State v. Cooper: A Defendant’s Stipulation That a Named Entity Is the “Owner” Satisfies the Theft “Owner” Element and Bars Later Sufficiency Challenges

1. Introduction

In State v. Cooper (Kan. May 15, 2026), the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed whether stipulated facts contained in a diversion agreement provided sufficient evidence to support a felony theft conviction after diversion was revoked. The appellant, Jordyn Lamont Cooper, argued the stipulation was deficient because it did not identify the legal form of the alleged owner, Cable Dahmer Kia, and therefore did not prove that the alleged owner was a statutory “person” capable of being an “owner” under the Kansas Criminal Code’s definitions.

The case sits at the intersection of (1) diversion practice under K.S.A. 22-2909(e), which permits a resumed prosecution to proceed “on the record of the stipulation of facts,” and (2) sufficiency-of-the-evidence review when a conviction is based on stipulated facts rather than live testimony.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed Cooper’s felony theft conviction. Although the court acknowledged that parties cannot bind a court with stipulations of law, it held that Cooper’s stipulation that Cable Dahmer Kia was the “owner” was a factual stipulation to an element of theft. Having stipulated to that fact, Cooper was barred from later disputing it on appeal. The court further held that “ownership” in this context is a factual determination and that no additional legal analysis was required to decide whether the stipulated “owner” satisfied the theft statute’s element.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • State v. Scheuerman, 314 Kan. 583, 587, 502 P.3d 502 (2022): The court relied on Scheuerman for the general sufficiency standard—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State to decide whether a rational fact-finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—and for the rule that when a case is submitted on stipulated facts, appellate review of sufficiency is de novo.

    Influence: Scheuerman supplied the framework for reviewing this record, which contained only stipulations rather than trial testimony.
  • State v. Darrow, 304 Kan. 710, 716, 374 P.3d 673 (2016): Darrow was invoked to emphasize that appellate courts may not ignore circumstantial evidence embedded in stipulated facts or reasonable inferences from them.

    Influence: This supported the court’s willingness to read the stipulation contextually—especially the stipulation’s express tethering to K.S.A. 21-5801(a)—and to infer that “owner” was used as an element-term, not casual shorthand.
  • Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 400, 266 P.3d 516 (2011): The court cited Wolfe Electric for the proposition that stipulations of law do not bind courts.

    Influence: This framed Cooper’s argument—he tried to recast “owner” as a legal conclusion—but the court ultimately distinguished between legal conclusions and factual concessions.
  • State v. Stoll, 312 Kan. 726, 735, 480 P.3d 158 (2021): Stoll was cited for the related principle that parties cannot concede or stipulate to an erroneous conclusion of law.

    Influence: Reinforced the doctrinal boundary: factual stipulations bind parties; legal conclusions do not bind courts. The court concluded Cooper’s “owner” statement was factual, not an attempt to dictate legal effect.
  • State v. Wilt, 273 Kan. 273, 44 P.3d 300 (2002): Cooper relied on Wilt to argue the State must prove a statutorily defined element using evidence that satisfies the definition (there, whether property was “school property” as defined).

    Influence: The court treated Wilt as materially distinguishable because it did not involve a conviction based on stipulated facts and did not address the binding effect of a defendant’s stipulation to an element.
  • State v. Witten, 45 Kan. App. 2d 544, 551-52, 251 P.3d 74 (2011), and State v. Star, 27 Kan. App. 2d 930, 936, 10 P.3d 37 (2000): Cooper cited these Court of Appeals decisions for the idea that the State must present evidence satisfying statutory definitions, and fact-finders cannot speculate to fill definitional gaps (in “school” proximity cases).

    Influence: The court again distinguished them as non-stipulation cases and therefore not controlling on the question whether a defendant may later dispute a fact he stipulated.
  • State v. Bogguess, 293 Kan. 743, 745, 268 P.3d 481 (2012): The court treated Bogguess as decisive on the procedural posture: by entering into a stipulation of facts, a defendant is precluded from disputing the factual evidence contained in that stipulation.

    Influence: Bogguess anchored the court’s holding that Cooper could not contest the “owner” fact after stipulating to it.
  • State v. Unruh, 320 Kan. 260, 261, 565 P.3d 825 (2025): Cited for the “right result, wrong reason” doctrine—affirming the Court of Appeals even though the Supreme Court’s reasoning differed.

