Hawaiʻi Constitution Requires an Express “Fifth Miranda Warning” and Continuing Right-to-Counsel Advisement (Prospective Only)

Case: State v. Garces, Jr., Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi (Aug. 24, 2026), SCWC-24-0000706 (cert. to ICA, CAAP-24-0000706).
Key new rule: Under Article I, Section 10, law enforcement must expressly advise custodial suspects that they may stop answering questions at any time and may request an attorney at any time after questioning begins.
Effective date: Prospective only; takes effect 60 days after opinion (Oct. 23, 2026).

1. Introduction

State v. Garces, Jr. arises from the custodial interrogation of Mariano Garces, Jr., convicted of second-degree murder for the killing of his girlfriend, Amie Kaholoaʻa. The central legal issue was not whether the traditional four Miranda warnings were given—they were—but whether the Maui Police Department’s waiver form (MPD Form 103) was constitutionally insufficient because it did not expressly advise that the suspect could terminate questioning at any time (the “fifth Miranda right” discussed in Miranda v. Arizona) and could request counsel even after questioning had started.

Garces also argued that, given his mental distress and suicidal statements, his waiver and statements were not voluntary under the totality of circumstances. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court used the case to announce a significant state-constitutional protection for custodial suspects, while affirming Garces’s conviction because the new rule was purely prospective.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• New constitutional rule: Article I, Section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution requires an express advisement that a suspect may stop answering questions at any time and may request an attorney at any time after questioning has begun.
• Prospective-only application: The rule is purely prospective and becomes effective 60 days after the opinion (Oct. 23, 2026), allowing agencies time to update forms and training.
• Disposition in Garces’s case: Because the rule is prospective, Garces’s interrogation was evaluated under existing Hawaiʻi law requiring only the four traditional Miranda warnings. The court held his waiver and statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and affirmed his conviction.
• Notable correction: The court held the circuit court clearly erred in suggesting suicidal statements are not credible absent action, but found the error harmless on voluntariness.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

A. The foundational federal framework and the “implied” fifth right

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): The opinion begins with Miranda’s four mandatory warnings and stresses Miranda’s additional teaching that custodial interrogation is coercive without a “right to cut off questioning.” The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court treats this as identifying an implied but historically under-advised “fifth” right and uses it as the doctrinal springboard for a new, express-warning requirement in Hawaiʻi.
• Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010): Cited to illustrate modern federal doctrine’s emphasis on invocation mechanics and to support the practical proposition that if a suspect knows rights can be invoked at any time, they can reassess their interests. Hawaiʻi deploys this logic to justify requiring an explicit advisement so that the “reassessment” is realistic, not theoretical.
• California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam): Used to clarify that Hawaiʻi is not imposing “talismanic” language—only a substantive requirement that the fifth-warning concept be clearly conveyed.

B. Federal “retrenchment” and why Hawaiʻi turns to state constitutionalism

• Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022): Hawaiʻi cites Vega as evidence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrowing view—characterizing Miranda advisements as judicially crafted rules rather than Fifth Amendment “rights” for certain enforcement purposes. This supports Hawaiʻi’s stated need to rely on the state constitution for durable protections.
• Granillo v. State, No. SCWC-22- 0000740, 2026 WL 2085397 (Haw. July 15, 2026): Cited for the interpretive principle that Hawaiʻi “interpret[s] the Hawaiʻi Constitution on its own terms,” reinforcing that federal narrowing does not cap state protections.

