State v. Fomo: Abstract “Grooming” Definitions by Police Experts—Harmless Error Without Case-Specific Application; No Plain-Error Reversal Absent Manifest Injustice

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut  |  Date: September 15, 2026  |  Case: State of Connecticut v. Frank Scott Fomo (SC 21083)

1. Introduction

State v. Fomo arose from allegations that Frank Scott Fomo sexually assaulted his then-girlfriend’s minor daughter over multiple years, both while he lived with the child and her mother (N) in Waterbury and after he moved to Willimantic. A jury convicted the defendant of sexual assault in the first degree (General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2)) and two counts of risk of injury to a child (General Statutes § 53-21 (a)).

The appeal centered on a recurring evidentiary fault line in child sexual abuse prosecutions: the use of “grooming” testimony to contextualize seemingly affectionate, parent-like conduct that might otherwise appear inconsistent with abuse. Here, the investigating detective, Todd McCormack, was permitted—despite the state’s lack of pretrial expert disclosure—to give an “expert” definition of “grooming,” limited to a general description and not applied to the case’s facts.

The defendant also claimed plain error because the trial court sentenced him without ruling on his pending motion for a new trial, which included an argument targeting the grooming testimony.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is chiefly a synthesis of Connecticut’s harmless-error doctrine as applied to expert testimony that risks “bolstering” credibility in child sexual abuse cases, plus Connecticut’s modern plain-error framework for unruled postverdict motions.

1) Harmless error framework: State v. Ayala

The court anchored its harm analysis in State v. Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 231–32, 215 A.3d 116 (2019), adopting the “fair assurance” test: whether the verdict was “substantially swayed by the error.” The opinion tracks Ayala’s factors—importance of the evidence, cumulativeness, corroboration/contradiction, extent of cross-examination, and overall strength of the case—and stresses that the “impact on the trier of fact” is paramount.

2) The line between contextual expertise and improper case-specific bolstering: State v. Favoccia

The defendant’s primary analogy was State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012). The Fomo court distinguishes Favoccia sharply:

• In Favoccia, the expert permissibly discussed general behavioral characteristics of abused children but impermissibly crossed the line by opining that the complainant herself displayed those characteristics (e.g., accidental disclosure, typical delayed disclosure, coping behaviors). That case-specific application created “a significant risk” the jury would treat the expert’s view as an “imprimatur” on credibility.
• In Fomo, McCormack gave only an abstract definition and did not opine that the defendant’s acts were grooming, did not assert the victim’s behaviors were consistent with grooming, and was not asked to apply the concept via hypotheticals resembling the case.

This distinction is the opinion’s doctrinal pivot: “definition-only” grooming testimony is treated as materially less dangerous than testimony that maps expert concepts onto the complainant’s behavior or the defendant’s conduct in a way that resolves a credibility dispute.

3) Closing-argument emphasis as a harm indicator: State v. Culbreath, State v. Sawyer, and State v. DeJesus

Citing State v. Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167, 195, 263 A.3d 350 (2021), and State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331, 360–61, 904 A.2d 101 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008), the court reiterated that frequent prosecutorial emphasis in closing can signal harmfulness. The court found no such prominence: the prosecutor referenced grooming once during rebuttal and in direct response to a defense theme.

4) Proper rebuttal to defense inferences: State v. Singh

The court relied on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 717, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), to explain that the state may respond to inferences raised in the defendant’s closing argument. This supported the court’s view that the prosecutor’s limited grooming reference functioned as rebuttal framing rather than an independent evidentiary crutch.

5) “Unfair surprise” and the importance of requesting relief: State v. Brett B. and continuing disclosure duty in State v. Jackson

Although the opinion assumes potential error, it treats the surprise claim as weak partly because defense counsel sought no continuance or comparable remedy—an approach consistent with State v. Brett B., 186 Conn. App. 563, 608, 200 A.3d 706 (2018), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 961, 199 A.3d 560 (2019). The court also referenced State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 813, 224 A.3d 886 (2020), for the “continuing duty to disclose” under Practice Book § 40-3, underscoring that the framework exists but harm still must be shown.

6) Strength of sexual abuse cases without physical evidence: State v. Felix R. and State v. Gary S.

The court rejected the notion that a case is necessarily weak without physical corroboration, citing State v. Felix R., 319 Conn. 1, 18–19, 124 A.3d 871 (2015), and State v. Gary S., 345 Conn. 387, 419, 285 A.3d 29 (2022), emphasizing that child sexual abuse often occurs “under a cloak of secrecy.”

7) Corroboration and credibility: State v. Ritrovato

In distinguishing cases where credibility is the near-exclusive axis of proof, the court cited State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 57–58, 905 A.2d 1079 (2006). Here, N’s testimony (including an alleged admission by the defendant) supplied independent corroboration that made it less plausible that a single definitional expert answer could swing the verdict.

8) Plain error doctrine and unruled new-trial motions: State v. McClain and State v. McCoy

For plain error, the court cited State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812, 155 A.3d 209 (2017), for the “truly extraordinary situations” standard, and relied heavily on State v. McCoy, 331 Conn. 561 (as cited in the opinion), which held that even where it is improper to neglect ruling on a motion for a new trial prior to execution of sentence, a defendant still must show harm amounting to manifest injustice, and appellate courts examine the motion’s substantive merit to assess that harm.

