State v. Contreras: No “Itemized” Jury-Waiver Requirement for Apprendi Age Facts When the Defendant Pleads and Admits the Charging Document

1. Introduction

In State v. Contreras (Kan. Sept. 11, 2026), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a recurring Apprendi/Blakely problem in sex-offense sentencing: when lifetime postrelease supervision depends on a fact not found by a jury—here, whether the defendant was 18 or older at the time of the offense under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i)—what must the record show to treat the fact as “admitted” in a plea case?

The parties were the State of Kansas (appellee) and Jorge Ponce Contreras (appellant), who pleaded to aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The district court imposed lifetime postrelease supervision, and the journal entry checked boxes indicating lifetime supervision on all counts. On appeal, a Court of Appeals panel agreed lifetime supervision was erroneous as to aggravated kidnapping (not reviewed further), but also held lifetime supervision for the indecent-solicitation counts violated Apprendi v. New Jersey because the court relied on Contreras’ “admissions” of age without first obtaining a sufficiently “knowing and voluntary” jury-waiver specifically tied to the age fact.

The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the split-producing reading of State v. Nunez adopted by the panel and to clarify what Kansas law requires for an Apprendi-compliant “admission” of age in plea proceedings.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The court reaffirmed that under Apprendi v. New Jersey, any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury or admitted following a valid waiver.
  • The court rejected the State’s invitation to create a practical “adult-court presumption” exception for age. Age is an Apprendi fact when it triggers lifetime postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i).
  • The court held the Court of Appeals misread State v. Nunez. Nunez did not change Kansas law or create a new “itemized” waiver requirement; it condemned the unconstitutional use of non-waiver “admissions” (e.g., PSI, affidavits) after a jury trial where no waiver occurred.
  • On this record, Contreras admitted the birth-year fact in the amended information after a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver inherent in his plea process; thus, imposing lifetime postrelease supervision for the indecent-solicitation counts did not violate Apprendi.
  • Result: the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the reviewed issue and reinstated lifetime postrelease supervision for the indecent-solicitation convictions.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Apprendi v. New Jersey

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), supplies the controlling constitutional rule: any fact (except prior conviction) increasing the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Contreras uses Apprendi as the baseline to decide whether “age 18+” is a sentencing fact that must be jury-found or validly admitted.

2) Blakely v. Washington

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), defines the “statutory maximum” as the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely based on facts reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Contreras relies on Blakely for two linked propositions:

  • Judicial factfinding beyond plea admissions violates Apprendi/Blakely.
  • A defendant may waive Apprendi rights; after “appropriate waivers,” judicial factfinding or stipulations may support enhancements.

The Kansas Supreme Court reads Blakely as implicitly requiring that a defendant’s “admissions” operate within a framework that includes a jury-trial waiver (as occurs in a valid guilty/no-contest plea). This reading is central to distinguishing plea admissions from the “admissions” problem in Nunez.

3) State v. Nunez

State v. Nunez, 319 Kan. 351 (2024), was the focal point of the interpretive dispute. The Court of Appeals panel treated Nunez as having “modified” Kansas law by requiring that a plea waiver explicitly advise the defendant that they are waiving a jury finding on the specific enhancement fact (age).

Contreras rejects that reading. Nunez addressed a case in which the defendant went to a jury trial and never waived the jury right. Because the jury made no age finding, the sentencing court tried to bootstrap age from documents and sentencing-hearing statements. Nunez held that—without a waiver—those materials were not constitutionally adequate “admissions” for Apprendi purposes. Contreras frames Nunez as an application of Apprendi/Blakely, not a new waiver doctrine requiring “itemization.”

4) State v. Gould and State v. Bello

The court cites State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394 (2001), and State v. Bello, 289 Kan. 191 (2009), to show Kansas has long aligned with Apprendi/Blakely’s definitions and requirements. This supports the court’s conclusion that Nunez did not “change” Kansas law; it corrected misapplications.

5) Boykin v. Alabama (and waiver as a component of a valid plea)

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), is used to emphasize that a valid guilty plea necessarily entails waivers of key constitutional rights, including the right to trial by jury. The court uses Boykin to bolster the logic that plea-based admissions come packaged with a jury-right waiver—unlike Nunez’s trial posture.

