoked).

3) Raises the stakes of compliance with bail recovery statutes in justification litigation. The opinion highlights record facts such as noncompliance with OCGA § 17-6-57(a) notice requirements and the use of a “ruse” to enter an apartment—facts likely to be litigated on remand under the “reasonableness” and “lawfulness” components of any asserted justification ground.

4) Appellate clarity and remand-driven development. By vacating rather than resolving the sheriff-revocation issue, the Court encourages trial courts to decide immunity on the narrowest proper statutory basis first, creating a clearer record for appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Immunity from prosecution” (OCGA § 16-3-24.2): A pretrial protection. If a defendant proves he acted lawfully under certain justification rules, he cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is decided by a judge at an evidentiary hearing, not by a jury at trial.
  • “Justification” (OCGA § 16-3-20): A defense that says, “Even if I did the act, the law considers it permissible under specific circumstances.” OCGA § 16-3-20 is a menu of different justification theories, and the court must apply the correct one.
  • “Preponderance of the evidence”: The defendant must show it is more likely than not that the justification applies. This is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • “De novo” review: Appellate judges give no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions; they decide legal issues independently.
  • Bail recovery agent authority vs. justified conduct: Even if a person is authorized (licensed/registered) to do a job, immunity depends on whether the conduct at issue was legally justified under the applicable statute (including reasonableness and lawfulness requirements).

Conclusion

State v. Faison establishes (and forcefully applies) a procedural-substantive rule for Georgia immunity litigation: when immunity is claimed under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 via OCGA § 16-3-20, the trial court must ground its ruling in a specific statutory justification basis and apply that basis’s elements—especially where multiple subsections could theoretically apply. A determination about a defendant’s professional status (here, bail recovery agent registration/authorization) may be relevant, but it cannot substitute for the statutorily required justification analysis. The result is a vacatur and remand, positioning the trial court to decide immunity under the correct legal framework and creating a clearer template for future immunity orders.