State v. Bunag: Consecutive Sentencing Requires Contemporaneous, Court-Stated Reasons—No Post-Hoc Orders and No Prosecutor “Parroting”

I. Introduction

In State v. Bunag (Haw. Apr. 20, 2026), the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court reviewed whether the circuit court lawfully imposed consecutive prison terms after accepting guilty pleas to (1) continuous sexual assault of a minor under 14, (3) promoting child abuse in the second degree, and (4) promoting child abuse in the third degree. The State sought consecutive sentencing; the circuit court granted the request and imposed an aggregate thirty-year term by running the twenty-year sentence on count 1 consecutive to the ten-year sentence on count 3 (count 4 concurrent).

The central issues were procedural and explanatory: whether the sentencing court (a) adequately stated on the record, at the time of sentencing, its reasons for departing from the statutory presumption of concurrent sentences, and (b) could later “fix” an inadequate in-court explanation through a written order filed weeks later (after the defendant appealed) that was drafted by the prosecution and adopted verbatim.

The parties were the State of Hawaiʻi (Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee) and Alden Bunag (Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court vacated the consecutive-sentencing portion of the judgment and remanded for resentencing. It held:

1. A sentencing court must state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences on the record at the time of sentencing, not in a later written order—even if that order contains more complete statutory-factor discussion.
2. The court may not satisfy its duty by parroting or wholesale adopting the prosecutor’s rationale; the court must independently articulate its own reasons.
3. A “thin” rationale that merely recites case circumstances, without explaining why consecutive terms are necessary (and without tethering reasons to each consecutive count), is an abuse of discretion under Hawaiʻi consecutive-sentencing jurisprudence.

The Court also ruled the ICA erred by relying extensively on the post-sentencing order to affirm the consecutive sentence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. State v. Bautista

State v. Bautista, 153 Hawaiʻi 284, 535 P.3d 1029 (2023), is the Opinion’s primary operational template. Bunag applies Bautista’s directives that sentencing courts must:

• state reasons “on the record at the time of sentencing” for consecutive terms,
• “adequately distinguish between the need for consecutive sentences and the sentence a defendant ‘would have received under the presumption of concurrent sentencing,’” and
• ensure the explanation is “tethered to each consecutive sentence,” because “stacking sentences after merely reciting a case’s circumstances is an abuse of discretion.”

The Court treated the circuit court’s remarks as the kind of “suboptimal explanation” criticized in Bautista, and emphasized that post-hearing backfilling cannot substitute for contemporaneous, count-specific reasoning.

2. Lewi v. State

Lewi v. State, 145 Hawaiʻi 333, 452 P.3d 330 (2019), supplies two key pillars:

• the presumption of concurrent sentences, and
• the requirement to explain why the court is departing from that presumption (including what the concurrent baseline would have been).

Bunag uses Lewi (often through Bautista) to frame consecutive sentencing as a departure that demands a transparent justification, rather than an unelaborated “seriousness” conclusion or a generalized description of the offense.

3. State v. Hussein

State v. Hussein, 122 Hawaiʻi 495, 229 P.3d 313 (2010), provides the foundational “in-court” requirement: courts “must state on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” In Bunag, Hussein does two jobs:

• It forecloses reliance on a later written order as a substitute for reasons stated at sentencing.
• It supports the Court’s insistence that the sentencing decision be demonstrably “deliberate, rational, and fair”—which is undermined when the court defers to a prosecutor’s argument instead of articulating its own analysis.

4. State v. Kong

State v. Kong, 131 Hawaiʻi 94, 315 P.3d 720 (2013), is cited for the public-facing function of sentencing explanations: providing reasons on the record confirms to the defendant, victim, public, and appellate courts that consecutive sentencing was “deliberate, rational, and fair.” Bunag deploys Kong to explain why post-hoc written rationales are structurally inconsistent with the transparency goals of the contemporaneous-record requirement.

5. State v. Barrios

State v. Barrios, 139 Hawaiʻi 321, 389 P.3d 916 (2016), is used to underscore how dramatically consecutive terms can extend incarceration (the Court notes aggregate consecutive sentences can more than double presumptive maxima, citing Barrios’ 100-year example). Barrios is also cited for the proposition that, absent clear evidence to the contrary, courts are presumed to have considered HRS § 706-606 factors; however, Bunag makes clear that this presumption does not excuse the absence of an articulated, consecutive-specific rationale on the record.

6. State v. Sandoval

State v. Sandoval, 149 Hawaiʻi 221, 487 P.3d 308 (2021), is cited for the requirement that courts provide clearly articulated reasons for “each and every consecutive sentence.” Bunag applies this principle to fault the sentencing court for not explaining why count 3 (ten years) ran consecutive while count 4 (five years) did not—i.e., the court did not perform count-by-count justification for its stacking choice.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three tightly connected steps.

