State v. Peterson: CrR 7.8(b)(5) Reaches Criminal “Orders,” but Due Process Does Not Require Refund of Voluntary Drug Court Participation Fees After Blake

1. Introduction

Parties: The State of Washington (Respondent) and Karen Kathleen Peterson (Petitioner). In 2015, Peterson was charged in Snohomish County with felony possession of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.4013. Rather than proceed to conviction, she entered the county’s Adult Drug Treatment Court (ADTC) program under a court-approved agreement. The agreement required, among other terms, a nonrefundable $900 participation fee, waiver of certain trial rights, and the risk of a stipulated-facts bench trial if terminated. Peterson successfully graduated, and the superior court dismissed the charge with prejudice in 2017.

In 2021, the Washington Supreme Court decided State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), holding that RCW 69.50.4013 was unconstitutional because it made simple possession a strict liability felony. After Blake, individuals with possession convictions could obtain vacatur and refunds of legal financial obligations (LFOs) paid as a result of those convictions. Peterson, however, had no conviction and no LFO sentence; instead, she sought to use CrR 7.8 to obtain a refund of the ADTC fee.

Key issues: (1) whether Peterson could use CrR 7.8(b) to challenge a prior order tied to her drug court participation (not a judgment of conviction), and (2) whether federal due process (principally Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 197 L. Ed. 2d 611 (2017)) required refund of the $900 drug court fee.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Washington Supreme Court (Gordon McCloud, J.) held:

  • Procedural holding (newly clarified rule): A movant may use CrR 7.8(b)—including CrR 7.8(b)(5)—to seek relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. The rule is not limited to challenges to “judgments” alone.
  • Subsection fit: Peterson could proceed under CrR 7.8(b)(5) (extraordinary circumstances), not under CrR 7.8(b)(4) (void judgment/order), because the drug court-related order was not “void.”
  • Merits holding (newly clarified limit): Federal due process does not require refund of a drug court participation fee paid pursuant to a valid diversion agreement to avoid conviction—even if the charged statute was later held unconstitutional in Blake.
  • Vacatur left open: Because Peterson abandoned vacatur as an independent remedy, the court declined to decide whether CrR 7.8 authorizes vacatur of a dismissed charge.
  • CrR 7.8(c)(2) “substantial showing” clarified: The trial court properly retained jurisdiction because Peterson’s claim was “debatable” among reasonable jurists (even though she ultimately lost).

Dispositions: the court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part, ultimately rejecting Peterson’s due process refund claim.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Substantive constitutional backdrop: Blake and its remedial ripple effects

State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021) supplies the essential premise: RCW 69.50.4013 was unconstitutional for imposing strict liability. The court in Peterson treats Blake as generating remedies (vacatur and LFO reimbursement) for those with convictions—but draws a sharp line between (a) monies exacted because of a conviction and (b) monies paid to avoid conviction through a diversionary agreement.

B. Due process refunds and “zero claim of right”: Nelson

Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 197 L. Ed. 2d 611 (2017) is the centerpiece for Peterson’s refund theory. Nelson held that when convictions are invalidated, due process forbids states from imposing more than minimal procedures to refund “exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated.” The Peterson majority adopts Nelson’s conceptual fulcrum—the conviction is the “sole legal basis” for the exaction—and uses it to deny relief: Peterson’s fee was not imposed “upon, and as a consequence of, the conviction” because there was no conviction at all.

C. The statute is not void ab initio: State v. Olsen

State v. Olsen, 3 Wn.3d 689, 701, 555 P.3d 868 (2024) is the court’s key Washington authority rejecting the “nullity” theory. The Peterson court relies on Olsen to conclude that RCW 69.50.4013, though later declared unconstitutional, was not treated as a legal nullity that retroactively voids all agreements and proceedings. Thus, Peterson’s drug court agreement remains valid, and the participation fee remains tethered to that agreement rather than to an invalid conviction.

