State v. Amasiu: Statute of Limitations “Commencement” for Information Charging Occurs Upon a Probable-Cause Finding

Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi (Aug. 26, 2026) — SCWC-21-0000556

I. Introduction

State v. Amasiu addresses a recurring practical problem in felony practice: when the State initiates a prosecution by information near the end of the limitations period, what event “commences” the prosecution for statute-of-limitations purposes, and what happens if the charging document is filed in one division (circuit) and later re-filed in another (family)?

The case arose from an alleged November 27, 2014 assault by Alika K. Amasiu on his infant son. Five days before the three-year limitations period expired, the State filed a felony information in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (the “First Information”). A district judge (sitting pursuant to authorization) found probable cause the same day and issued a warrant that was never served. About a month later, the State filed an identical charge by felony information in the Family Court of the Second Circuit (the “Second Information”); probable cause was again found and a warrant was served. Years later, Amasiu moved to dismiss on limitations grounds, arguing the first filing did not toll time because (1) Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction under HRS § 571-14(a)(1), (2) a district judge lacked authority to make probable cause findings, and (3) the first case never “commenced” because the first warrant was not served (and/or the information was not served).

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss, but importantly corrected the ICA’s rationale and clarified a point of statewide significance: for prosecutions by information, “commencement” under HRS § 701-108(5) occurs when the court makes a probable cause finding—not merely when the information is filed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held:

• Circuit court jurisdiction existed when the First Information was filed and when probable cause was determined, notwithstanding Family Court’s “exclusive” jurisdiction “to try” parent-on-child offenses under HRS § 571-14(a)(1).
• District Judge Kobayashi was authorized to make the probable cause determination under HRS § 806-85(d) and the Chief Justice’s 2005 order (issued pursuant to the statutory authorization).
• Commencement by information for statute-of-limitations purposes occurs upon the probable-cause finding, by applying HRS § 806-9 (indictment rules apply “as near as may be” to informations) to HRS § 701-108(5) (prosecution commences when an indictment “is found”).

Because probable cause on the First Information was found within the limitations period, the prosecution commenced timely and the limitations period was tolled while that prosecution was pending. The dismissal and re-filing did not render the later Family Court case time-barred.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Statutory-interpretation framework

The court applied the standard interpretive approach stated in State v. Castillon and State v. Abihai, beginning with the statutory text, enforcing plain meaning where unambiguous, and using context and legislative purpose when harmonizing related provisions. These cases supplied the doctrinal scaffolding for reconciling potentially competing jurisdictional statutes (HRS chs. 603 and 571) and procedural provisions (HRS ch. 806) with the limitations statute (HRS § 701-108).

2. Jurisdiction and when it may be raised

The opinion relied on State v. Adam for de novo review of jurisdiction and Schwartz v. State for the principle that subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised “at any stage.” These citations underscored why Amasiu’s jurisdiction-based limitations argument was properly considered, even though it arose after years of continuances.

3. Abuse-of-discretion review for dismissal motions

Citing State v. Pitolo, the court framed the ultimate review of the denial of a motion to dismiss as abuse of discretion, while recognizing that the determinative questions were legal (jurisdiction; statutory interpretation of “commencement”).

4. Harmonizing statutes; avoiding surplusage

The court invoked State v. Bautista for the canon that statutes must be read to give effect to all parts and avoid rendering clauses superfluous. This was central to the court’s reconciliation of:

• HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1) (general circuit criminal jurisdiction “except as otherwise expressly provided”);
• HRS § 571-14(a)(1) (Family Court “exclusive original jurisdiction” “[t]o try” certain offenses against children by parents); and
• HRS §§ 806-84(g) and 806-85(a), (d) (information “shall be filed in the circuit court” and probable cause is determined by the “court having jurisdiction,” defined as the circuit court, with district-judge authorization by Chief Justice order).

The court’s key move was to read Family Court exclusivity as exclusivity “to try” the case, not exclusivity over every procedural step connected to initiating it—thus preserving the information-charging scheme in HRS ch. 806.

