State v. Trickle: Admissibility of Suicide “Relative Risk” Expert Testimony, Strict Objection Specificity, and Limits on “Liar” Rhetoric in Closing

1. Introduction

In State v. Trickle, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a starkly binary narrative: whether Kristen Trickle died by suicide in bed next to her husband, Colby Trickle, or whether she was murdered. A jury convicted Trickle of first-degree murder and interference with law enforcement. On direct appeal, Trickle challenged (among other issues) the admission of “suicide-risk” expert testimony based on a retrospective assessment, the exclusion of a defense lay witness offering an unrelated suicide anecdote, the admission of prejudicial spending evidence (a sex doll), alleged “best evidence” problems from playing excerpts of recordings, claims of judicial bias, and asserted prosecutorial error in closing argument.

The opinion is most significant for what it clarifies about (1) the permissible form of expert testimony when the defense theory is suicide, (2) Kansas’ stringent preservation requirements for evidentiary objections, and (3) the line between permissible credibility argument and improper insinuations that a defendant is lying.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed. It held:

• The defense preserved only a narrow objection to the suicide expert’s opinion—“invading the province of the jury”—and therefore waived broader attacks on the methodology’s necessity/reliability.
• Within that preserved frame, admitting Dr. Ashley Christiansen’s opinions that Kristen was “low risk” for suicide and that professionals would not conclude suicide from the data did not invade the jury’s role under K.S.A. 60-456, because the testimony addressed a forensic/clinical assessment and did not directly opine on Trickle’s guilt or witness credibility.
• The defense failed to preserve its “burden dilution” argument because the contemporaneous objection (“characterization”) did not specify the claimed legal error as required by K.S.A. 60-404.
• The district court properly excluded a defense lay witness who would have testified about an unrelated person’s suicide; the evidence lacked materiality and probative value and threatened “floodgates.”
• No “best evidence” violation occurred because excerpts can qualify as originals/duplicates for what they purport to show under K.S.A. 60-467.
• Judicial bias was not shown; adverse rulings (most of which were correct) do not equal misconduct.
• Several closing-argument statements were conceded errors (gunshot residue disclaimer not in evidence; “convenient” jab at defense). Two additional comments (“performance of a lifetime,” “spins a yarn”) were prosecutorial error under Kansas law restricting “liar” rhetoric.
• All errors—assumed and found—were harmless cumulatively given the strength of the evidence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shape the decision)

A. Preservation and contemporaneous objection

• Schutt v. Foster: Used to enforce the appellate rule that issues raised for the first time require invocation of a preservation exception (Rule 6.02(a)(5)). Trickle’s failure to invoke an exception foreclosed new theories on appeal.
• State v. Crudo: Treated K.S.A. 60-404 as a “procedural bar” when a timely and specific objection is missing. The Trickle court deploys Crudo to explain why preservation is not discretionary—without the right objection, appellate review generally stops.
• State v. Bryant: Stands for the “no switching grounds” rule—objecting on one basis at trial does not preserve a different one on appeal. The court analogizes: Trickle objected to “province of the jury,” so he could not later recast the issue as unreliability/unnecessariness of psychological autopsies.
• State v. Horton: Reinforces that an objection must be specific to the error asserted on appeal. The court cites Horton twice: first, to limit Trickle’s expert-testimony arguments to what was actually objected to; second, to reject the burden-dilution argument because “characterization” did not clearly raise it.

B. Expert testimony, ultimate issues, and the “province of the jury”

• State v. Aguirre and State v. Lyman: Provide the governing framework—expert admission under K.S.A. 60-456 reviewed for abuse of discretion, with the three-part Kansas abuse-of-discretion formulation.
• State v. Lash: The cautionary boundary case. In Lash, a psychologist could not testify that the victim had been molested by the defendant because that effectively asked the expert to decide whether the accuser was telling the truth—i.e., to pass on credibility.
• State v. Smallwood: The enabling contrast. Smallwood allowed an expert opinion that a child died from abuse; it did not directly decide guilt and did not rest on vouching for a witness. The Trickle court treats Dr. Christiansen’s “low suicide risk” opinion as akin to cause/manner-of-death-type expertise rather than credibility adjudication.
• State v. Horton (again): Supplies the doctrinal phrasing that an expert’s opinion is admissible “up to the point” it requires passing on credibility or weighing disputed evidence.

C. Relevance and the right to present a defense

• State v. Hogan and State v. Knox: Provide Kansas relevance architecture (materiality vs. probative value) and standards of review. The court uses these to classify the unrelated-suicide anecdote as immaterial and non-probative.
• State v. Seacat: Central to rejecting the defense lay witness. The court treats Seacat as rejecting tenuous suicide-related evidence where the mental condition at issue is not meaningfully connected. Trickle’s offered anecdote was even less connected than the prior-suicidal-ideation evidence in Seacat.