C. Hawaiʻi’s independent Miranda jurisprudence and expansion of protections

• State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971): A core pillar. The court reiterates Santiago’s holding that Miranda protections have an independent source in the Hawaiʻi Constitution. It also highlights Santiago’s rejection of federal impeachment use authorized by Harris v. New York, demonstrating Hawaiʻi’s willingness to exceed federal baselines.
• Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971): Used as the federal contrast point that Hawaiʻi declined to follow in Santiago, underscoring Hawaiʻi’s broader exclusionary approach for state Miranda violations.
• State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126, 681 P.2d 553 (1984): Cited for methodology: when Miranda claims are raised, Hawaiʻi looks first to Miranda and Hawaiʻi precedent rather than letting federal doctrine circumscribe state rights.
• State v. Miyasaki, 62 Haw. 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980): Cited to reaffirm that Hawaiʻi extends protections beyond federal parallels when warranted; here, it supports adding an express fifth-warning requirement.
• State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai'i 51, 881 P.2d 538 (1994) (and Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)): Cited to show Hawaiʻi’s willingness to depart from federal voluntariness doctrine—Bowe declined to adopt Connelly’s state-action limitation—reinforcing robust protection of voluntariness under state law.
• State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawaiʻi 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): Cited as another instance of Hawaiʻi reaffirming Miranda-adjacent protections (warnings required once probable cause to arrest develops).
• State v. Zuffante, 157 Hawai'i 194, 576 P.3d 243 (2025): Strongly supportive precedent: Hawaiʻi required recording of all in-station custodial interrogations. The court aligns the new fifth-warning rule with Zuffante’s concern about inherent coercion and the need for structural safeguards.
• State v. Tolentino, 158 Hawai'i 321, 592 P.3d 209 (2026): Provides the normative constitutional framing: autonomy and dignity are central to the Hawaiʻi self-incrimination privilege; the new warning is justified as necessary to protect free choice.
• State v. Wilson, 154 Hawai'i 8, 543 P.3d 440 (2024): Cited both for interpretive sequencing (state constitution first) and for recognizing the “Aloha Spirit” as informing constitutional interpretation—supporting a dignity-centered, Hawaiʻi-specific approach.

D. Existing Hawaiʻi Miranda-waiver precedent the court partially displaces

• State v. Wallace, 105 Hawai'i 131, 94 P.3d 1275 (2004): The key Hawaiʻi precedent effectively overruled in part. Wallace approved a valid waiver based on an earlier MPD Form 103 that lacked the fifth-warning language. The court cites Wallace to justify prospective-only application: law enforcement relied on it.
• State v. Spies, 157 Hawai'i 75, 575 P.3d 708 (2025): Quoted for the “minimal safeguards” (the four warnings) and the totality-of-circumstances approach to knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Spies represents the “old rule” baseline that the court expands going forward.

E. Lower-court decision under review

• State v. Garces, No. CAAP-24- 0000706, 2025 WL 3002926 (Haw. App. Oct. 27, 2025) (SDO): The ICA held the four-warning advisement was constitutionally sufficient and found voluntariness under the record. The Supreme Court affirms the result but changes the law prospectively.

F. Non-Hawaiʻi cases showing consensus against a mandatory fifth-warning requirement (and why Hawaiʻi departs)

• Engle v. Lumpkin, 33 F.4th 783 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Crumpton, 824 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1991): These are cited to show federal circuits generally read Miranda as not requiring an express “stop questioning” warning. Hawaiʻi acknowledges this landscape but chooses state-constitutional expansion.
• Com. v. Silanskas, 746 N.E.2d 445 (Mass. 2001); State v. Mitchell, 482 N.W.2d 364 (Wisc. 1992); State v. Nicholas S., 444 A.2d 373 (Me. 1982); Gray v. State, 441 A.2d 209 (Del. 1981); State v. McGhee, 280 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1979); State v. Cobbs, 324 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1973): These are cited to show state courts have also generally declined to constitutionally require a fifth warning. Hawaiʻi’s opinion positions its rule as a corrective to uneven advisement practices and as consistent with its own constitutional tradition.
• United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978): Cited for the proposition that failing to advise a right to terminate questioning is at least relevant to voluntariness—supporting Hawaiʻi’s view that the omission matters.

G. Prospective application doctrine

• State v. Jess, 117 Hawai'i 381, 184 P.3d 133 (2008): Supplies the framework for choosing among purely prospective, pipeline retroactive, or fully retroactive application. The court uses Jess to classify this as the “paradigm case” for prospective-only treatment because it overrules reliance-based precedent.
• State v. Auld, 136 Hawai'i 244, 361 P.3d 471 (2015): Used to reinforce that overruling precedent in a way that changes outcomes favors prospective-only application.

H. Voluntariness and mental condition

• State v. Baker, 147 Hawai'i 413, 465 P.3d 860 (2020): Establishes standards of review: clearly erroneous for factual findings; de novo for the ultimate voluntariness determination.
• State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 849 P.2d 58 (1993): Confirms mental/physical condition is part of totality but mental instability alone does not render a confession involuntary absent insanity or mental depletion.
• State v. Edwards, 96 Hawai'i 224, 30 P.3d 238 (2001): Provides a close analogy: even a suspect on suicide watch and emotionally fragile can still make voluntary statements absent evidence that the condition specifically overbore will. The court uses Edwards to reject the idea that suicidal ideation, without more, automatically invalidates a waiver.