6) Duncan v. Louisiana

The opinion cites Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), in the Blakely waiver discussion: defendants may consent to judicial factfinding as to enhancements, illustrating that waiver is the constitutional hinge—again highlighting why Nunez (no waiver) and Contreras (plea waiver) are different.

7) Persuasive/non-Kansas authorities on “admissions” and waiver

The court cites a cluster of cases to show other jurisdictions recognize that “admissions” used to increase punishment require procedural safeguards and waiver:

  • United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (Seymour, Circuit Judge, concurring)
  • United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2004)
  • Coffin v. Cate, No. 2:10-CV-00026-JAM EFB P., 2013 WL 6230452 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
  • People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190 (Colo. 2006)
  • State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006)

These citations reinforce the court’s core move: treating “admissions” as constitutionally meaningful for enhancement only where the defendant has properly relinquished the jury’s factfinding role.

8) Kansas waiver/colloquy and “no checklist” cases

To reject the Court of Appeals’ implied “itemized waiver” framework, the court relies on Kansas waiver doctrine, including:

  • State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 371 (2020) (refusing to establish an enumerated “checklist” for advising defendants about jury trial rights)
  • State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588 (1975) (knowing waiver asks whether the defendant knew and understood what they were doing)
  • State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 126 (1964) (record showed defendant knew and understood what he was doing)
  • State v. Redick, 307 Kan. 797 (2018) (jury-trial waiver jurisprudence)
  • State v. Bentley, 317 Kan. 222 (2023) (insufficient jury-trial waiver is structural error)

The court also notes intra-appellate disagreement and cites State v. Duckworth, No. 126,677, 2024 WL 4579265 (Kan. App. 2024), rev. denied 320 Kan. 864 (2025), as an example of a panel reading Nunez more narrowly (i.e., not specifying waiver granularity).

9) Issue framing and waiver/abandonment authorities

The opinion’s disposition also rests on party-position and appellate-waiver principles:

  • Kelly v. Kobach, 322 Kan. 85 (2026) (where party positions eliminate any live dispute, “there is nothing left for us to decide”)
  • State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244 (2021) (issues not briefed are waived/abandoned)
  • State v. Laborde, 303 Kan. 1 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Balbirnie v. State, 311 Kan. 893 (2020)

These cases supported the court’s decision not to independently re-litigate the general validity of Contreras’ plea waiver when Contreras did not brief those waiver-defect arguments under Kansas waiver caselaw.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Age “18+” is an Apprendi fact under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i)

The court begins with a straightforward statutory-constitutional mapping: K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i) makes lifetime postrelease supervision turn on whether the offender was 18 or older when committing a sexually violent crime. Because that fact changes the maximum postrelease term, it is an Apprendi/Blakely fact. The court refuses to create a pragmatic exception based on the “obviousness” of adult age in adult court.

2) Nunez condemned “admissions” without waiver; it did not heighten waiver requirements in plea cases

The central clarification is doctrinal: the Court of Appeals treated Nunez as creating a new procedure—an explicit advisement that the defendant is waiving a jury finding on age, plus a specific age admission after that advisement. The Supreme Court calls this a “critical misunderstanding.”

In the Supreme Court’s account, Nunez stands for a narrower and older principle: because Apprendi protects the jury right, a court cannot treat statements in documents (PSI, affidavits, motions) or even sentencing-hearing remarks as “admissions” that substitute for a jury finding when the defendant never waived the jury right. Nunez did not define the content of a “knowing” waiver because Nunez had no waiver at all.

3) Kansas “knowing and voluntary” waiver is not an “itemized” checklist

Having declared Nunez inapplicable to the “what must a waiver say” question, the court returns to Kansas waiver law: the inquiry is whether the defendant voluntarily acted with understanding—i.e., “knew and understood what he was doing” (State v. Irving). The court reiterates it will not impose a rigid script (State v. Harris).