5. Prior cases on forum/“division” issues

The ICA had relied on State v. Pedro. The Supreme Court distinguished it. In State v. Pedro, an indictment was filed in family court even though family court jurisdiction under HRS § 571-14(a)(1) was doubtful; the court noted any defect was “immaterial” because the circuit court had jurisdiction and family court is a “division” of the circuit court under HRS § 571-3. In Amasiu, the claimed defect was the reverse: the First Information was filed in circuit court where the defendant argued family court was exclusive. The Supreme Court explained that there was no defect in the first place because circuit court jurisdiction existed for filing and probable-cause review of informations under the HRS ch. 806 framework.

6. What counts as initiating a felony case

The court cited Moana v. Wong for the general proposition that complaint/preliminary hearing, indictment, and information are “separate, parallel methods” of initiating a felony prosecution. This supported rejecting Amasiu’s attempt to treat an information as “other process” under HRS § 701-108(5) (i.e., akin to a warrant), rather than as a charging instrument parallel to indictment and complaint.

7. “Found” as the operative event for indictment commencement

In interpreting “found” in HRS § 701-108(5), the court relied on State v. Abdon, which treated the date the grand jury found the indictment as the commencement date for limitations purposes. Amasiu extends that logic through HRS § 806-9 to informations: the comparable “found” event for an information is the court’s probable-cause finding required by HRS § 806-85.

8. Trial court’s reliance on a tolling/“pending” case

The Family Court had cited State v. Armitage for the proposition that a prosecution is “pending” upon filing, even if the charging document is deficient. The Supreme Court did not adopt that broad rationale as the basis for its statute-of-limitations holding; instead it grounded commencement in the probable-cause finding. Still, Armitage remained relevant background to the lower court’s “pending prosecution” analysis under HRS § 701-108(6)(b).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: “exclusive to try” vs. jurisdiction to initiate by information

The court began from circuit courts’ broad criminal jurisdiction under HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1). It then addressed HRS § 571-14(a)(1), which provides family court “exclusive original jurisdiction” “[t]o try” offenses committed against a child by the child’s parent. The phrase “to try” did heavy interpretive work: exclusivity was read as allocating the trial forum, not invalidating the circuit court’s statutorily assigned role in information filing and probable-cause review.

The court reinforced this reading by reference to HRS § 806-84(g) (“The information shall be filed in the circuit court”) and HRS § 806-85(a), (d) (probable-cause review by the circuit court, with district-judge authorization by Chief Justice order). Reading HRS § 571-14(a)(1) to strip the circuit court of jurisdiction even to accept and review an information would, in the court’s view, conflict with the information-charging statutes and undermine the child-protective purposes in HRS § 571-1.

The court also noted that the family court may waive its jurisdiction in such cases (now codified in a different subsection after amendment), implying that circuit court jurisdiction must exist at least contingently—another reason not to read HRS § 571-14(a)(1) as negating the circuit court’s information procedures at the outset.

2. Authority of district judges to find probable cause

HRS § 806-85(d) defines “court having jurisdiction” as the circuit court, but expressly allows the Chief Justice to authorize district judges to make probable cause determinations. The court accepted the ICA’s analysis that a 2005 Chief Justice order (In re Info. Charging) did exactly that for the Second Circuit. Thus, the probable-cause determination made on the First Information was statutorily and administratively authorized.

3. The key clarification: “commencement” by information occurs when probable cause is found

The most consequential doctrinal development is the court’s construction of HRS § 701-108(5) (limitations commencement) together with HRS § 806-9 (indictment provisions apply to informations “as near as may be”).

HRS § 701-108(5) says a prosecution commences when “an indictment is found” or “a complaint filed,” or when “an arrest warrant or other process is issued” (if executed without unreasonable delay). The court rejected the argument that an information is “other process.” Instead, it treated information charging as the analogue of indictment charging. Because an indictment “commences” when “found,” and because informations must track indictment rules as near as may be, the “found” analogue for an information is the probable-cause finding required by HRS § 806-85.

