State v. Woody: A Two-Step Standard for State Continuances Based on Witness Unavailability (HRPP Rule 48 Due Diligence First; Common-Law Good Cause Totality Second) and Rejection of the “Lee Test”

Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi (July 13, 2026) — SCWC-23-0000478

1. Introduction

State v. Woody addresses a recurring practical problem in criminal litigation: what standard governs a prosecution motion to continue a hearing when a key State witness cannot appear. The immediate stakes were high despite the case’s misdemeanor posture, because the district court’s denial of a continuance at the suppression stage led to suppression “in its entirety,” effectively leaving the prosecution unable to proceed.

The Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, the State of Hawaiʻi, sought to continue a suppression hearing because Officer Alexis Molina—its essential witness—was unavailable due to weekend military reservist training (and later, extended military service). The Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee, Basil Woody, opposed the continuance and sought suppression of evidence stemming from an allegedly unconstitutional seizure and arrest.

The legal issues crystallized into two questions:

• What legal standard governs a State motion to continue based on witness unavailability?
• Did the district court err in denying the continuance (and granting suppression) where the State lacked “due diligence” but HRPP Rule 48 time remained?

2. Summary of the Opinion

Procedurally, the Supreme Court affirms the ICA’s judgment vacating the suppression order, but on different reasoning, and remands to the district court.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The rejected framework: State v. Lee and its federal source

The ICA relied on State v. Lee, which had adopted a federal four-factor approach from United States v. Walker. In Lee, the ICA used the test to assess a defense continuance request. The Supreme Court in Woody emphasizes two problems with importing and rigidly applying that test in Hawaiʻi:

• Doctrinal mismatch: the Lee test was crafted for a different context and had already been rejected for defense continuances.
• Practical unfairness/unworkability when applied to the State, including requiring the State to show a witness is “willing” (not realistic in many prosecutions) and risking functional pretrial termination of serious cases despite remaining HRPP Rule 48 time.

The opinion also notes the ICA’s reliance on its own unpublished approach in State v. O'Donnell did not cure the foundational flaw: both Lee and O’Donnell concerned defense continuances, and neither was adopted by the Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi.

B. Constitutional constraint on rigid defense continuance tests: State v. Williander

State v. Williander is the pivot point. It rejected the Lee test for defense motions because it imposed “unnecessary burdens” inconsistent with the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process. Although the ICA attempted to confine Williander to the defense context, Woody extends the critique: the Lee test’s rigidity is problematic as a general decisional rule in Hawaiʻi courts, including for the prosecution.

Notably, Woody does not “mirror” Williander by simply substituting a two-factor test for the State; instead, it anchors the analysis in HRPP Rule 48 (speedy-trial administration) and then preserves a discretionary, common-law “good cause” analysis where Rule 48 time remains.

C. HRPP Rule 48’s structure and limits: State v. Estencion, State v. Gillis, and State v. Choy Foo

The opinion treats HRPP Rule 48 as the necessary starting point for continuances sought by the State due to witness unavailability. State v. Estencion supplies the foundational understanding that Rule 48 implements a speedy-trial scheme “separate and distinct” from the constitutional right, with policy aims including congestion relief and efficient processing.

State v. Gillis supplies the key limitation: HRPP Rule 48(c)(8) “good cause” may not be used “to excuse a lack of diligence” where HRPP Rule 48(c)(4) (the State’s witness-unavailability exclusion) requires due diligence. Woody applies this principle directly: if the State fails due diligence under Rule 48(c)(4)(i), the continuance time is not excludable under Rule 48(c)(8).

State v. Choy Foo is invoked for how Hawaiʻi has described “good cause” in the Rule 48 context: substantial reason, legal excuse, and typically “unanticipated” and “not reasonably foreseeable” events. While Woody distinguishes the Rule 48 excludability inquiry from the common-law continuance inquiry, it draws on this vocabulary to shape the new totality factors.

D. Continuances and measured sanctions: State v. Dowsett

State v. Dowsett is used to underscore Hawaiʻi appellate caution against “harsh” remedies when less severe measures can cure prejudice. Although Dowsett concerns discovery sanctions (HRPP Rule 16), Woody deploys its policy impulse to illustrate why rigid continuance tests that can precipitate functional dismissal are disfavored.

