State v. Manczuk: Statute of Limitations Is Waivable (Not Jurisdictional) and Cannot Be Revived on Appeal as “Sufficiency”

1. Introduction

In State v. Manczuk, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed convictions for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, sexual exploitation of a child, and solicitation to commit capital murder. The sex-offense charges stemmed from alleged abuse of two victims (R.S. and H.S.) years earlier, and the solicitation charge arose from allegations that Manczuk attempted to have the victims killed to prevent testimony.

The key appellate battleground was not whether the State proved the elements of the sex offenses, but whether Manczuk could obtain appellate relief on a statute-of-limitations theory he did not timely and consistently litigate below—and whether he could repackage that forfeited defense as either a jurisdictional defect or a sufficiency claim.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed all convictions. It held:

• Statute of limitations (sex offenses): Manczuk failed to preserve his current limitations theory because he advanced one legal theory pretrial and a materially different theory posttrial; the court declined to reach the merits.
• Jurisdiction: A criminal statute of limitations is not jurisdictional; it is a procedural bar and waivable affirmative defense.
• Sufficiency (sex offenses): Manczuk’s “sufficiency” argument was substantively an unpreserved limitations defense and was not reviewable on that label.
• Solicitation to commit capital murder: Despite awkward instructional wording in the definition of the target crime, the instruction as a whole required solicitation of “a person,” the evidence supported that theory, and any instructional challenge was barred by invited error.
• Cumulative error: Did not apply (no properly reviewable multiple errors).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Preservation and “same legal theory”

• State v. Anderson (2026): Cited for de novo review of preservation determinations; set the standard of review for the threshold question.
• State v. Williams (2020): Reaffirmed the general rule that issues not raised below are not raised on appeal and tied preservation to Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5).
• State v. Scheetz (2024): Used to articulate the “no new grounds on appeal” principle—i.e., you cannot object on one ground below and switch theories on appeal.
• State v. Nelson (2010): Supported the court’s refusal to entertain new theories requiring factual findings, emphasizing appellate courts do not make fact findings even if the record appears “sufficient.”
• State v. Holt (2013): Anchored the timing component of preservation for defenses requiring fact development—legal theories must be raised when the district court can resolve factual issues.

B. Plain error discretion in the Supreme Court’s review posture

• Stroud v. Ozark Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (2025): Justified addressing an unpresented issue to avoid confusing or misleading precedent—here, the Court of Appeals’ inconsistent preservation analysis.
• In re K.R. (2026) and State v. Williams (2020): Framed plain error as appropriate where needed to prevent miscarriage of justice or protect the integrity of the judicial process.

C. Statute of limitations: not jurisdictional, but waivable

• State v. Jordan (2023): Cited for unlimited review of subject matter jurisdiction questions.
• State v. Gleason (2022): Central authority reiterating that limitations is “an affirmative defense that can be waived” and not a jurisdictional bar.
• State v. Dunn (2016): Reinforced that statutory infirmity does not necessarily deprive subject matter jurisdiction.
• State v. Valdiviezo-Martinez (2021); State v. Sitlington (2010); State v. Noah (1990); In re Johnson (1924): A line of Kansas precedent spanning a century, invoked to reject Manczuk’s jurisdictional reframing and to confirm waiver principles.

D. No relabeling to evade preservation: “substance over label”

• State v. King (2009): Provided the analogy that a party cannot avoid preservation requirements by reframing the same underlying issue under a different doctrinal heading.
• State v. Godfrey (2015) and Schutt v. Foster (2025): Supported strict enforcement of Rule 6.02(a)(5)’s requirement that an appellant explain why an unpreserved issue is properly before the court; the court noted Manczuk did not invoke exceptions.

E. Solicitation conviction: sufficiency, solicitation elements, and invited error

• State v. Aguirre (2021): Provided the standard of review for sufficiency claims (view evidence in light most favorable to the State; no reweighing/credibility determinations).
• State v. DePriest (1995): Confirmed solicitation is complete upon communicating the solicitation with the requisite mens rea; no further act is required.
• State v. Stewart (2017) and State v. Fleming (2018): Applied the invited error doctrine to bar an instructional challenge where the defendant proposed nearly identical wording.

F. “Legal impossibility” framing

• State v. Gutierrez (2007) and State v. Collins (1995): Cited as examples of Kansas recognizing legal/logical impossibility concepts, but distinguished because Manczuk was not convicted of an impossible offense (he was not convicted of soliciting himself).
• State v. Bodine (2021): Distinguished because it involved impossibility inherent in the statutory offense’s validity, whereas Manczuk’s claim depended on awkward instruction phrasing, not a nonexistent crime.

