State v. Keville (2026 N.H. 31): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence and Post-Police-Search Disposal as Proof of Falsifying Physical Evidence

1. Introduction

In State v. Keville, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed Craig Keville’s jury convictions for two counts of first degree murder (RSA 630:1-a, I(a)) and three counts of falsifying physical evidence (RSA 641:6, I), arising from the shooting deaths of Holly Banks (the defendant’s ex-partner) and Keith LaBelle. The appeal presented a single issue: whether the State introduced sufficient evidence—largely circumstantial—to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murders and then impaired the availability of key evidence (a Ruger 9E handgun, a gun case, and a bill of sale).

The State’s theory relied on a time-stamped mosaic of texts, surveillance video, cell-site location data, and a Wi-Fi connection to a password-protected network, paired with post-offense conduct: the defendant’s messages to his mother, his appearance at the Gorham police department directing officers to the apartment, and the later disposal of the gun case and bill of sale after a first police search and release. The defense argued the evidence permitted reasonable innocent explanations (e.g., he checked on Banks, found something wrong, or drove to gather himself) and that the physical-evidence counts failed because he lacked the required purpose to impair an investigation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court (per curiam) held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that:

• the defendant committed both murders, and
• the defendant falsified physical evidence by disposing of the Ruger 9E handgun, gun case, and bill of sale with the purpose to impair their availability in an investigation.

The court reiterated New Hampshire’s circumstantial-evidence sufficiency framework—requiring the evidence to exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt—and concluded the defendant’s proposed alternatives did not reasonably explain the full course of conduct and physical evidence. The court also distinguished State v. Harris, 177 N.H. 473 (2025), 2025 N.H. 32, holding its reasoning “inapposite” where police searched the defendant’s home twice (before and after release), and the defendant disposed of items after learning police had already searched.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440 (2021)

Seibel supplied the governing appellate lens for sufficiency claims: review is de novo, but the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Crucially, Seibel frames the “sole rational conclusion” inquiry for purely circumstantial cases: the question is not whether innocence is possible, but whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational factfinder could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Keville, the court repeatedly invoked Seibel to reject defense narratives that did not account for the totality of the circumstantial chain (notably the “I’m sorry, mom” text immediately after departing the apartment area; the hour-long drive consistent with disposal; and the subsequent destruction/discarding of the gun case and bill of sale after release).

2) State v. Lopez, 162 N.H. 153 (2011)

Lopez reinforced two constraints on sufficiency review in circumstantial cases: (1) evidence must be examined “in context, not in isolation,” and (2) the standard requires exclusion of all reasonable conclusions other than guilt.

The court used Lopez to justify a cumulative-evidence approach: location data, surveillance timing, Wi-Fi association with a password-protected network, and the gun-related items were treated as mutually reinforcing, not individually dispositive.

3) State v. Harris, 177 N.H. 473 (2025), 2025 N.H. 32

Harris served as the defendant’s primary comparator on the falsifying-evidence count. There, the court found the State had not excluded a rational innocent conclusion because police searched an apartment soon after the incident, did not locate the firearm, made no further attempt to search, and the defendant later returned—leaving open the reasonable possibility that the gun was present after the search.

Keville narrows Harris by emphasizing a distinguishing fact pattern: police searched the defendant’s home twice, including once while he was in custody and again after he was released, and the disputed items (gun case and bill of sale) were found in the trash after the release. That sequencing allowed the jury to infer purposeful impairment—particularly because the defendant knew police had already searched and yet disposed of the items before the second search.

4) State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47 (2003)

Blackmer was cited for a procedural principle: issues raised in the notice of appeal but not briefed are deemed waived. The case plays no role in the merits analysis but underscores the court’s insistence on proper issue preservation and presentation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency framework for circumstantial proof

The opinion’s core doctrinal move is an application (not a reformulation) of New Hampshire’s circumstantial-evidence sufficiency test: circumstantial evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt, and appellate courts do not reweigh credibility or pick among competing inferences so long as the jury’s inference is rational under the totality of the evidence.