D. Evidentiary “best evidence” and recordings

• (Statutory interpretation rather than case-driven.) The court relies primarily on K.S.A. 60-467 definitions of “original” and “duplicate” and concludes excerpts are not automatically suspect as “not the original,” because each excerpt can be an original/duplicate of what it purports to depict.

E. Judicial misconduct and bias

• State v. Lyman: Supplies “unlimited review” for judicial misconduct claims.
• State v. Lemmie: Assigns the burden to the party alleging misconduct to show both misconduct and prejudice to substantial rights.
• State v. Hayden: Used to distinguish true judicial misconduct from an “isolated comment or action.” The trial judge’s terse remarks, in context of correct rulings, did not meet the threshold.
• State v. Kahler: Provides the maxim that an erroneous ruling alone does not establish judicial misconduct—important here because the defense tried to build a bias narrative largely from adverse rulings.

F. Prosecutorial error in closing argument and harmlessness

• State v. Mendez: Provides the two-step framework—(1) error (outside wide latitude) and (2) prejudice (constitutional harmlessness).
• State v. Sherman and Chapman: Supply the harmlessness test—State must show beyond a reasonable doubt no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict.
• State v. Anderson and State v. Watson: Control the “burden shifting” discussion when the prosecutor comments on the defense’s failure to present evidence. The Trickle court distinguishes Anderson (where subpoena-power talk was tied to reasonable doubt) and aligns with Watson (permitting comments about lack of evidence supporting a defense theory, especially in rebuttal).
• State v. Thurber: States the general rule—wide latitude allows reasonable inferences but not facts not in evidence. Used to assess the Kansas City “isolation” inference and the “kicked out” narrative.
• State v. Liles: States the “may argue inconsistencies; may not accuse defendant of lying” principle.
• State v. Elnicki, State v. Pribble, State v. Fisher, State v. Boatwright: Together map the language line. Elnicki is the key comparator because it disapproved “yarn” rhetoric; Pribble articulates acceptable phrasing (“The evidence contradicts...”) versus impermissible personal credibility attacks; Fisher flags slangy disparagement (“bull”); Boatwright illustrates permissible contradiction framing.
• State v. Randle: Mentioned as disapproving certain grounds in Fisher, showing the doctrine’s evolution while leaving the “wide latitude” limits intact.

G. Cumulative error

• State v. Bobian: Cited for reserving harmlessness analysis for cumulative error when the State concedes error.
• State v. Allen: Used to deem underdeveloped “automatic reversal” arguments waived/abandoned.
• State v. Zongker: Supplies the cumulative-error framework and the rule that if any aggregated errors are constitutional, the beneficiary of the error must show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The opinion narrows the appellate battlefield through preservation

The court’s first major move is procedural: it confines review to the exact objection made. Trickle objected that Dr. Christiansen’s final “low risk” conclusion “invades the purview of the jury,” while explicitly not challenging “methodology or her information.” That trial stance locked the defense into a single appellate lane: whether the opinion improperly supplanted the jury’s role.

This is not mere formalism. The court treats K.S.A. 60-404 as a gatekeeping rule ensuring (1) the trial judge can correct problems in real time and (2) the proponent can develop the record (e.g., by reframing a question or laying additional foundation). The court’s rejection of the “burden dilution” argument underscores how unforgiving Kansas preservation is when the objection does not identify the precise legal harm.

B. Expert testimony on suicide “risk” vs. expert testimony on guilt

On the merits of the preserved issue, the court harmonizes two statutory ideas in K.S.A. 60-456:

• K.S.A. 60-456(b): expert testimony must help the fact-finder understand evidence or decide a fact in issue; and
• K.S.A. 60-456(d): testimony is not objectionable merely because it “embraces the ultimate issue.”

But Kansas also enforces a practical limit: even if “ultimate issue” testimony is allowed, an expert may not become a “credibility oracle.” The court uses State v. Lash and State v. Smallwood to draw the line:

• Lash is improper because it effectively answers, “Is the witness telling the truth about who did it?”
• Smallwood is proper because it answers, “What does the expert’s specialized knowledge indicate about the cause/manner of death?” leaving guilt to the jury.

Dr. Christiansen’s testimony—framed as “relatively less likely” suicide and “low risk” based on data—falls, for this court, into the Smallwood category: it informs the jury’s evaluation of the suicide theory without explicitly declaring Trickle the killer or vouching for a witness’ truthfulness. Even the statement that other professionals “would not conclude” suicide is treated as a professional-consensus point rather than a directive to convict.

