State v. Raeon A.: No Golding Review and No Plain Error for Daniel W. E. Delayed-Reporting Instruction Given Under Then-Governing Law

1. Introduction

In State v. Raeon A. (Conn. Sup. Ct., officially released June 23, 2026), the defendant appealed from convictions of sexual assault in the first degree (General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2)) and risk of injury to a child (General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2)) arising from the sexual abuse of his minor biological daughter (identified as “R”).

The appeal centered on a single, unpreserved instructional issue: the trial court instructed the jury—tracking this court’s then-binding directive in State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593)—that the jury should not consider the victim’s delay in officially reporting sexual assault when evaluating her credibility. The defendant framed the instruction as a federal due process and fair trial violation, seeking review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), or, alternatively, reversal under the plain error doctrine.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claim failed Golding’s second prong (constitutional magnitude) and that plain error relief was unavailable because the trial court correctly applied governing law at the time of trial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • No Golding review: The court declined to review the unpreserved instructional challenge under State v. Golding because the defendant failed to establish that the claim was of constitutional magnitude (Golding prong two).
  • Adam P. controls constitutional magnitude: The defendant’s argument that the instruction usurped the jury’s fact-finding role and diluted the state’s burden was foreclosed by State v. Adam P. (351 Conn. 213), which held that a similar Daniel W. E. instruction claim is not constitutional in nature.
  • No plain error: Because the instruction conformed to State v. Daniel W. E., the governing law when the defendant was tried (2024), the trial court’s charge could not constitute reversible plain error.
  • No supervisory-authority “bypass to the bypass”: The court rejected the defendant’s request for extraordinary review via supervisory authority, reiterating limits articulated in State v. Turner (334 Conn. 660) and In re Aisjaha N. (343 Conn. 709).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Preservation, reviewability, and “constitutional magnitude”

  • State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233): The foundational framework for reviewing unpreserved constitutional claims. The court focused on prong two—whether the claim is “of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right.”
  • In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773): Cited as modifying Golding (specifically the third prong), reinforcing that Golding remains a structured gateway: the first two prongs determine reviewability; the last two address the merits.
  • State v. Carlos G. (354 Conn. 21): Cited for the proposition that Golding’s first two prongs are about reviewability, not merits, underscoring why the court could end the analysis at prong two.
  • State v. LaBrec (270 Conn. 548): Cited for the principle that only certain instructional errors are truly constitutional in nature, supporting the court’s insistence that “constitutional labels” do not transform evidentiary/credibility instructions into constitutional claims.
  • State v. Cutler (293 Conn. 303), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson (311 Conn. 726): Quoted for the admonition against “robbing” garden-variety instructional complaints “in the majestic garb of constitutional claims.”

B. Constancy of accusation and delayed reporting

  • State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593): The origin of the challenged instruction. The trial court’s charge in Raeon A. matched the Daniel W. E. directive: jurors should not consider delay in official reporting when evaluating credibility because there may be many reasons for delay.
  • State v. Adam P. (351 Conn. 213): The decisive precedent. Although Adam P. later “overruled the modification” announced in Daniel W. E. and returned the doctrine to State v. Troupe (237 Conn. 284), it also held that challenges to the Daniel W. E. instruction are not of constitutional magnitude for Golding purposes. Raeon A. treated that conclusion as controlling and refused to reconsider it.
  • State v. Troupe (237 Conn. 284): Identified as the prior baseline doctrine restored by Adam P. (i.e., the framework to which Connecticut returned after abandoning Daniel W. E.).
  • Appellate line confirming nonconstitutional status of constancy-instruction issues (cited in footnote 5): State v. Roberto Q. (170 Conn. App. 733), State v. Rivera (145 Conn. App. 344), State v. Antwon W. (118 Conn. App. 180), State v. Wild (43 Conn. App. 458), and State v. William G. (232 Conn. App. 317). These cases were invoked not for their fact patterns but for a doctrinal point: alleged missteps in this category of instructions typically do not rise to constitutional magnitude.

C. Plain error and fidelity to then-existing law

  • State v. McClain (324 Conn. 802): Cited for the high threshold of plain error—an “extraordinary” doctrine reserved for obvious errors that compromise the fairness, integrity, or public confidence in proceedings.
  • State v. Diaz (302 Conn. 93): The key plain-error principle applied here: a trial court’s proper application of the law existing at the time of trial “cannot constitute reversible error under the plain error doctrine.”
  • State v. Adam P. (351 Conn. 213): Also used to reinforce that, even though Adam P. later disapproved the Daniel W. E. instruction, a court that “faithfully implement[ed]” Daniel W. E. at the time does not commit plain error.

