State v. Roman: § 54-84 (b) Requires a No-Adverse-Inference Instruction in the Final Charge; Suplicki’s Automatic Reversal Rule Overruled

1. Introduction

State v. Roman is a Supreme Court of Connecticut decision reversing a murder conviction because the trial court failed to include, in its final jury instructions, the statutory “no adverse inference” instruction required by General Statutes § 54-84 (b) when a defendant does not testify.

The defendant, Luiz Roman, was convicted of murder arising from the shooting death of Miguel Afzal. The state’s case relied heavily on surveillance footage and the defendant’s prior statements (including alleged confessions and inconsistencies), rather than physical or trace evidence. Although the trial court gave no-adverse-inference instructions during jury selection and again in preliminary instructions, it omitted the instruction from the final charge provided after the close of evidence and immediately before deliberations.

The key issues were: (1) whether omission of the § 54-84 (b) instruction from the final charge constitutes plain error; (2) whether such an omission mandates automatic reversal; and (3) what prejudice/harmlessness framework applies on plain-error review of § 54-84 (b) noncompliance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the trial court committed plain error by omitting the § 54-84 (b) instruction from the final jury instructions and reversed the conviction, remanding for a new trial. The omission was “obvious and readily discernable” because it contravened controlling Appellate Court precedent—particularly State v. Hicks.

The court rejected the defendant’s argument (rooted in State v. Suplicki) that the omission required automatic reversal. The court concluded the error is not structural and is subject to harmless-error analysis. It further overruled Suplicki to the extent it required automatic reversal for § 54-84 (b) violations.

The court clarified that, at the second stage of plain-error review for § 54-84 (b) noncompliance, courts should apply the constitutional harmless error standard: the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility the jury was misled by the instructional error. On this record, the state did not meet that burden.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The controlling instruction-timing precedent: State v. Hicks

State v. Hicks (97 Conn. App. 266) is the central precedent. It held that § 54-84 (b) requires the no-adverse-inference instruction to be included in the final jury charge and that a preliminary instruction is an inadequate substitute. Roman treats Hicks as “clearly and unequivocally” controlling and finds patent error because the trial court’s final charge omitted the instruction entirely.

Roman also endorses Hicks on the merits. It reasons that, historically, “instruct the jury” at the time § 54-84 (b) was enacted (1977) meant the final charge after closing arguments; preliminary instructions were not part of Connecticut practice until later (discussed via State v. Woolcock).

B. Appellate Court cases reinforcing Hicks: State v. Stewart and State v. Vega

Hicks relied on State v. Stewart (60 Conn. App. 301) and State v. Vega (36 Conn. App. 41). Roman reprises their core concerns: the time gap between preliminary instructions and deliberations, the non-substitutive role of preliminary instructions, and the risk of confusion when the final charge omits a point critical to deliberations.

C. Plain error framework: State v. Jamison, State v. Pierce, and Practice Book § 60-5

Roman applies the two-step plain-error test articulated in State v. Jamison: (1) a “patent” error that is obvious and not debatable, and (2) a failure to grant relief would result in “manifest injustice.” It also draws from State v. Pierce on the “unreliable verdict or miscarriage of justice” consideration, and grounds review in Practice Book § 60-5.

D. Statutory mandates effectuating fundamental rights: State v. Burke, State v. Carter, and State v. Sinclair

Roman situates § 54-84 (b) in a line of cases emphasizing that the statute effectuates the fundamental constitutional right not to testify. It cites State v. Burke and State v. Carter for the proposition that failure to follow the statute’s mandatory provisions constitutes plain error. It quotes State v. Sinclair for the constitutional rationale: absent the instruction, juror speculation about silence can impose an “impermissible toll” on the privilege against self-incrimination.

E. Harmless error in § 54-84 (b) cases: State v. Ruocco, State v. Yurch, State v. Tatem, State v. Marra, State v. Carrione, State v. Cobb, State v. Townsend, and State v. Cook

Roman uses State v. Ruocco to (i) confirm that § 54-84 (b) noncompliance is patent error and (ii) frame harmlessness as “no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled.” It also draws on State v. Yurch (harmlessness can be found where the charge “completely” forbids using silence), and State v. Tatem (presumption of innocence and burden-of-proof instructions do not substitute for the statutory instruction).