E. Discretionary “good cause” is context-specific: Doe v. Doe and Chen v. Mah

To justify a flexible common-law inquiry, the court relies on civil jurisprudence describing “good cause” as circumstance-dependent. Doe v. Doe emphasizes that good cause depends on the individual case and lies largely within the court’s discretion. Chen v. Mah reinforces that a single definition is not possible across contexts.

F. Prior Hawaiʻi continuance factors and witness materiality: State v. Valmoja, State v. Mara, and State v. Villiarimo

In discussing that the Supreme Court had not adopted Lee while sometimes considering similar factors, the opinion draws from State v. Valmoja (abuse of discretion where diligence and materiality were apparent) and State v. Mara (no abuse where defendant failed to show material prejudice).

State v. Villiarimo is cited as an instance where the court applied a good cause standard to a continuance request tied to securing testimony (there, an expert in a probation-related context). Woody uses Villiarimo to show that a common-law good-cause framework is already part of Hawaiʻi decisional practice.

G. Comparative state authority on suppression-stage continuances: People v. Bakari and People v. Brown

The court supports its approach with instructive parallels:

• People v. Bakari (Colorado): denying the State’s continuance at a suppression hearing can be tantamount to dismissal; courts should weigh harsh consequences, public interest, and alternatives where the continuance does not prejudice the defendant or delay trial.
• People v. Brown (California): “good cause” determinations should consider the totality of circumstances, including whether denial makes dismissal reasonably foreseeable; the prosecution bears the burden to show that consequence.

Woody does not import California’s statutory constraints; instead, it uses Brown primarily to validate a totality approach and to recognize that suppression-stage continuances can decide the life of a case.

H. Prejudice and offense seriousness: State v. Fukuoka

In balancing prejudice, the court cites State v. Fukuoka for the proposition that OVUII—though classified as a petty misdemeanor— can still be treated as “serious.” This supports treating the practical termination of the prosecution as significant prejudice to the State and the public, especially where the charge is OVUII “as a highly intoxicated driver.”

I. Standards of review and mixed questions: Matter of Kuamoo

On review methodology, the court reiterates abuse-of-discretion review for continuances (citing Williander), and notes that mixed questions dependent on case-specific facts are reviewed for clear error, citing Matter of Kuamoo. This framing matters because “due diligence” is treated as a fact-dependent determination entitled to deference—central to the court’s conclusion that the ICA improperly displaced the district court’s diligence finding.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why the court repudiated the Lee test “in its entirety”

The opinion’s rejection is not merely that Lee was never adopted by the Supreme Court; it is also normative and structural. The Lee test is “rigid,” “unworkable,” and “fundamentally unfair,” even to the State, because it can:

• Turn a diligence misstep into a functional case-terminating event at the suppression stage, even when HRPP Rule 48 time remains.
• Impose requirements misaligned with real-world prosecution (e.g., proving a witness is “willing”).
• Conflict with Hawaiʻi’s general preference for less severe case-ending outcomes when other measures can address prejudice.

B. The new two-step framework

C. The “totality of circumstances” factors for common-law good cause

The court articulates a non-exclusive set of considerations:

• Foreseeability: Were the circumstances making the witness unavailable unanticipated or not reasonably foreseeable?
• Materiality/Relevance to the State: Is the witness expected to provide relevant and material testimony benefiting the State?
• Prejudice balancing: What prejudice flows to the State or defendant from granting or denying the continuance?

Importantly, the court’s design separates two concepts that are often conflated in practice: (i) whether time is excludable for Rule 48 purposes (a speedy-trial computation question) and (ii) whether a continuance should be granted at all (a case-management and fairness question).

D. Application to the facts (and why the ICA’s diligence reversal was error)

The Supreme Court agrees with the district court that the State failed to exercise due diligence: after a 53-day continuance of the suppression hearing, the State waited until nine days before the hearing to issue a subpoena, learned four days before that the officer was unavailable, and moved two days before. On this record, the district court’s view that earlier contact could have allowed rescheduling without burdening the defense was a reasonable inference; thus the ICA erred by substituting its own view.