D. Limits on supervisory authority as a substitute for preservation

  • State v. Turner (334 Conn. 660): Cited for the proposition that supervisory authority is not meant to become a “bypass to the bypass” where Golding and plain error do not provide relief.
  • In re Aisjaha N. (343 Conn. 709): Reinforces that supervisory powers are not a “last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal.”
  • State v. Kitchens (299 Conn. 447): Not applied; mentioned because the state did not argue implicit waiver of instructional challenges under Kitchens, leaving Golding prong two as the dispositive procedural gate.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Golding prong two as the dispositive step: The court treated the appeal as a reviewability problem, not a merits problem. It reiterated that only a subset of instructional errors are constitutional—typically those affecting the elements, burden of proof, or presumption of innocence.
  2. Why the delayed-reporting/credibility instruction is nonconstitutional: Relying on State v. Adam P., the court concluded that “neither delay nor credibility is an element of the charged offenses,” and the complained-of instruction does not “shift the state’s burden of proof” or implicate “the defendant’s presumption of innocence.” Accordingly, even if the instruction is debatable as a matter of evidentiary policy or clarity, it is not of constitutional magnitude for Golding purposes.
  3. Refusal to revisit Adam P.: The court emphasized recency (Adam P. was decided about a year earlier), lack of a “sound reason” to reconsider, and consistency with a long line of appellate authority treating constancy-of-accusation instructional issues as nonconstitutional.
  4. Plain error barred by correct application of then-governing law: Even though Adam P. later enjoined trial courts from using the Daniel W. E. instruction, the defendant’s trial occurred when Daniel W. E. was still binding. Under State v. Diaz, fidelity to then-existing precedent cannot be “obvious error” warranting plain error reversal.
  5. Supervisory authority is not an alternate preservation regime: The defendant’s attempt to obtain reversal through supervisory authority was rejected under State v. Turner. The court framed supervisory authority as systemic (forward-looking and institutional), not a routine mechanism to reach unpreserved, case-specific errors when Golding and plain error are unavailable.

3.3 Impact

State v. Raeon A. cements a practical procedural rule for Connecticut criminal appeals involving legacy Daniel W. E. delayed-reporting instructions:

  • Unpreserved challenges will usually be stopped at Golding prong two: By reaffirming State v. Adam P. on constitutional magnitude, Raeon A. signals that defendants cannot convert credibility/constancy instruction disputes into federal constitutional claims simply by invoking “jury role” or “burden dilution” rhetoric.
  • No plain error for pre-Adam P. trials that followed Daniel W. E.: The opinion protects convictions obtained when trial courts followed binding law later abandoned. This is an important “reliance” and “finality” principle: doctrinal evolution does not automatically create reversible error in earlier trials.
  • Supervisory authority remains cabined: Raeon A. reinforces that supervisory authority is not a third route to merits review of unpreserved claims.
  • Post-Adam P. future trials: Although Raeon A. itself addresses a pre-Adam P. trial, it operates in the background of Adam P.’s forward-looking directive that trial courts should not give the Daniel W. E. instruction going forward.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Constancy of accusation
A doctrine governing how jurors may consider evidence that a sexual assault complainant disclosed the assault to others. It often comes with limiting instructions explaining the purpose for which disclosure evidence may be used and how to avoid improper inferences.
Golding review (unpreserved constitutional claims)
A four-part test from State v. Golding that sometimes allows appellate review of issues not raised at trial. If the claim is not truly constitutional (prong two), the court will not consider the merits.
“Constitutional magnitude” (Golding prong two)
Not every trial error is constitutional. Generally, instructions become constitutional issues when they affect core protections like the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, or the elements of the crime. Instructions about credibility or evidentiary use are often treated as nonconstitutional.
Plain error
A narrow doctrine permitting reversal for obvious and extraordinary errors that seriously undermine the integrity or fairness of the proceeding. A court does not commit plain error by correctly following the controlling law at the time of trial.
Supervisory authority
The appellate courts’ institutional power to manage and improve judicial administration (often through prospective rules). It is not meant to function as an all-purpose substitute for preservation requirements when Golding and plain error do not apply.

5. Conclusion

State v. Raeon A. is a procedural and institutional decision more than a substantive criminal law ruling. It confirms that an unpreserved challenge to a Daniel W. E. delayed-reporting credibility instruction is not of constitutional magnitude under State v. Golding, as held in State v. Adam P., and it further holds that there is no plain error when a trial court used the instruction while Daniel W. E. was still governing law. The opinion thus preserves finality for pre-Adam P. convictions and clarifies that supervisory authority will not be used to circumvent ordinary preservation and reviewability limits.