G. Cumulative error limits

• State v. Alfaro-Valleda (2022) and State v. Gallegos (2021): Provided the cumulative error framework and the rule that it does not apply with no errors or only one error.
• State v. Waldschmidt (2024): Limited aggregation of unpreserved instructional issues in cumulative error analysis under K.S.A. 22-3414(3).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The “theory-switch” problem and why timing mattered

Manczuk advanced one limitations theory pretrial (focused on K.S.A. 21-5107 and retroactive extension/ex post facto concerns for sexual exploitation) and then switched posttrial to a different theory grounded in the 2011 recodification’s alleged bar on retroactivity, arguing the pre-2011 scheme in K.S.A. 21-3106 (Torrence 2007) controlled.

The court held this was not a mere refinement. The posttrial theory triggered factual questions—particularly tolling under K.S.A. 21-3106(5)(f) (Torrence 2007)—that had not been litigated because the theory arrived after verdict. That posture would force appellate fact-finding, which Kansas appellate courts do not do (State v. Nelson).

B. Correcting the Court of Appeals’ inconsistent preservation analysis

The Court of Appeals treated the rape/sodomy limitations theories as waived but reached the merits for sexual exploitation on the rationale that a limitations defense had been raised, even though the underlying legal theory changed. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion under Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i), citing the risk of misleading precedent (Stroud v. Ozark Nat'l Life Ins. Co.), and held the same preservation rule applies across counts: the new posttrial limitations theory was unpreserved for all sex-offense charges.

C. Rejecting the jurisdictional “escape hatch”

Manczuk argued that if a prosecution is time-barred, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected this as inconsistent with the Kansas Constitution/statutes source of jurisdiction and longstanding Kansas precedent that limitations is procedural and waivable (State v. Gleason; State v. Valdiviezo-Martinez; In re Johnson).

D. The “sufficiency” relabeling rule announced in practice

Manczuk did not claim the State failed to prove statutory elements; he argued the State failed to prove timeliness under his unpreserved limitations theory. The court treated this as an impermissible end-run around waiver: since limitations is not an element, it cannot be injected on appeal via sufficiency review. The court noted State v. Valdiviezo-Martinez had previously addressed a limitations-sufficiency merits question only because preservation had not been raised, and it had expressly cautioned it was not “bless[ing] use of a sufficiency argument for matters other than elements.”

E. Solicitation conviction: instruction read as a whole; invited error blocks reframed instructional attack

Although the capital murder definition portion of the solicitation instruction used awkward phrasing (“the defendant intentionally killed...”), the operative solicitation elements required Manczuk to have commanded/encouraged/requested “a person” to commit or attempt capital murder. Read as a whole, the instruction did not require proof that he solicited himself. Evidence from inmates supported that he sought to procure others to kill the victims. Any claim that the instruction should have been better tailored was barred by invited error because Manczuk proposed nearly identical language (State v. Stewart; State v. Fleming).

3.3 Impact

• Stricter, clearer preservation discipline for limitations defenses: Defendants must raise the specific statute-of-limitations legal theory early enough for factual development (including tolling). Postverdict pivots will be treated as unpreserved.
• Eliminates a common appellate workaround: The opinion squarely forecloses the strategy of repackaging an unpreserved limitations defense as “insufficient evidence.”
• Stabilizes jurisdiction doctrine: Reaffirms that limitations does not affect subject matter jurisdiction, reducing late-stage jurisdictional attacks on otherwise final convictions.
• Trial-level practice effects: Defense counsel must investigate and litigate tolling and retroactivity theories pretrial; prosecutors are on notice to develop factual records once a timely limitations theory is properly raised.
• Instructional drafting reminder: While not granting relief, the court signaled a “better practice” when defining a target offense inside a solicitation instruction to avoid confusing identity references (citing PIK Crim. 4th 54.020 (2020 Supp.) “Notes on Use”).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Preservation: To argue an issue on appeal, you generally must have raised it in the district court. Importantly, you must raise the same legal theory, not just the same general topic.
• Affirmative defense (statute of limitations): A defense the defendant must assert; it is not something the State must prove as part of the crime’s elements unless properly put in issue in time.
• Waiver: Losing a defense because it was not raised properly or timely.
• Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s power to hear a class of cases. Kansas treats limitations as a procedural bar, not a limit on this power.
• Tolling: Rules that can pause or extend the limitations clock based on facts (e.g., victim’s age, delayed reporting reasons). Tolling often requires fact-finding—another reason the theory must be raised before verdict.
• Invited error: You generally cannot complain on appeal about an instruction you requested or effectively endorsed at trial.
• Legal/logical impossibility: A narrow concept where the charged offense is impossible as a matter of law/logic (e.g., attempting an unintentional crime). The court held this did not apply because Manczuk was charged with soliciting another person, a legally valid offense.
• Cumulative error: Multiple errors can collectively deny a fair trial; it does not apply when there are no (or only one) properly reviewable errors.

5. Conclusion

State v. Manczuk is chiefly a preservation-and-procedure decision with significant practical consequences: it reaffirms that the criminal statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional limitation; it requires that defendants present the same limitations theory at a procedurally meaningful time in the district court; and it holds defendants cannot recast an unpreserved limitations defense as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on appeal. The opinion also reinforces invited error limits on instructional challenges and narrows cumulative error analysis to properly reviewable errors.