D. The procedural vehicle: CrR 7.8’s scope and its civil analog

The court situates CrR 7.8 within Washington’s broader relief-from-judgment architecture:

  • State v. Scott, 92 Wn.2d 209, 595 P.2d 549 (1979): recognized that CR 60(b) applies in criminal cases (historical impetus for adopting CrR 7.8).
  • Vaughn v. Chung, 119 Wn.2d 273, 280, 830 P.2d 668, 671 (1992): CR 60(b) gives trial courts broad equitable power to grant relief from judgments or orders (used to support reading CrR 7.8 expansively).
  • Jane Doe v. Fife Mun. Ct., 74 Wn. App. 444, 452, 874 P.2d 182 (1994): interpreted identical language in CrRLJ 7.8(b) to allow relief from void orders even absent conviction.
  • PeaceHealth St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Revenue, 196 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 468 P.3d 1056 (2020): cited in rejecting Peterson’s reliance on the “series-qualifier rule” as a misfit for this text.

E. Defining the CrR 7.8(b)(5) “extraordinary circumstances” and the “substantial showing” standard

The court draws on several cases to describe CrR 7.8(b)(5)’s narrow, extraordinary nature:

  • State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 128, 285 P.3d 27 (2012) (b)(5) is for extraordinary circumstances).
  • State v. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn. App. 313, 321, 949 P.2d 824 (1997) (circumstances must be fundamental/irregular and often extraneous to the court’s action).
  • State v. Aguirre, 73 Wn. App. 682, 688, 871 P.2d 616 (1994) (same framework).
  • State v. Smith, 159 Wn. App. 694, 701, 247 P.3d 775 (2011) and State v. Klump, 80 Wn. App. 391, 909 P.2d 317 (1996) (examples of extraordinary post-judgment disruptions).

For retention/transfer under CrR 7.8(c)(2), the court uses federal habeas vocabulary: Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000) (a “substantial showing” means the issue is debatable among reasonable jurists). This becomes an important procedural clarification: a movant can satisfy the “substantial showing” threshold without ultimately winning.

F. Other Washington and Court of Appeals decisions in the procedural background

  • State v. Peterson, 35 Wn. App. 2d 1, 573 P.3d 462 (2005) (Court of Appeals reversal under review; addressed mootness exception and rejected refund).
  • Civil Survival Project v. State, 24 Wn. App. 2d 564, 520 P.3d 1066 (2022), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1011 (2023) (CrR 7.8 as exclusive procedural means for Blake LFO refunds; distinguished here because the ADTC fee was not an LFO).
  • State v. Hecht, 2 Wn. App. 2d 359, 364, 409 P.3d 1146 (2018) (used by the Court of Appeals regarding “judgment” framing; discussed in separate writings).
  • Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972) (mootness principle; emphasized by Mungia, J., concurring).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Interpreting CrR 7.8(b): “final judgment, order, or proceeding” is operative across subsections

The court’s first major move is interpretive: CrR 7.8(b)’s prefatory language authorizes relief from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding,” and the court reads that breadth as applying across the listed “reasons” in (1)-(5). This is framed as avoiding surplusage: if (4) and (5) were confined to “judgments” only, much of the prefatory clause (especially “proceeding”) would do no work.

Purpose and history reinforce the reading: CrR 7.8 was adopted to codify criminal application of CR 60 principles after State v. Scott, and CR 60 relief can extend to “orders” (in extraordinary circumstances) under the civil analog.

B. Choosing the correct subsection: (b)(4) vs (b)(5)

The court rejects CrR 7.8(b)(4) (“void”) because the underlying proceedings were not voided by Blake. State v. Olsen is decisive: an unconstitutional statute is not necessarily treated as void ab initio, and Blake does not retroactively nullify all related proceedings and agreements.

Instead, the court places Blake within CrR 7.8(b)(5)’s “extraordinary circumstances” category: invalidation of the statute is an extraneous, fundamental irregularity justifying the filing of a motion—though not necessarily the granting of the requested remedy.

C. The merits: why due process does not compel refund of ADTC fees

On the constitutional question, the court centers the Nelson principle: refunds are constitutionally required where the state’s retention of money depends on a conviction later invalidated. Peterson’s situation differs in two ways the court treats as dispositive:

  1. No conviction, no sentence, no LFOs: Peterson’s $900 fee was not imposed as a sentencing consequence; it was part of a diversion agreement.
  2. Payment was a condition of avoiding conviction: the fee was exchanged for the opportunity to participate in drug court and earn dismissal with prejudice. Due process, in the majority’s view, does not convert that bargained-for exchange into a refundable “exaction” once the underlying statute is later invalidated.

