Marsy’s Law in South Dakota: Police Officers Are “Victims,” and Victims May Seek Public Redaction of Names/Initials Subject to Constitutional Balancing

1. Introduction

State v. Albaidhani, 2026 S.D. 24 (Apr. 22, 2026), arose from a foot chase in Sioux Falls during which Defendant Samir Albaidhani allegedly shot and injured Officer One and shot at Officer Two. Albaidhani was charged with, among other offenses, attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer.

The controversy did not focus on guilt or innocence, but on the public court record: the State’s warrant materials and complaint included the officers’ unredacted first and last names. The officers—supported by their collective bargaining unit, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 1—invoked South Dakota’s crime-victims amendment, Article VI, § 29 (“Marsy’s Law”), seeking to redact their names/initials from public filings.

The circuit court denied the request, reasoning Marsy’s Law does not expressly protect a victim’s name and concluding it lacked authority to force parties to redact filings. The officers appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, establishing key rules about (1) police officers’ eligibility for Marsy’s Law protections and (2) the treatment of victim names/initials in public court records.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Police officers can be “victims” under Marsy’s Law. The constitutional definition—“a person against whom a crime or delinquent act is committed”—contains no law-enforcement carveout.
  • Courts have authority to enforce Marsy’s Law through filing redactions. The circuit court erred in concluding it could not compel redaction of filings.
  • A victim’s name/initials qualify as information that “could be used to locate or harass,” meaning victims may request public redaction of names/initials under Article VI, § 29(5).
  • No categorical entitlement to name/initial redaction. The circuit court must apply a case-by-case constitutional balancing (victim interests vs. defendant and public rights). Because the circuit court declined to balance, remand was required.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Methods of constitutional interpretation

  • Dakota Constructors, Inc. v. Hanson Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2023 S.D. 38, ¶ 12, 994 N.W.2d 222, 227 and Holborn v. Deuel Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2021 S.D. 6, ¶ 22, 955 N.W.2d 363, 374: These cases anchored the Court’s standard of review—de novo—for constitutional interpretation, reinforcing that the Supreme Court owes no deference to the circuit court on the meaning of Marsy’s Law.
  • Betty Jean Strom Tr. v. SCS Carbon Transp., LLC, 2024 S.D. 48, ¶ 53, 11 N.W.3d 71, 90 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part)): The Court framed its interpretive goal as the “most likely public understanding” at adoption, emphasizing public meaning and textual analysis.
  • Doe v. Nelson, 2004 S.D. 62, ¶ 9, 680 N.W.2d 302, 305: The Court relied on the canon that constitutional words carry “common use” meaning absent strong reasons otherwise—supporting a straightforward reading of “person,” “could,” and “harass.”
  • S.D. Auto. Club, Inc. v. Volk, 305 N.W.2d 693, 696 (S.D. 1981) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Carter, 89 S.D. 40, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975)) and In re McKennan's Est., 126 N.W. 611, 617 (S.D. 1910): These authorities supported reading Marsy’s Law as a whole and avoiding interpretations that make words meaningless—critical when the Court later insisted “harass” must be given independent effect alongside “locate.”

South Dakota Marsy’s Law enforcement framework

  • State v. Waldner, 2024 S.D. 67, ¶ 22, 14 N.W.3d 229, 237: Waldner was used to confirm that Marsy’s Law creates a constitutional right to seek enforcement and requires courts to “act promptly” and provide “a remedy by due course of law.” In Albaidhani, this supported treating Marsy’s Law as self-executing enough to allow requests without importing the full procedural apparatus of SDCL 15-15A-13.
  • In re Implicated Individual, 2023 S.D. 16, ¶ 17, 989 N.W.2d 517, 523: The Court referenced this to characterize SDCL 15-15A-13 as procedural—governing how to request restricted public access—while emphasizing that the substantive grounds come from constitutional/statutory/common law (including Marsy’s Law).

Whether law enforcement can be “victims”

  • State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dep't, No. 2023-1327, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2025 WL 3274795 (Ohio 2025): Although not binding, the Court found GateHouse persuasive on the core textual point: because police officers are “persons” against whom crimes can be committed, they can qualify as victims. Albaidhani used GateHouse to reinforce that courts should not create an implied exception for officers.
  • In re Rhoden, 2026 S.D. 7, ¶ 22, 32 N.W.3d 369, 376: This recent South Dakota precedent supplied a key constraint: courts cannot add constitutional language “that is not there.” It was deployed to reject arguments urging a law-enforcement exemption from “victim.”

Whether names/initials fall within “locate or harass”

  • City of Tallahassee v. Florida Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc., 375 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2023): Tallahassee held that a victim’s name, “standing alone,” is not the type of information that could be used to locate/harass, and it rejected a categorical right to withhold names. The South Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Tallahassee’s “no categorical right” conclusion, but disagreed with its narrow view that a name is generally outside the “locate or harass” phrase—particularly because Tallahassee focused heavily on “locate” and gave little weight to “harass.”
  • In re Est. of Flaws, 2016 S.D. 61, ¶ 29, 885 N.W.2d 580, 588: Cited for the significance of the disjunctive “or.” This was essential to Albaidhani’s textual move: “locate” and “harass” are alternatives, and each must be treated independently.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Police officers as “victims” under Article VI, § 29(19)

The Court treated “victim” status as a threshold issue. Marsy’s Law defines “victim” as “a person against whom a crime or delinquent act is committed.” The Court reasoned:

  1. “Person” includes police officers under ordinary meaning.
  2. The charged conduct (attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer; aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer) is plainly a “crime.”
  3. The alleged crimes were committed “against” the officers as targets of the shooting.

