I. Introduction
State v. Sarria is a consolidated criminal appeal from Union County involving (1) a prosecution for
unlawfully purchasing a firearm (ORS 166.425) and (2) a later prosecution for failure to appear on a criminal citation
(ORS 133.076). The defendant, Colton James Gerry Sarria, entered a conditional guilty plea under
ORS 135.335(3) to preserve appellate review of a pretrial ruling.
The key dispute in the failure-to-appear case was purely statutory: whether the underlying “Citation” that the defendant
did not appear on was a “criminal citation issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076,” as ORS 133.076 requires.
The citation document had been drafted by the district attorney’s office and signed by the circuit court judge,
then later served on defendant by a sheriff’s deputy.
Two appellate issues drove the Supreme Court’s opinion:
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Procedural/appellate review issue: Could the Court of Appeals avoid the preserved merits issue by affirming on a
new procedural ground raised for the first time on appeal (i.e., that defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss was an improper
“sufficiency” challenge)?
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Merits issue: Did the criminal citation qualify as one “issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076” if it was signed/issued
by the court rather than by a peace officer?
III. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
1. Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon
Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 20 P3d 180 (2001), supplied the controlling framework for
the Supreme Court’s procedural holding. Outdoor Media permits “right for the wrong reason” affirmance only if:
- the record supports the alternative basis,
- the trial court’s ruling is consistent with that view of the evidence, and
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critically, “the record materially be the same one that would have been developed” had the alternative basis been raised below.
The court held the state’s late-raised procedural theory failed the third requirement: had the state objected in the trial court that the issue
must be litigated via trial mechanisms (e.g., stipulated facts trial, jury instruction route, motion practice aimed at evidentiary exclusion),
defendant could have pursued other procedural paths and built a different record. Because the state instead litigated the merits and consented to
conditional-plea preservation, the Court of Appeals could not later affirm on a ground that depends on defendant having proceeded differently.
2. State v. McKenzie
The court invoked State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 771 P2d 264 (1989), for the proposition that Oregon appellate courts may look past
labels where a “viable issue” is presented, reinforcing the majority’s view that the substance here was a preserved legal question about statutory validity,
not a conventional evidentiary sufficiency contest.
3. State v. McAnulty; State v. Dinsmore; State v. Tannehill (discussed)
In explaining conditional pleas, the court relied on State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 338 P3d 653 (2014), and
State v. Dinsmore, 342 Or 1, 147 P3d 1146 (2006), to emphasize that ORS 135.335(3) is designed to allow efficient appellate review
of specified pretrial determinations without a stipulated facts trial, and that the essential “condition” is the right to withdraw the plea if the defendant
prevails on the preserved issue. The court also referenced State v. Tannehill, 341 Or 205, 141 P3d 584 (2006), in a footnote when
distinguishing broader plea-agreement doctrines from its Outdoor Media analysis.
4. State v. Meiser; State v. Roberts
In deciding to reach the merits rather than remand, the court cited State v. Meiser, 369 Or 347, 506 P3d 402 (2022), for its discretion
to resolve remaining issues for judicial efficiency. It also cited State v. Roberts, 374 Or 821, 584 P3d 1217 (2026), to underscore
the real-world consequences of criminal convictions and the value of prompt resolution.
5. Statutory interpretation methodology: State v. Gaines; PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries
On the merits, the court used State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), together with contextual reference to
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), to frame text/context/history interpretation of
“issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076.”
6. Additional interpretive/context cases
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Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 948 P2d 722 (1997): dictionary/legal meaning usage.
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Gadalean v. SAIF, 364 Or 707, 439 P3d 965 (2019): different terms imply different meanings (“issue” vs “serve”).
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Preble v. Dept. of Rev., 331 Or 320, 14 P3d 613 (2000): “and” as cumulative, not alternative.
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State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 359 P3d 232 (2015) and Jordan v. SAIF, 343 Or 208, 167 P3d 451 (2007):
surplusage/purposeful omission.
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Bonner v. American Golf Corp. of California, 372 Or 814, 558 P3d 812 (2024) (citing State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536,
920 P2d 535 (1996)): constitutional avoidance (not ultimately necessary to the holding).
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State v. Lee, 373 Or 525, 568 P3d 139 (2025): “shall” as mandatory duty (used in contextual statutory discussion).
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State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 956 P2d 202 (1998): omnibus hearing purpose (“early, coordinated resolution”).
7. State v. Kenny (distinguished)
The dissent relied heavily on State v. Kenny, 262 Or App 702, 327 P3d 548 (2014), which read “issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076”
in ORS 133.076 as describing the type of citation rather than imposing compliance-proof as an “element.” The majority acknowledged Kenny but
treated it as factually distinguishable and not resolving the “who may issue” question presented here, ultimately adopting a compliance-focused reading
that requires lawful issuance under the citation statutes.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. Why the Court of Appeals had to reach the merits
The Supreme Court framed the Court of Appeals’ disposition as an improper “right for the wrong reason” affirmance.