C. Relevance and the “floodgates” concern for unrelated-suicide anecdotes

The defense sought to counter suicide-risk testimony with a lay anecdote: a stepson who seemed fine but died by suicide. The court rejects this as lacking a logical connection to any fact of consequence about Kristen’s death. The reasoning is classic relevance doctrine (materiality + probative value) with a pragmatic evidentiary-policy overlay: allowing such testimony would convert trials into collateral mini-hearings on third-party tragedies whenever suicide is raised.

D. Excerpts and “best evidence”: redefining the perceived “whole recording” instinct

The defense argued that playing excerpts violated the best-evidence principle. The court reframes the issue: the problem is not whether the State played “everything,” but whether what it played was an original/accurate duplicate of what it purported to show. Under K.S.A. 60-467, and absent authenticity/unfairness concerns, excerpts are not per se inadmissible.

E. Prosecutorial closing: error for flippant “liar” insinuations, but no reversal

The court’s clearest merits holding on prosecutorial conduct is its condemnation of “performance of a lifetime” and “spins a yarn” rhetoric, anchored in State v. Elnicki and the “don’t call the defendant a liar” line of cases (State v. Liles, State v. Pribble, State v. Fisher). Even where the State can argue contradictions, it must do so in evidence-focused terms, not with derisive insinuations that the defendant is fabricating.

Still, the court affirms under cumulative-error analysis, emphasizing isolation of the remarks, sustained objections on some points, and (critically) “significant, if not overwhelming” evidence of guilt (ownership of the gun, lack of blood despite claimed aid, multiple lies, SGLI search timing disproved by video).

3.3 Impact

A. Expanded practical room for “suicide-risk” experts (with careful framing)

Although fact-bound, State v. Trickle will likely be cited to support admitting forensic psychological testimony that evaluates suicide as a competing explanation—particularly when phrased in probabilistic/relative-risk terms rather than categorical declarations (e.g., “this was not suicide” or “the defendant murdered her”). The decision implicitly validates “psychological autopsy”-style testimony as helpful under K.S.A. 60-456, so long as it stays away from credibility determinations.

B. Even stricter emphasis on objection specificity

The case reinforces that Kansas appellate courts will not rescue imprecise objections—especially where counsel expressly disclaimed other grounds. Trial lawyers can expect Trickle to be used as a preservation checklist case: if you mean reliability, say reliability; if you mean burden dilution, say burden dilution; if you mean constitutional jury-trial infringement, say so and explain why.

C. Closing-argument discipline: “liar” rhetoric remains a recurring trap

The court’s error finding on “performance” and “yarn” continues a consistent Kansas theme: prosecutors may argue inference from evidence, but not use rhetorical flourishes that amount to calling the defendant a liar. Yet the affirmance also shows the practical reality: such errors often will be deemed harmless when evidence is strong and remarks are isolated—so the main effect is likely future citation in motions in limine and contemporaneous objections, not automatic reversals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Psychological autopsy”: A retrospective clinical/forensic evaluation of a deceased person’s mental state based on records, history, and collateral information. It is not a literal autopsy; it is an expert reconstruction used to assess whether suicide risk indicators were present.
• “Invading the province of the jury”: Shorthand for testimony that effectively tells the jury what conclusion to reach on guilt or resolves credibility disputes the jury must decide. Kansas allows experts to “embrace” ultimate issues (K.S.A. 60-456(d)) but not to decide who is telling the truth.
• “Contemporaneous objection” (K.S.A. 60-404): You must object at the time evidence is offered and state the specific reason. If you object on Ground A at trial, you usually cannot appeal on Ground B.
• “Best evidence” (K.S.A. 60-467): A rule about proving the content of writings/recordings; it generally prefers originals but permits duplicates absent authenticity/unfairness issues. It does not automatically require “playing the entire recording.”
• “Cumulative error”: Even if each error alone is harmless, multiple errors together can deny a fair trial. Courts examine the number, relationship, and context of errors and the overall strength of evidence.

5. Conclusion

State v. Trickle is a procedural-and-evidentiary roadmap disguised as a homicide appeal. Substantively, it approves (on these facts) expert suicide testimony framed as relative risk and professional assessment, treating it like cause/manner-of-death assistance rather than a guilt verdict. Procedurally, it reiterates that Kansas appellate review is tightly constrained by K.S.A. 60-404—vague objections and shifted appellate theories will fail. And in trial advocacy, it reaffirms that prosecutors may argue inconsistencies but may not drift into flippant “he’s lying” rhetoric—though such missteps may still be held harmless when the evidentiary record is strong.