9) Additional authorities noted in the opinion

• State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997): referenced only as a motion footnote issue; not pursued on appeal.
• United States v. Bindues, 741 F. Supp. 3d 967, 1008 (D.N.M. 2024): cited to show general agreement on “grooming” as a behavioral cluster.
• Dictionary definitions (Merriam-Webster; Cambridge): used to suggest the detective’s definition was close to ordinary meaning, reducing the plausibility of meaningful rebuttal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s “assume error, decide harmlessness” pathway

Rather than definitively resolving whether the detective was properly qualified, whether a sufficient foundation was laid, or whether the lack of pretrial disclosure violated Practice Book requirements, the court assumed arguendo that admitting the expert testimony was erroneous and proceeded directly to harmlessness. This approach underscores a pragmatic appellate technique: when the record makes harm unlikely, the court may affirm without reaching contested foundational issues.

2) Why the definitional “grooming” testimony was deemed non-prejudicial in context

• Tight scope: One question; one-sentence definition; no application to the defendant or victim; no hypotheticals.
• Cross-examination achieved the defense’s core limiting point: defense elicited that a “good father” exhibits similar positive conduct, leaving the jury with competing inferences.
• Jury instructions: the court instructed that the jury could accept or reject expert testimony and remained the judge of credibility and facts, reducing risk that the “expert” label carried dispositive weight.
• Argumentative inevitability: the court reasoned that even without the label “grooming,” the state could (and likely would) argue that kindness can be instrumental—an inference “hardly” novel—so the definitional testimony did not inject a uniquely case-altering idea.
• Limited closing emphasis: a single rebuttal reference responding to defense argument did not elevate the definition into a centerpiece of proof.

3) Handling the late-disclosure / unfair-surprise claim

The opinion treats “surprise” as an incomplete showing absent (i) a request for a continuance or other curative opportunity and (ii) an explanation of what rebuttal evidence could realistically have countered a dictionary-level definition. In effect, the court required a concrete showing that earlier disclosure would have changed defense preparation in a meaningful way—particularly given that the court prohibited the detective from tying grooming to the defendant’s conduct.

4) Plain error and the unruled motion for a new trial

The court adopted State v. McCoy’s sequencing: even if failing to rule before sentencing were “clear” error, the defendant must still show “manifest injustice.” Because the defendant’s sole argued basis for manifest injustice was the grooming testimony issue—and the court had already found any such error harmless—the defendant could not satisfy the second prong of plain error. In short, the absence of a trial-court ruling did not matter where the only potentially meritorious ground failed on appellate review.

C. Impact

1) On grooming testimony in child sexual abuse trials

Fomo signals that Connecticut appellate courts will treat “grooming” testimony as far less problematic when it is: (i) limited to a general definition, (ii) not applied to the defendant/victim, (iii) not used repetitively as a credibility bolster, and (iv) balanced by cross-examination and instructions. The opinion’s careful distinction from State v. Favoccia effectively reinforces a boundary: contextual education for jurors is one thing; case-specific expert gloss that validates the complainant’s story is another.

2) On disclosure and trial management

The decision does not relax Practice Book §§ 40-3 and 40-11 (a) (3) obligations; instead, it demonstrates that remedies and preservation matter. Defense counsel confronted with late expert testimony must consider seeking a continuance, time to prepare cross, or an opportunity to retain a rebuttal expert—both to mitigate prejudice at trial and to build a stronger appellate harm record.

3) On postverdict motion practice and plain error

Fomo extends State v. McCoy’s practical lesson: appellate courts will not grant plain-error relief solely because a motion for a new trial went unruled before sentencing. The defendant must demonstrate that the failure to rule produced a manifest injustice, which typically requires showing that the motion had substantive merit and that the absence of a ruling caused real harm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Grooming”: a pattern of relationship-building and trust-gaining behavior used to facilitate exploitation. In this case, the detective defined grooming as “building a relationship, gaining trust, [and] developing an emotional connection” with younger children “in order to exploit or manipulate them.”
• Expert testimony vs. improper bolstering: experts may explain general concepts beyond common juror knowledge, but they generally may not “certify” that a particular complainant’s behavior proves abuse or that the defendant’s conduct matches the abusive pattern in a way that usurps the jury’s role—an issue highlighted by the contrast with State v. Favoccia.
• Nonconstitutional harmless error (“fair assurance”): even if a ruling was wrong, the conviction stands if the appellate court is fairly assured the error did not substantially affect the verdict.
• Plain error / manifest injustice: a demanding, discretionary doctrine reserved for obvious and grievous mistakes that threaten the fairness and integrity of proceedings. A clear mistake alone is not enough; the defendant must show a manifest injustice.
• Continuing duty to disclose (Practice Book § 40-3): if the state learns it will use additional discoverable material (including expert-related material), it must disclose it “as soon as practicable.” But an appellate remedy still turns on demonstrated prejudice.

5. Conclusion

State v. Fomo is most significant for what it treats as non-decisive: a late-disclosed, police-officer “expert” definition of “grooming,” when constrained to an abstract meaning and not applied to the case, will not readily warrant reversal absent a concrete showing that the testimony substantially swayed the verdict. The opinion reinforces the critical distinction drawn in State v. Favoccia between general explanatory testimony and case-specific expert opinions that effectively bolster credibility.

On procedure, Fomo also confirms that plain-error relief for an unruled motion for a new trial before sentencing hinges on manifest injustice—and that manifest injustice will not be found where the only asserted ground underlying the motion is harmless on appellate review.