The record showed:
- the state did not object in the trial court that defendant’s motion was procedurally improper,
- both parties introduced exhibits and litigated the issue as a legal validity question with essentially undisputed facts,
- the trial court decided the issue on the merits (finding the citation lawful), and
- the state and court consented to a conditional plea that expressly preserved the adverse determination for appeal.
Under Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, allowing a new procedural rationale on appeal would be unfair because defendant
could have pursued other litigation routes to secure an appealable ruling (including trial-based routes) if alerted earlier. In a conditional plea posture,
the unfairness is sharpened: the state’s consent to conditional resolution is part of why no trial record exists.
2. Why the citation was not “issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076” for ORS 133.076
Turning to the merits, the court focused on the statutory structure:
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ORS 133.076 criminalizes failure to appear only when the person has been served with a criminal citation “issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076.”
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ORS 133.055(1) states, “A peace officer may issue a criminal citation… [and] shall deliver a copy…”
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ORS 133.065 and related provisions repeatedly separate “issue” from “serve,” implying distinct actions rather than synonyms.
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ORS 133.068 and ORS 133.069 require, among other things, inclusion of “the name of the peace officer who issued the citation.”
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ORS 133.110 authorizes a court to “authorize a peace officer to issue and serve” a citation in lieu of arrest, but does not grant the court power
to issue the citation itself.
The majority’s core interpretive move is institutional: the legislature located the “issuance” authority in peace officers, and located the court’s role in
ORS 133.110 as authorization of the officer’s exercise of that authority (as an alternative to issuing an arrest warrant). Reading ORS 133.110
as implicitly authorizing courts to issue citations would collapse the “authorize a peace officer” phrasing into surplusage.
Applying that reading to the undisputed record, the officer’s declaration showed the deputy received the citation and later served it.
The only signature on the served “Citation” was the judge’s. Because the peace officer did not issue the citation—only served the court-issued document—
the citation was not lawfully “issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076” for purposes of ORS 133.076. The failure-to-appear conviction therefore could not stand.
3. Scope of the holding
The court emphasized a narrow rule: for ORS 133.076, the predicate citation must be one that has been both issued and served by a peace officer.
A trial court may authorize that issuance (ORS 133.110), but may not issue the citation itself.
The court also noted alternative enforcement mechanisms for court orders (e.g., contempt under ORS 33.015(2)(b)), indicating the decision is not an invitation
to disregard court authority generally, but an insistence on statutory compliance for the specific crime defined by ORS 133.076.
C. Impact
1. Criminal citation practice and charging decisions
Practically, Sarria constrains a practice in which a district attorney presents a court-signed “citation” that a deputy later serves.
After Sarria, that approach cannot support an ORS 133.076 prosecution unless the citation was issued by a peace officer pursuant to the
ORS 133.055–133.076 scheme (even if the court has authorized issuance under ORS 133.110).
Prosecutors and courts may shift toward:
- obtaining warrants more frequently where citation issuance cannot be lawfully accomplished,
- ensuring peace officers complete and issue uniform citations (including in “citation in lieu of arrest” settings), or
- using alternative procedural tools (summons/process mechanisms) not framed as “criminal citations” under ORS 133.055–133.076 when appropriate.
2. Litigation in failure-to-appear cases
The decision creates a concrete statutory defense to ORS 133.076 where the predicate document was court-issued rather than officer-issued. It also
invites careful record-making about who performed the statutory “issuance” acts (not merely service) and whether the instrument is a citation “under”
the criminal citation statutes at all.
3. Appellate review and conditional pleas
On the appellate-procedure side, Sarria reinforces that appellate courts should be cautious about accepting brand-new procedural “gotchas” to affirm
when the parties litigated the merits below and structured the case around a conditional plea. Outdoor Media’s “materially the same record” requirement
will do real work in conditional-plea cases, where the defendant has waived trial and the state has consented to that posture.
D. Complex Concepts Simplified
1. Conditional plea (ORS 135.335(3))
A conditional guilty/no-contest plea lets a defendant plead while preserving appellate review of a specified adverse pretrial ruling.
It requires consent of both the state and the court, and the reservation must be in writing.
If the defendant “finally prevails” on the preserved issue, the defendant may withdraw the plea.
2. “Right for the wrong reason” affirmance and Outdoor Media
Appellate courts sometimes affirm even if the trial court’s reasoning was wrong, so long as another legal basis supports the result.
Outdoor Media limits that practice when the alternative basis was not raised below and the losing party could have made a different record if it had been.
3. “Issue” vs “serve” a citation
In the citation statutes, issuance is the official act of creating/authorizing the citation as a legal command under statutory authority.
Service is delivery of the citation to the person. Sarria treats these as distinct statutory acts; a peace officer may be required to do both
for the citation to qualify as “issued under” the criminal citation statutes for ORS 133.076.
4. “Court may authorize” under ORS 133.110
ORS 133.110 gives the court a gatekeeping choice after an information/complaint and probable cause finding:
the court can issue an arrest warrant, or it can authorize a peace officer to issue and serve a criminal citation instead. Sarria holds that
“authorize” does not mean the court itself may issue the citation.