    Influence: Supported affirmance without adopting the panel’s analysis.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory structure at issue. Felony theft under K.S.A. 21-5801(a) requires proof that the defendant acted “with the intent to permanently deprive the owner” of property. The code defines:

  • “owner” as “a person who has any interest in property,” K.S.A. 21-5111(s); and
  • “person” as including “an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association,” K.S.A. 21-5111(t).

(b) The stipulation’s content and context. Cooper’s diversion stipulation stated that he unlawfully obtained unauthorized control over the Kia “with the intention to deprive the owner, to-wit: CABLE DAHMER KIA ... permanently.” It also expressly referenced the theft statute. The court treated those features as important context: the word “owner” was used in the statutory, element-tracking sense.

(c) “Owner” treated as a fact question in this posture. The court rejected Cooper’s attempt to convert “ownership” into a legal conclusion requiring separate proof of Cable Dahmer Kia’s entity status. It characterized “whether Cable Dahmer Kia was an ‘owner’ of the vehicle” as “clearly a factual, rather than a legal, question,” akin to routine determinations fact-finders make in theft cases.

(d) Binding effect of factual stipulations—especially in diversion revocations. Under K.S.A. 22-2909(e), once diversion is revoked, the resumed prosecution “shall be conducted on the record of the stipulation of facts.” That statutory design makes the stipulation the evidentiary record. Applying State v. Bogguess, the court held Cooper could not later dispute the stipulated ownership fact.

(e) Internal inconsistency identified by the court. The court found it illogical for Cooper to concede that his “owner” stipulation could establish an “interest” in the vehicle (a component of the statutory “owner” definition) while simultaneously claiming that the same “owner” term was a non-binding legal conclusion. The court used this inconsistency to reinforce that “owner” operated here as a factual concession to the theft element.

(f) Sufficiency conclusion. Viewing the stipulation and its reasonable inferences under the stipulated-facts sufficiency standard, the court held a rational fact-finder could find Cooper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was therefore supported by sufficient evidence.

3.3. Impact

  • Strengthening diversion stipulations as trial substitutes. Because K.S.A. 22-2909(e) makes stipulated facts the record after revocation, Cooper signals that defendants who stipulate to element-like facts during diversion face significant limits on later sufficiency attacks.
  • Framing “owner” as ordinarily factual in theft prosecutions. The decision reduces the likelihood that Kansas appellate courts will require formal proof of a victim-business’s precise legal form when the record otherwise supports (or the defendant stipulates to) ownership.
  • Litigation behavior change. Defense counsel may respond by narrowing stipulations (e.g., stipulating only to conduct but not to “owner” identity), while prosecutors may insist on element-tracking stipulations to preserve convictions if diversion fails.
  • Appellate posture clarified. Cooper reinforces the de novo sufficiency review in stipulated-fact cases while simultaneously emphasizing that appellate courts must credit reasonable inferences from the stipulations and cannot allow a defendant to relitigate stipulated facts on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Diversion agreement (criminal diversion). A negotiated program allowing a defendant to avoid a conviction if they comply with conditions. If diversion is revoked, the case can resume—here, on a pre-agreed written record of facts.
  • K.S.A. 22-2909(e) “shall be conducted on the record of the stipulation of facts.” This means the court may determine guilt using the stipulated facts without a conventional evidentiary trial.
  • Stipulated facts. Facts the parties agree are true. In criminal cases, a defendant who stipulates to facts generally cannot later dispute those facts.
  • De novo review (in stipulated-fact sufficiency). The appellate court independently evaluates whether the stipulated record, and reasonable inferences from it, could support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • “Owner” vs. “person” in the theft statutes. Kansas defines “owner” as a “person” with any interest in property. Cooper argued the State had to prove the entity was a qualifying “person.” The court held the defendant’s stipulation that the entity was the “owner” resolved the element as a factual matter in this posture.
  • Stipulations of fact vs. stipulations of law. Courts accept factual stipulations as binding on the parties; courts are not bound by parties’ agreements about what the law means or how it applies. The court treated “owner” here as a fact stipulation, not a legal one.

5. Conclusion

State v. Cooper establishes (and reinforces) a practical rule for Kansas theft and diversion-revocation cases: where a defendant stipulates—especially in element-tracking language—that a named entity is the “owner,” that stipulation functions as sufficient factual evidence of the ownership element, and the defendant may not later attack that fact on appeal by reframing it as an unproven legal conclusion about corporate or entity status. The decision thus elevates the importance of careful drafting and understanding of diversion stipulations, because those stipulations may become the entire evidentiary record supporting a later conviction.