The court also rejects the framing that the charge’s later unconstitutionality stripped the court of lawful authority at the time. Again, State v. Olsen is used to deny the “nullity” view and preserve the validity of Peterson’s earlier election and the court-approved diversion structure.

D. Trial court error and the “substantial showing” safety valve

The majority labels the superior court’s grant of a refund an abuse of discretion because it rested on an incorrect due process conclusion. But it simultaneously holds the superior court properly retained the motion under CrR 7.8(c)(2) because Peterson made a “substantial showing”: i.e., the issue was sufficiently debatable among reasonable jurists (invoking Slack v. McDaniel). This separates gatekeeping from ultimate merit—a noteworthy procedural clarification for postconviction motion practice.

3.3. Impact

1) Diversion-program fees after Blake: The opinion establishes a limiting principle: the due process refund logic applicable to Blake convictions does not automatically extend to drug court/diversion participation fees paid to avoid conviction. Future claimants who completed diversion (and thus have no conviction) will face a steep constitutional barrier to refunds absent legislative authorization or a distinct equitable theory.

2) Expanded clarity on CrR 7.8’s reach: The court’s construction strengthens CrR 7.8 as a procedural vehicle for challenging not only judgments, but also orders and proceedings, including in cases that never resulted in conviction. Even though Peterson loses on the refund merits, litigants gain a clearer procedural pathway to raise extraordinary post hoc legal changes.

3) “Substantial showing” standard: By adopting a “reasonable jurists could debate” standard, the court gives trial judges a workable threshold for retention vs transfer under CrR 7.8(c)(2), which may reduce reflexive transfers while preserving appellate screening for plainly meritless filings.

4) Open question on vacating dismissed charges: The court expressly avoids deciding whether CrR 7.8 can authorize vacatur of charges that did not result in conviction. That leaves room for future litigation—particularly where collateral consequences attach to nonconviction records or where agencies require “vacatur” documentation for relief.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Legal financial obligations (LFOs): Court-ordered payments imposed as part of a sentence after conviction (e.g., fines, fees, restitution). Peterson’s drug court fee was not an LFO because it was not imposed at sentencing after conviction.
  • CrR 7.8 motion: A criminal rule allowing a party to seek relief from certain final court actions (judgments/orders/proceedings) for specified reasons, including extraordinary circumstances under (b)(5).
  • “Void” vs “voidable” (practical meaning in this case): A “void” judgment/order is treated as having no legal force (typically due to lack of jurisdiction or power). The court held Blake did not make pre-Blake proceedings automatically void.
  • Diversion/drug court agreement: A court-approved program where prosecution is paused and charges are dismissed upon successful completion. The fee here was part of the bargain to access the program and avoid conviction.
  • Mootness (raised in concurrence): If the issue is already resolved (here, the State refunded the $900), an appeal can be dismissed. The majority still decided the merits, while Mungia, J., would have dismissed.
  • “Substantial showing”: Not “you must win,” but “the claim is serious enough that reasonable judges could debate it,” allowing the trial court to keep the case rather than transferring it automatically.

5. Conclusion

State v. Peterson delivers two principal clarifications. First, it interprets CrR 7.8(b) to permit challenges to final orders and proceedings (not only judgments), and it confirms that Blake-type legal changes may qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” under CrR 7.8(b)(5). Second, it limits Nelson v. Colorado’s due process refund principle to conviction-dependent exactions and holds that a voluntary drug court participation fee paid to avoid conviction is not constitutionally refundable merely because the charged statute was later invalidated in State v. Blake.

The decision therefore preserves a sharp doctrinal boundary between (a) unconstitutional convictions that generate mandatory refunds of conviction-based assessments, and (b) diversionary bargains entered to avoid conviction, which remain enforceable—and financially final—absent a conviction-based exaction or some independent refund authority.