2) Murder convictions: “means, motive, opportunity, and intent” plus consciousness of guilt

The court held the jury could rationally infer the defendant was the shooter based on (among other facts):

• Motive/relationship dynamics: earlier aggression and jealousy at Fagin’s Pub; escalating texts (“You’re going to get people hurt, Holly.”).
• Opportunity and presence: synchronized surveillance and cell-site data placing the defendant’s truck and phone at the apartment at the critical time.
• Entry/inside inference: the defendant’s phone connecting to Banks’s password-protected Wi-Fi network during the relevant minutes.
• Consciousness of guilt: immediate “I’m sorry, mom” after leaving; an hour-long drive consistent with disposal; reporting to police and directing them to the scene.
• Ballistics-related circumstantial link: a 9mm handgun was used; Banks’s Ruger SR9c was excluded as the murder weapon; the defendant’s home contained an empty pistol-sized gun case and a bill of sale for a Ruger 9E (a 9mm handgun).

The defense’s alternatives—he knocked and left; he discovered the bodies shot by someone else—failed because they did not reasonably account for the combined significance of the gun case/bill of sale, the timing of his movements, his messages, and later disposal of items.

3) Falsifying physical evidence: disposal and purpose to impair

Applying RSA 641:6, I, the court focused on two statutory components:

• Knowledge/belief of a pending or imminent investigation: the defendant went to the police station and directed officers to Banks’s apartment; he was detained and knew police searched his apartment while he was in custody.
• Purpose to impair verity or availability: soon after release, he disposed of the gun case and bill of sale (later found ripped up/in the trash) before the second search.

On the handgun itself, the court approved the jury’s inference that the defendant disposed of the Ruger 9E before reporting to police, citing the “inferential chain” (9mm casings at the scene; empty pistol-sized case and Ruger 9E bill of sale; later discovery of an FC 9mm Luger live round in a storage unit; and the hour-long drive route between leaving the apartment and arriving at the police station).

C. Impact

Keville is likely to be cited for three practical propositions in New Hampshire criminal litigation:

1. “Context, not isolation” has teeth in digital-evidence cases: the decision exemplifies how courts may treat cell-site data, surveillance timestamps, and Wi-Fi association as a coherent evidentiary timeline rather than requiring a single “smoking gun.”
2. Post-contact disposal after police awareness supports RSA 641:6 intent: discarding or destroying items after learning police have searched (or are investigating) can strongly support the “purpose to impair” element, even if police initially did not seize the items.
3. Limitation of State v. Harris: defendants may invoke Harris where search timing leaves a realistic window for innocent explanations, but Keville indicates that multiple searches bracketing a defendant’s release can neutralize that line of argument and strengthen inferential certainty.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sufficiency of the evidence (on appeal): The appellate court does not decide whether it personally believes the defendant is guilty; it asks whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in the State’s favor.
• Circumstantial evidence standard (“exclude all rational conclusions except guilt”): The State need not eliminate every imagined innocent possibility. It must eliminate reasonable innocent explanations when the evidence is considered as a whole.
• “In context, not in isolation”: A single fact (e.g., a gun case) may be ambiguous; combined with timing, location data, texts, and later disposal, it can support a strong inference.
• Consciousness of guilt: Behavior after the crime—such as apologetic messages, unusual travel consistent with disposal, or destroying items—can be used as circumstantial evidence that the person knows they committed wrongdoing.
• Falsifying physical evidence (RSA 641:6, I): The crime is not limited to forging evidence. It includes destroying, concealing, or removing “any thing” to keep it from being used in an investigation or proceeding, as long as the defendant acts with that purpose while believing an investigation is pending or about to begin.

5. Conclusion

State v. Keville reinforces New Hampshire’s rigorous—but prosecution-viable—approach to circumstantial proof: the evidentiary chain must exclude all reasonable innocent conclusions, assessed cumulatively and in the State’s favor. The decision also clarifies how the “purpose to impair” element of RSA 641:6, I can be inferred from timing and conduct—especially when a defendant disposes of items after learning police have searched and while an investigation is plainly underway. Finally, by distinguishing State v. Harris, 177 N.H. 473 (2025), 2025 N.H. 32, the court signals that the availability of a “reasonable innocent window” may turn on investigative chronology—particularly whether subsequent searches and post-release conduct close off alternative explanations.