4) Application to Contreras: admission of birth year within the amended information after waiver

The court then resolves the case largely as a record-and-positions matter. Contreras’ counsel conceded the jury waiver was valid as to the facts in the amended information (while mistakenly believing the amended information omitted age). The amended information in fact listed Contreras’ birth year (1987). Because Contreras waived jury trial rights in the plea colloquy and admitted the amended information’s facts, the court treated the age fact as admitted after waiver—satisfying Apprendi/Blakely and allowing lifetime postrelease supervision.

The court declines to explore other possible defects in the waiver colloquy because Contreras did not brief them under Kansas waiver cases; such arguments were deemed waived/abandoned (State v. Davis).

C. Impact

1) Clarifying Nunez to prevent overreading

The opinion’s most significant precedential contribution is interpretive: it prevents Nunez from becoming a vehicle for an “itemized” jury-waiver requirement that would demand enhancement-by-enhancement advisements during pleas. The court characterizes that approach as inconsistent with Kansas law’s rejection of rigid waiver checklists.

2) Practical consequences for pleas involving lifetime postrelease supervision

After Contreras, Kansas courts and practitioners should expect:

  • Continued recognition that age is an Apprendi fact for lifetime postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i).
  • Fewer successful Apprendi challenges where the defendant entered a valid plea with a general jury-waiver and admitted the charging document that contains the age fact (or contains the birth date/year from which age at offense is established).
  • Nunez to be applied primarily in trial-posture cases (or other non-waiver contexts) where the State tries to prove enhancement facts through PSI/affidavits/sentencing remarks rather than jury findings or valid stipulations.

3) Litigation incentives and record-making

Contreras also signals the importance of precise briefing and record disputes. The court effectively treated the case as resolved by the parties’ convergence: if a defendant concedes the waiver covers the charging document, and the charging document contains the enhancement fact, Apprendi relief will be difficult.

Conversely, if defendants wish to challenge a waiver’s adequacy (especially given State v. Bentley labeling denial of jury-trial right via insufficient waiver as structural error), they must develop and brief the waiver issue directly under Kansas waiver cases rather than relying on an expansive reading of Nunez.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Apprendi rule: If a fact increases the legally available maximum punishment, the jury must find it beyond a reasonable doubt—unless the defendant validly admits it.
  • Blakely “statutory maximum”: Not the absolute maximum in the statute books, but the maximum the judge can impose based only on the jury verdict or the defendant’s admissions.
  • Judicial factfinding: When a judge (not a jury) decides a punishment-increasing fact. This is unconstitutional under Apprendi unless the defendant waived the jury right and allowed judicial factfinding (or admitted/stipulated to the fact after waiver).
  • “Admission” for sentencing: Not merely that something appears true in paperwork; it is a constitutionally meaningful acceptance of a fact that can substitute for a jury finding because the defendant waived the jury’s role and agreed to the fact in a procedurally adequate way (commonly through a valid plea or formal stipulation).
  • Knowing and voluntary jury waiver: In Kansas, the key question is whether the defendant voluntarily chose to give up the jury right with understanding of what they were doing, not whether the judge recited an “itemized” list of every sentencing fact that might later matter.
  • Structural error: A fundamental error affecting the framework of the proceeding. Kansas recognizes that failing to obtain a sufficient jury-waiver before a bench trial or guilty plea can be structural (State v. Bentley), underscoring why waiver doctrine matters—while also explaining why courts resist turning waiver into a rigid script.

5. Conclusion

State v. Contreras delivers a targeted but important clarification: while a defendant’s age is an Apprendi fact when it triggers lifetime postrelease supervision under K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i), State v. Nunez does not impose an “itemized” jury-waiver requirement in plea cases. Nunez addressed the unconstitutional practice of treating documents and sentencing-stage statements as “admissions” when the defendant never waived the jury right.

Going forward, Kansas courts will likely treat enhancement facts embedded in charging documents as Apprendi-compliant “admissions” when (1) the defendant enters a valid plea with a knowing and voluntary jury waiver under established Kansas standards and (2) admits the charging document’s factual basis. The decision stabilizes plea-based sentencing practice, narrows Nunez to its proper setting, and reduces the risk that Apprendi litigation will turn into a requirement that judges separately enumerate and obtain waivers on each sentencing fact in every plea colloquy.