This reasoning simultaneously (a) corrected the ICA’s statement that filing alone commences the prosecution for limitations purposes, and (b) resolved the case against Amasiu because probable cause on the First Information was found the same day it was filed—within the limitations period—thereby tolling time while that prosecution was pending (HRS § 701-108(6)(b)).

4. Service/execution of the warrant was not dispositive

Amasiu’s service-focused argument depended on treating the information as “other process” under HRS § 701-108(5), which would trigger the “executed without unreasonable delay” clause. Once the court held that information commencement turns on the probable-cause finding (the “found” analogue), the fact the first warrant was not served ceased to be a limitations-defeating fact on these circumstances.

C. Impact

1. A clear, administrable commencement rule for informations

The decision supplies a bright-line marker for limitations practice in information cases: the probable-cause determination is the “commencement” event. This reduces uncertainty when informations are filed near the limitations deadline and aligns information practice with indictment practice under HRS § 701-108(5).

2. Practical consequences for prosecutors and defense counsel

• Prosecutors must ensure probable cause review under HRS § 806-85 occurs within the limitations period; filing alone is not the safest marker after Amasiu. The State prevailed here because probable cause was found the same day as filing.
• Defense counsel now have a sharper tool: examine the date/time of the probable-cause finding (not merely filing) when evaluating a limitations defense. If probable cause is found after the limitations deadline, Amasiu indicates the prosecution may be untimely commenced.

3. Division-of-circuit-court dynamics (Family vs. Circuit)

The opinion clarifies that Family Court exclusivity under HRS § 571-14(a)(1) is exclusivity “to try,” not a jurisdictional bar to the circuit-court-centered information filing and probable-cause process mandated by HRS ch. 806. This reading should reduce forum-based limitations challenges where the State’s charging path includes transfers or re-filings between circuit and family divisions.

4. Potential downstream litigation

The decision leaves room for future disputes about what precisely constitutes a “probable cause finding” sufficient to render an information “found” (e.g., defective findings, later vacatur, or procedural irregularities), and how “pending” time under HRS § 701-108(6)(b) interacts with rapid dismissals and re-filings. But the anchoring principle—probable cause as the commencement event—sets the baseline for those future questions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Statute of limitations: A deadline by which the State must start a criminal case. For a class B felony here, the period was three years.
• Tolling: Stopping the limitations clock while a qualifying condition exists. Under HRS § 701-108(6)(b), time does not run while a prosecution for the same conduct is “pending” in Hawaiʻi.
• Information vs. indictment vs. complaint: Different lawful ways to initiate felony prosecution. An indictment comes from a grand jury; an information is a written charge by the prosecutor under statutory procedures (including a probable-cause determination); a complaint is another charging mechanism often tied to preliminary hearing practice.
• “Commencement” under HRS § 701-108(5): The legally recognized “start date” for limitations purposes. After Amasiu, for informations, it is the probable-cause finding, not merely the filing date.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: The court’s power to hear a type of case. Here, Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction “to try” certain parent-on-child offenses, but the circuit court still had jurisdiction to accept and process an information and probable-cause review under HRS ch. 806.
• In pari materia: Reading related statutes together so they work as a coherent system. The court effectively did this across HRS §§ 603-21.5, 571-14, 806-84, 806-85, 806-9, and 701-108.

V. Conclusion

State v. Amasiu establishes a clarifying precedent for Hawaiʻi criminal practice: a prosecution by information “commences” for statute-of-limitations purposes when the court makes the probable-cause finding required by HRS § 806-85, by operation of HRS § 806-9’s instruction to apply indictment provisions “as near as may be” to informations and HRS § 701-108(5)’s “indictment is found” language.

The court also confirmed that (1) the circuit court had jurisdiction to accept and process the First Information and its probable-cause determination despite Family Court’s exclusive jurisdiction “to try” the offense, and (2) a district judge could make the probable-cause determination under HRS § 806-85(d) and the Chief Justice’s standing authorization. The result is a more precise, statewide rule governing limitations disputes in information-charging cases—one that will shape charging timelines, defense strategy, and trial-court analysis going forward.