State v. Porter (R.I. 2026): Trial Judges Must Make On-the-Record Findings at All Three Batson Steps; Omission of Step Three Requires Automatic Reversal

Introduction

State v. Leron Porter (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, July 9, 2026) is the Court’s second encounter with the jury-selection issues arising from Mr. Porter’s prosecution for the 2011 fatal shooting of seventeen-year-old Tiphany Tallo. After Mr. Porter’s first conviction was upheld by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Porter, 179 A.3d 1218 (R.I. 2018) (Porter I), the federal courts ultimately granted habeas relief in Porter v. Coyne-Fague, 35 F.4th 68 (1st Cir. 2022) (Porter III) based on a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) violation involving the peremptory strike of the sole African-American venireperson (Juror 103).

The present appeal concerns the second trial, where—again—there was only one African-American venireperson (Juror 90), and—again—the State’s peremptory strike resulted in a jury “absent African Americans.” The central issue was not whether the prosecutor offered a facially race-neutral reason (he did), but whether the trial justice properly performed Batson’s decisive third step: determining, after a “probing inquiry,” whether the stated reasons were genuine or pretextual in light of all the circumstances.

Summary of the Opinion

The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated Mr. Porter’s second-trial convictions and remanded for a new trial. The Court held that the trial justice failed to conduct the required step-three Batson analysis and failed to create an adequate record explaining credibility findings and the basis for accepting the State’s reasons for striking Juror 90.

The Court further stated that a Batson error is a “structural error” that “def[ies] harmless-error analysis,” requiring automatic reversal, citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) and approving the First Circuit’s articulation in Porter III (quoting Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2014)).

Most significantly as an operational rule for Rhode Island trial courts, the Court announced: trial justices must address, delineate, and explain on the record their rationale as to all three Batson steps.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): The foundational rule that the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory strikes “solely on account of [a juror’s] race” or on assumptions of group bias. The opinion reiterates Batson’s three-step framework and treats meaningful step-three adjudication as indispensable.
  • Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019): Used to emphasize (1) the constitutional imperative (“Equal justice under law”), (2) that even striking one juror for a discriminatory purpose is forbidden, (3) that trial judges bear “first and foremost” responsibility for enforcing Batson, and (4) that disparate questioning/investigation can be a “clue” of pretext that a court “cannot ignore.”
  • Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345 (2026): The Court relies on this then-recent U.S. Supreme Court decision for the specific proposition that it is error to omit Batson’s third step—i.e., to fail to determine pretext. Pitchford functions as a direct warning against exactly what occurred here: a breakdown in the ordinary step-three procedure.
  • Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008): Cited for the deferential appellate standard (“clearly erroneous”) and to underline that credibility/demeanor assessments fall peculiarly within the trial judge’s province—making a complete record essential.
  • Rhode Island’s Batson line:
    • State v. Pona, 926 A.2d 592 (R.I. 2007) (Pona I): Treated as the Court’s key procedural roadmap—requiring a “sensitive inquiry,” and, critically, requiring trial justices to “clearly and unequivocally” place findings, credibility determinations, and reasons on the record to permit appellate review.
    • State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454 (R.I. 2013) (Pona II): Reaffirmed the tripartite test and supported the Court’s handling of step one (assuming a prima facie showing when the judge moves to steps two and three).
    • State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795 (R.I. 2014): Supplies the doctrinal point that step one becomes moot if the court proceeds to steps two and three, and that race-neutral reasons need not rise to “for cause” severity, though alignment with “for cause” considerations can demonstrate race-neutral character.
    • State v. Garcia, 316 A.3d 1223 (R.I. 2024): Used to stress step three’s “probing inquiry” and that courts must “search beyond the face” of justifications and evaluate all circumstances—framing the trial justice’s omission here as a failure to perform the required credibility determination.
    • State v. Montero, 339 A.3d 1055 (R.I. 2025): Clarifies that a Batson challenge does not apply to for-cause excusals—helping distinguish what is and is not governed by Batson.
  • Federal framework and “low burden” at step two:
    • Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991): Step-one mootness once the court rules on intentional discrimination.
    • Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995): Step-two is satisfied even by implausible explanations if facially race-neutral.
    • Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (Miller-El II): “Clear and reasonably specific” explanation; comparative juror analysis relevance (also emphasized in concurrences).
  • Structural error doctrine:
    • Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986): Define structural defects affecting the framework of trial.
    • Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2014) (via Porter III): A completed Batson violation is structural and requires automatic reversal.
  • Case-history precedents:
    • State v. Porter, 179 A.3d 1218 (R.I. 2018) (Porter I): The state-court decision found “race-neutral and nonpretextual” reasons for striking Juror 103.
    • Porter v. Coyne-Fague, 528 F. Supp. 3d 2 (D.R.I. 2021) (Porter II): District court expressed apparent Batson concerns but denied relief under habeas deference.
    • Porter v. Coyne-Fague, 35 F.4th 68 (1st Cir. 2022) (Porter III): Found Porter I’s treatment unreasonable because the prosecutor’s Juror 103 rationale assumed race-based juror bias.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is best understood as a procedural enforcement decision: even if the prosecutor’s explanation could be race-neutral, the process for deciding that question must be correctly executed and transparently recorded.