1. Consecutive sentencing is a consequential departure requiring disciplined explanation

The Opinion emphasizes that imposing consecutive terms extends liberty restraints beyond the presumptive concurrent framework, functioning in practice like a significant enhancement. Because consecutive sentences can dramatically increase imprisonment, the court’s discretion is “bounded” by: (a) the statutory presumption of concurrency and (b) Hawaiʻi case law requiring clear articulation of reasons to depart.

2. The “reasons” must be stated in court, at sentencing—no post-hoc rehabilitation through written orders

The ICA relied on a written order filed after the notice of appeal, drafted by the State and adopted verbatim, to supply details absent from the oral sentencing record (including discussion of dissemination of recorded assaults and defendant-specific background information). The Supreme Court held this was impermissible because it contradicts the rule that reasons must be stated “on the record at the time of sentencing.”

The Court identifies two purposes of the contemporaneous requirement:

• ensuring the court performed the analysis before imposing consecutive terms (not after),
• ensuring transparency and reviewability for all stakeholders (defendant, victim, public, appellate court).

Permitting post-sentencing “backfill” would, in the Court’s view, render the on-the-record requirement meaningless.

3. The court must independently articulate its rationale; adopting the prosecutor’s argument is not enough

The sentencing judge stated that the State had every right to request consecutive years “as she [the prosecutor] stated on the record,” and that the sentence was based on HRS § 706-606 factors “and as stated by the prosecutor.” The Supreme Court held this “what-she-said” approach fails because it leaves the court’s own reasoning unstated and undermines the requirement of an independent judicial explanation.

4. A recitation of offense circumstances, without connecting them to the need for stacking, is inadequate

The circuit court discussed the teacher-student dynamic and the lasting harm to the victim—facts relevant to “the nature and circumstances of the offense” (HRS § 706-606(1)). But the Supreme Court concluded this explained (at most) why a lengthy sentence was warranted, not why a consecutive term was required beyond the concurrent baseline.

Critically, the court did not identify the distinct conduct supporting count 3—recording and dissemination—nor explain why that distinct harm required stacking count 3 onto count 1. Nor did it meaningfully address the “seriousness” factor (HRS § 706-606(2)(a)) by explaining why the concurrent baseline would be insufficient.

C. Impact

• Appellate review will focus on the sentencing transcript, not post-hearing paperwork. Trial courts and litigants should expect consecutive sentences to be vacated when the in-court rationale is thin, even if later written findings are robust.
• Prosecutor-drafted orders are particularly risky as “fixes.” While courts may use proposed orders, Bunag signals that reliance on such an order to supply missing in-court reasoning—especially after an appeal is filed—will not withstand scrutiny.
• Count-by-count tethering is reinforced. Courts must explain why each consecutive count is stacked (and why others are not), tying reasons to distinct conduct or harms.
• Sentencing practice will likely change in real time. Judges imposing consecutive terms should explicitly (a) state the concurrent baseline, (b) articulate the factors that justify departure, and (c) link those factors to each consecutive decision—using the court’s own words.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Presumption of concurrent sentencing

The default rule is that multiple prison terms run at the same time (overlap). A judge must justify any departure that makes sentences run one after another.

Consecutive sentencing

“Stacking” sentences so the defendant serves one term after another, increasing total prison time beyond what concurrent terms would produce.

“On the record at the time of sentencing”

The judge must explain the consecutive-sentencing reasons aloud during the sentencing hearing (in the transcript), not later in a written order.

“Tethered to each consecutive sentence”

The judge must explain why this count is consecutive to that count—especially where different counts reflect different conduct or harms.

HRS § 706-606 factors

Hawaiʻi’s statutory sentencing considerations, including the nature/circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history/characteristics, and purposes of sentencing like punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation. Bunag stresses these factors must be applied to justify departing from concurrency—not merely referenced.

Abuse of discretion (sentencing)

A legal standard under which an appellate court can overturn a sentence if the judge’s decision lacked the required reasoning, used improper considerations, or failed to follow governing sentencing rules.

V. Conclusion

State v. Bunag strengthens and clarifies Hawaiʻi’s consecutive-sentencing discipline: the justification for stacking prison terms must be (1) stated by the court, (2) stated in court, (3) stated at sentencing, and (4) stated in a way that distinguishes the concurrent baseline and ties reasons to each consecutive count. Post-hoc written orders—especially prosecution-drafted backfills—cannot salvage an inadequate oral record, and judicial “parroting” of the State’s arguments is not an independent rationale. The decision is a practical directive to trial courts: if you impose consecutive terms, explain why—clearly, contemporaneously, and count by count.