I. Hawaiʻi-specific history and the court’s normative framing

• The King v. Paakaula, 3 Haw. 30 (Haw. Kingdom 1867); Republic of Hawaii v. Parsons, 10 Haw. 601 (Haw. Terr. 1896): These cases anchor the self-incrimination privilege as long-standing in Hawaiʻi’s legal tradition, supporting the opinion’s claim of continuity rather than novelty in values.
• State v. Maluia, 56 Haw. 428, 539 P.2d 1200 (1975): Used to emphasize the practical test: warnings must impart a “clear, understandable” explanation of rights considering the suspect’s characteristics. Maluia also notes HPD’s long use of a “stop questioning” advisement, which the court uses to highlight uneven county practices.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

1. Identify the doctrinal gap: Miranda v. Arizona recognized the necessity of a “right to cut off questioning,” yet courts historically treated this as implicit and not separately warned. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court accepted that this has produced uneven advisement across agencies and counties.
2. Ground the expansion in Hawaiʻi constitutional values: The opinion treats Article I, Section 10 not as a mere mirror of the Fifth Amendment but as a dignity- and autonomy-protecting guarantee, informed by the Hawaiʻi Constitution’s Preamble and the court’s approach in cases such as State v. Santiago, State v. Tolentino, and State v. Wilson. Because custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, a suspect’s meaningful “free choice” requires knowing that rights are continuous—waiver is not a one-way door.
3. Limit disruption through prospectivity: Recognizing reliance on State v. Wallace and the four-warning regime described in cases such as State v. Spies, the court applies State v. Jess and State v. Auld to hold the rule purely prospective and delayed 60 days for implementation. This balances institutional reliance interests against the court’s duty to correct what it views as a constitutional deficiency going forward.

3.3. Impact

• Uniform statewide baseline: The decision aims to eliminate county-by-county divergence in custodial-rights advisements—particularly between agencies like HPD (which historically included a termination warning) and MPD (which did not at the time of Garces).
• Litigation shift after Oct. 23, 2026: Post-effective-date interrogations lacking the express fifth-warning content risk suppression under the Hawaiʻi Constitution’s exclusionary approach to state Miranda violations (consistent with State v. Santiago’s broader remedial stance).
• Expanded “continuing rights” doctrine in practice: By requiring express notice that rights may be re-invoked midstream, the opinion will likely shape how courts evaluate (a) mid-interrogation invocations, (b) waiver forms and scripts, and (c) voluntariness challenges where a suspect claims they believed waiver was irrevocable.
• Training, forms, and recording synergy: Together with State v. Zuffante (recording requirement), the rule pushes Hawaiʻi toward a more auditable and standardized interrogation process, reducing disputes about what suspects were told and understood.
• Prospective-only limitation narrows immediate case disruption: The court’s choice of pure prospectivity (and 60-day delay) substantially limits reopened convictions, insulating pre-effective-date interrogations from the new suppression theory.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Miranda warnings” vs. “Miranda rights”: The warnings are the advisements police give. The underlying “rights” are constitutional protections (here, anchored in Article I, Section 10 in Hawaiʻi). The opinion stresses Hawaiʻi’s ability to treat the warnings as constitutionally required as a matter of state law, regardless of federal retrenchment.
• The “fifth Miranda right”: Not one of the standard four recited in most forms, but the idea—stated in Miranda v. Arizona—that a suspect must be able to cut off questioning. Hawaiʻi now requires police to say this explicitly.
• “Waiver is continuous”: Waiving rights at the start does not mean you permanently gave them up. You may change your mind mid-interview—stop talking and/or ask for a lawyer. The court requires police to explain this in advance.
• “Totality of the circumstances” (voluntariness): Courts do not look at one fact alone (e.g., emotional distress). They assess the whole situation—conditions of detention, police conduct, suspect characteristics, and what was said and done—when deciding if a statement was the product of free choice.
• “Purely prospective”: The new rule does not apply to the parties in the case or earlier events; it applies only to interrogations occurring after the effective date set by the court.

5. Conclusion

State v. Garces, Jr. establishes a new, Hawaiʻi-specific constitutional baseline for custodial interrogation: to protect autonomy and dignity under Article I, Section 10, police must expressly advise suspects that they can stop answering questions at any time and can request counsel at any time even after questioning begins. The court simultaneously preserves reliance interests by making the rule purely prospective and delaying implementation until Oct. 23, 2026. On the facts, Garces’s waiver and confession were upheld under the prior four-warning regime, and the conviction was affirmed—making the opinion primarily a forward-looking restructuring of Hawaiʻi Miranda practice rather than a case-specific reversal.