  1. Step One (prima facie showing) can be treated as moot once the trial court proceeds. The trial justice expressly “skip[ped]” step one and moved to step two. Under State v. Gallop, State v. Garcia, and Hernandez v. New York, that move renders step one moot for appellate purposes. The Supreme Court therefore did not reach the State’s argument that no prima facie case was shown.
  2. Step Two (facially race-neutral reason) was satisfied. The State cited Juror 90’s two pending DUI matters, perceived lack of candor about the second case, alleged hostile conduct toward police in reports, and concerns about attentiveness due to heroin-dependency medication. The Court treated these as facially race-neutral and sufficient under the low step-two bar, consistent with Purkett v. Elem and Rhode Island precedent.
  3. Step Three (pretext/credibility determination) was missing in substance and in record support. This is the crux. The Court emphasized that step three requires a “probing inquiry” and “sensitive inquiry” into all circumstantial and direct evidence of intent, including credibility and veracity assessments, with findings placed clearly on the record (State v. Garcia; Pona I). Here, the trial justice (a) first said he did not “buy” the prosecutor’s explanation, then (b) later allowed the strike stating there were “absolute strong grounds” and “without any racial undercurrent whatsoever,” but (c) did not explain why his credibility view changed or analyze circumstantial evidence such as the prosecutor’s additional recess investigation into Juror 90, a point the Court flagged through Flowers v. Mississippi.

The decision therefore rests on a rule-of-law principle: trial courts must do step three and must show their work. The Supreme Court framed this as essential to meaningful appellate review and as necessary to prevent discrimination from “seeping into” jury selection.

Impact

  • Procedural mandate for Rhode Island trial courts: The Court’s express holding—requiring trial justices to “address, delineate, and explain” all three steps on the record—raises the expected level of judicial documentation in jury selection disputes. Batson rulings that are conclusory, internally inconsistent, or record-thin face heightened reversal risk.
  • Greater scrutiny of “disparate investigation” issues: By foregrounding Flowers v. Mississippi and the prosecutor’s recess investigation, the opinion signals that trial courts should treat targeted background digging and intensive questioning of the only minority venireperson as a circumstance that must be evaluated at step three—even if it is not, standing alone, dispositive.
  • Automatic reversal framework: The Court’s adoption/endorsement of the proposition that a completed Batson violation is “structural error” strengthens defendants’ remedies and reduces the State’s ability to defend errors as harmless.
  • Institutional pressure on jury-pool diversity: The Court’s acknowledgment of the “embarrassing reality” of repeated venires with only one African-American prospective juror underscores that the risk of exclusion is magnified when minority representation is thin; future litigation may leverage this language when arguing that trial courts must be especially careful with the record.
  • Fuel for reform debates on peremptory challenges: Although not the majority’s holding, Justice Long’s concurrence renews a call to eliminate peremptory strikes, and Justice Goldberg’s concurrence suggests procedural safeguards for handling Batson challenges. These concurrences may influence rulemaking, trial-court practice, and future appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Peremptory challenge
A party’s limited right to remove a prospective juror without proving a traditional “for cause” basis. It cannot be exercised for discriminatory reasons.
Challenge for cause
A request to remove a juror because the juror is legally unqualified or biased. As noted in State v. Montero, Batson does not apply to for-cause rulings.
Batson’s three steps
  1. Prima facie showing: Defendant points to circumstances suggesting race-based use of a peremptory strike.
  2. Race-neutral reason: Prosecutor must state a facially nonracial reason.
  3. Pretext/intent: Judge decides whether the stated reason is genuine or a cover for discrimination, considering all circumstances.
Race-neutral vs. pretext
A reason can sound nonracial on its face (step two) yet still be a pretext for discrimination (step three). Step three is where courts test credibility and context.
Disparate questioning/investigation
When one juror (often the only minority juror) is questioned more aggressively or investigated more deeply than others, it can create “race-neutral” sounding justifications and must be evaluated as a possible clue of discrimination (Flowers v. Mississippi).
Structural error
An error that undermines the trial’s basic framework, requiring reversal without asking whether it “probably didn’t matter.” The Court held Batson errors fit this category.
Why record-making matters
Appellate courts review what the trial judge actually found and why. If credibility findings and reasoning are not clearly stated, review becomes impossible and reversal more likely.

Conclusion

State v. Porter reinforces that Batson is not satisfied by labels (“race-neutral”) or conclusory assurances (“no racial undercurrent”). The constitutional safeguard depends on a trial justice performing—and recording—a complete, three-step analysis, including a genuine step-three credibility and pretext inquiry informed by all circumstances (including disparate investigation).

The decision’s practical takeaway is clear: in Rhode Island, a trial court’s failure to meaningfully perform and articulate Batson step three is not a technical defect; it is reversible error requiring a new trial, consistent with the Court’s conclusion that completed Batson violations are structural and not subject to harmless-error review.