The opinion cites State v. Marra and other cases for the principle that slight deviations in wording may be acceptable if the substantive meaning is conveyed, but emphasizes that Roman is a “total omission” from the final charge. State v. Cook supplies the broader constitutional harmless error statement: whether the error contributed to the verdict.

F. The overruled automatic reversal approach: State v. Suplicki

State v. Suplicki held that total omission of the no-adverse-inference instruction is plain error not subject to harmless-error analysis, effectively requiring automatic reversal. Roman rejects that view, holds that § 54-84 (b) violations are not structural, and expressly overrules Suplicki “to the extent that it required the automatic reversal of a conviction when a trial court's jury instructions fail to comply with § 54-84 (b).”

G. Structural error doctrine: State v. Joseph A., State v. Cushard, United States v. Davila, Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, Greer v. United States, and Neder v. United States

To justify rejecting automatic reversal, Roman relies on structural-error principles as described in State v. Joseph A. and State v. Cushard, and analogizes to federal doctrine (e.g., United States v. Davila). It explains that many serious constitutional errors are still subject to harmless-error review, including omission of an element from jury instructions (citing Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, Greer v. United States, and Neder v. United States).

H. Federal baseline for no-adverse-inference instructions: Carter v. Kentucky and Connecticut’s approach: State v. Dudla

Roman notes that Connecticut’s statute is more protective than federal law, because Carter v. Kentucky requires the instruction only upon request. Roman also cites State v. Dudla, in which Connecticut held that a Carter violation is not structural and is subject to harmless-error analysis—supporting Roman’s conclusion that § 54-84 (b) violations likewise are not structural.

I. Binding precedent and “controlling law at the time of trial”: Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP, State v. Turner, State v. Darryl W., State v. Bellamy, and Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission

Roman emphasizes hierarchical stare decisis: trial courts must follow applicable appellate precedent (Mendillo v. Tinley, Renehan & Dost, LLP). It also frames patent error as overlooking “clearly controlling law” (citing Ralto Developers, Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission) and states that “controlling law” is what existed at the time of trial (State v. Turner; State v. Darryl W.; State v. Bellamy (Rogers, C. J., concurring)).

J. Statutory interpretation methodology and historical meaning: Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., Airey v. Feliciano, Kuchta v. Arisian, State v. Wright, Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission, and State v. Fernando A.

To conclude that § 54-84 (b) contemplates a final charge, Roman relies on interpretive methods that incorporate prior judicial gloss (Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd.; Airey v. Feliciano) and contemporaneous meaning and practice (Kuchta v. Arisian; State v. Wright; Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission). It also invokes the presumption that the legislature knew existing law when enacting the statute (State v. Fernando A.).

K. Preliminary instructions are not substitutes for final instructions: State v. Woolcock, People v. Newman, and State v. Lewis

Roman uses State v. Woolcock—which approved preliminary instructions but insisted they are not a substitute for final instructions—to support why § 54-84 (b)’s required instruction must appear in the final charge. Woolcock’s reliance on People v. Newman underscores that the “eventual predeliberation instructions” remain essential. State v. Lewis reinforces the point that final instructions are delivered “at [a] critical time.”

L. Preservation doctrines and plain error availability: State v. Kitchens and State v. McClain

Roman notes that failure to object can constitute a waiver of ordinary review under State v. Kitchens, but reaffirms that a Kitchens waiver does not foreclose plain-error review, citing State v. McClain.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Patent error: omission from the final charge violated controlling law

Roman’s “patent error” holding is anchored in the idea that a paradigmatic plain error occurs when the trial court overlooks controlling law. Because State v. Hicks squarely required the § 54-84 (b) instruction in the final charge, the trial court’s omission was obvious and readily discernible. Roman then goes further: even though the Supreme Court had not previously passed on Hicks, it evaluates Hicks’ statutory construction and adopts it as correct.