Yet, under the newly articulated common-law totality framework, the court finds good cause to grant a reasonable continuance because:

• The unavailability tied to military duty was “arguably” not reasonably foreseeable (at least on the record as developed).
• Officer Molina’s testimony was plainly material to litigating reasonable suspicion/probable cause at suppression.
• Denial predictably produced suppression and a likely dismissal (or strategic dismissal to avoid jeopardy), creating strong prejudice to the State and undermining adjudication on the merits, while the defendant did not show comparable witness-related prejudice from a short continuance.
• HRPP Rule 48 time remained until October 2023, so a continuance could be granted without immediate Rule 48 expiration—though the time would count against the State’s remaining Rule 48 window.

3.3. Impact

A. Trial-court practice: a clarified sequence and record-making expectations

Woody formalizes a workflow for State continuance requests based on witness unavailability:

• Courts should explicitly address Rule 48(c)(4)(i) due diligence (for excludability) as a first question.
• If diligence is lacking, courts should avoid mistakenly “curing” that deficiency via Rule 48(c)(8), consistent with Gillis.
• Courts must then separately decide common-law good cause where Rule 48 time remains, using the totality factors and making a record adequate for appellate review (foreseeability, materiality, prejudice).

B. Prosecutorial incentives: diligence still matters, even when continuances may be granted

The decision does not reward lack of diligence; it preserves a meaningful consequence: if the State fails due diligence, the continuance period is not excludable under Rule 48, shrinking the State’s remaining speedy-trial time. This creates a structural incentive to coordinate witnesses early, while preventing case-ending outcomes that hinge solely on scheduling failures when adjudication on the merits remains feasible within Rule 48.

C. Defense strategy and fairness

Defendants gain a clearer argument structure: they can concede that a continuance might be granted under common-law good cause while still contesting Rule 48 excludability—pressing the clock where the State has been dilatory. Conversely, defendants should expect less reliance on rigid tests that can convert a single witness absence into an automatic suppression-stage “win” without a merits hearing.

D. Appellate review: deference to diligence findings, but structured balancing for good cause

The court’s treatment of the district court’s diligence finding signals that appellate courts should be cautious about reweighing record-based diligence determinations. At the same time, the new totality framework offers appellate courts a more transparent set of criteria to evaluate whether a lower court reasonably balanced prejudice and foreseeability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• HRPP Rule 48 (speedy-trial rule): A rule requiring the State to start trial within six months (with certain time exclusions). If the deadline is missed and the defendant moves, the charge must be dismissed (with or without prejudice).
• “Excludable time”: Periods that do not count toward the six-month clock (e.g., certain continuances). Under HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i), a prosecution continuance due to unavailable material evidence is excludable only if the prosecutor used “due diligence.”
• Due diligence: Reasonable, timely efforts to secure the witness/evidence (e.g., contacting the witness early, timely subpoena service, confirming availability, pursuing alternatives).
• Rule 48(c)(8) “good cause” vs. common-law “good cause”: Rule 48(c)(8) is about whether time can be excluded from the speedy-trial clock; common-law good cause is about whether the court should grant a continuance at all as a matter of fairness and sound case management. Woody separates these inquiries.
• Motion to suppress / “fruits of the poisonous tree”: A request to exclude evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure. If granted broadly (as here), the prosecution may be left without admissible evidence to proceed.
• Jeopardy: The constitutional point at which a defendant is considered “in jeopardy” (often when a jury is sworn or the first witness is sworn in a bench trial). The opinion notes the practical incentive for the State to dismiss before jeopardy attaches if it cannot proceed.

5. Conclusion

State v. Woody makes two lasting contributions to Hawaiʻi criminal procedure. First, it definitively discards the ICA’s imported “Lee test” as a rigid and unjust approach to witness-unavailability continuances. Second, it establishes a structured, two-step method for State continuance requests: Rule 48(c)(4)(i) due diligence governs excludability, while common-law good cause—assessed under a totality-of-circumstances framework—governs whether a continuance may still be granted when Rule 48 time remains.

The decision recalibrates the system toward adjudication on the merits without abandoning speedy-trial discipline: the State may receive a necessary continuance, but if it lacked diligence, it pays for that failure by losing Rule 48 excludable time. In short, Woody rejects rigid, one-size-fits-all tests and replaces them with a bifurcated approach that is simultaneously more principled, more transparent, and more workable in practice.