The Court rejected two defense themes: (1) that Marsy’s Law is “silent” about officers (silence does not create an exception), and (2) that presumption of innocence means there is no “victim” pre-conviction (which would largely nullify Marsy’s Law in pretrial practice).

(B) Judicial authority to order redactions

The circuit court framed the issue as whether it could “force the parties to redact their filings,” concluding it could not. The Supreme Court disagreed: Marsy’s Law prohibits disclosure of certain information to the public, and courts with jurisdiction must be able to enforce that command. The Court also pointed to SDCL 16-21A-5(1), which places responsibility on filing parties to redact or designate documents as confidential/sealed when appropriate.

(C) Names/initials as information that “could be used to locate or harass” (Article VI, § 29(5))

The Court departed from a narrow “name standing alone” approach. It emphasized three textual features:

  1. “Locate or harass” is disjunctive. Even if a name does not pinpoint a physical location, it can still facilitate harassment.
  2. “Could be used” is possibility-based. The Court rejected the circuit court’s implicit requirement that the information be sufficient “in isolation” to locate/harass; instead, a name can be a key data point enabling location or harassment in combination with other publicly available information.
  3. Digital-era realism. The Court recognized that in modern conditions, a name may be “the first and most important piece of information” used to locate or harass someone.

The Court also accepted the officers’ argument that initials can be used to obtain names by searching public databases, bringing initials within the same logic.

(D) No categorical entitlement; required constitutional balancing

Even while holding that names/initials are within the scope of information victims may seek to protect, the Court rejected an automatic rule compelling redaction in every case. Instead, it reiterated (citing State v. Waldner, 2024 S.D. 67, ¶ 47, 14 N.W.3d 229, 244-45) that the circuit court must balance the victim’s Marsy’s Law interests against other constitutional rights, including:

  • the defendant’s rights (e.g., confrontation and public trial concerns, as raised below), and
  • the public’s right of access (even though no public-access litigant appeared and the State did not participate on appeal).

The dispositive error was procedural/substantive: the circuit court declined to conduct balancing because it concluded Marsy’s Law did not reach names. Because the Supreme Court held Marsy’s Law does allow preventing public disclosure of a victim’s name/initials (subject to balancing), it reversed and remanded for the circuit court to apply the appropriate test.

3.3. Impact

  • First clear South Dakota holding that police officers may invoke Marsy’s Law as “victims.” This will affect pretrial litigation in cases involving assaults on officers and may expand the pool of Marsy’s Law claimants in high-profile prosecutions.
  • Names/initials are within the universe of protectable “locate or harass” information—at least enough to trigger a request and balancing. Practically, this encourages earlier motions for redaction in charging documents, warrant affidavits, and other public filings.
  • Redaction authority is confirmed. Trial courts can order filing parties to redact to comply with constitutional victim protections, reinforcing the court’s supervisory control over public records.
  • Balancing becomes the central battleground. Because no categorical right exists, future cases will likely focus on evidentiary showings of harassment risk, the nature of the charges, the defendant’s articulated needs, and the strength of public-access interests in transparency and accountability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Marsy’s Law (S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29)
A constitutional “crime victims’ rights” amendment. Relevant here is § 29(5), allowing victims—upon request—to prevent public disclosure of certain information that could be used to locate or harass them or their family.
“Victim” under § 29(19)
Defined broadly as any “person against whom a crime or delinquent act is committed.” The Court held this includes law enforcement officers when they are targets of alleged crimes.
Redaction vs. sealing/confidential designation
Redaction removes specific information (e.g., names) while leaving the document public. Confidential and sealed restrict public access more broadly; the opinion references these concepts via SDCL 16-21A-1(3) and (4).
Mandamus
An extraordinary court order compelling a government official to perform a duty. The mandamus court declined that route because it viewed Marsy’s Law/SDCL 15-15A-13 as providing an adequate remedy within the criminal case.
Constitutional balancing
When constitutional rights collide, courts weigh them rather than giving one side an automatic win. Here, Marsy’s Law protections must be weighed against the defendant’s rights (and potentially public access) based on case-specific facts.
Disjunctive “or”
“Locate or harass” means either condition can justify protection; the Court held courts must analyze “harass” independently, not treat “locate” as the only meaningful term.

5. Conclusion

State v. Albaidhani establishes that South Dakota law enforcement officers can qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law and may request public redaction of their names/initials because such identifiers could be used to locate or harass. At the same time, the Court rejected a categorical entitlement to anonymity: trial courts must conduct a case-by-case constitutional balancing that accounts for competing defendant and public interests. The decision thus expands the practical reach of Marsy’s Law in South Dakota while preserving judicial discretion to reconcile conflicting constitutional rights.