B. Why § 54-84 (b) requires the final-charge instruction

Roman acknowledges that § 54-84 (b) does not explicitly specify timing, but finds legislative intent through historical practice. When the statute was enacted (1977), Connecticut practice required jury instructions after closing arguments (referencing Practice Book (1963) § 2265 discussed in State v. Woolcock). Preliminary instructions were not customary; thus, “instruct the jury” reasonably meant the final, predeliberation charge. The court also ties the timing requirement to the instruction’s purpose: preventing jurors from giving evidentiary weight to silence at the moment deliberations begin.

C. Overruling Suplicki: no automatic reversal because the error is not structural

Roman rejects the premise that noncompliance with § 54-84 (b) is structural. It applies structural error principles (from State v. Joseph A. and State v. Cushard) and notes that even serious constitutional instruction errors can be harmless. Because State v. Dudla treated a requested-instruction violation under Carter v. Kentucky as subject to harmless-error review, Roman finds no basis to impose a stricter automatic reversal rule for Connecticut’s statutory regime.

D. Plain error’s second stage: constitutional harmless error rubric and burden on the state

Roman clarifies that “manifest injustice” analysis for § 54-84 (b) noncompliance proceeds under the constitutional harmless error standard: the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility the jury was misled.

Applying that standard, Roman finds the state’s harmlessness arguments inadequate:

• General instructions (presumption of innocence, burden of proof, no “guesswork”) do not address the specific harm: jurors speculating about or penalizing the defendant’s silence.
• Earlier instructions to venire panels and in preliminary instructions do not cure the final omission because (i) final instructions serve a distinct, critical function, (ii) time and intervening events create a realistic risk of forgetting, and (iii) giving the instruction early but omitting it at the end can create confusion.
• Evidence and theory of guilt—inconsistent statements, disposal of clothing, and Cruz’ confession testimony—could naturally prompt jurors to wonder why the defendant did not testify to explain, thereby increasing the risk of an adverse inference.

3.3. Impact

Roman has three immediate, practical effects on Connecticut criminal trials and appeals:

1. Bright-line compliance requirement for trial courts: unless a defendant requests otherwise, the § 54-84 (b) instruction must appear in the final jury instructions. Including it only during jury selection or preliminary instructions is legally insufficient.
2. Rejection of automatic reversal: by overruling State v. Suplicki in relevant part, Roman aligns § 54-84 (b) violations with harmless-error review rather than structural error.
3. Clarified plain-error prejudice framework: for unpreserved § 54-84 (b) claims, the second-stage inquiry is conducted under the constitutional harmless error standard, with the burden on the state to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Doctrinally, Roman strengthens the practical force of intermediate appellate precedent in the “plain error/patent error” setting: overlooking controlling Appellate Court authority can itself make an instructional omission “obvious” for purposes of plain-error review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

No adverse inference instruction (§ 54-84 (b))

A mandatory instruction (unless the defendant asks not to give it) telling jurors they may not hold it against the defendant if the defendant does not testify.

Plain error; “patent error”

An appellate safety valve for unpreserved mistakes. “Patent” means the error is obvious on the record and not reasonably debatable—often because controlling law was overlooked.

Manifest injustice

The second step of plain-error review: whether leaving the error uncorrected would undermine fairness and confidence in the proceeding.

Structural error vs. harmless error

Structural errors infect the framework of the trial and require automatic reversal (e.g., denial of counsel). Most instructional errors, however, are reviewed for harmlessness—whether the error likely affected the verdict.

Constitutional harmless error (beyond a reasonable doubt)

The state must show beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility the jury was misled and that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

Kitchens waiver and plain error

Failing to object after reviewing instructions can waive ordinary appellate review (State v. Kitchens), but plain-error review can still be available (State v. McClain).

5. Conclusion

State v. Roman establishes (and confirms statewide at the Supreme Court level) that § 54-84 (b) requires the no-adverse-inference instruction to be given in the final jury instructions immediately before deliberations, notwithstanding earlier preliminary instructions. It also reshapes Connecticut doctrine by overruling State v. Suplicki’s automatic reversal rule and clarifying that prejudice at the second stage of plain-error review is assessed under the constitutional harmless error standard, with the state bearing the burden beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision underscores the central role of the final jury charge in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination and signals that omissions affecting how jurors may interpret silence will be treated with exceptional seriousness—often requiring retrial unless the state can conclusively show the omission had no reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict.